## Shevuot Daf 40b

###### Shevuot 40b:1
[Shevuot 40b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:1)

הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת קַרְקָעוֹת – פָּטוּר. בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If **he admitted to part of** the claim about the **land,** he is **exempt.** If he admitted **to part** of the claim about the **vessels,** he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:2
[Shevuot 40b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:2)

טַעְמָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – דְּקַרְקַע לָאו בַּת שְׁבוּעָה הִיא; הָא כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – חַיָּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara infers: **The reason** he is exempt in the first cases is **that** the claim was for **vessels and land, as** a claim with regard to **land is not subject to an oath; but** if the claim was for **vessels** of one type **and vessels** of another type, or for wheat and barley, **similar to** the case of a claim for **vessels and land** in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:3
[Shevuot 40b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:3)

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים נָמֵי פָּטוּר; וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים, חַיָּיב אַף עַל הַקַּרְקָעוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that **the same is true,** i.e., **that even** if the claim was for **vessels** of one type **and vessels** of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is **exempt. And** the reason **that** the mishna **teaches** specifically the case where the claim is for **vessels and land** is that this **teaches us that** in a case **where** the defendant **admitted to a part of** the claim with regard to the **vessels,** he is **liable** to take an oath **concerning the land as well.**


###### Shevuot 40b:4
[Shevuot 40b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:4)

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? זוֹקְקִין?! תְּנֵינָא: ״זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** this **teaching us?** Does it teach the *halakha* that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also **binds** the land to the oath? **We learn** this in a mishna in tractate *Kiddushin* (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property **binds the property that serves as a guarantee,** i.e., land, so that he is forced **to take an oath concerning it** too.


###### Shevuot 40b:5
[Shevuot 40b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:5)

הָא עִיקָּר, הָהִיא אַגַּב גְּרָרָא נַסְבַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This** mishna is the **primary** reference to this *halakha*, as it discusses the *halakhot* of oaths, whereas **that** mishna **cites it incidentally,** in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.


###### Shevuot 40b:6
[Shevuot 40b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:6)

וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין, וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – פָּטוּר. וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: יִישַׁר, וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן! אָמוֹרָאֵי נִינְהוּ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba** disagrees with Shmuel and **says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** If one **claimed** that another owes **him** both **wheat and barley, and** the latter **admitted to** owing **him one of them,** he is **exempt** from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: **But doesn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say** to Rav Naḥman: You have spoken **well** in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; **and so** also **said Rabbi Yoḥanan?** If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: **They are *amora’im*,** and they disagree **with regard to** the opinion **of Rabbi Yoḥanan.**


###### Shevuot 40b:7
[Shevuot 40b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:7)

תָּא שְׁמַע: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – פָּטוּר, וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב. טַעְמָא דִּטְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין; הָא חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof against the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from the mishna: If one **claimed** that another owes **him wheat, and** the defendant **admitted to** owing **him barley,** he is **exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems** him **liable** to take an oath. The Gemara infers: **The reason** he is exempt **is that he claimed** that he owes **him wheat and** the defendant **admitted to** owing **him barley; but** if the claim was for both **wheat and barley, and** the defendant **admitted to** owing **him one of them,** he would be **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:8
[Shevuot 40b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:8)

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין נָמֵי פָּטוּר, וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי הָכִי – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that **the same is true,** i.e., **that even** if the claim was for both **wheat and barley** the defendant is **exempt. And** the fact **that** the mishna **teaches** specifically **this** case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order **to convey to you the far-reaching nature of** the opinion of **Rabban Gamliel,** as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:9
[Shevuot 40b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:9)

תָּא שְׁמַע: טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת; וְהוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת, בְּקַרְקָעוֹת וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – פָּטוּר. הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת קַרְקַע – פָּטוּר. בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים – חַיָּיב. טַעְמָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – דְּקַרְקַע לָאו בַּת שְׁבוּעָה הִיא; הָא כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת – חַיָּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** another proof from the mishna: If one **claimed** that another owes **him vessels and land, and** the defendant **admitted to** owing him **vessels but denied** the claim of **land,** or if he admitted **to** owing him **land but denied** the claim of **vessels,** he is **exempt** from taking an oath. If **he admitted to part** of the claim with regard to the **land,** he is **exempt.** If he admitted **to part** of the claim with regard to the **vessels,** he is **liable** to take an oath. The Gemara infers: **The reason** he is exempt in the first cases is **that** the claim was for **vessels and land, as** a claim with regard to **land is not subject to an oath; but** if the claim was for **vessels** of one type **and vessels** of another type, **similar to** the case of a claim for **vessels and land** in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:10
[Shevuot 40b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:10)

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ כֵּלִים וְכֵלִים נָמֵי פָּטוּר; וְהָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּהוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת כֵּלִים, חַיָּיב אַף עַל הַקַּרְקָעוֹת. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? זוֹקְקִין?! תְּנֵינָא: זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת, לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן! הָא עִיקָּר, הָהִיא אַגַּב גְּרָרָא נַסְבַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that **the same is true, that even** if the claim was for **vessels** of one type **and vessels** of another type he is **exempt. And** the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because **this teaches us that** if the defendant **admitted to a part of** the claim with regard to the **vessels,** he is **liable** to take an oath **concerning the land as well.** The Gemara asks: **What is** this **teaching us?** Does it teach the *halakha* that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also **binds** the land to the oath? **We learn** this in a mishna in tractate *Kiddushin* (26a): The movable property **binds the property that serves as a guarantee,** so that he is forced **to take an oath concerning it** too. The Gemara answers: **This** mishna is the **primary** reference to this *halakha*, whereas **that** mishna **cites it incidentally.**


###### Shevuot 40b:11
[Shevuot 40b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:11)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: טְעָנוֹ שׁוֹר וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּשֶׂה, שֶׂה וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּשׁוֹר – פָּטוּר. טְעָנוֹ בְּשׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to** the opinion of **Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba** from a *baraita*: If one **claimed** that another owes **him an ox, and** the latter **admitted to** owing **him a sheep,** or conversely, if the claim was for **a sheep and** the defendant **admitted to** owing **him an ox,** he is **exempt** from taking an oath. If one **claimed** that another owes **him an ox and a sheep, and** the defendant **admitted to** owing **him one of them,** he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:12
[Shevuot 40b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:12)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא. אִי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba **said to him** in response: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Gamliel,** who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: **If** it is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Gamliel,** the defendant should be liable to take an oath **even** in **the first clause** of the *baraita*, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.


###### Shevuot 40b:13
[Shevuot 40b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:13)

אֶלָּא הָא מַנִּי – אַדְמוֹן הִיא; וְלָא דַּחוֹיֵי מְדַחֵינָא לָךְ, אֶלָּא תַּלְמוּד עָרוּךְ הוּא בְּפִיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא מַנִּי – אַדְמוֹן הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba explained: **Rather,** in accordance with **whose** opinion **is this? It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Admon,** who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). **And I am not dismissing your** objection insubstantially; **rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yoḥanan,** who would say: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Admon.**


###### Shevuot 40b:14
[Shevuot 40b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:14)

אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין, וְקָדַם וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – אִם כְּמַעֲרִים, חַיָּיב. אִם בְּמִתְכַּוֵּין, פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Anan says** that **Shmuel says:** If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and **claimed** that he owes **him wheat, and** before he finished his claim, the defendant **first admitted** that he owes **him barley,** in this case, **if** the defendant did so **as one who employs artifice,** so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is **liable** to take an oath. But **if** he did so **as one who intends** to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is **exempt.**


###### Shevuot 40b:15
[Shevuot 40b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:15)

וְאָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ שְׁתֵּי מְחָטִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב; לְפִיכָךְ יָצְאוּ כֵּלִים לְמָה שֶׁהֵן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Anan says** that **Shmuel says:** If one **claimed** that another owes **him two needles, and** the latter **admitted to** owing **him one of them,** he is **liable** to take an oath. It is **for this reason** that **vessels were singled out** in the verse, **to** teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of **any value.**


###### Shevuot 40b:16
[Shevuot 40b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:16)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וּפְרוּטָה, וְהוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּפְּרוּטָה – פָּטוּר. הוֹדָה בַּפְּרוּטָה וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa says:** If one **claimed** that another owes **him vessels and** also **one *peruta*, and** the latter **admitted to** owing **him** the **vessels but denied** the claim that he owes him the ***peruta*,** he is **exempt** from taking an oath. If he **admitted** that he owes him **one *peruta* but denied** the claim that he owes him the **vessels,** he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:17
[Shevuot 40b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:17)

חֲדָא כְּרַב, וַחֲדָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל. חֲדָא כְּרַב – דְּאָמַר: כְּפִירַת טַעֲנָה שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף. חֲדָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל – דְּאָמַר: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **One** of these rulings **is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav, and** the other **one is in accordance with** the opinion of **Shmuel.** The former **one,** that if the defendant denied owing the *peruta* he is exempt, **is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav, who says** that **the denial of a claim** must be of least the value of **two silver** *ma’a* in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter **one,** that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, **is in accordance with** the opinion of **Shmuel, who says** that if one **claimed** that another owes **him** both **wheat and barley, and** the latter **admitted to** owing **him one of them,** he is **liable** to take an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:18
[Shevuot 40b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:18)

״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – פָּטוּר. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: וּמַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעַת הֶיסֵּת. מַאי טַעְמָא? חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם תּוֹבֵעַ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יֵשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: **I have one hundred dinars in your possession,** and the defendant responded: **Nothing** of **yours** is **in my possession,** he is **exempt. Rav Naḥman says: And** the court **administers an oath of inducement [*heisset*],** an oath instituted by the Sages, **to him. What is the reason?** There is **a presumption** that **one does not make a claim unless he has** a valid case **against** the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant’s denial should be examined through an oath.


###### Shevuot 40b:19
[Shevuot 40b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:19)

אַדְּרַבָּה, חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ! אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, סָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵי לִי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **On the contrary;** there is **a presumption** that **a person does not exhibit insolence** by lying **in the presence of his creditor** to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant’s denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor’s categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily **avoiding** paying **him.** He **rationalizes** doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only **until** the time **that I have** enough money, **and** then **I will repay him.**


###### Shevuot 40b:20
[Shevuot 40b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:20)

תִּדַּע, דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמִלְוֶה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת. בְּפִקָּדוֹן – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Know** that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, **as Rav Idi bar Avin says** that **Rav Ḥisda says: One who denies** a claim **with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness** even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim **with regard to a deposit** and is proven to be lying **is disqualified from bearing witness.** The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.


###### Shevuot 40b:21
[Shevuot 40b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:21)

רַב חֲבִיבָא מַתְנֵי אַסֵּיפָא – ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״; לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, ״נְתַתִּיו לָךְ״ – פָּטוּר. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעַת הֶיסֵּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥaviva teaches** Rav Naḥman’s statement as referring **to the latter clause** in the mishna: If one said to another: **I have one hundred dinars in your possession,** and the latter **said to him: Yes,** and **the next day** the claimant **said to him: Give** the money **to me,** and the defendant responded: **I** already **gave it to you,** he is **exempt. And Rav Naḥman says:** Nevertheless, the court **administers an oath of inducement to him.**


###### Shevuot 40b:22
[Shevuot 40b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/40b:22)

מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי אַרֵישָׁא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַסֵּיפָא;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Naḥman’s statement: With regard to **the one who teaches** it in reference **to the former clause,** where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, **all the more so** does this *amora* agree that an oath of inducement is administered **in** the case of **the latter clause,** where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.