## Shevuot Daf 4a

###### Shevuot 4a:1
[Shevuot 4a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:1)

אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קׇרְבַּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**he is liable** for **only one** violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: **This is an oath on an utterance** for **which one is liable** to receive **lashes for its intentional** violation, **and** to bring **a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting** violation.


###### Shevuot 4a:2
[Shevuot 4a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:2)

״זוֹ הִיא דְּחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת״ – אֲבָל ״אוֹכַל״ וְלֹא אָכַל, לָא לָקֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It **is** specifically **this** case of an oath on an utterance for **which one is liable** to receive **lashes for its intentional** violation. **But** if a person stated: On my oath **I will eat, and** then **he did not eat, he is not flogged.** Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.


###### Shevuot 4a:3
[Shevuot 4a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:3)

מִכְּדִי הַאי סְתָמָא וְהַאי סְתָמָא; מַאי חָזֵי דְּעָבֵיד כִּי הַאי סְתָמָא? לֶעְבֵּיד כִּי הַאי סְתָמָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Now, this** mishna (27b) **is unattributed and that** mishna (2a) **is unattributed. What did** Rabbi Yoḥanan **see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed** mishna? **Let him** instead **practice in accordance with that unattributed** mishna.


###### Shevuot 4a:4
[Shevuot 4a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:4)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ – רַבִּי גּוּפֵיהּ, הֵיכִי סְתַם לַן הָכָא הָכִי וְהָכָא הָכִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara adds another question: **And according to your reasoning** that both *mishnayot* carry equal weight, then with regard to **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **himself,** when he redacted the Mishna, **how could he teach us as unattributed** both **this** opinion in the mishna **here and that** opinion in the mishna **there?** This would result in a contradiction.


###### Shevuot 4a:5
[Shevuot 4a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:5)

אֶלָּא מֵעִיקָּרָא סָבַר לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו, וְסַתְמַהּ, וַהֲדַר סָבַר אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו, וְסַתְמַהּ; וּמִשְׁנָה לֹא זָזָה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is apparent that **initially** Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi **held** that **for** a violation of **a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and** so **he taught it** as **an unattributed** mishna, **and** later **he retracted** his opinion and **held** that **one is not flogged for** a violation of such a prohibition, **and** so **he taught** that opinion as **an unattributed** mishna. **And** he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because **a mishna does not move from its place,** i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b).


###### Shevuot 4a:6
[Shevuot 4a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:6)

בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתָּא – כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וּלְמַלְקוֹת; מַרְאוֹת נְגָעִים – מַאי מַלְקוֹת אִיכָּא? בְּקוֹצֵץ בַּהַרְתּוֹ, וּכְרַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הִשָּׁמֶר״, ״פֶּן״ וְ״אַל״ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **In accordance with which** opinion **did you interpret** the mishna? **In accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael, and** it is referring to liability **to** receive **lashes.** The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of **shades of** leprous **marks, what** punishment of **lashes is there?** The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case **where one cuts off his snow-white** leprous **mark [*baheret*], and in accordance with** the principle that **Rabbi Avin says** that **Rabbi Ile’a** says, **as Rabbi Avin says** that **Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: Observe,** or: **Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition.** So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: “Observe the leprous mark” (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile’a’s principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes.


###### Shevuot 4a:7
[Shevuot 4a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:7)

יְצִיאוֹת שַׁבָּת, מַאי מַלְקוֹת אִיכָּא? לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין הוּא – וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין, אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו! מִשּׁוּם הָכִי קָא מוֹקֵימְנָא כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִין – לוֹקִין עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of **carrying out** that are prohibited **on Shabbat, what** punishment of **lashes is there?** The prohibition against doing so **is a prohibition** in the Torah **that** potentially **serves as a mandate** for court-imposed **capital punishment, and** the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of **any prohibition** in the Torah **that** potentially **serves as a mandate** for court-imposed **capital punishment, one is not flogged for its** violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: **It is due to that** reason that **we interpreted** the mishna to be **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael, as he says** that with regard to **a prohibition** in the Torah **that** potentially **serves as a mandate** for court-imposed **capital punishment, one is flogged for its** violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty.


###### Shevuot 4a:8
[Shevuot 4a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:8)

הָא לָאו הָכִי, קָיְימָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?! קַשְׁיָא יְדִיעוֹת! לָאו אָמְרַתְּ: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא – וּלְמַלְקוּת? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי – וּלְמַלְקוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that **were it not for this** reason, the mishna could be **interpreted in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva,** who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna’s detailing of the cases of one’s **awareness** of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses **a difficulty,** as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: **Didn’t you say** above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael and** the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability **to** receive **lashes?** Similarly, it is **also** possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva and** the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability **to** receive **lashes.**


###### Shevuot 4a:9
[Shevuot 4a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:9)

אִי הָכִי, ״יְדִיעוֹת״?! ״הַתְרָאוֹת״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, תְּנִי ״יְדִיעוֹת דְּהַתְרָאוֹת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so,** why did the *tanna* use the term: Cases of **awareness,** which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The *tanna* **should have** instead said: **Forewarnings,** as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: **This** is **not difficult;** emend and **teach** the mishna as saying: Cases of **awareness of forewarnings.**


###### Shevuot 4a:10
[Shevuot 4a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:10)

אִי הָכִי, ״שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע״?! תַּרְתֵּי הוּא דְּהָוְיָין! וְתוּ, ״אֶת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִלָּה וִידִיעָה בַּסּוֹף וְהֶעְלֵם בֵּינָתַיִם״ – הַעֲלָמָה לְמַלְקוּת מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ? וְתוּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה בְּעוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: **If so,** if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are **two** types **that are four? There are** only **two** types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. **And furthermore,** the continuation of the mishna states the case: **In which** one **had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but** had **a lapse of awareness in between,** when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: **What** is **the relevance of lapses of awareness to** one’s liability to receive **lashes? And furthermore,** that clause explicitly concludes: **This** person is liable **to** bring **a sliding-scale** offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes.


###### Shevuot 4a:11
[Shevuot 4a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:11)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: רַבִּי הִיא, וְנָסֵיב לַהּ אַלִּיבָּא דְתַנָּאֵי. בִּידִיעוֹת – נָסֵיב לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת – נָסֵיב לַהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna’s ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? **Rather, Rav Yosef said:** The mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **and he formulates** the mishna **according to** different ***tanna’im*,** as follows: **With regard to** cases of one’s **awareness** of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, **he formulates it in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yishmael,** and **with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva.**


###### Shevuot 4a:12
[Shevuot 4a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:12)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, וְאָמַר לִי: לָא תֵּימָא רַבִּי נָסֵיב לַהּ אַלִּיבָּא דְתַנָּאֵי – וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said: I said** this **statement** of Rav Yosef **before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say** that **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **formulates** the mishna **according to** different ***tanna’im* but he himself does not hold accordingly.**


###### Shevuot 4a:13
[Shevuot 4a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:13)

אֶלָּא רַבִּי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ מְפָרֵשׁ, דְּתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִלָּה וִידִיעָה בַּסּוֹף וְהֶעְלֵם בֵּינָתַיִם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעְלַם״ ״וְנֶעְלַם״ שְׁנֵי פְּעָמִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Kahana continued: **Rather, Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **From where** is it derived **that one is liable** to bring a sliding-scale offering **only for** cases **in which** one **had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and** had **a lapse of awareness** only **in between,** when he actually transgressed? **The verses state** with regard to a person’s awareness of the fact that he was impure: **“And it was concealed,” “and it was concealed”** (Leviticus 5:2–3), mentioning concealment **twice.** The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is **the statement of Rabbi Akiva.**


###### Shevuot 4a:14
[Shevuot 4a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Shevuot/r/4a:14)

רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says:** This proof **is not necessary,** as **it says** in the verse: