## Shevuot Daf 32b

###### Shevuot 32b:1
[Shevuot 32b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:1)

וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה – בְּעֵדֵי סְתִירָה; מָר סָבַר: דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי – וְחַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי – וּפָטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** there is **a dispute with regard to witnesses** in the case **of a *sota*;** this is referring **to witnesses of seclusion** who testify that the woman who was warned by her husband in fact entered into seclusion with the man in question. One **Sage,** Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, **holds** that **a matter that causes financial** loss **is considered** to have **monetary** value, **and** each witness is **liable** for taking a false oath of testimony, as had they testified the woman would lose her marriage contract. **And** one **Sage,** the Rabbis, **hold** that a matter that causes financial loss **is not considered** to have **monetary** value, **and he is exempt.**


###### Shevuot 32b:2
[Shevuot 32b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:2)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ It is stated above further: **All concede with regard to** a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant **when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. All concede in** the case of **one witness,** as in the incident **with Rabbi Abba.**


###### Shevuot 32b:3
[Shevuot 32b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:3)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה – דַּחֲשִׁיד מַאן? אִילֵימָא דַּחֲשִׁיד לֹוֶה, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ מַלְוֶה: אִי אֲתֵית אַסְהֵדְתְּ לִי, הֲוָה מִשְׁתְּבַעְנָא וְשָׁקֵילְנָא; וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: מִי יֵימַר דְּמִשְׁתְּבַעְתְּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **All concede with regard to** a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant **when his counterpart is suspect about the oath.** The testimony of one witness renders the borrower liable to take an oath that he does not owe money. The Gemara asks: In a case **where who is suspect? If we say that the borrower** who is denying the debt **is suspect,** and it is a case **where the lender says to** the witness: **If you came** and **testified on my** behalf **I would have taken an oath and taken** the sum owed me from the borrower, since he is suspect with regard to oaths, why would the witness be liable for taking a false oath of testimony? **Let** the witness **say to** the lender: **Who** could **say that you** would have **taken an oath?** Since there is no certainty that he would have taken the oath, the witness is merely the cause of a cause of financial loss.


###### Shevuot 32b:4
[Shevuot 32b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:4)

אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶן חֲשׁוּדֵין, דְּאָמַר מָר: חָזְרָה שְׁבוּעָה לַמְחוּיָּב לָהּ, וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is a case **where both** the borrower and the lender **are suspect, as the Master says:** Since both are suspect, the **oath reverts to the one who is** initially **obligated to take it,** i.e., the borrower, **and since he is unable to take the oath** because he is suspect, **he pays** the entire claim to the lender. One witness rendered the borrower liable to pay the debt.


###### Shevuot 32b:5
[Shevuot 32b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:5)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא – דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּחֲטַף נְסָכָא מֵחַבְרֵיהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַבִּי אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ; אֲזַל אַיְיתִי חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִיחְטָף חַטְפַהּ מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״אִין, חֲטַפִי – וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye said: **All concede in** the case of **one witness,** as in the incident **with Rabbi Abba.** What are the circumstances? **As** there was **a certain man who snatched** a silver **ingot from another.** The one from whom it was taken **came before Rabbi Ami** while **Rabbi Abba was sitting before him,** and he **went** and **brought one witness** who testified **that** the defendant indeed **snatched it from him.** The one who snatched it **said to him: Yes,** it is true that **I snatched** it, **but I** merely **snatched** that which was **mine.**


###### Shevuot 32b:6
[Shevuot 32b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:6)

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הֵיכִי (לִדַיְּינֵי) [לִידַיְּינוּהּ] דַּיָּינֵי לְהַאי דִּינָא? לִישַׁלֵּם – לֵיכָּא תְּרֵי סָהֲדִי! לִיפְטְרֵיהּ – הָא אִיכָּא חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִחְטָף חֲטַף! לִישְׁתְּבַע – כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״אֵין, חֲטַפִי – וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי״, הָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּגַזְלָן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָוֵה לֵיהּ מְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע, וְכׇל הַמְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ami said: How shall judges rule in this case? Let** the judges require him to **pay.** But **there are not two witnesses** who witnessed the robbery. **Let** the judges rule to **exempt him** from payment. **But there is one witness that he snatched** the ingot. Based on the testimony of that witness, **let** the alleged robber **take an oath** that he did not snatch the ingot. But **once he said: Yes, I snatched** it, **but I** merely **snatched** that which was **mine,** his halakhic status **is like** that of **a robber,** who is disqualified from taking an oath. **Rabbi Abba said to him: He is** one who is **obligated** to take **an oath but is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is obligated** to take **an oath but is unable to take an oath** is liable to **pay.** In that case, were that witness to take a false oath and deny knowledge of the matter, he would be liable.


###### Shevuot 32b:7
[Shevuot 32b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:7)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Pappa says: All concede with regard to** the **witness of a death that he is liable** for taking an oath of testimony if he took a false oath and denied knowledge of the incident, **and all concede with regard to** the **witness of a death that he is exempt** in that case.


###### Shevuot 32b:8
[Shevuot 32b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:8)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר – דַּאֲמַר לַהּ לְדִידַהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ – תִּנָּשֵׂא, ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ – תִּתְיַבֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **All concede with regard to** the **witness of a death that he is exempt where he said to** the wife **herself** that her husband is dead, **but he did not tell** it **to the court,** and now he denies his earlier statement, **as we learned** in a mishna (*Eduyyot* 1:12): **The woman who said: My husband died, shall remarry** on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she says: **My husband died, she shall enter into levirate marriage** with her brother-in-law on the basis of her own testimony. The fact that the witness subsequently denied knowledge of the matter does not cause her to lose her marriage contract, since she can come to the court and testify based on the statement of the witness and collect her marriage contract.


###### Shevuot 32b:9
[Shevuot 32b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:9)

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב – דְּלָא אָמַר לְדִידַהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**All concede with regard to** the **witness of a death that he is liable** in a case **where he did not say** that the husband is dead **to** the wife **herself nor did he say** it **to the court.** In that case, his denial of knowledge of the matter causes the wife to lose payment of her marriage contract.


###### Shevuot 32b:10
[Shevuot 32b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:10)

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע חַיָּיב? דִּלְמָא דִּתְפִישָׂא מִטַּלְטְלֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Shall we **conclude from** here that according to Rav Pappa, in the case of **one who administers an oath to witnesses** with regard to **land,** the witnesses are **liable** for taking a false oath of testimony, given that the marriage contract here is collected from land belonging to the husband? This matter is subject to a dispute between the Sages (37b). The Gemara answers: No proof may be cited from here, as **perhaps** Rav Pappa is referring to a case **where she seizes** her husband’s **movable property** as payment for her marriage contract. Therefore, this is not considered testimony with regard to land.


###### Shevuot 32b:11
[Shevuot 32b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:11)

כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד כּוּ׳. הַשְׁתָּא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ קָא כָפְרִי – אָמְרַתְּ הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר; כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד מִיבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If **one** of the two witnesses **denied** knowledge of the incident, **and** the other **one admitted** that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, **the one who denies** knowledge of the incident is **liable.** The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary to teach this *halakha* in the mishna? **Now** that in the previous case, where the potential witnesses **both** denied knowledge of the matter **one after the other, you said: The first is liable and the second is exempt,** in a case where **one denied** knowledge **and one admitted** that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, **is** it **necessary** to mention that the one who denied knowledge is liable?


###### Shevuot 32b:12
[Shevuot 32b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:12)

לָא צְרִיכָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן, וְחָזַר אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְהוֹדָה בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר; וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** it is **necessary** to state this *halakha* in a case **where both of them denied** knowledge of the matter, **and one of them retracted** his denial **and admitted** to knowledge of the matter **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase. **And this teaches us that** the halakhic status of a pause or retraction **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase **is like** that of continuous **speech.**


###### Shevuot 32b:13
[Shevuot 32b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:13)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּמוֹקֵי לַהּ לְהָהוּא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – רֵישָׁא אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וְסֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – רֵישָׁא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, סֵיפָא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר! תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who interprets** the previous case in the mishna in which the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident as one, and they are liable **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,** a different *halakha* may be learned from each clause in the mishna. It is learned from **the first clause** that it is **possible** for two events **to coincide precisely, and the latter clause was necessary to teach us that** the halakhic status of a pause or retraction **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase **is like** that of continuous **speech. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,** the *halakha* of: **Within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase, is learned from **the first clause,** and the *halakha* of: **Within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase, is learned from **the latter clause. Why do I** need **two** clauses to teach the same *halakha*?


###### Shevuot 32b:14
[Shevuot 32b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:14)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי כְּפִירָה וּכְפִירָה, אֲבָל כְּפִירָה וְהוֹדָאָה – אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, both clauses are necessary. **Lest you say** that **this statement:** The halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, applies only in a case where the first statement is **a denial and** the second statement is **a denial; but** in a case where the first statement is **a denial and** the second statement is **an admission, say** that **no,** its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech and one cannot admit knowledge after having denied it. Therefore, the *tanna* **teaches us** that even in a case where he retracts the denial and admits his knowledge, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech.


###### Shevuot 32b:15
[Shevuot 32b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/32b:15)

הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה. בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁנִיָּה תִּתְחַיֵּיב – דְּכָפְרָה לַהּ רִאשׁוֹנָה; אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹנָה אַמַּאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If **there were two sets of witnesses** that took the oath of testimony, and **the first** set **denied** knowledge of the matter **and thereafter, the second** set **denied** knowledge of the matter, both sets of witnesses are liable. The Gemara asks: **Granted,** the **second** set **will be held liable, as** since **the first** set **denied** knowledge of the matter, the ability of the plaintiff to collect his monetary claim is dependent exclusively on the second set, and their denial caused his loss. **But why** is the **first** set liable?