## Sanhedrin Daf 34a

###### Sanhedrin 34a:1
[Sanhedrin 34a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:1)

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״עֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ לָמוּת״. לָמוּת הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ עוֹנֶה, אֲבָל לִזְכוּת עוֹנֶה. וְרַבָּנַן? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּנוֹגֵעַ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.”** One can infer: **That he die is** the matter concerning **which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit.** The Gemara asks: **And** what is the reasoning of **the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says:** A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony **because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony.** If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness’s testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:2
[Sanhedrin 34a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:2)

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״לָמוּת״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ? מוֹקְמִי לֵיהּ בְּאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים. כִּדְתַנְיָא: אָמַר אֶחָד מִן הָעֵדִים ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו זְכוּת״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה״. מִנַּיִין לְאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים שֶׁאָמַר ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו חוֹבָה״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ לָמוּת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **the Rabbis,** in **what** manner do **they interpret this** term: **“That he die”?** The Gemara answers: **They establish it** as teaching the *halakha* **with regard to one of the students. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: If **one of the witnesses said: I have** the ability **to teach** a reason to **acquit him, from where** is it derived **that** the court **does not listen to him? The verse states: “One witness shall not testify.” From where** is it derived **that** if there is **one of the students who said: I have** the ability **to teach** a reason to deem **him liable, from where** is it derived **that** the court **does not listen to him? The verse states:** “But **one** witness **shall not testify against any person that he die.”**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:3
[Sanhedrin 34a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:3)

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת: הַמְלַמֵּד כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין – מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: In cases of **capital law, one who** initially **teaches** a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. **Rav says: They taught** this *halakha* **only with regard to the time of** the **deliberations** of the court, **but at the time of** the **verdict,** one who initially **teaches** a reason to **acquit may return and teach** a reason to deem him **liable.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:4
[Sanhedrin 34a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:4)

מֵיתִיבִי: לְמׇחֳרָת מַשְׁכִּימִין וּבָאִין. הַמְזַכֶּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֲנִי הַמְזַכֶּה, וּמְזַכֶּה אֲנִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״. הַמְחַיֵּיב אוֹמֵר: ״אֲנִי הַמְחַיֵּיב, וּמְחַיֵּיב אֲנִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״. הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** from a mishna (40a): **The following day,** i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would **arise early and come** to court. **One who** yesterday was of the opinion to **acquit says: I** said to **acquit, and I acquit in my place,** i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. **And one who** yesterday was of the opinion to **deem** him **liable says: I** said to **deem** him **liable, and I deem** him **liable in my place. One who** yesterday **taught** a reason to deem him **liable may** then **teach** a reason to **acquit, but one who** yesterday **taught** a reason to **acquit may not** then **teach** a reason to deem him **liable.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:5
[Sanhedrin 34a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:5)

וְהָא לַמׇּחֳרָת גְּמַר דִּין הוּא, וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, לַמׇּחֳרָת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן מִי לֵיכָּא? כִּי קָתָנֵי בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the objection: **But the following day is** at the time of **the verdict,** and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: **And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day?** The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that **when** the mishna **teaches** that the judge may not change his opinion, it is **with regard to the time of** the **deliberations.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:6
[Sanhedrin 34a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:6)

תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּנִין אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ, עַד שֶׁיִּרְאֶה אֶחָד מִן הַמְחַיְּיבִין דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין. וְאִם אִיתַהּ, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי אִיפְּכָא! תַּנָּא אַזְּכוּת קָא מְהַדַּר, אַחוֹבָה לָא קָא מְהַדַּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, **they** continue to **deliberate** the matter, **these** judges **against those** judges, **until one of those who deems** him **liable sees** the validity of **the statements of those who acquit** and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: **And if it is so** that one who initially **teaches** a reason **to acquit may return and teach** a reason to deem him **liable, let** the mishna **also teach the opposite** possibility. The Gemara explains: **The *tanna* is searching for** scenarios of **acquittal,** he **is not searching for** scenarios of **liability.** It may be that the *halakha* is the same in the opposite case, but the *tanna* prefers to employ an example of acquittal.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:7
[Sanhedrin 34a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:7)

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: אֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים שֶׁזִּיכָּה וָמֵת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ חַי וְעוֹמֵד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: אִילּוּ הֲוָה קַיָּים, [הֲוָה] הָדַר בֵּיהּ! הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from a *baraita*: **As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says:** In a case where there was **one of the students who** argued to **acquit and** then **died,** the court **views him as if** he were **alive and standing in his place** and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: **But why?** According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, **let us say:** Perhaps **if** that student **were alive,** he would **retract** his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: **Now, in any event,** he **did not retract from** his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:8
[Sanhedrin 34a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:8)

וְהָא שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא, מוּצָא מִכְּלַל רַבֵּינוּ! ״אֵין מוּצָא״ אִיתְּמַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this explanation: **But** the Sages **sent** a statement **from there,** Eretz Yisrael: **According to** this version of **the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina,** he engages in **a dispute with our teacher,** i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it **was stated** that he does **not** engage in **a dispute** with Rav.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:9
[Sanhedrin 34a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:9)

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנֵי סוֹפְרֵי הַדַּיָּינִין עוֹמְדִין לִפְנֵיהֶן, אֶחָד מִן הַיָּמִין וְאֶחָד מִן הַשְּׂמֹאל, וְכוֹתְבִין דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין וְדִבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from a *baraita*: After the initial deliberations, **two judges’ scribes stand before** the court, **one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit** the accused **and the statements of those who find** him **liable.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:10
[Sanhedrin 34a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:10)

בִּשְׁלָמָא דִּבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין, לִמְחַר חָזוּ טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא וּבָעוּ לְמֶעְבַּד הֲלָנַת דִּין. אֶלָּא דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין, מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאִי חָזוּ טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא לְחוֹבָה, לָא מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בְּהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the proof: **Granted,** they write the **statements of those who find** the accused **liable** even though they may not change their opinions, as **on the following day they** may **see another reason** to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. **And** once this new reason is given, the court **is required to perform a suspension of the trial** until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. **But what is the reason** the scribes write **the statements of those who acquit** the accused? Is it **not because** the *halakha* is that **if** the judges would **see another reason to** find the accused **liable, we do not pay heed to them,** and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?


###### Sanhedrin 34a:11
[Sanhedrin 34a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:11)

לֹא, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת. כְּדִבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַסִּי מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין מוֹנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא אֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** the reason they write their statements is **so that two** of the judges **should not say one explanation** to acquit **from two** different **verses.** If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. **As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan:** If **two** of the judges **say one explanation** to acquit **from two** different **verses, what is** the *halakha*? **Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: We count them only as one,** as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:12
[Sanhedrin 34a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:12)

מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אַחַת דִּבֶּר אֱלֹהִים שְׁתַּיִם זוּ שָׁמָעְתִּי כִּי עֹז לֵאלֹהִים״. מִקְרָא אֶחָד יוֹצֵא לְכַמָּה טְעָמִים, וְאֵין טַעַם אֶחָד יוֹצֵא מִכַּמָּה מִקְרָאוֹת. דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״וּכְפַטִּישׁ יְפֹצֵץ סָלַע״ – מָה פַּטִּישׁ זֶה מִתְחַלֵּק לְכַמָּה נִיצוֹצוֹת, אַף מִקְרָא אֶחָד יוֹצֵא לְכַמָּה טְעָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: **From where is this matter** derived? **Abaye says: As the verse states: “God has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God”** (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: **One verse** is stated by God and from it **emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses.** Alternatively, **the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** that the verse states: “Is not My word like as fire? says the Lord; **and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces”** (Jeremiah 23:29). **Just as this hammer breaks** a stone **into several fragments, so too, one verse** is stated by God **and** from it **emerge several explanations.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:13
[Sanhedrin 34a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:13)

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת? אָמַר רַב זְבִיד, כְּדִתְנַן: מִזְבֵּחַ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָרָאוּי לוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What is considered one explanation from two** different **verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned** in a mishna (*Zevaḥim* 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed *ab initio*, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but **the altar sanctifies** only items **that are suited for it,** as the Gemara will explain. The *tanna’im* disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:14
[Sanhedrin 34a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:14)

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָעֹלָה עַל מוֹקְדָה״. מָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלְתָה – לֹא תֵּרֵד, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any** item **that is suited to** be consumed by **the fire** on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, **if it ascended** upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed *ab initio*, **it shall not descend.** Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, **as it is stated:** “It is **the burnt-offering on the pyre** upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: **Just as** with regard to **a burnt-offering that is suited to** be consumed by **the fire** on the altar, **if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too** with regard to **any** item **that is suited to** be consumed by **the fire** on the altar, **if it ascended, it shall not descend.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:15
[Sanhedrin 34a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:15)

רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הִיא הָעֹלָה עַל מוֹקְדָה עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״. מָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – אִם עָלְתָה לֹא תֵּרֵד, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְמִזְבֵּחַ – אִם עָלָה לֹא יֵרֵד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabban Gamliel says:** With regard to **any** item **that is suited to** ascend upon **the altar,** even if it is not typically consumed, **if it ascended, it shall not descend,** even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed *ab initio*, **as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,”** from which it is derived: **Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any** item **that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.**


###### Sanhedrin 34a:16
[Sanhedrin 34a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:16)

וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ מַאי קָמְרַבּוּ? פְּסוּלִין. מָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״מּוֹקְדָה״, וּמָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״מִּזְבֵּחַ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Zevid explains: **And what do the two of them include** by means of these explanations? **Disqualified** offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One **Sage,** Rabbi Yehoshua, **brings** proof for **this** *halakha* **from** the term **“on the pyre,” and** one **Sage,** Rabban Gamliel, **brings** proof to **this** *halakha* **from** the term “upon the **altar.”** This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:17
[Sanhedrin 34a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:17)

וְהָא הָתָם מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֵין בֵּין דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֶלָּא הַדָּם וְהַנְּסָכִים, שֶׁרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֵרְדוּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: יֵרְדוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this example: **But there,** Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel **disagree,** and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. **As the latter clause** of that mishna **teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only** with regard to disqualified **blood and libations,** which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, **as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend,** as they are fit to ascend on the altar, **and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend,** as they are not burned on the altar.


###### Sanhedrin 34a:18
[Sanhedrin 34a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/34a:18)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Pappa says:** An example of one explanation from two different verses is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated:**