## Sanhedrin Daf 41a

###### Sanhedrin 41a:1
[Sanhedrin 41a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:1)

תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְמַלְקוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**apply it to the matter of lashes,** as forewarning is required for the court to be able to administer lashes.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:2
[Sanhedrin 41a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:2)

דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה תָּנָא: ״וְכִי יָזִד אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ לְהׇרְגוֹ בְעׇרְמָה״ – שֶׁהִתְרוּ בּוֹ, וַעֲדַיִין הוּא מֵזִיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The school of Ḥizkiyya taught** a source for the requirement of forewarning from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to a murderer, as it is states: **“But if a man come intentionally upon his neighbor to slay him with guile”** (Exodus 21:14). How do the witnesses know that he acted intentionally? It must be **that they forewarned him, and still he** acts **intentionally.**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:3
[Sanhedrin 41a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:3)

דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״הַמֹּצְאִים אִתּוֹ מְקֹשֵׁשׁ עֵצִים״ – שֶׁהִתְרוּ בּוֹ, וַעֲדַיִין הוּא מְקוֹשֵׁשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** a source for the requirement to forewarn transgressors from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to the wood-gatherer on Shabbat in the wilderness, as it is stated: “And **they that found him gathering sticks** brought him” (Numbers 15:33). By writing “gathering” in the present tense, the verse indicates **that they forewarned him, but** he is **still gathering.**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:4
[Sanhedrin 41a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:4)

דְּבֵי רַבִּי תָּנָא: ״עַל דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר עִנָּה״ – עַל עִסְקֵי דִּיבּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The school of Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **taught** a source for the requirement to forewarn a transgressor from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman, as it is stated: **“For the matter [*devar*] that he has humbled** his neighbor’s wife” (Deuteronomy 22:24). They make a verbal analogy: **For matters** involving **speech [*dibbur*],** the punishment is given only if the witnesses issued a verbal forewarning.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:5
[Sanhedrin 41a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:5)

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״אֲחֹתוֹ״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת – אִין, חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת – לָא. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כִּי יָזִד״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** to have all of these sources, **since if the Merciful One** would **write** the requirement of forewarning in the context of **“his sister”** (Leviticus 20:17) alone, **I would say: Those liable** to receive **lashes, yes,** they do require forewarning, but **those liable** to receive court-imposed **capital punishments,** whose transgressions are severe, do **not** require forewarning. Therefore **the Merciful One writes,** with regard to a murderer: **“If** a man **come intentionally.”**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:6
[Sanhedrin 41a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:6)

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְכִי יָזִד״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי – סַיִיף דְּקִיל, אֲבָל סְקִילָה דַּחֲמוּרָה – אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if the Merciful One** would **write** only: **“If** a man **come intentionally,” I would say** that **this statement** applies only when the penalty is death by the **sword, as** that is **a lenient** form of court-imposed capital punishment. **But** with regard to **stoning, which** is **a severe** form of court-imposed capital punishment, one could **say** that it does **not** require forewarning. Therefore, it is **necessary** to state the requirement of forewarning with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:7
[Sanhedrin 41a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:7)

וְתַרְתֵּי בְּנִסְקָלִין לְמָה לִי? לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לְאֵתוֹיֵי נִשְׂרָפִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And why do I** need **two** verses that state the requirement for forewarning **in** the context of those liable to be **stoned?** Both the Shabbat violator and one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman are punished with stoning. The Gemara answers: **According to** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon** that death by burning is more severe than death by stoning, the additional verse serves **to add** the *halakha* that a forewarning must be issued to **those** liable to be **burned** for their transgressions, by way of the application of the principle: If this *halakha* is not needed for the matter in which it is written, apply it to a different matter.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:8
[Sanhedrin 41a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:8)

לְרַבָּנַן, מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר טָרַח וְכָתַב לַהּ קְרָא. וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּנִסְקָלִין, וְלֵיתוֹ הָנָךְ וְלִיגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ? הָכָא נָמֵי, מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר טָרַח וְכָתַב לַהּ קְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**According to** the opinion of **the Rabbis** that death by stoning is more severe than death by burning, one can say that even with **a matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori*** inference, the **verse** nevertheless **takes the trouble and writes it** explicitly. The Gemara challenges: **But let the Merciful One write** this *halakha* only **in** the context of **those** liable to be **stoned, and let these** others **be derived from it,** as stoning is the most severe punishment. The Gemara answers: **Here too,** one can say that even with **a matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori*** inference, the **verse** nevertheless **takes the trouble and writes it** explicitly.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:9
[Sanhedrin 41a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:9)

הִתִּיר עַצְמוֹ לְמִיתָה, מְנָא לַן? אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא חִזְקִיָּה, אָמַר קְרָא: ״יוּמַת הַמֵּת״ – עַד שֶׁיַּתִּיר עַצְמוֹ לְמִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The *baraita* teaches that one of the questions the court asks of the witnesses is: **Did he release himself to death,** i.e., did he acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive that he must release himself to death? **Rava said, and some say** it was **Ḥizkiyya** who said, that **the verse states:** “By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall **the dead be put to death”** (Deuteronomy 17:6). By referring to the transgressor as dead even before he is executed, the verse indicates that he is not executed **until he releases himself to death,** by stating that he is aware that he will be executed for his transgression.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:10
[Sanhedrin 41a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:10)

אָמַר רַב חָנָן: עֵדֵי נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלִים לוֹמַר ״לְאוֹסְרָהּ עַל בַּעְלָהּ בָּאנוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥanan says: Witnesses** who testify to the adultery **of a betrothed young woman who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not killed.** Although conspiring witnesses are generally punished with the same punishment they attempted to impose on the purported transgressor (see Deuteronomy 19:19), this is an exception. This is **because they can say:** We did not come to testify in order to have her be executed; rather, **we came to forbid her to her husband,** as a betrothed or married woman who willingly engages in adulterous sexual intercourse is forbidden to her husband.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:11
[Sanhedrin 41a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:11)

וְהָא אַתְרוֹ בַּהּ? דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בַּהּ. וְאִי לָא אַתְרוֹ בַּהּ, הֵיכִי מִיקַּטְלָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this ruling: **But** they must testify that **they forewarned her** before her transgression, and a forewarning includes apprising the transgressor of the punishment he or she will receive. How can the witnesses claim that they did not intend this result? The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥanan stated his *halakha* with regard to a case **where** they claim **they did not forewarn her.** The Gemara asks: **But if** they claim **they did not forewarn her, how can she be killed?** If she would not have been killed, there is no novelty to Rav Ḥanan’s statement that the witnesses are not killed.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:12
[Sanhedrin 41a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:12)

בְּאִשָּׁה חֲבֵירָה, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חָבֵר אֵין צָרִיךְ הַתְרָאָה, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְּנָה הַתְרָאָה אֶלָּא לְהַבְחִין בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג לְמֵזִיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥanan stated his *halakha* **with regard to a woman** who is **a *ḥavera*,** knowledgeable in Torah, **and** it is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A *ḥaver* does not require forewarning** in order to be liable for a transgression, **because forewarning is given only in order to distinguish between an intentional** and **an unintentional** act.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:13
[Sanhedrin 41a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:13)

וְכֵיוָן דְּאִינְהוּ לָא מִיקַּטְלִי, אִיהִי הֵיכִי מִיקַּטְלָא? הָוְיָא לַהּ עֵדוּת שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲזִימָּהּ, וְכׇל עֵדוּת שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲזִימָּהּ לֹא שְׁמָהּ עֵדוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks further: **But since** the witnesses **are not killed** for their conspiratory testimony in the case of a *ḥavera*, **how can she be killed** for her action? Their testimony is **testimony that you cannot render conspiratory** testimony, i.e., the witnesses cannot be punished for their testimony, **and any testimony that you cannot** potentially **render conspiratory** testimony is **not categorized as testimony.**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:14
[Sanhedrin 41a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:14)

הָכִי נָמֵי קָאָמַר: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, שֶׁיְּכוֹלִין לוֹמַר ״לְאוֹסְרָהּ עַל בַּעְלָהּ בָּאנוּ״, אַף הִיא אֵינָהּ נֶהֱרֶגֶת, דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ עֵדוּת שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲזִימָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **That is also what he is saying: Since** the witnesses **are not killed, as they can say: We came to forbid her to her husband, she is also not killed, since** their testimony **is testimony that you cannot** potentially **render conspiratory** testimony.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:15
[Sanhedrin 41a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:15)

אֶלָּא בְּאִשָּׁה חֲבֵירָה, דְּקַיְימָא לַן דְּמִיקַּטְלָא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּשֶׁזִּינְּתָה, וְחָזְרָה וְזִינְּתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **But with regard to a woman** who is **a *ḥavera*, since we maintain that she** can be **killed** without being forewarned, **how can you find this** occurring **according to** the opinion **of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda?** As there was no forewarning, the witnesses can claim that their intention was to forbid her to her husband. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case **where** they testify that **she committed adultery and then** they testified that **she again committed adultery.** The witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was meant to forbid her to her husband, as she was already forbidden to him due to the first time she committed adultery.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:16
[Sanhedrin 41a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:16)

וְהָא יְכוֹלִין לוֹמַר: ״לְאוֹסְרָהּ עַל בּוֹעֲלָהּ שֵׁנִי בָּאנוּ״! שֶׁזִּינְּתָה מִבּוֹעֵל רִאשׁוֹן, אִי נָמֵי שֶׁזִּינְּתָה מִקְּרוֹבֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this: **But** the witnesses **can say: We come to forbid her to her second paramour.** The *halakha* is that in addition to becoming forbidden to her husband, an adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her paramour. The witnesses can claim that this was their intent in testifying. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case **where** they testify that **she** again **committed adultery with the first paramour,** i.e., the second act was with the same paramour, to whom she was already forbidden. **Alternatively,** it is found in a case **where** they testify that **she committed adultery with** one of **her relatives,** to whom she is forbidden regardless.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:17
[Sanhedrin 41a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:17)

מַאי שְׁנָא נַעֲרָה מְאוֹרָסָה דְּנָקֵט? אֲפִילּוּ נְשׂוּאָה נָמֵי! אִין, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הַאי דְּלָא יָתְבָא תּוּתֵיהּ יְכוֹלִין לוֹמַר: ״לְאוֹסְרָהּ עַל בַּעְלָהּ בָּאנוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What is different that** Rav Ḥanan **chose** to state his *halakha* with regard to **a betrothed young woman?** His *halakha* could be stated with regard to **a married woman as well.** The Gemara answers: **Yes,** that is correct. **But** the novelty of this element of his ruling is that **even** with regard to **this** betrothed young woman, **who does not live under** her husband, the witnesses **can say: We came to forbid her to her husband.**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:18
[Sanhedrin 41a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:18)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בְּסַיִיף הֲרָגוֹ״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בַּאֲרִירָן הֲרָגוֹ״ – אֵין זֶה ״נָכוֹן״. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״כֵּלָיו שְׁחוֹרִין״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״כֵּלָיו לְבָנִים״ – הֲרֵי זֶה ״נָכוֹן״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Ḥisda says:** In a case where **one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer **killed** the victim **with a sword, and one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer **killed** the victim **with an *ariran*,** another weapon, **this is not congruent** testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if **one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer’s **garments** were **black, and one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer’s **garments** were **white, this is congruent** testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:19
[Sanhedrin 41a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:19)

מֵיתִיבִי: ״נָכוֹן״ – שֶׁיְּהֵא נָכוֹן. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״בְּסַיִיף הֲרָגוֹ״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״בַּאֲרִירָן הֲרָגוֹ״. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״כֵּלָיו שְׁחוֹרִין״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״כֵּלָיו לְבָנִים״ – אֵין זֶה ״נָכוֹן״. תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּסוּדָר שֶׁחֲנָקוֹ בּוֹ, דְּהַיְינוּ סַיִיף וַאֲרִירָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** from a *baraita*: The verse states with regard to testimony: “And behold it be truth, the matter certain” (Deuteronomy 17:4). The meaning of **“certain”** is that the testimony of the two witnesses **must be congruent.** If **one** witness **says:** The murderer **killed** the victim **with a sword, and one says:** The murderer **killed** the victim **with an *ariran*,** or if **one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer’s **garments** were **black, and one** of the witnesses **says:** The murderer’s **garments** were **white, this is not congruent** testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: **Rav Ḥisda interpreted** that *baraita* as speaking **about a scarf with which** the murderer **strangled** the victim, **as this is** the same as a contradiction with regard to **a sword and an *ariran*.** As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:20
[Sanhedrin 41a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:20)

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״סַנְדָּלָיו שְׁחוֹרִין״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״סַנְדָּלָיו לְבָנִים״ – אֵין זֶה ״נָכוֹן״. הָתָם נָמֵי, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּעַט בּוֹ בְּסַנְדָּלוֹ וַהֲרָגוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from a *baraita*: If **one** of the witnesses **says:** The **sandals of** the murderer were **black, and one** of the witnesses **says:** The **sandals of** the murderer were **white, this is not congruent** testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda can explain that **there also,** it is speaking of a case **where** the murderer **kicked** the victim **with his sandal and killed him.**


###### Sanhedrin 41a:21
[Sanhedrin 41a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:21)

תָּא שְׁמַע: מַעֲשֶׂה, וּבָדַק בֶּן זַכַּאי בְּעוּקְצֵי תְּאֵנָה. אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקַץ תְּאֵנָה בְּשַׁבָּת, דַּעֲלַהּ קָא מִיקְּטִיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from the mishna: **An incident** occurred, **and ben Zakkai examined** the witnesses **about the stems of figs,** indicating that even a contradiction concerning a minor point such as this would render the testimony incongruent. The Gemara answers: **Rami bar Ḥama said:** It is speaking there of a case **where he picked a fig on Shabbat, as he is killed for that** act itself. Picking a fruit from its source of growth is an example of the forbidden labor of reaping, so the testimony about the characteristics of the fig is significant.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:22
[Sanhedrin 41a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:22)

וְהָא תַּנְיָא: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״תַּחַת תְּאֵנָה הֲרָגוֹ״? אֶלָּא אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁשִּׁפְּדוֹ בְּיִיחוּר שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: When ben Zakkai asked the witnesses the question about the stems of figs, **they said to him:** The murderer **killed** the victim **beneath a fig tree,** indicating that it is speaking of a murder case? **Rather, Rami bar Ḥama said:** The mishna is speaking of a case **where** the murderer **stabbed** the victim **with a branch of a fig tree.** As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:23
[Sanhedrin 41a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:23)

תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר לָהֶן: תְּאֵנָה זוֹ עֳקָצֶיהָ דַּקִּין? עֳקָצֶיהָ גַּסִּין? תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת? תְּאֵנִים לְבָנוֹת? אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִבֶּן זַכַּאי לוֹתֵיב אִינִישׁ? שָׁאנֵי בֶּן זַכַּאי, דִּבְדִיקוֹת כַּחֲקִירוֹת מְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Come** and **hear** a proof, as in that same examination ben Zakkai **said to** the witnesses: **This fig** tree about which you are testifying, were **its stems thin** or were **its stems thick?** Were the **figs** on it **black** or were the **figs white?** These questions concern the fruit itself, not the characteristics of a branch. **Rather, Rav Yosef says: Should a person raise a difficulty from** the conduct of **ben Zakkai? Ben Zakkai is different, as he equated examinations with interrogations.** According to ben Zakkai’s opinion, a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an examination is as significant as a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an interrogation, and it also renders the testimony incongruent.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:24
[Sanhedrin 41a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:24)

מַאן בֶּן זַכַּאי? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי, מִי הֲוָה בְּסַנְהֶדְרִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: כׇּל שְׁנוֹתָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה. אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה עָסַק בִּפְרַקְמַטְיָא, אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה לָמַד, אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה לִימֵּד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara clarifies: **Who** is the **ben Zakkai** mentioned in the mishna? **If we say** it is **Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, was he** a member **in a Sanhedrin** that judged capital cases? **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: **All the years of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai** were **120 years.** For **forty** of those **years he dealt in business [*biferakmatya*],** for **forty** of those **years he studied, and** for **forty** of those **years he taught** and guided the Jewish people.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:25
[Sanhedrin 41a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:25)

וְתַנְיָא: אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה קוֹדֶם חוּרְבַּן הַבַּיִת, גָּלְתָה סַנְהֶדְרִין וְיָשְׁבָה לָהּ בַּחֲנוּת. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אֲבוּדִימִי: לוֹמַר שֶׁלֹּא דָּנוּ דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת. דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא דָּנוּ דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its question: **And it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Forty years before the destruction of the** Second **Temple, the Sanhedrin was exiled** from the Chamber of Hewn Stone **and sat in the store** near the Temple Mount. **And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says:** The intent of the statement concerning the relocation of the Sanhedrin is **to say that** they **no** longer **judged laws of fines.** The Gemara asks: Does it **enter your mind** to say that they no longer judged **laws of fines?** It is known that the Sanhedrin would judge laws of fines for hundreds of years after the destruction of the Temple. **Rather,** he must have said **that** the Sanhedrin **no** longer **judged** cases of **capital law.** Once the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone, the court’s power to judge capital cases was nullified.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:26
[Sanhedrin 41a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:26)

וּתְנַן: מִשֶּׁחָרַב בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, הִתְקִין רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara concludes its question: **And** since as **we learned** in a mishna (*Sukka* 41a): **Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted** an ordinance that the mitzva of *lulav* should be performed even in the rest of the country for seven days in commemoration of the Temple, it is clear that he was in a position of prominence after the destruction of the Temple. Since the Sanhedrin ceased judging cases of capital law forty years before the destruction of the Temple, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was in a position of prominence for only forty years, he could not have been a judge in a capital case.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:27
[Sanhedrin 41a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:27)

אֶלָּא, בֶּן זַכַּאי דְּעָלְמָא. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי, קָרֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי ״בֶּן זַכַּאי״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Rather,** one can say that it was **merely** a different person named **ben Zakkai,** not the well-known Sage of that name. The Gemara comments: **So too, it is reasonable** to say this, **as if it enters your mind** that this was **Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, would Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **call him ben Zakkai,** without any title? He must have been referring to someone else.


###### Sanhedrin 41a:28
[Sanhedrin 41a:28](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/41a:28)

וְהָתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה וּבָדַק רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי בְּעוּקְצֵי תְּאֵנִים! אֶלָּא, תַּלְמִיד הַיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ הֲוָה, וַאֲמַר מִילְּתָא וּמִסְתַּבַּר לְהוּ טַעְמֵיהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* explicitly: **An incident** occurred, **and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai examined** the witnesses **with regard to the stems of figs?** This proves that the Sage in question is Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. **Rather,** one can say that at that time, when this incident occurred, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai **was a student sitting before his teacher,** and in those years the Sanhedrin was in its place and judged cases of capital law. **And he said a matter** in the course of examining the witnesses, **and his reasoning was logical to them,** and the judges asked his question,