## Shevuot Daf 34a

###### Shevuot 34a:1
[Shevuot 34a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:1)

כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן; עֵדוּת שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָּהּ נָשִׁים כַּאֲנָשִׁים, קְרוֹבִים כִּרְחוֹקִים, פְּסוּלִין כִּכְשֵׁרִים; וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**each and every** oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath **before a court or not before a court,** and despite the broad application of the *halakha*, the verse **is speaking** of liability **only in** cases involving **a monetary claim,** then in the case of an oath of **testimony with regard to which** the Torah **did not render** the halakhic status of **women like** that of **men,** the status of **relatives like** that of **non-relatives,** and the status of **unfit** witnesses **like** that of those **fit** to testify, **and he is liable** to bring **only one** sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter **in the presence of a court, is it not right that** the verse **is speaking** of liability **only in** cases involving **a monetary claim?**


###### Shevuot 34a:2
[Shevuot 34a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:2)

מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג; תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדוּת – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָּהּ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* rejects this inference: **What** is notable **about** the case of **a deposit?** It is notable in **that with regard to** a deposit the Torah **did not render** the halakhic status of **one to whom an oath was administered** by others **like** that of **one who** himself **took an oath,** as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; **and** the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes **an intentional** false oath **like** that of one who takes **an unwitting** false oath. **Will you say** that the same is true **with regard to** an oath of **testimony, as in** that case the Torah **rendered** the halakhic status of **one to whom an oath was administered** by others **like** that of **one who** himself **took an oath; and** it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes **an intentional** false oath **like** that of one who takes **an unwitting** false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?


###### Shevuot 34a:3
[Shevuot 34a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:3)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תֶּחֱטָא״–״תֶּחֱטָא״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה – נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״תֶּחֱטָא״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״; מָה לְהַלָּן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן, אַף כָּאן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, **the verse states** the term **“shall sin”** with regard to an oath of testimony and states **“shall sin”** with regard to an oath on a deposit in order **to** derive **a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated** with regard to an oath of testimony: **“Shall sin”** (Leviticus 5:1), **and there, it is stated** with regard to an oath on a deposit: **“Shall sin”** (Leviticus 5:21). **Just as there,** concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse **is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here,** concerning an oath of testimony, the verse **is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.**


###### Shevuot 34a:4
[Shevuot 34a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:4)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: ״אוֹ״ ״אוֹ״ בִּיטּוּי יוֹכִיחוּ – שֶׁהֵן ״אוֹאִין״, וְיֵשׁ עִמָּהֶן שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין עִמָּהֶן כֹּהֵן – וּמְדַבְּרִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ After presenting the different proofs cited in the *baraita*, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term “or” that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term “or” and there is no priest in their context. **Rabba bar Ulla objects to this:** The multiple instances of the term “or” in the verse: **“Or** if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil **or** to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on **an utterance, will prove** that one is liable even without a monetary claim, **as they are** multiple instances of the term **“or,” and there is an oath in their** context, **and there is no priest in their** context, **and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.**


###### Shevuot 34a:5
[Shevuot 34a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:5)

מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **It stands to reason** that **he should have derived** the *halakha* with regard to an oath of testimony **from** an oath on **a deposit** and not from an oath on an utterance **due to** the verbal analogy between the terms **“shall sin”** and **“shall sin.”**


###### Shevuot 34a:6
[Shevuot 34a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:6)

אַדְּרַבָּה – מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת מֵחַטָּאת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **On the contrary, he should have derived** the *halakha* with regard to an oath of testimony **from** the *halakha* with regard to an oath on **an utterance, as** it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring **a sin-offering** for taking a false oath **from** another case for which one is liable to bring **a sin-offering** for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.


###### Shevuot 34a:7
[Shevuot 34a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:7)

אֶלָּא מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף – שֶׁכֵּן חֵטְא; בְּמֵזִיד; תַּבְעֵיהּ וְכַפְרֵיהּ; וְעַבְרֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, it stands to reason** that **he should have derived** the *halakha* with regard to an oath of testimony **from** the *halakha* with regard to an oath on **a deposit, as** there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: **Sin, intentionally, claimed** from **him, denied his** claim, **and his past.** There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term “shall sin” appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.


###### Shevuot 34a:8
[Shevuot 34a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:8)

אַדְּרַבָּה, מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְחוֹמֶשׁ! הָנָךְ נְפִישָׁן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **On the contrary, he should have derived** the *halakha* with regard to an oath of testimony **from** the *halakha* with regard to an oath on **an utterance, as** there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: **Sin**-**offering, that descended, to one-fifth.** In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: **These** elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more **numerous** than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.


###### Shevuot 34a:9
[Shevuot 34a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:9)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ – יֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְיֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. הָא כֵּיצַד? תְּבָעוֹ מָמוֹן – חַיָּיב, תְּבָעוֹ דָּבָר אַחֵר – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rabbi Akiva says** that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: **“And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these”** (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: **There are** some **of these** for **which he is liable and there are** some **of these** for **which he is exempt. How so?** If the plaintiff **demanded** testimony from the witness with regard to **a monetary** claim, the witness is **liable** for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff **demanded** testimony from the witness with regard to **another matter,** he is **exempt.**


###### Shevuot 34a:10
[Shevuot 34a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:10)

אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, **I will reverse** it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.


###### Shevuot 34a:11
[Shevuot 34a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:11)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אַ״אוֹאִין״ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְמִיךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Akiva relies on** the multiple instances of the term **“or,”** as cited **by Rabbi Eliezer,** to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term “of these” Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.


###### Shevuot 34a:12
[Shevuot 34a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:12)

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּבֵין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the practical difference **between** the opinions of **Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?** With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?


###### Shevuot 34a:13
[Shevuot 34a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:13)

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע – לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר חַיָּיבִין, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּטוּרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The practical difference **between their** opinions is in the case of **one who administers an oath to witnesses** with regard to testimony involving **land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable** if they take a false oath. **According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt** in that case, as it is excluded by the term “of these.”


###### Shevuot 34a:14
[Shevuot 34a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:14)

וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר הָתָם: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פְּטוּרִין – הָכָא מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says there** with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of **one who administers an oath to witnesses** with regard to testimony involving **land,** the witnesses **are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what** difference **is there between** the opinions of **Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?**


###### Shevuot 34a:15
[Shevuot 34a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:15)

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ עֵדֵי קְנָס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The practical difference **between their** opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to **witnesses** with regard to testimony involving **a fine.** According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.


###### Shevuot 34a:16
[Shevuot 34a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:16)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״ – בְּעֵדוּת הַמִּתְקַיֶּימֶת בִּרְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה וּבִידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili** cites a different proof and **says:** The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: **“And he is a witness or he saw or he knew”** (Leviticus 5:1). It is **with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge** of the matter, **or by means of knowledge without sight,** that **the verse is speaking.** The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.


###### Shevuot 34a:17
[Shevuot 34a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִידּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ. דְּאִי אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא, בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say** that **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept** the opinion **of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Kamma* 3:6) that **Rabbi Aḥa says:** If there is **a rutting** male **camel [*gamal haoḥer*]** that is rampaging **among** other **camels and** then **a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this** rampaging camel **killed it,** and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. **As, if he is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Rabbi Aḥa** that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, **in** cases of **capital law too, you find** a case of knowledge without sight, **as** in the case discussed by **Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.**


###### Shevuot 34a:18
[Shevuot 34a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:18)

דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח: אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי אֶחָד שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתִּי אַחֲרָיו, וּמָצָאתִי סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָם מְטַפְטֵף וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר; אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: רָשָׁע! מִי הֲרָגוֹ לָזֶה? אוֹ אֲנִי, אוֹ אַתָּה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said** in the form of an oath: **I will** not **see the consolation** of Israel **if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping** from the sword, **and the slain** person **convulsing. I said to him: Wicked** one, **who killed this** person? It was **either me or you,** as there is no one else here.


###### Shevuot 34a:19
[Shevuot 34a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:19)

אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה, שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים יוּמַת הַמֵּת״. אֶלָּא הַמָּקוֹם יִפָּרַע מִמְּךָ. אָמְרוּ: לֹא זָזוּ מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ וָמֵת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control** and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, **as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death”** (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. **Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you.** The Sages **said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit** the pursuer **and he died.** Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.


###### Shevuot 34a:20
[Shevuot 34a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:20)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא; בִּשְׁלָמָא יְדִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ; אֶלָּא רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע אִם גּוֹי הָרַג אוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל הָרַג, אִם אָדָם טְרֵפָה הָרַג אוֹ שָׁלֵם הָרַג?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Even** if **you say** that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili **is of** the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion **of Rabbi Aḥa** that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. **Granted,** even in cases of capital law **you find** testimony based on **knowledge without sight, but how can you find** a case of **sight without knowledge? Don’t** the witnesses **need to know if** the one whom he witnessed killing another **killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [*tereifa*] or he killed** one whose body is **intact?**


###### Shevuot 34a:21
[Shevuot 34a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:21)

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קְנָס – פָּטוּר; דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חַיָּיב, נְהִי דִּידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – אַשְׁכְּחַן לַהּ; רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע גּוֹיָה בָּעַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּעַל, בְּתוּלָה בָּעַל בְּעוּלָה בָּעַל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **Conclude from it** that **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds** that in a case where **one administers an oath to witnesses** with regard to testimony involving **a fine,** the witnesses are **exempt** from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. **As if it enters your mind** to say that the witnesses are **liable, although you find** testimony with regard to fines based on **knowledge without sight,** and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of **sight without knowledge,** when it comes to fines, **don’t** the witnesses **need to know if** the rapist **engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman** or if **he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman,** if **he engaged in intercourse with a virgin** or if **he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin?** Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.


###### Shevuot 34a:22
[Shevuot 34a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/34a:22)

יָתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, וְיָתֵיב רַב יְהוּדָה וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מְנִיתִיךְ בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי״,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: **Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma:** If one demands payment from another and claims: **I counted for you** and gave you **one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,**