## Sanhedrin Daf 85a

###### Sanhedrin 85a:1
[Sanhedrin 85a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:1)

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָאָמַר: כׇּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ – פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**and doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say:** With regard to one who performs **any** prohibited **labor that is not necessary for its own sake,** it is labor for which he is **exempt?** In this case, causing the wound was inadvertent and was not his objective when performing the action.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:2
[Sanhedrin 85a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:2)

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בֵּן מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְאָבִיו, לְהַכּוֹתוֹ וּלְקַלְלוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Sages **raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is** the *halakha* with regard to whether **a son may be designated an agent** of the court in order **to flog his father or to curse him** if the court sentenced him to ostracism?


###### Sanhedrin 85a:3
[Sanhedrin 85a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:3)

אֲמַר לְהוּ: וְאַחֵר מִי הִתִּירוֹ? אֶלָּא, כְּבוֹד שָׁמַיִם עָדִיף. הָכָא נָמֵי, כְּבוֹד שָׁמַיִם עָדִיף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet **said to them: And did** the Torah render it **permitted** to flog or curse **another** who is not his father? The Torah prohibited such actions. **Rather,** the reason that an agent of the court may flog or curse the one found liable is that **the honor of Heaven takes precedence** over the honor due to another. **Here too,** a son may serve as an agent of the court because **the honor of Heaven takes precedence** over the honor due to his father.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:4
[Sanhedrin 85a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:4)

מֵיתִיבִי: וּמָה מִי שֶׁמִּצְוָה לְהַכּוֹתוֹ, מִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ; מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִצְוָה לְהַכּוֹתוֹ, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמִּצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** from a *baraita*: **And just as** with regard to one **who is commanded to strike him** there is **a mitzva not to strike him** under other circumstances, with regard to one **who is not commanded to strike him is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?**


###### Sanhedrin 85a:5
[Sanhedrin 85a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:5)

מַאי לָאו אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה? הָא – בִּבְנוֹ, הָא – בְּאַחֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the *baraita*: **What, is it not** that both **this** first clause of the statement of the *baraita* **and that** latter clause of the statement of the *baraita* are referring **to a situation** where striking another is **a mitzva,** e.g., where the other is liable to receive lashes. The distinction between them is that **this** latter clause, which is referring to one who is not commanded to strike him, is concerning a case **where** the agent is **his son** and is therefore prohibited from striking his father even in that capacity, while **that** first clause, which is referring to one who is commanded to strike him, is concerning a case **where** the agent is **another** individual and not his son. This indicates that it is prohibited for a son to flog his father as an agent of the court.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:6
[Sanhedrin 85a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:6)

לָא, אִידֵּי וְאִידִי לָא שְׁנָא בְּנוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא אַחֵר. וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, כָּאן – שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** in both **this** clause **and that** clause **it is no different** if the agent is **his son and it is no different** if the agent is **another. And** it is **not difficult** to distinguish between the clauses: **Here,** in the first clause, the reference is **to a situation** where striking another is **a mitzva,** as he is an agent of the court; **there,** in the latter clause, the reference is **not to a situation** where striking another is **a mitzva.**


###### Sanhedrin 85a:7
[Sanhedrin 85a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:7)

וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, שֶׁמִּצְוָה לְהַכּוֹתוֹ – מִצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ; שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִצְוָה לְהַכּוֹתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמִּצְוָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹתוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** accordingly, **this** is what the *baraita* **is teaching: And just as in a situation** where striking another is **a mitzva, where** the agent of the court **is commanded to strike him,** there is **a mitzva not to strike him** even one lash beyond the number determined by the court, as it is written: “Forty lashes shall he strike him, he shall not exceed, lest if he shall exceed to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), accordingly, **in a situation** where striking another is **not a mitzva, where one is not commanded to strike him, is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?** The general prohibition against striking another in any situation is derived from this verse.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:8
[Sanhedrin 85a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:8)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג וּבָא בְּנוֹ וְהִכָּהוּ וְקִילְּלוֹ – חַיָּיב, בָּא אַחֵר וְהִכָּהוּ וְקִילְּלוֹ – פָּטוּר. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַאי שְׁנָא בְּנוֹ וּמַאי שְׁנָא אַחֵר? וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: בִּמְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לָצֵאת וְאֵינוֹ יוֹצֵא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from a *baraita*: In the case of **one who emerges** from the court condemned **to be executed and his son came and struck him or cursed him,** the son is **liable** to be executed for striking or cursing his father. If **another came and struck him or cursed him,** he is **exempt. And we discussed it** as follows: **What is different** about the case where **his son** strikes or curses him that he is liable, **and what is different** about the case where **another** strikes or curses him that he is exempt? **And Rav Ḥisda says:** The *baraita* is referring to a case **where they are imploring** the condemned man **to emerge** from the court to be executed **but he is not emerging.** Therefore, it is necessary to employ force. Apparently, even under those circumstances, where the use of force is sanctioned by the court, it is prohibited for the son to strike his father.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:9
[Sanhedrin 85a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:9)

רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּשֶׁאֵין מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לָצֵאת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this proof: **Rav Sheshet interprets** this *baraita* as referring to a case **where they are not imploring him to emerge** from the court for his execution. It is referring to a case where the condemned man is proceeding willingly, and it is not an agent of the court but someone else who strikes and curses him at his own initiative.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:10
[Sanhedrin 85a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:10)

אִי הָכִי, אַחֵר נָמֵי? אַחֵר – גַּבְרָא קְטִילָא הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If so, even another** who strikes one who is condemned to death should be liable, as it is prohibited to strike or curse another. The Gemara responds: If **another** does so he is exempt, since the legal status of the one condemned to death **is** that of **a dead man.** Therefore, one is not liable for striking or humiliating him.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:11
[Sanhedrin 85a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:11)

וְהָאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בִּיְּישׁוֹ יָשֵׁן וָמֵת – חַיָּיב? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּשֶׁהִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But doesn’t Rav Sheshet** himself **say:** If **one humiliates** another who is **sleeping** and the individual never awakens **and dies,** the one who humiliated him is **liable** to compensate his heirs for that humiliation? Apparently, even if the status of the condemned is that of a dead person, the one who cursed him should be liable to compensate his heirs. The Gemara answers: **With what are we dealing here** in the *baraita*? We are dealing **with** a case where **he struck him** with **a blow that does not have** sufficient force to cause damage **worth one *peruta*,** in which case no compensation is paid.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:12
[Sanhedrin 85a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:12)

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִכָּהוּ הַכָּאָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – לוֹקֶה? מַאי ״פָּטוּר״ דְּקָאָמַר? פָּטוּר מִמָּמוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But doesn’t Rabbi Ami say** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** In a case where **one struck** another with **a blow that does not have** sufficient force to cause damage **worth one *peruta*, he is flogged** for violating the prohibition: “He shall not exceed”? Why does the *baraita* exempt another entirely? The Gemara explains: **What** is the meaning of the term **exempt that is stated** in this *baraita*? It means that he is **exempt from monetary restitution,** but he is liable to receive lashes.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:13
[Sanhedrin 85a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:13)

מִכְלָל דִּבְנוֹ חַיָּיב בְּמָמוֹן? אֶלָּא בְּדִינוֹ. הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּדִינוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If the clause of the *baraita* that discusses a case where another individual strikes or curses him states that he is exempt only from payment of restitution, one may conclude **by inference that** the clause of the *baraita* that discusses **his son** states that he is **liable** to pay **monetary restitution.** That is certainly not the case. **Rather,** the clause of the *baraita* that discusses his son states that he is liable to be punished **in accordance with his** appropriate **sentence; here too,** the clause of the *baraita* that discusses another individual states that he is exempt from punishment **in accordance with his** appropriate **sentence.** The question remains: Why is another exempt from receiving lashes in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one *peruta*?


###### Sanhedrin 85a:14
[Sanhedrin 85a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:14)

אֶלָּא, אַחֵר הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּפָטוּר, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ לֹא תָאֹר״ – בְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֵׂה עַמְּךָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rather, this is the reason that** another **is exempt: As the verse states: “Nor curse a ruler of your people”** (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only **with regard to one who performs an action of “your people,”** i.e., an action befitting a Jew. There is no prohibition against cursing one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:15
[Sanhedrin 85a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:15)

הָתִינַח קְלָלָה, הַכָּאָה מְנָלַן? דְּמַקְּשִׁינַן הַכָּאָה לִקְלָלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **This** explanation **works out well** with regard to **cursing,** as that is the prohibition mentioned in that verse. **From where do we** derive that the *halakha* is the same with regard to **striking?** The Gemara answers: We derive that the *halakha* is the same for both, **as we liken striking to cursing** based on the juxtaposition between the verses that address the cases of one who strikes his father (Exodus 21:15) and one who curses his father (Exodus 21:17).


###### Sanhedrin 85a:16
[Sanhedrin 85a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:16)

אִי הָכִי, בְּנוֹ נָמֵי? כִּדְאָמַר רַב פִּינְחָס: בְּשֶׁעָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה. הָכִי נָמֵי, בְּשֶׁעָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If so,** and the prohibition does not apply to one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew, **his son too** should be exempt if he strikes or curses his father whose conduct is inappropriate. The Gemara explains: **As Rav Pineḥas says** in another context that the reference is to a case **where** the one in question **repented, so too,** the *baraita* is referring to a case **where** the condemned man **repented.** Although he is being taken to his execution, because he repented he is considered as one who performs actions “of your people,” and his son is liable for striking or cursing him.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:17
[Sanhedrin 85a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:17)

אִי הָכִי, אַחֵר נָמֵי? אָמַר רַב מָרִי: ״בְּעַמְּךָ״ – בִּמְקוּיָּם שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If so,** and the *baraita* is referring to one who repented, **another** should be rendered liable **as well. Rav Mari says:** One derives from the expression **“of your people”** that the prohibition applies only **to one enduring among your people,** not to one whose execution is imminent.


###### Sanhedrin 85a:18
[Sanhedrin 85a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sanhedrin/r/85a:18)

אִי הָכִי, בְּנוֹ נָמֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If so, his son** should be exempt **as well,** since his father’s execution is imminent.