## Sanhedrin Daf 33b

###### Sanhedrin 33b:1
[Sanhedrin 33b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:1)

וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. מַחְזִירִין לִזְכוּת – זְכוּת גְּרֵידְתָּא, וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה – לִזְכוּת שֶׁהִיא חוֹבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**but** they **do not bring** him **back** to be judged with a claim **to find** him **liable.** When the mishna says: The court **brings** the accused **back to acquit** him, this is **an acquittal alone** and is not to anyone’s liability. When it says: **But** they **do not bring** him **back** to be judged with a claim **to find** him **liable,** this is **an acquittal that is** also **a liability.** The court does not bring the accused back to acquit him if this entails a liability to another.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:2
[Sanhedrin 33b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:2)

חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּמַאן? הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּגוֹאֵל הַדָּם. מִשּׁוּם חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּגוֹאֵל הַדָּם קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ לְהַאי? וְעוֹד, מַאי ״בֵּין״ ״בֵּין״? קַשְׁיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **A liability for whom?** There is no other litigant in cases of capital law. The Gemara answers: **This** is **not difficult,** this is to **the liability,** i.e., the detriment, **of the blood redeemer,** as he desires that the murderer be killed, and he will no longer be allowed to kill him. The Gemara questions this explanation: Is it reasonable that **due to the liability of the blood redeemer, we kill this one** and do not reverse the verdict to acquit him even when there is a reason to do so? **And further, what** is the meaning of the term: **Whether** with a claim to exempt the accused, or **whether** with a claim to find him liable? It is clear that this is referring to two separate matters, not to two types of acquittal. The Gemara comments: This is **difficult.**


###### Sanhedrin 33b:3
[Sanhedrin 33b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:3)

רָבִינָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ בְּיָדוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹן, וּנְטָלוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites another explanation of how one can find a judge giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party. **Ravina said:** It is possible in a case **where** the one who lodged the claim **had in his possession** an item belonging to the other litigant that functioned as **collateral** for a debt, **and** when the judge issued a verdict in favor of the other he **took** the collateral **from him,** thereby physically transferring it to the wrong party.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:4
[Sanhedrin 33b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:4)

טִימֵּא אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, דְּאַגַּע בֵּיהּ שֶׁרֶץ. טִיהֵר אֶת הַטָּמֵא, שֶׁעֵירְבָן בֵּין פֵּירוֹתָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In the case from the mishna in tractate *Bekhorot*: He **ruled** that **a pure** item is **impure,** how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is **where** he **had** the litigant’s ritually pure item **touch a creeping animal** to emphasize that he believes it was already impure, and he thereby imparted impurity to it. In that mishna’s case of: He **ruled** that **an impure** item is **pure,** how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is **where** he **mixed** this impure produce of the litigant’s **with** the litigant’s ritually pure **produce,** and he thereby caused all of the produce to be considered impure.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:5
[Sanhedrin 33b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:5)

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִין לְיוֹצֵא מִבֵּית דִּין חַיָּיב, וְאָמַר אֶחָד ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו זְכוּת״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁמַּחְזִירִין אוֹתוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״נָקִי אַל תַּהֲרֹג״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that in cases of **capital law,** the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms “innocent” and “righteous” in the verse: “And the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay” (Exodus 23:7), **the Sages taught: From where** is it derived **that** with regard to one who is **leaving the court** having been found **liable, and someone said: I have** the ability **to teach** a reason to **acquit him, from where** is it derived **that** the court **brings** the accused **back** to be judged again? **The verse states: The innocent you shall not slay,** and the accused may in fact be innocent.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:6
[Sanhedrin 33b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:6)

וּמִנַּיִין לְיוֹצֵא מִבֵּית דִּין זַכַּאי, וְאָמַר אֶחָד: ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו חוֹבָה״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין מַחְזִירִין אוֹתוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״צַדִּיק אַל תַּהֲרֹג״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And from where** is it derived **that** with regard to one who is **leaving the court,** having been **acquitted, and someone says: I have** the ability **to teach** a reason to find **him liable, from where** is it derived **that** the court **does not bring** the accused **back** to be judged again? **The verse states: “The righteous you shall not slay,”** and the accused was found righteous in his trial.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:7
[Sanhedrin 33b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:7)

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וְחִילּוּפָא לְמֵסִית, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תַחְמֹל וְלֹא תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו״. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי מִ״כִּי הָרֹג תַּהַרְגֶנּוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: And the opposite of this** is the *halakha* **with regard to one who entices** others to engage in idol worship, **as it is written** concerning him: **“Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him”** (Deuteronomy 13:9). He is brought back to court to find him liable, but not to acquit him. **Rav Kahana teaches** this last *halakha* citing a different verse concerning the enticer: **“But you shall kill him [*harog tahargennu*]”** (Deuteronomy 13:10). The repetition of the verb indicates that he is killed even in circumstances where transgressors of other prohibitions would not be.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:8
[Sanhedrin 33b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:8)

בְּעָא מִנֵּיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: חַיָּיבֵי גָּלִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רֹצֵחַ״ ״רֹצֵחַ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where** is it derived that the *halakha* concerning **those liable** to be **exiled** to a city of refuge for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the *halakha* concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is **derived** from a verbal analogy employing the term **“murderer”** stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:16) and the term **“murderer”** stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally (see Numbers 35:19).


###### Sanhedrin 33b:9
[Sanhedrin 33b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:9)

חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: **From where** is it derived that the *halakha* concerning **those liable** to receive forty **lashes** is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the *halakha* concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is **derived** from a verbal analogy employing the term **“wicked”** stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:31) and the term **“wicked”** stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 25:2).


###### Sanhedrin 33b:10
[Sanhedrin 33b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:10)

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: חַיָּיבֵי גָּלִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אַתְיָא ״רֹצֵחַ״ ״רֹצֵחַ״. חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **This is also taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta* 7:3): **From where** is it derived that the *halakha* concerning **those liable** to be **exiled** for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the *halakha* concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is **derived** from a verbal analogy employing the term **“murderer”** stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term **“murderer”** stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally. **From where** is it derived that the *halakha* concerning **those liable** to receive forty **lashes** is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the *halakha* concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is **derived** from a verbal analogy employing the term **“wicked”** stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term **“wicked”** stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:11
[Sanhedrin 33b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:11)

וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁטָּעָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ, אֲבָל טָעָה בִּדְבַר שֶׁהַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ – זִיל קְרִי בֵּי רַב הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches concerning cases of capital law: **But** the court **does not bring** him **back** to be judged with a claim **to find** him **liable. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this** is the *halakha* only in a case **where** the judge **erred with regard to a matter** for **which the Sadducees do not admit to its** validity, i.e., he erred in a matter learned from tradition or established by the Sages. **But** if the judge **erred in a matter** for **which the Sadducees admit to its** validity, i.e., a matter that is written explicitly in the Torah, **it is** a topic that you could **go learn in a children’s school,** and such an error negates the verdict and is reversed.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:12
[Sanhedrin 33b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:12)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טָעָה בְּנוֹאֵף וְנוֹאֶפֶת מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּמוֹקְדָךְ יְקִיד, זִיל קוּץ קָרָךְ וּצְלִי. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טָעָה בְּנוֹאֵף – חוֹזֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is** the *halakha* in the case of a judge who **erred with regard to** the judgment of **an adulterer and adulteress,** by ruling that only the man is liable but not the woman? Rabbi Yoḥanan **said to him: While your fire is burning, cut your squash and roast it,** i.e., seize the opportunity to add this case to the principle I taught you earlier. It **was also stated: Rabbi Ami says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** Concerning a judge who **erred with regard to an adulterer,** the court **revokes** the verdict.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:13
[Sanhedrin 33b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:13)

אֶלָּא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי אֵין חוֹזְרִין? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁטָּעָה שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Rather, what are the circumstances** where the court **does not revoke** the acquittal? **Rabbi Abbahu says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** In a case **where he erred** and acquitted the adulterer who engaged in sexual intercourse **in an atypical manner,** i.e., anal intercourse. The *halakha* that this is considered sexual intercourse is not explicit in a verse. Therefore, if a court acquits one so accused, the verdict is not revoked.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:14
[Sanhedrin 33b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:14)

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל כּוּ׳. הַכֹּל, וַאֲפִילּוּ עֵדִים? נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְלָא רַבָּנַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that in cases of **monetary law, all** those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. The Gemara asks: In capital cases, may **all** those present teach a reason to acquit, **and even witnesses?** The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that **the mishna** is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and not** in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis.**


###### Sanhedrin 33b:15
[Sanhedrin 33b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:15)

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְעֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ״ – בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עוֹנֶה לִזְכוּת, וְאֵין עוֹנֶה לְחוֹבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: **“But one witness shall not testify against any person** that he die” (Numbers 35:30). A witness cannot state anything other than his testimony, **whether** to provide a reason **to acquit** the accused **or** to provide a reason **to** find him **liable;** this is the opinion of the Rabbis. **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:** A witness **may answer** to provide a reason **to acquit, but** a witness **may not answer** to provide a reason **to** find the accused **liable.** The mishna here seems to be in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.


###### Sanhedrin 33b:16
[Sanhedrin 33b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/33b:16)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa says:** When the mishna refers to all those present at the trial, it is not referring to the witnesses but **to one of the students** sitting before the court, **and** therefore **all agree** with the ruling of the mishna.