## Shevuot Daf 32a

###### Shevuot 32a:1
[Shevuot 32a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:1)

עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ מִפִּי הַתּוֹבֵעַ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**until they hear** a demand to testify directly **from the mouth of the plaintiff.**


###### Shevuot 32a:2
[Shevuot 32a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:2)

רָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֵּיוָן דְּרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְהוּ דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Mentioning the case of the plaintiff **pursuing them was necessary for** Shmuel, as otherwise it could **enter your mind to say: Since** the plaintiff **is pursuing them,** it is **like** the case of **one who says to them** directly to testify. Therefore, Shmuel **teaches us** that although the intent of the plaintiff is for them to testify, the witnesses are liable only if he tells them so explicitly.


###### Shevuot 32a:3
[Shevuot 32a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:3)

וְהָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לְעֵדִים ״בּוֹאוּ וְהַעִידוּנִי״, ״שְׁבוּעָה״ כּוּ׳ – אָמַר אִין, לָא אָמַר לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But this too, we learn** in the mishna: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false **oath of testimony, how so?** In a case where the plaintiff **said to** two **witnesses: Come and testify** on **my** behalf, and they replied: On our **oath, etc.,** from which it can be inferred that if the plaintiff **said** this to the witnesses, **yes,** they are liable, and if he **did not say** this to the witnesses, **no,** they are not liable.


###### Shevuot 32a:4
[Shevuot 32a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:4)

״אָמַר״ לָאו דַּוְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: No proof may be cited from the mishna, as perhaps when the *tanna* states: In a case where the plaintiff **said,** he did **not** mean that this is the *halakha* only in a case where he **specifically** verbalized his demand that they testify; rather, the same would be true even if he conveyed his intent in a non-verbal manner.


###### Shevuot 32a:5
[Shevuot 32a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:5)

דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, גַּבֵּי פִּקָּדוֹן דְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ ; הָכָא נָמֵי – אָמַר אִין, לָא אָמַר לָא?! הָא ״וְכִחֶשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ כֹּל דְּהוּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As, if you do not say so** and assert that the language of the mishna is precise and one is liable only if the oath was in response to a verbal demand, then as for the mishna (36b), **which teaches with regard to a deposit:** Liability to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false **oath on a deposit, how so?** In a case where the owner **said to** the bailee: **Give me** the **deposit that belongs to me** and is **in your possession,** would you say there, **also,** that if the owner **said** this to the bailee, **yes,** he is liable, and if he **did not say** this to the bailee, **no,** he is not liable? **But** doesn’t the verse **“And deals falsely with his colleague** in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21) indicate that the bailee is liable for any denial of the deposit **at all,** unrelated to the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item?


###### Shevuot 32a:6
[Shevuot 32a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:6)

אֶלָּא ״אָמַר״ לָאו דַּוְקָא; הָכָא נָמֵי לָאו דַּוְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it must be that when the *tanna* says with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner **said** to the bailee, he did **not** mean that this is the *halakha* only in a case where he **specifically** verbalized his demand. **Here too,** with regard to the oath of testimony, the *tanna* did **not** mean that this is the *halakha* only in a case where the plaintiff **specifically** verbalized his demand.


###### Shevuot 32a:7
[Shevuot 32a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:7)

הַאי מַאי? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָכָא דַּוְקָא – תְּנָא הָתָם אַטּוּ הָכָא. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָתָם דַּוְקָא וְלָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָכָא דַּוְקָא – ״אָמַר״ ״אָמַר״ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנְיַיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is this** comparison? **Granted, if you say that here,** when the *tanna* says in the mishna with regard to the oath of testimony: In a case where the plaintiff **said** to two individuals, it is **specifically** in a case where the plaintiff verbalized his demand, one could explain that the *tanna* **taught there,** with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner said, **due to** the fact that he employed that formulation **here** in the mishna. *Tanna’im* frequently employ uniform language in different cases, even though there are halakhic differences between them. **But if you say** that **neither there** with regard to the oath on a deposit is it **specifically** in a case where the owner verbally **said, nor here** with regard to the oath of testimony is it **specifically** in a case where the plaintiff verbally **said, why do I** need **to teach: Said, said,** in both instances?


###### Shevuot 32a:8
[Shevuot 32a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:8)

דִּלְמָא אוֹרְחָא דְּמִילְּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Perhaps** the *tanna* **is teaching us the matter** in **the manner in which** it typically occurs, as both a plaintiff and the owner of a deposit typically articulate their claims verbally. It may still be that if the demand was conveyed non-verbally, the witness is liable. Since there is no proof from the mishna, the statement of Shmuel is necessary to teach that if the demand is not articulated verbally, the witness is not liable for taking a false oath.


###### Shevuot 32a:9
[Shevuot 32a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:9)

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: רָאוּהוּ שֶׁבָּא אַחֲרֵיהֶן, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״מָה אַתָּה בָּא אַחֲרֵינוּ? שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״ – פְּטוּרִין. וְאִם בְּפִקָּדוֹן – חַיָּיבִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes that **it is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Shmuel:** In a case where the witnesses **saw that** the plaintiff **was pursuing them,** and **they said to him:** For **what** reason **are you pursuing us;** on our **oath we do not know testimony on your** behalf, **they are exempt. And if** it is **with regard to** an oath on **a deposit,** in a case where the owner is pursuing the bailee and he denies that the deposit is in his possession, the bailees **are liable,** as they are liable for any denial of the deposit at all, irrespective of the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item.


###### Shevuot 32a:10
[Shevuot 32a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:10)

הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים כּוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If **he administered an oath to them five times** and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court.


###### Shevuot 32a:11
[Shevuot 32a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:11)

מְנָלַן דְּאַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין הוּא דִּמְחַיְּיבִי, אַחוּץ לְבֵית דִּין לָא מִחַיְּיבִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive **that it is** specifically **for denial in court that they are liable,** and **they are not liable for** denial **outside court?**


###### Shevuot 32a:12
[Shevuot 32a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:12)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ״ – לֹא אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִילּוּ מַגִּיד זֶה, מִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה מָמוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said:** It is derived as **the verse states** with regard to the oath of testimony: **“If he does not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity”** (Leviticus 5:1), from which it is derived: **I said** this *halakha* **to you only in a place where, were this** witness **to utter** his testimony, **that** other individual **becomes liable** to make **a monetary** payment, i.e., in court. He is not liable for denial in a place where his testimony would not render one liable to pay.


###### Shevuot 32a:13
[Shevuot 32a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:13)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא שְׁבוּעָה גּוּפַאּ – בְּבֵית דִּין אֵין, וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, say** that it is not the denial but **the oath itself;** if it is taken **in court, yes,** he is liable, **and** if it is **that** which is **not** taken **in court, no,** he is not liable.


###### Shevuot 32a:14
[Shevuot 32a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:14)

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לְאַחַת״ – לְחַיֵּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּבֵית דִּין, מִי מְחַיֵּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת?! וְהָתְנַן: הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְכָפְרוּ – אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָם יְכוֹלִין לַחְזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת. אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שְׁבוּעָה – חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, כְּפִירָה – בְּבֵית דִּין?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye said to Rav Pappa: That should **not enter your mind, as it is taught** in a *baraita* that the verse: “And it will be when he is guilty **of any one** of these” (Leviticus 5:5), serves **to render** one **liable** to bring an offering **for each and every** instance when one repeatedly performs the transgressions for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. **And if it enters your mind** that one is liable only for an oath taken **in court, is one liable for each and every** oath? **But didn’t we learn** in the mishna: If **he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied** knowledge of any testimony relating to the incident, **they are liable** for taking **only one** false oath. **Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason** for this ruling? **Since** once they denied that they had any knowledge of the matter **they can no** longer **retract** that denial **and admit** that they have knowledge of the matter. Abaye explains: **Rather,** must one **not conclude from it** that one is liable for each and every **oath** taken **outside court;** but one is liable only if the **denial** is **in court?**


###### Shevuot 32a:15
[Shevuot 32a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:15)

כָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאַחַת – חַיָּיבִין. הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If **both of** the witnesses **denied** knowledge of the incident **together,** both of them **are liable.** The Gemara asks: **But** isn’t it **impossible** for two events **to coincide precisely?** By necessity, one denial must have preceded the other.


###### Shevuot 32a:16
[Shevuot 32a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:16)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הִיא, דְּאָמַר אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** mishna? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says:** It is **possible** for two events **to coincide precisely.**


###### Shevuot 32a:17
[Shevuot 32a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:17)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר – וְתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even** if **you say** that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis** who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the mishna can be interpreted in a case **where both of them denied** knowledge of relevant testimony **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase, **and** the halakhic status of a pause or retraction **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase **is like** that of continuous **speech.** Although the two statements did not coincide precisely, their halakhic status is as if they did.


###### Shevuot 32a:18
[Shevuot 32a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:18)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מִכְּדִי תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כַּמָּה הָוֵי – כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת תַּלְמִיד לָרַב, אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת הָרַב לַתַּלְמִיד; עַד דְּאָמְרִי ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״, טוּבָא הָוֵי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד תּוֹךְ דִּיבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: After all, how long is** the duration of: **Within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase? It is an interval **equivalent to** the duration of **the** three-word **greeting of a student to** his **teacher:** *Shalom alekha rabbi*. **Some say** that it is a briefer interval, **equivalent to** the duration of **the** two-word **greeting of a teacher to** his **student:** *Shalom alekha*. According to either opinion, in the time that elapses **until** the two of them **say:** On my **oath we do not know** any **testimony for you, it is** an interval **greater** than the time required to utter those words. How, then, can the mishna be interpreted as referring to a case where they stated their denials within the time required for speaking those words? Ravina **said to** Rav Aḥa of Difti: The case in the mishna is one where **each and every** potential witness will issue his denial **within** the time required **for speaking,** starting from the end of the statement **of the other.**


###### Shevuot 32a:19
[Shevuot 32a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:19)

בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא – דְּתַנְיָא: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵד אֶחָד – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְחַיֵּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If they denied knowledge **one after the other, the first** one who denied knowledge is **liable, and the second** one is **exempt,** as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive, and he is exempt from the oath of testimony. The Gemara notes: **The mishna is not in accordance with** the opinion of **this *tanna*, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: In the case of **one who administers an oath to one witness,** the witness is **exempt** from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony; **and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, deems** the witness **liable** to bring an offering. In his opinion, the second witness in the case in the mishna would be liable, not exempt.


###### Shevuot 32a:20
[Shevuot 32a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:20)

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אָתֵא – לִשְׁבוּעָה הוּא דְּקָא אָתֵא; וּמָר סָבַר: עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אֲתָא – לְמָמוֹנָא קָא אָתֵא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that **they disagree about this:** One **Sage,** the first *tanna*, **holds: When one witness comes** to testify, **it is to** render the one against whom he is testifying liable to take **an oath,** and that is the reason **that he is coming,** as one witness cannot render him liable to make a monetary payment. **And** one **Sage,** Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, **holds: When one witness comes** to testify, **it is to** render the one against whom he is testifying liable to make **a monetary** payment, and that is the reason that **he is coming.** The *tanna’im* disagree whether denial by one witness constitutes a denial with regard to monetary matters.


###### Shevuot 32a:21
[Shevuot 32a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:21)

וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! הָאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה, וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה; הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **And** how can **you understand** their dispute in that way? **Doesn’t Abaye say: All** concede **with regard to a witness** in the case **of a *sota*** that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; **and all concede with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota*; and** there is **a dispute with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota*. All concede with regard to one witness** that he is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony because he cannot render another liable to make a monetary payment; **and all concede with regard to a witness** testifying on behalf of the claimant **when his counterpart,** the defendant, **is suspect about the oath.**


###### Shevuot 32a:22
[Shevuot 32a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:22)

אֶלָּא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אָתֵי – לִשְׁבוּעָה קָא אָתֵי; וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן – כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי, וּמָר סָבַר לָאו כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Rather, all concede** that **when one witness comes** to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable **to** take **an oath,** and that is the reason **he is coming. And here they disagree about this:** One **Sage,** Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, **holds: A matter that causes financial** loss **is considered** to have **monetary** value. Although the testimony of one witness does not render one liable for monetary payment, occasionally the party against whom he testified will prefer to pay rather than take the oath that the witness rendered him liable to take. In those cases, the testimony of one witness does in fact cause money to be paid. **And** one **Sage,** the first *tanna*, **holds:** A matter that causes financial loss **is not considered** to have **monetary** value.


###### Shevuot 32a:23
[Shevuot 32a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:23)

גּוּפָא – אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה, וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה; הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ With regard to **the** matter **itself, Abaye says: All concede with regard to a witness** in the case **of a *sota*** that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; **and all concede with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota*; and** there is **a dispute with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota*. All concede with regard to one witness, and all concede with regard to a witness** testifying on behalf of the claimant **when his counterpart is suspect about the oath.**


###### Shevuot 32a:24
[Shevuot 32a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:24)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה – שֶׁחַיָּיב, בְּעֵד טוּמְאָה; דְּרַחֲמָנָא הֵימְנֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב ״וְעֵד אֵין בָּהּ״ – כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **All concede with regard to a witness** in the case **of a *sota* that** he is **liable** for taking a false oath of testimony **in** the case of **a witness of impurity.** This is referring to a case where the husband issues a warning to his wife in the presence of two witnesses that she may not enter into seclusion with a certain man and witnesses testify that she entered into seclusion with him, and one witness testifies that she engaged in intercourse with that man, **as** in that case **the Merciful One accorded credibility to** the witness, **as it is written** with regard to a *sota*: **“And there is no witness against her”** (Numbers 5:13), that she engaged in intercourse. From that verse it is derived that **any** witness **that there is against her** is sufficient to render her forbidden to her husband and enable him to divorce her without paying the sum stipulated in the marriage contract. Therefore, the witness who testified that she engaged in intercourse with that man is for all intents and purposes a witness to a monetary matter.


###### Shevuot 32a:25
[Shevuot 32a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32a:25)

וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה – שֶׁפָּטוּר, בְּעֵדֵי קִינּוּי; דְּהָוֵה גּוֹרֵם דְּגוֹרֵם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And all concede with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota* that** each witness is **exempt** from liability due to a false oath of testimony. This is referring **to** the case of **witnesses of warning,** who testify that the jealous husband warned his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, **as** each witness **is** the **cause of a cause** of financial loss, not a direct cause of that loss. In order to lose payment of her marriage contract, in addition to the witnesses of warning, witnesses of seclusion would also be required, after which either a witness would testify that she engaged in intercourse or she would be required to drink the bitter water of a *sota*, either of which would confirm that she engaged in an adulterous relationship.