## Shevuot Daf 25b

###### Shevuot 25b:1
[Shevuot 25b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:1)

דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא וְרַבָּנַן קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דִּתְנַן: נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל – פָּטוּר. לְקַיֵּים אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא קִיֵּים – פָּטוּר. שֶׁהָיָה בַּדִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב, כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא: וּמָה אִם הָרְשׁוּת, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי – הֲרֵי הוּא חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ; מִצְוָה, שֶׁמּוּשְׁבָּע עָלֶיהָ מֵהַר סִינַי – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
between these *amora’im* parallels the **disagreement** between **Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis? As we learned** in a mishna (27a): If one **took an oath to refrain from** performing **a mitzva and he did not refrain,** he is **exempt** from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If one took an oath **to perform a mitzva and he did not perform** it, he is also **exempt, though it would have been fitting** to argue **that he is liable** to bring the offering, **in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. As Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If,** with regard to an oath concerning **an optional** matter, **for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for** breaking **it,** then with regard to an oath about **a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for it?**


###### Shevuot 25b:2
[Shevuot 25b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:2)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִּשְׁבוּעַת הָרְשׁוּת – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָּהּ לָאו כְּהֵן; תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת מִצְוָה – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בָּהּ לָאו כְּהֵן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Rabbis **said to him: No, if you said** that one is liable **for** breaking **an oath** concerning **an optional** action, **where** the Torah **rendered** one liable for **a negative** oath not to perform it **like** for **a positive** oath to perform it, **shall you** also **say** one is liable **for** breaking **an oath** concerning **a mitzva, where** the Torah **did not render** one liable for **a negative** oath **like** for **a positive** oath? If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he did not refrain, he is exempt.


###### Shevuot 25b:3
[Shevuot 25b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:3)

נֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּנַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Shall we say** that **Rav states** his opinion **in accordance with** that of **Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,** who holds that one can be liable for an oath that cannot be inverted, **and Shmuel states** his opinion **in accordance with** that of **the Rabbis,** who hold that one can be liable only if the oath can be inverted?


###### Shevuot 25b:4
[Shevuot 25b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:4)

אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי; הַשְׁתָּא לָאו וָהֵן לָא בָּעֵי, לְהַבָּא וּלְשֶׁעָבַר בָּעֵי?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **Everyone,** i.e., both Rav and Shmuel, **agrees with regard to** the opinion **of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira** that one is liable if he took an oath that so-and-so performed an action that he did not in fact perform. The Gemara explains: **Now,** given that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira **does not require** that it be possible to invert **a negative** oath to **a positive** oath, **does he require** that it be possible for an oath to refer **to the future as well as to the past?** Shmuel explained that the reason one is not liable for an oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea is that it cannot be inverted to address the future, in other words: So-and-so will throw a stone into the sea, as that is not under the oath taker’s control.


###### Shevuot 25b:5
[Shevuot 25b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:5)

כִּי פְּלִיגִי – אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן. שְׁמוּאֵל – כְּרַבָּנַן; וְרַב – כִּי לָא מְחַיְּיבִי רַבָּנַן בְּלָאו וָהֵן, דִּכְתִיב ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ בְּהֶדְיָא; אֲבָל לְהַבָּא וּלְשֶׁעָבַר, דְּמֵרִיבּוּיָא דִּקְרָאֵי אָתוּ – מְחַיְּיבִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When they disagree** it is **with regard to** the opinion **of the Rabbis: Shmuel** holds **like the Rabbis,** that one is exempt in the case of an oath that cannot be inverted. Accordingly, Shmuel ruled that one who takes an oath that so-and-so threw an item is exempt from bringing an offering if it is found that the statement was false. **And Rav** holds that **the Rabbis do not deem one liable in** the case of an oath that cannot be inverted from **negative** to **positive** or vice versa, **as it is written explicitly:** “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips **to do evil, or to do good”** (Leviticus 5:4). **But** with regard to the requirement that it be possible to invert an oath referring **to the future** to refer **to the past** or vice versa, **which is derived from an amplification of** the meaning of **the verses,** the Rabbis **deem one liable,** as they do not accept the derivation.


###### Shevuot 25b:6
[Shevuot 25b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:6)

מֵתִיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם״ וְ״לֹא הִנַּחְתִּי תְּפִילִּין הַיּוֹם״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. בִּשְׁלָמָא ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – אִיתֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא אוֹכַל״; אֶלָּא ״לֹא הִנַּחְתִּי״ – מִי אִיתֵיהּ בְּ״לֹא אַנִּיחַ״?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Hamnuna raises an objection** to Shmuel’s opinion from a mishna (29b): If one said: **I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today,** and another said to him: **I administer an oath to you** that your statement is true, **and** the original speaker **said: Amen,** he is **liable** for breaking an oath on an utterance if his statement was false, as responding amen to an oath administered to oneself is equivalent to stating the oath explicitly. **Granted,** he is liable in the case where he said: **I did not eat,** since it also **would have been possible** for him to take an oath saying: **I will not eat, but** in the case where he said: **I did not don** phylacteries, **would it have been possible** for him to take an oath saying: **I will not don** phylacteries, and in doing so abrogate a positive mitzva?


###### Shevuot 25b:7
[Shevuot 25b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:7)

הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ – לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי: ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – לְקׇרְבָּן, ״לֹא הִנַּחְתִּי״ – לְמַלְקוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**He,** Rav Hamnuna, **raises the objection and he resolves it:** The *tanna* **teaches** this mishna **disjunctively,** referring to two different cases. When he teaches that one is liable for taking the oath: **I did not eat,** it refers to one’s liability **to** bring **an offering.** When he teaches liability for the oath: **I did not don** phylacteries, it refers to one’s liability **to** receive **lashes** for taking a false oath. This liability does not require that it be possible to invert the oath to refer to the future.


###### Shevuot 25b:8
[Shevuot 25b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:8)

מֵתִיב רָבָא: אֵיזוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא? נִשְׁבַּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לָאָדָם – וְאָמַר עַל עַמּוּד שֶׁל אֶבֶן שֶׁהוּא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁהוּא שֶׁל זָהָב. וְאָמַר עוּלָּא: וְהוּא שֶׁנִּיכָּר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם. טַעְמָא דְּנִיכָּר; הָא לֹא נִיכָּר – עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי. וְאַמַּאי? הָא אֵינוֹ בִּ״יהֵא שֶׁל זָהָב״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava** also **raises an objection** to Shmuel’s opinion from a mishna (see 29a): **Which** oath **is an oath** taken **in vain?** It is when one **takes an oath to deny that which is known to people** to be true, **and,** for example, **says about a stone column that is in such and such a place that it is** made **of gold. And Ulla says** that the phrase: Known to people, in the mishna is referring to when **it is** a fact **that is known to three people.** The Gemara explains the objection to Shmuel’s opinion: **The reason** he is liable for taking an oath in vain is due to the fact **that** his oath contradicted a fact **known** to three people. **But** if it is **not known, he violates** the prohibition **of** taking a false **oath on an utterance.** Given Shmuel’s opinion, **why** should he be liable? **Isn’t it impossible** to invert the oath to make it about the future, saying: That column **will be of gold?**


###### Shevuot 25b:9
[Shevuot 25b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:9)

הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ: נִיכָּר – עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, לֹא נִיכָּר – עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**He raises the objection and he resolves it.** When the fact is **known** to three people, the one who takes an oath denying it **violates** the prohibition **of** taking **an oath in vain.** If it is **not known,** then **he violates** the prohibition **of** taking **a false oath,** for which he receives lashes if he did so intentionally. Nevertheless, he is not liable to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance, since this oath cannot be inverted to be about the future.


###### Shevuot 25b:10
[Shevuot 25b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:10)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַב בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֲנִי יוֹדֵעַ לְךָ עֵדוּת״, וְאִשְׁתְּכַח דְּלָא יְדַע לֵיהּ – דְּפָטוּר, הוֹאִיל וְלֵיתֵיהּ בִּכְלַל ״שֶׁאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ לְךָ עֵדוּת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Abaye said: And Rav,** who holds one liable for an oath on an utterance even if it cannot be inverted to refer to the future, **concedes** in a case **where one says to another:** On my **oath I know testimony** that is relevant **to you, and it is found** afterward **that he did not know** testimony that was relevant **to him,** that in **that** case **he is exempt** from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. The reason is **that it is not in the category of** an oath that could be inverted to the negative oath of: **I do not know testimony** that is relevant **to you,** as that oath would be an oath of testimony, rather than an oath on an utterance. The Torah states: “And if anyone sin, in that he hears the voice of adjuration, he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). One is liable to bring an offering for an oath of testimony if he takes an oath falsely denying that he has knowledge of testimony in a monetary matter.


###### Shevuot 25b:11
[Shevuot 25b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:11)

״יָדַעְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא יָדַעְתִּי״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת. ״הֵעַדְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא הֵעַדְתִּי״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
But if he takes an oath saying: **I knew** testimony that is relevant to you, **or: I did not know** testimony that is relevant to you, the *halakha* is subject to the **dispute** between Rav and Shmuel. Similarly, if he took an oath saying: **I testified, or: I did not testify,** whether or not he is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance depends on the **dispute** between Rav and Shmuel. In these cases, the oaths cannot be inverted from the past to the future and are also not oaths of testimony, since they do not involve the refusal to testify.


###### Shevuot 25b:12
[Shevuot 25b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:12)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר: מִילְּתָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בִּלְהַבָּא לָא מְחַיֵּיב עֲלֵיהּ לְשֶׁעָבַר; לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לִשְׁבוּעַת עֵדוּת מִכְּלַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי. אֶלָּא לְרַב, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: **Granted, according to** the opinion of **Shmuel, who says** that an oath about **a matter that cannot** be inverted to refer **to the future** is one **for which one is not liable** when it refers **to the past,** it is **for that** reason **the Merciful One removed an oath of testimony,** which cannot be inverted, **from the category of an oath on an utterance** and legislated it in a separate verse (see Leviticus 5:1). **But according to** the opinion of **Rav, for what *halakha* did the Merciful One remove it** from the category of an oath on an utterance and relate to it as a distinct category? Every oath of testimony is a case of an oath on an utterance and there is no need to relate to it as a special case.


###### Shevuot 25b:13
[Shevuot 25b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:13)

אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: לְאִיחַיּוֹבֵי עֲלַיהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages said before Abaye:** An oath of testimony is singled out, according to Rav, in order **to render** one who takes it falsely **liable** to bring **two** sliding-scale offerings **for it,** one for a false oath on an utterance and one for a false oath of testimony.


###### Shevuot 25b:14
[Shevuot 25b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:14)

אֲמַר לְהוּ: תַּרְתֵּי לָא מָצִיתוּ אָמְרִיתוּ, דְּתַנְיָא: לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה – לְאַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁתַּיִם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye **said to them: You cannot say** that one who takes a false oath of testimony is liable to bring **two** offerings, **as it is taught** in a *baraita* with regard to the sliding-scale offering that is brought for both an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance: The verse states: “And it shall be, when he shall be guilty **in one of these things”** (Leviticus 5:5). By inference, **for one** of the sins that render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering **you may deem him liable, but you may not deem him liable** for **two.**


###### Shevuot 25b:15
[Shevuot 25b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:15)

וּלְאַבָּיֵי, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אַפְּקָיהּ רַחֲמָנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** if this is so, then **according to Abaye’s** understanding of the opinion of Rav, **for what *halakha* did the Merciful One remove** an oath of testimony from the category of an oath on an utterance and relate to it as a distinct category?


###### Shevuot 25b:16
[Shevuot 25b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:16)

לְכִדְתַנְיָא: בְּכוּלָּן נֶאֱמַר ״וְנֶעֱלַם״, וְכָאן לֹא נֶאֱמַר ״וְנֶעְלַם״; לְחַיֵּיב עַל הַמֵּזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: An oath of testimony is singled out, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **For every** other one of the prohibitions for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, it **is stated** in the verse: **“And it is hidden** from him” (see Leviticus 5:2–4), **and here,** with regard to the oath of testimony, the phrase: **And it is hidden** from him, **is not stated.** This serves **to render** one **liable** to bring an offering **for** taking a false oath of testimony **intentionally like** one who is liable for doing so **unwittingly.**


###### Shevuot 25b:17
[Shevuot 25b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:17)

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְאַבָּיֵי: אֵימָא בְּמֵזִיד מִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא, בְּשׁוֹגֵג מִיחַיַּיב תַּרְתֵּי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages said to Abaye: Say** that the oath of testimony was singled out for a different reason: When he takes a false oath of testimony **intentionally he is liable** to bring only **one** offering but when he does so **unwittingly, he is liable** to bring **two,** one for an oath of testimony and one for an oath on an utterance.


###### Shevuot 25b:18
[Shevuot 25b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:18)

אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָאו הַיְינוּ דַּאֲמַרִי – ״לְאַחַת״, אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁתַּיִם; וְאִי בְּמֵזִיד, מִי אִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye **said to them** in response: **Is this not what they said** in a *baraita* with regard to the verse about the sliding-scale offering: “When he shall be guilty **in one of these** things” (Leviticus 5:5)? By inference, **for one** of the sins that render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering **you may deem him liable, but you may not deem him liable** for **two? And** since one does not bring an offering for an intentional false oath on an utterance, **if** the verse is referring to a case where he **intentionally** took a false oath of testimony, **how could there be** a case where one is liable to bring **two** offerings such that this case needs to be excluded? Consequently, the verse must be referring to a case where he took the oath unwittingly, and it teaches that nevertheless, one brings only one offering for each violation.


###### Shevuot 25b:19
[Shevuot 25b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:19)

רָבָא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר שֶׁבַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – אֵין לְךָ בּוֹ אֶלָּא חִידּוּשׁוֹ בִּלְבַד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** in response to the question posed by the Sages: There is no need to derive from a verse that one is liable to bring only one offering for a false oath of testimony. **Since** an oath of testimony **is a matter that was** included **in a generalization,** i.e., the general principle of an oath on an utterance, **and** it **was singled out to teach a new matter with regard to it, you have only the new matter alone** to consider. Since an oath of testimony is singled out in that it applies only to potential witnesses in the context of a court, a case of an oath of testimony ceases to be included under the rubric of an oath on an utterance.


###### Shevuot 25b:20
[Shevuot 25b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:20)

מִכְּלַל דְּאַבָּיֵי סָבַר: אִיתַהּ לִשְׁבוּעָה בָּעוֹלָם?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Should one understand **by inference that Abaye holds** that in cases of an oath of testimony, **the oath** on an utterance still **exists in principle?** One does not bring two offerings because of the *halakha* derived from the verse, but if for some reason the oath of testimony does not take effect, one may still be liable for an oath on an utterance.


###### Shevuot 25b:21
[Shevuot 25b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:21)

וְהָאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה רַב בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֲנִי יוֹדֵעַ לָךְ עֵדוּת״, וְאִשְׁתְּכַח דְּלָא יְדַע לֵיהּ – דְּפָטוּר, הוֹאִיל וְלֵיתֵיהּ בְּאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ לָךְ עֵדוּת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But didn’t Abaye say** that **Rav concedes** that one is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance in a case **where one says to another:** On my **oath I know testimony** that is relevant **to you, and it was found that he did not know** testimony that was relevant **to him?** In **that** case he is **exempt** from bringing an offering for an oath on utterance, **since it is not** an oath that could be inverted **to** the negative oath: **I do not know testimony** that is relevant **to you,** as that oath would be an oath of testimony rather than an oath on an utterance.


###### Shevuot 25b:22
[Shevuot 25b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/25b:22)

הֲדַר בֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי מֵהַהִיא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Abaye retracted that** opinion. **And if you wish, say** instead that