## Shabbat Daf 91a

###### Shabbat 91a:1
[Shabbat 91a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:1)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, בַּטּוֹלֵי בַּטְּלַהּ לְמַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כׇּל הָעוֹשֶׂה, עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה הוּא עוֹשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Lest you say** that in doing so his original **intention is** completely **nullified,** since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the *tanna* of the mishna **teaches us** that **anyone who performs** an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, **performs** the action **with the original** intention **in mind.**


###### Shabbat 91a:2
[Shabbat 91a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:2)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אַף בְּמוֹצִיא חִטָּה אַחַת לִזְרִיעָה. פְּשִׁיטָא, ״כׇּל שֶׁהוּא״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״כׇּל שֶׁהוּא״ — לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִגְּרוֹגֶרֶת, וּלְעוֹלָם עַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. מַתְקִיף לַהּ רַב יִצְחָק בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חִישֵּׁב לְהוֹצִיא כׇּל בֵּיתוֹ, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מִיחַיַּיב עַד דְּמַפֵּיק לְכוּלֵּיהּ?! הָתָם — בָּטְלָה דַּעְתּוֹ אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yehuda said** that **Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat** seed for **sowing** on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is **obvious. We learned** in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is **any amount.** Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. **Lest you say** that when the mishna employs the term **any amount** it is **to exclude** the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, **a dried fig-**bulk; **and actually** one is **only liable if there is** at least **an olive-bulk** of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel **teaches us** that any amount refers to even a single seed. **Rav Yitzḥak the son** of **Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now,** based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, **one who planned to carry out** the contents of **his entire house** at once, **so too, is he only liable when he carries it out** at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. **There,** with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, **his intention is** rendered **irrelevant by** the opinions of **all** other **people,** as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.


###### Shabbat 91a:3
[Shabbat 91a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:3)

וְכׇל אָדָם אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו אֶלָּא כְּשִׁיעוּרוֹ. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, דְּתַנְיָא: כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לְהַצְנִיעַ, וְאֵין מַצְנִיעִין כָּמוֹהוּ, וְהוּכְשַׁר לָזֶה וְהִצְנִיעוֹ, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהוֹצִיאוֹ — נִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה בְּמַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ שֶׁל זֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
We also learned in the mishna: **And any** other **person is only liable** for carrying it out on Shabbat **if** he carries out **its measure** for liability. The Gemara comments: **The mishna** is **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and** therefore people do **not** typically **store** items **like it, but it was deemed fit** for storage **by this** person **and he stored it, and another** person **came and carried out** the object that was stored, **that** person, who carried it out, **is rendered liable by the thought of this** person, who stored it.


###### Shabbat 91a:4
[Shabbat 91a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:4)

אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הוֹצִיא כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת לַאֲכִילָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עָלֶיהָ לִזְרִיעָה, אִי נָמֵי לִזְרִיעָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עָלֶיהָ לַאֲכִילָה — חַיָּיב. פְּשִׁיטָא, זִיל הָכָא — אִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא, וְזִיל הָכָא — אִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא בָּעֵינַן עֲקִירָה וְהַנָּחָה בַּחֲדָא מַחְשָׁבָה וְהָא לֵיכָּא — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** that **Rav Naḥman said:** If **one carried out** on Shabbat a **dried fig-bulk** of seeds **for eating, and** along the way he **reconsidered** and decided to use them **for sowing;** or, **alternatively,** if one intended to carry them out **for sowing and reconsidered** and decided to use them **for eating, he is liable.** The Gemara wonders: This is **obvious.** Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. **Go here** and examine his initial intention, **there is a measure** that determines liability; **and go here** and examine his ultimate intention, **there is a measure** that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naḥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. **Lest you say** that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, **we require** that the **lifting and placing** of the object be performed **with a single,** identical, **intention, and that is not** the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naḥman **teaches us** that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.


###### Shabbat 91a:5
[Shabbat 91a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:5)

בָּעֵי רָבָא: הוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת לִזְרִיעָה וְתָפְחָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עָלֶיהָ לַאֲכִילָה, מַהוּ? אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: הָתָם הוּא דְּמִיחַיַּיב — דְּזִיל הָכָא אִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא וְזִיל הָכָא אִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא, הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּאַפְּקֵהּ לָא הֲוָה בֵּיהּ שִׁיעוּר אֲכִילָה — לָא מִיחַיַּיב, אוֹ דִילְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אִישְׁתִּיק וְלָא חַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ מִיחַיַּיב אַמַּחְשָׁבָה דִזְרִיעָה — הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
On the basis of this *halakha*, **Rava raised a dilemma:** With regard to **one who carried out half a dried fig-**bulk of seeds for the purpose of **sowing,** which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist **and expanded** to a dried fig-bulk, **and** he **reconsidered** his plans **for** the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it **for eating, what** is the *halakha*? The two sides of the dilemma are: **If you say** that **there,** in the first case, **he is liable** because **go here** and examine his initial intention, **there is a measure** that determines liability; **and go here** and examine his ultimate intention, **there is a measure** that determines liability; but **here,** in this case, **since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure** that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of **eating,** then **he** is **not liable. Or, perhaps,** since **had** he been **silent and had no intention with regard to** the seeds at all, **he** would be **liable** for the **intention** of carrying it out for the purpose of **sowing,** then **now too, he is liable** because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.


###### Shabbat 91a:6
[Shabbat 91a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:6)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ אִישְׁתִּיק וְלָא חַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ מִיחַיַּיב אַמַּחְשָׁבָה דִזְרִיעָה, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב — הוֹצִיא כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת לַאֲכִילָה וְצָמְקָה וְנִמְלַךְ עָלֶיהָ לִזְרִיעָה, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי כִּי אִישְׁתִּיק — אַמַּחְשָׁבָה קַמַּיְיתָא לָא מִיחַיַּיב, אוֹ דִילְמָא בָּתַר הַשְׁתָּא אָזְלִינַן, וּמִיחַיַּיב. וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: בָּתַר הַשְׁתָּא אָזְלִינַן, וּמִיחַיַּיב — הוֹצִיא כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת לַאֲכִילָה וְצָמְקָה וְחָזְרָה וְתָפְחָה, מַהוּ? יֵשׁ דִּיחוּי לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת, אוֹ אֵין דִּיחוּי לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** that since **had** he been **silent and had no intention with regard to** the seeds at all, **he** would be **liable** for the **intention** of carrying it out for the purpose of **sowing, now too, he** is **liable,** if **he carried out** seeds in the measure **of a dried fig-bulk for** the purpose of **eating, and** they **shriveled** until there was less than that measure, **and he reconsidered** and decided to use them **for** the purpose of **sowing,** then **what** is the *halakha*? **Here, certainly had** he been **silent and had no intention with regard to** the seeds at all, for **the original intention he is not liable** because there remains less than the measure for liability; **or perhaps we follow** his intention at **present and he is liable. And if you say** that **we follow** his intention at **present, and he is liable,** the dilemma arises: If **one carried out a dried fig-bulk** of seeds **for** the purpose of **eating, and it shriveled** until there was less than that measure, **and then it expanded** to a fig-bulk, **what** is the *halakha*? **Is there disqualification with regard to** the *halakhot* of **Shabbat?** Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. **Or,** perhaps **there is no disqualification with regard to** the *halakhot* of **Shabbat.** The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, **let them stand** unresolved.


###### Shabbat 91a:7
[Shabbat 91a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shabbat/r/91a:7)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: זָרַק כְּזַיִת תְּרוּמָה לְבַיִת טָמֵא מַהוּ? לְמַאי: אִי לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת — כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת בָּעֵינַן, אִי לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה — כְּבֵיצָה אוֹכָלִין בָּעֵינַן! לְעוֹלָם לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת, וּכְגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא פָּחוֹת מִכְּבֵיצָה אוֹכָלִין, וְהַאי מַשְׁלִימוֹ לִכְבֵיצָה. מַאי: מִדְּמִצְטָרֵף לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה — מִיחַיַּיב נָמֵי לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת, אוֹ דִילְמָא: כׇּל לְעִנְיַן שַׁבָּת כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת בָּעֵינַן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם וְלֶחֶם הַפָּנִים שִׁיעוּרָן כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת, וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא: מִדִּלְעִנְיַן

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman:** If **one threw an olive-bulk of *teruma* into an impure house, what** is the *halakha*? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard **to what** matter was this dilemma raised? **If** it was raised **with regard to Shabbat,** the measure that **we require** to determine liability for carrying out is **a dried fig-bulk,** and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And **if** it was raised with regard **to ritual impurity,** the measure that **we require** to determine impurity for **food** is at least **an egg-bulk,** and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: **Actually,** this dilemma was raised **with regard to Shabbat. And** it is referring to a case **where there is less than an egg-bulk of food** in the house, **and this** olive-bulk that was thrown into the house **completes** the measure of the food in the house **to an egg-bulk.** The dilemma is: **What** is the *halakha* in that case? Is it **from** the fact **that** the olive-bulk **joins together** with the food in the house **with regard to ritual impurity** that **he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters** concerning carrying out on **Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk** in order to be liable. Rav Naḥman **said to him: We** already **learned** the resolution to that dilemma in a *baraita*: **Abba Shaul says:** The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of **the two loaves** of bread **and the showbread** that were in the Temple **is a dried fig-bulk.** The Gemara asks: **And why** is that their measure? **Let us say: From** the fact that **with regard to the matter of**