## Sotah Daf 29a

###### Sotah 29a:1
[Sotah 29a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:1)

שֶׁהֲרֵי עָשָׂה בָּהּ סְפֵק זוֹנָה כְּזוֹנָה. תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי קְרָא, שֶׁהֲרֵי עָשָׂה בָּהּ סְפֵק זוֹנָה כְּזוֹנָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**as** the Torah has already **rendered an uncertain** case of **a woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a man forbidden to her by the Torah [*zona*] as though** she is certainly **a *zona*,** since a *sota* is forbidden to her husband after seclusion even though there are no witnesses that she committed adultery, and therefore it should be prohibited for her to marry a priest just like any *zona*, then with regard to her prohibition against partaking of ***teruma* a verse should also not be necessary, as** it is prohibited for a *zona* to partake of *teruma*. Therefore, the Torah **renders an uncertain *zona* like** a certain ***zona*.**


###### Sotah 29a:2
[Sotah 29a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:2)

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אַרְבְּעָה קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי: חַד לְבַעַל, וְחַד לְבוֹעֵל, וְחַד לִכְהוּנָּה, וְחַד לִתְרוּמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it must be explained that **according to Rabbi Akiva,** the equivalent of **four verses** worthy of exposition **are written** with regard to the defilement of a *sota*, as he maintains that an additional *halakha* should be derived from the superfluous prefix *vav* in the verse: “And is defiled [*venitma’a*]” (Numbers 5:29). Therefore, **one** verse is written to forbid her **to** her **husband, and one** is to forbid her **to** her **paramour, and one** is to forbid her **to** marry into the **priesthood, and one** is to forbid her **to** partake of ***teruma*.**


###### Sotah 29a:3
[Sotah 29a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:3)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תְּלָתָא קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי: חַד לְבַעַל, וְחַד לְבוֹעֵל, וְחַד לִתְרוּמָה, וּכְהוּנָּה אָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yishmael** disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, as he does not expound on the superfluous *vav*, and therefore maintains that only **three verses are written: One** is to forbid her **to** her **husband, and one** is to forbid her **to** her **paramour, and one** is to forbid her **to** partake of ***teruma*. And** her being prohibited to marry into the **priesthood is derived through an *a fortiori*** inference, as described in the *baraita*.


###### Sotah 29a:4
[Sotah 29a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:4)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, מִמַּאי דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לִתְרוּמָה, וּכְהוּנָּה אָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? דִּילְמָא כִּי אִצְטְרִיךְ לִכְהוּנָּה, וּתְרוּמָה שַׁרְיָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And from where does Rabbi Yishmael** derive **that the verse was necessary** to teach the prohibition of a *sota* **to** partake of ***teruma*, and** her prohibition against marrying into the **priesthood is derived through an *a fortiori*** inference? **Perhaps** the verse **was necessary** in order to teach that it is prohibited for the woman to marry **into** the **priesthood, but *teruma* is permitted** for her?


###### Sotah 29a:5
[Sotah 29a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:5)

אָמַר לָךְ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא דּוּמְיָא דְּבַעַל וּבוֹעֵל. מָה בַּעַל וּבוֹעֵל מֵחַיִּים — אַף תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי מֵחַיִּים, לְאַפּוֹקֵי כְּהוּנָּה דִּלְאַחַר מִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael could have **said to you: It is reasonable** to derive from this verse a prohibition that is **similar to** the prohibitions derived from the other verses, i.e., that she is forbidden **to** her **husband and** her **paramour. Just as** she is forbidden to her **husband and** her **paramour** even **during** the **lifetime** of her husband, **so too,** the prohibition against partaking of ***teruma*** applies **also during** the **lifetime** of her husband, **to the exclusion of** her prohibition against marrying into the **priesthood, which** is relevant only **after** the **death** of her husband. The reason is that if her husband would divorce her it would be prohibited for her to marry a priest anyway.


###### Sotah 29a:6
[Sotah 29a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:6)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דּוּמְיָא דְּבַעַל וּבוֹעֵל לֵית לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** how would **Rabbi Akiva** respond? The Gemara answers: **He is not** of the opinion that it is more reasonable to derive a prohibition from the phrase “and is defiled” that is **similar to** the prohibitions involving her **husband and** her **paramour,** and therefore he requires two separate derivations; one for *teruma* and one for the priesthood.


###### Sotah 29a:7
[Sotah 29a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:7)

וְאִי נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ, מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וְחוֹמֶר טָרַח וְכָתֵב לַהּ קְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or alternatively,** perhaps **he accepts** the opinion that the *halakha* derived from “and is defiled” should be similar to the prohibitions involving the husband and paramour, but nevertheless, in certain instances with regard to **a matter that can be derived through an *a fortiori*** inference, the **verse** nevertheless **takes the trouble and writes** explicitly. Therefore, although unnecessary, two verses are stated, one for *teruma* and one for the priesthood.


###### Sotah 29a:8
[Sotah 29a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:8)

אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל וְאֵין בּוֹ דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל מֵהַאי קְרָא נָפְקָא: ״וְהַבָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּכׇל טָמֵא לֹא יֵאָכֵל״; וַדַּאי טָמֵא הוּא דְּלֹא יֵאָכֵל, הָא סָפֵק טָמֵא וְסָפֵק טָהוֹר — יֵאָכֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues discussing the *baraita*. **Rav Giddel said** that **Rav said:** The *halakha* with regard to **an entity that has awareness** in order for it **to be asked and** an entity that **lacks awareness** in order for it **to be asked** in cases of uncertain ritual impurity **is derived from this verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten”** (Leviticus 7:19). This would seem to indicate that specifically food that is **impure** for **certain is** that **which shall not be eaten, but** food for which it is **uncertain** whether it is **impure and uncertain** whether it is **pure can be eaten.**


###### Sotah 29a:9
[Sotah 29a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:9)

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״וְהַבָּשָׂר כׇּל טָהוֹר יֹאכַל בָּשָׂר״; וַדַּאי טָהוֹר הוּא דְּיֹאכַל בָּשָׂר, הָא סָפֵק טָמֵא וְסָפֵק טָהוֹר — לֹא יֹאכַל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
However, **say the latter clause** of the verse: **“And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh”** (Leviticus 7:19), which would seem to indicate that specifically one who is **pure** for **certain is** one **who shall eat meat, but** one for whom it is **uncertain** whether he is **impure and uncertain** whether he is **pure shall not eat.** The two clauses in the verse seem to contradict one another with regard to the status of uncertain purity.


###### Sotah 29a:10
[Sotah 29a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:10)

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כָּאן שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל, כָּאן שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ דַּעַת לִישָּׁאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** must one **not conclude from it** that the Torah differentiates between two different types of uncertainty? **Here,** the latter clause, which discusses “every one that is pure,” is referring to an entity **that has awareness** in order for it **to be asked,** e.g., a person, who is considered impure if he is uncertain whether he contracted ritual impurity. **There,** the former clause which discusses impure meat presents the principle of an entity **that lacks awareness** in order for it **to be asked,** where an uncertain case of ritual impurity is deemed pure.


###### Sotah 29a:11
[Sotah 29a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:11)

וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ דְּרַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיגְמַר מִסּוֹטָה. דְּאִי מִדְּרַב, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא — בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וּבֵין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיגְמַר מִסּוֹטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the need for two separate derivations concerning uncertain contractions of ritual impurity: **And** the derivation **that Rav Giddel** said that **Rav said was necessary, and** it **was** also **necessary to derive** the principle of uncertain ritual impurity **from *sota*; since if** it were derived only **through** the derivation **of Rav, I would say** that it makes no difference **whether** the uncertain contraction of impurity occurred **in the private domain or whether** it occurred **in the public domain.** Therefore, it **was necessary to derive from *sota*** that uncertain impurity is considered impure only in the private domain.


###### Sotah 29a:12
[Sotah 29a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:12)

וְאִי מִסּוֹטָה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא — עַד דְּאִיכָּא דַּעַת נוֹגֵעַ וּמַגִּיעַ, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** it is derived only **from *sota*, I would say** that similar to *sota*, where both the woman and the paramour possess awareness in order to be asked if they committed the act, so too, items with uncertain impurity should not be deemed impure **unless there is awareness** on the part of both **the one who touches** the impure item **and the one who causes him to touch,** i.e., the agent of impurity and the recipient of impurity are both competent people. Therefore, the derivation of Rav was **necessary,** as it teaches that in an uncertain case of impurity in the private domain, one is deemed impure even if only the contractor of impurity possesses the awareness to be asked.


###### Sotah 29a:13
[Sotah 29a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:13)

בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְכׇל כְּלִי חֶרֶשׂ כּוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ It is stated in the mishna: **On that same day Rabbi Akiva interpreted** the phrase “shall be impure” in the verse: **“And every earthen vessel** into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure [*yitma*], and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33), as indicating that a loaf that has second-degree ritual impurity can render other food with which it comes into contact impure with third-degree impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua related that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai had predicted that a future generation would purify a loaf that contracted third-degree impurity, as there is no explicit verse in the Torah stating that this degree of impurity exists.


###### Sotah 29a:14
[Sotah 29a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:14)

וּמֵאַחַר דְּאֵין לוֹ, לָמָּה טָמֵא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But since** the loaf **does not have** an explicit verse stating that it is impure, **why** did Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai himself maintain that it is **impure?**


###### Sotah 29a:15
[Sotah 29a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:15)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֵין לוֹ, מִדִּין קַל וָחוֹמֶר יֵשׁ לוֹ. וּמָה טְבוּל יוֹם שֶׁמּוּתָּר בְּחוּלִּין — פּוֹסֵל בִּתְרוּמָה, כִּכָּר שֵׁנִי שֶׁפָּסוּל בְּחוּלִּין — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שְׁלִישִׁי בִּתְרוּמָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yehuda says** that **Rav says:** Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai maintained that although **it has no** explicit basis **from** a verse in **the Torah, it has** proof for its impurity **through an *a fortiori* inference: If** even **one who immersed** in a ritual bath **that day** and will become completely purified after nightfall, **who is** therefore **permitted to** touch **non-sacred** articles, i.e., he does not transmit impurity to them, **disqualifies *teruma*** that he touches, then with regard to **a loaf** that has **second-**degree impurity as result of contact with an impure item of the first degree, **which is disqualified,** i.e., it is rendered impure, even if it is **non-sacred, isn’t it logical that it should impart third-**degree impurity **upon *teruma*?**


###### Sotah 29a:16
[Sotah 29a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:16)

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לִטְבוּל יוֹם שֶׁכֵּן אַב הַטּוּמְאָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: This *a fortiori* inference **can be refuted. What** is unique **about one** who was ritually impure **who immersed that day** and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed **is that** prior to his immersion, he was **a primary source of impurity.** He therefore retains his stringent status even after immersion with regard to his capability of disqualifying *teruma*. The loaf, by contrast, has second-degree impurity from the outset, and should therefore be treated more lightly.


###### Sotah 29a:17
[Sotah 29a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Sotah/r/29a:17)

תֵּיתֵי

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Derive** this *halakha*