## Shevuot Daf 26a

###### Shevuot 26a:1
[Shevuot 26a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:1)

חֲדָא מִינַּיְיהוּ רַב פָּפָּא אַמְרַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said one of those** statements, not Abaye.


###### Shevuot 26a:2
[Shevuot 26a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:2)

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה; שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only** for an oath on an utterance taken **about the future. The Sages taught** in a *baraita* with regard to an oath on an utterance: From the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips **to do evil, or to do good”** (Leviticus 5:4), **I have** derived **only** that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to **matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where** do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to **matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips,”** which includes other matters.


###### Shevuot 26a:3
[Shevuot 26a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:3)

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא לְהַבָּא, לְשֶׁעָבַר מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא הָאָדָם בִּשְׁבֻעָה״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – לְהַבָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**I have** derived **only** that one is liable for oaths referring **to the future. From where** do I derive that one is liable for oaths referring **to the past? The verse** subsequently **states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath”** (Leviticus 5:4); this is **the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says:** The verse states: **“To do evil, or to do good,”** referring exclusively to oaths **about the future.**


###### Shevuot 26a:4
[Shevuot 26a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:4)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִם כֵּן, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲטָבָה וְהָרָעָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן? אָמַר לוֹ: מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב. אָמַר לוֹ: אִם רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so,** then **I have** derived **only** that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to **matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where** do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to **matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply?** Rabbi Yishmael **said to** Rabbi Akiva in response: It is derived **from an amplification** of the meaning **of the verse.** Rabbi Akiva **said to him: If the verse is amplified for this,** i.e., to extend the *halakha* of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, **the verse is amplified for that,** i.e., oaths about the past.


###### Shevuot 26a:5
[Shevuot 26a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:5)

שַׁפִּיר קָא אָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions: **Rabbi Akiva said well** his critique of the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael.** Why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree?


###### Shevuot 26a:6
[Shevuot 26a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:6)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ אֶת רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן הַקָּנָה, שֶׁהָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת כָּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט – אִיהוּ נָמֵי דּוֹרֵשׁ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ אֶת נַחוּם אִישׁ גַּם זוֹ, שֶׁהָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת כָּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ בְּרִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט – אִיהוּ נָמֵי דּוֹרֵשׁ רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** It is because **Rabbi Yishmael** was the one **who served** as a disciple of **Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who would interpret the entire Torah with** the hermeneutical principle of **a generalization and a detail.** Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael **also interprets** the Torah **with** the method of **a generalization and a detail. Rabbi Akiva** was one **who served** as a disciple of **Naḥum of Gam Zo, who would interpret the entire Torah with** the hermeneutical principle of **amplification and restriction.** Therefore, Rabbi Akiva **also interprets** the Torah by **amplification and restriction.**


###### Shevuot 26a:7
[Shevuot 26a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:7)

מַאי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּדָרֵישׁ רִיבּוּיֵי וּמִיעוּטֵי? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע״ – רִיבָּה, ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – מִיעֵט, ״לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא הָאָדָם״ – חָזַר וְרִיבָּה; רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט וְרִיבָּה – רִיבָּה הַכֹּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What** is the specific instance in this context where one finds **that Rabbi Akiva interprets** with **amplifications and restrictions?** It is **as it is taught** in a *baraita* that when the verse states: **“Or if anyone take an oath** clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), it **amplifies** the range of possible oaths for which one could be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. When the verse continues: **“To do evil, or to do good,”** it **restricts** that range. When it further continues: **“Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly** with an oath,” it **then amplifies** again. According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse **amplified, and** then **restricted, and** then **amplified, it amplified** the relevant category to include **everything** except for the specific matter that was excluded by the restriction.


###### Shevuot 26a:8
[Shevuot 26a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:8)

מַאי רִיבָּה? רִיבָּה כֹּל מִילֵּי, וּמַאי מִיעֵט? מִיעֵט דְּבַר מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What** was included when the verse **amplified** the range of liability? **It amplified** it to include **all matters** about which one might take an oath. **And** in **what** way did it **restrict** it when it continued: “To do evil, or to do good”? It **restricted** the range of liability for an oath on an utterance to exclude an oath that is **a matter** involving **a mitzva,** i.e., an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva.


###### Shevuot 26a:9
[Shevuot 26a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:9)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דָּרֵישׁ כְּלָל וּפְרָט: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״ – כְּלָל, ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – פְּרָט, ״לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא הָאָדָם״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל; כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – לְהַבָּא, אַף כֹּל לְהַבָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yishmael interprets** the verse following the hermeneutical principle of **a generalization and a detail: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips”** (Leviticus 5:4), is **a generalization; “to do evil, or to do good,”** is **a detail; “whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly** with an oath,” the verse **then** further **generalized.** There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains **a generalization, and a detail, and** another **generalization, you may deduce** that the verse is referring **only** to items **similar to the detail. Just as the detail** in the verse is **explicitly** an oath referring **to the future, so too, all** the oaths for which one is liable must be referring **to the future.**


###### Shevuot 26a:10
[Shevuot 26a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:10)

אַהֲנִי כְּלָלָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי אֲפִילּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה לְהַבָּא; אַהֲנִי פְּרָטָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי אֲפִילּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה לְשֶׁעָבַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The generalization serves to include even** those **matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good** when they refer **to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good** when they refer **to the past.**


###### Shevuot 26a:11
[Shevuot 26a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:11)

אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **I will reverse** it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?


###### Shevuot 26a:12
[Shevuot 26a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:12)

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דּוּמְיָא דִּ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – מִי שֶׁאִיסּוּרוֹ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״; יָצָאתָה זוֹ, שֶׁאֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תְּשַׁקְּרוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yitzḥak said** that Rabbi Yishmael understands that liability is extended to one whose oath **is similar to an oath “to do evil, or to do good”** (Leviticus 5:4). **He whose prohibition is due to** the verse**: “He shall not break his word”** (Numbers 30:3), is liable, as liability for an oath about the future entails breaking one’s word. **Excluded is that** oath **whose prohibition is not due to** the verse**: “He shall not break his word”; rather,** it is **due to** the verse**: “You shall not lie”** (Leviticus 19:11), since liability for an oath about the past applies when the oath itself was a lie.


###### Shevuot 26a:13
[Shevuot 26a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:13)

רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אָבִין אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״ – מִי שֶׁהַשְּׁבוּעָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַבִּיטּוּי, וְלֹא שֶׁהַבִּיטּוּי קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁבוּעָה; יָצָא זֶה ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״, שֶׁהַמַּעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לַשְּׁבוּעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says** that there is a different explanation of Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion: **The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips** to do evil, or to do good,” referring to **one whose oath precedes** its **clarification,** i.e., the action that breaks it, **and not** to one who takes an oath **where the clarification,** i.e., the action prohibited in the oath, **precedes the oath. Excluded is that** oath where one said, for example: **I ate, or: I did not eat, where the action precedes the oath.**


###### Shevuot 26a:14
[Shevuot 26a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:14)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הָאָדָם בִּשְׁבוּעָה״ – פְּרָט לְאָנוּס. ״וְנֶעְלַם״ – פְּרָט לְמֵזִיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him; and, when he knows of it, be guilty in one of these things” (Leviticus 5:4). The phrase **“a man…with an oath”** serves **to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control** from liability to bring an offering. The term **“and it is hidden”** serves **to exclude** from liability one who broke his oath **intentionally,** as he does not deserve to be able to achieve atonement through bringing an offering.


###### Shevuot 26a:15
[Shevuot 26a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:15)

״מִמֶּנּוּ״ – שֶׁנִּתְעַלְּמָה מִמֶּנּוּ שְׁבוּעָה. יָכוֹל שֶׁנִּתְעַלְּמָה מִמֶּנּוּ חֵפֶץ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְנֶעְלַם״ – עַל הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: The term **“from him”** teaches that **one who was unaware of** his **oath,** i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One **might** have thought that an oath taker is also liable when he broke an oath **because he was unaware** that a particular item is forbidden as the **object** of his oath; therefore, **the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object** of the oath.


###### Shevuot 26a:16
[Shevuot 26a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:16)

אָמַר מָר: ״הָאָדָם בִּשְׁבוּעָה״ – פְּרָט לְאָנוּס. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Master says** above in the *baraita*: The phrase **“a man…with an oath”** serves **to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control.** The Gemara asks: **What are** such **circumstances?**


###### Shevuot 26a:17
[Shevuot 26a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:17)

כִּדְרַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי, כִּי הֲווֹ קָיְימִי מִקַּמֵּי דְּרַב, מָר אֲמַר: שְׁבוּעֲתָא דְּהָכִי אֲמַר רַב, וּמָר אָמַר: שְׁבוּעֲתָא דְּהָכִי אֲמַר רַב. כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, אֲמַר כְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידַּךְ: וַאֲנָא בְּשִׁיקְרָא אִישְׁתְּבַעִי?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It is **as** it was **with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi,** who, **when they were standing up in the presence of Rav,** their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One **Sage said:** On my **oath Rav said like this, and** the other **Sage said:** On my **oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav** to clarify what he had said, **he stated** his opinion **in accordance with** what **one of them** had said. **The other said to** Rav: **Did I** then **take a false oath?**


###### Shevuot 26a:18
[Shevuot 26a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:18)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִבָּךְ אֲנָסָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav **said to him: Your heart compelled you.** It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.


###### Shevuot 26a:19
[Shevuot 26a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:19)

״וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ״ – שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנּוּ שְׁבוּעָה. יָכוֹל שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנּוּ חֵפֶץ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ״ – עַל הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The *baraita* teaches: The phrase **“and it is hidden from him”** teaches that **one who was unaware of his oath,** i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One **might** have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath **because he was unaware** that a particular item is forbidden as the **object** of his oath; therefore, **the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object** of the oath.


###### Shevuot 26a:20
[Shevuot 26a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:20)

מַחֲכוּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁבוּעָה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּלָא חֵפֶץ, כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין״, וּכְסָבוּר ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ קָאָמַר – דִּשְׁבוּעֲתֵיהּ אִינְּשִׁי, חֶפְצָא דְּכִיר; אֶלָּא חֵפֶץ בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**They laughed at this in the West,** Eretz Yisrael, and said: **Granted, you find** lack of awareness of one’s **oath without** there being lack of awareness of **the object** of the oath, as in a case **where one said:** On my **oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat** wheat bread, **as** in that case **his oath is forgotten** and **the object** of it **is remembered. But** under **what circumstances** is there a case of lack of awareness of **the object** of the oath **without** lack of awareness of the **oath** itself?


###### Shevuot 26a:21
[Shevuot 26a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:21)

כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין״, וּכְסָבוּר ״שֶׁל שְׂעוֹרִים״ קָאָמַר – דִּשְׁבוּעֲתֵיהּ דְּכִיר לֵיהּ, חֶפְצָא אִינְּשִׁי. כֵּיוָן דְּחֶפְצָא אִינְּשִׁי לְהוּ, הַיְינוּ הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case **where he said:** On my **oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said:** On my oath I will not eat **barley** bread, **as** in that case **his oath is remembered by him** and **the object** of it **is forgotten.** The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **Once the object** of the oath **is forgotten by him, that is** a case of **lack of awareness of his oath.**


###### Shevuot 26a:22
[Shevuot 26a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:22)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דָּא וְדָא אַחַת הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rabbi Elazar said:** The distinction made in the *baraita* between lack of awareness of one’s oath and lack of awareness of the object of one’s oath is not valid, and both **this and that are one** and the same.


###### Shevuot 26a:23
[Shevuot 26a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:23)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: אַלְמָא חֵפֶץ בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? וְהָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין״, וְהוֹשִׁיט יָדוֹ לַסַּל לִיטּוֹל פַּת שְׂעוֹרִין; וְעָלְתָה בְּיָדוֹ שֶׁל חִטִּין, וּכְסָבוּר שְׂעוֹרִים הִיא וַאֲכָלָהּ; דִּשְׁבוּעֲתֵיהּ דְּכִיר לֵיהּ, חֶפְצָא הוּא דְּלָא יָדַע לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yosef objects to this.** Is it **really** the case that **you do not find** a case of lack of awareness of **the object** of an oath **without** lack of awareness of the **oath? But you find** it in a case **where he said:** On my **oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he extended his hand to the basket to take barley bread, and wheat** bread **came up in his hand, and he thought it was barley** bread **and ate it.** That is a case **where his oath is remembered by him, and it is the object** of the oath **of which he is unaware.**


###### Shevuot 26a:24
[Shevuot 26a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:24)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כְּלוּם מְחַיְּיבַתְּ לֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן – אֶלָּא אַמַּאי דִּתְפִיס בִּידֵיהּ; הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה הוּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to him: Don’t you deem him liable** to bring **an offering** for breaking his oath **only for that which he holds in his hand** and eats? When he eats the bread, that **is lack of awareness of the oath,** since he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.


###### Shevuot 26a:25
[Shevuot 26a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:25)

לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא – אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: סוֹף סוֹף, קׇרְבָּן דְּקָא מַיְיתֵי עֲלַהּ דְּהַאי פַּת מִיהַת, הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה הוּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara presents **another formulation** of this statement. **Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering he brings for this bread is in any event** due to **lack of awareness of the oath,** as he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.


###### Shevuot 26a:26
[Shevuot 26a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:26)

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר לָךְ: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי יָדַע לֵיהּ דְּחִטִּין הוּא – פָּרֵישׁ מִינֵּיהּ, הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Yosef** could **say to you: Since were he to know of it that it is wheat** bread **he would refrain from** eating **it,** this should be regarded as a case of **lack of awareness of the object.**


###### Shevuot 26a:27
[Shevuot 26a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:27)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הֶעְלֵם זֶה וְזֶה בְּיָדוֹ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְחַיָּיב. אַדְּרַבָּה, הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ בְּיָדוֹ, וּפָטוּר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava asked of Rav Naḥman:** In a case where one **has a lack of awareness of this,** the oath, **and that,** its object, **what is** the *halakha*? Rav Naḥman **said to him: He** breaks the oath while **having a lack of awareness of the oath and** is therefore **liable.** Rava replied: **On the contrary, he has a lack of awareness of the object** of the oath **and** should therefore be **exempt.**


###### Shevuot 26a:28
[Shevuot 26a:28](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:28)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: חָזֵינַן; אִי מֵחֲמַת שְׁבוּעָה קָא פָרֵישׁ – הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְחַיָּיב; אִי מֵחֲמַת חֵפֶץ קָא פָרֵישׁ – הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ בְּיָדוֹ, וּפָטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said: We see: If he refrains** from eating **due to the oath,** i.e., when he is reminded that he took an oath, **he had a lack of awareness of the oath and is liable. If he refrains due to the object** of the oath, i.e., when he is reminded what it is he is about to eat, **he had a lack of awareness due to the object, and is exempt.**


###### Shevuot 26a:29
[Shevuot 26a:29](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:29)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: כְּלוּם פָּרֵישׁ מִשְּׁבוּעָה – אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם חֵפֶץ! כְּלוּם פָּרֵישׁ מֵחֵפֶץ – אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעָה! אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn’t he refrain from** breaking the **oath due to** his recognition of the **object? Doesn’t he refrain from** the **object due only to** the **oath?** In either case, he needs to remember both the oath and its object, and the manner in which he was reminded does not serve to indicate anything. **Rather, there is no difference** between the two.


###### Shevuot 26a:30
[Shevuot 26a:30](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/26a:30)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava asked of Rav Naḥman:**