## Tosafot on Kiddushin Daf 6b

###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:3:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:3:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:3:1)

אשה דלא קני ליה גופה לכ"ש - אע"ג דגבי הרי את בת חורין לא מהני מק"ו היינו משום דלא שייך חירות באשה ולא עביד ק"ו אלא מלשונות דשייכי הכא והכא:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"A wife, whose body is not acquired [by her husband], all the more so!?" Even though regarding "Behold, you are a free woman" this ק״ו is not effective (although "Behold, you are for yourself" is for a wife, and both are for a slave) because "freedom" is not relevant to a wife and we don't do a ק״ו except from language that is relevant for both cases.


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:6:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:6:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:6:1)

כשתברח ממנו - כלומר מן העובד כוכבים אבל אינו רוצה לומר כשתברח ממני מעכשיו אין לי עסק בך א"כ יהיה מיד בן חורין ויתחייב במצות ולא יוכל לקיימו בבית העובד כוכבים נמצא שרע לו מה שכותב עליו אונו:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"When you flee from him"—i.e. from the Gentile. But, he doesn't want to say "When you free from *me*, from now I have no business with you", for if so, immediately he would be free and obligated in the mitvot but he would not be able to observe them in the Gentile's house, so it turns out that the "Ono" is worse for him.


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:9:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:9:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:9:1)

דארווח לה זימנא - פי' בקונטרס שהיתה חייבת לו ונתן לה זמן ואמר לה התקדשי לי בהנאה זו שאת היית נותנת לאדם פרוטה שיפייסני על כך ואם פירש לה כך מקודשת והערמת רבית הוא דהויא ולא רבית גמור דלא קץ לה ולא מידי שקיל מינה וכ"ש אם מחל לה כל המלוה ואמר לה התקדשי לי בהנאת מחילה זו מקודשת אבל כי מקדשה בעיקר המעות לאו מידי יהיב לה שכבר הם שלה וברשותה ומה שפי' דרבית קצוצה לא הוי כיון שאין האשה נותנת לאיש כלום לא נהירא כיון שהוא נותן לה זה פרוטה בקידושין ולא נתן לה כלום הוי כאילו נתנה לו פרוטה ממש והוי רבית גמור וכי ההיא (ב"מ דף סב:) דמנה אין לי חטין במנה יש לי שייך לקרות הערמת רבית שמערים דלא הוי אגר נטר ליה לכן פר"ת דאיירי הכא שהיתה חייבת מעות לאדם אחר והגיע זמנו לפרוע ובא זה ונותן למלוה פרוטה לארווחי לה זימנא וקידשה באותה הנאה ואם תאמר אמאי אסור לעשות כן מפני הערמת רבית והא אמר בפרק איזהו נשך (בבא מציעא דף סט:) שרי ליה לאיניש למימר לחבריה שקול ד' זוזי ואוזפי לפלוני זוזי דלא אסרה תורה אלא רבית הבאה מלוה למלוה וי"ל היינו שאין הלוה נותן כלום לנותן אבל אם היה נותן היה נראה כשלוחו ואסור דכי נמי אמרינן התם באיזהו נשך (שם) שרי ליה לאיניש למימר לחבריה שקול ד' זוזי ואמור לפלוני דלוזפן זוזי היינו כשאין המקבל נותן כלום למלוה כי אם היה נותן היה נראה כשלוחו ואסור וא"ת אמאי מוקי לה בארווח לה בתחילת הלוואה היה יכול להעמיד דבהנאת מלוה מקודשת כגון שהמקדש נותן למלוה פרוטה להלוות לה מעות ובאותה פרוטה נתקדשה לו וי"ל בהנאת מלוה משמע מלוה שהיתה עליו כבר:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"When he extended for her the time [for repaying the debt]." Rashi's explanation: "She was obligated to him [in a debt] and he gave her time and said to her: 'Be betrothed to me with this benefit, that you could have given a perutah to a man to appease me about this [to extend the loan, and now I will extend it and you don't have to do anything about it]'—and if he explained this to her, she is betrothed, but it is scheming to do usury; but it is not full usury because he didn't fix [the monetary value] and he didn't take anything from her. All the more so if he forgave her all the loan and said to her: 'Be betrothed to me with the benefit of this forgiveness', she is betrothed [and it is not even scheming to do usury]. However, if he betrothed her with the actual money [of the loan], he didn't give her anything [at the time of kiddushin] since it was already hers and in her domain." Problem: As for what he explained, that this situation is not one of usury of a [real] fixed amount since the woman didn't give the man anything, this is not clear. Since he would [normally] give her this perutah for kiddushin but [in this case] didn't give her anything, it's as if SHE gave HIM a real perutah—thus it is full usury! Support: For it is (in Baba Metzia 62b) that "I don't have a maneh, but I have wheat for a maneh" would be appropriately called "scheming to do usury" since he schemed that he wouldn't have to pay to increase the deadline. Therefore Rabbenun Tam explained that we are dealing with a case where she was indebted to another guy, the time to collect arrived, and this [prospective husband] came and gave the creditor a perutah to give her more time and betrothed her with that benefit. Problem: But if you say: Why would it be forbidden to do this because of scheming to do usury? Doesn't it say in the chapter Eizehu Neshekh (Baba Metzia 69b): "It is permitted for a man to say to his fellow: Take 4 zuzim and loan them to Ploni", for the Torah forbade only usury that came from debtor to creditor!? Solution: This is true if the debtor doesn't give anything to the third party, but if he were to give [something to him] he would seem to be his agent and be forbidden [i.e. the prospective husband is the prospective wife's agent because the result of this relationship is betrothal, and that's why it's forbidden]. And this is also what we say there in Eizehu Neshekh, "A man is permitted to say to his fellow: Take 4 zuzim and say to Ploni that he should loan zuzim—this is when the receiver doesn't give anything to the creditor, but if he did then he appears as his agent." New problem: Why does [the Talmud] assign this [tradition of Abaye] to one of extending her deadline? At the beginning of the loan he could have established that with the benefit of the loan she would be betrothed, such as the betrother gives to the creditor a perutah to loan money to her, and with that perutah she would be betrothed to him! Answer: "The benefit of the loan"—this implies a loan that was already in existence.


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:13:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:13:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:13:1)

לא החזירו לא יצא - וא"ת אמאי לא יצא הא לא הוה תנאי כפול וי"ל דאיכא תנאי דלא בעי כפול כגון הכא שהיה דעתו שיברך חבירו על אתרוג שלו וגדולה מזאת אמרו (לקמן קידושין דף מט: ושם) בההוא גברא דזבין נכסיה אדעתא למיסק לארעא דישראל ולא פירש ולא מידי וסוף לא סליק בעי למיהדר ואמר רב הונא הוי דברים שבלב ואינם דברים א"כ משמע דוקא משום דלא פירש אבל אם פירש הוי תנאי אע"ג דלא כפליה וה"נ איתא במי שמת (ב"ב דף קמז.) גבי ש"מ שאמר כמדומה אני שאשתי מעוברת אבל עכשיו שאינה מעוברת נכסי לפלוני לסוף נתגלה שהיתה מעוברת וקאמר התם דלא הוי מתנה משום דמעיקרא לא היה בדעתו ליתנם לאותו פלוני אם היתה אשתו מעוברת ה"נ לא בעינן תנאי כפול כיון שהיה בדעתו לכך וא"ת ובלא החזירו אמאי לא יצא והא הוי תנאי ומעשה בדבר אחד והתנאי בטל כדאמרי' התם (גיטין דף עה.) מכדי כל תנאי מהיכא ילפינן מתנאי בני גד ובני ראובן והתם תנאי בדבר אחד ומעשה בדבר אחר הוה וי"ל התם לא הוי מסקנא הכי ואיכא שינויי אחריני א"נ י"ל הא דלא מהני תנאי ומעשה בדבר אחד היינו כששניהם סותרים זה את זה כי ההיא דעל מנת שתחזירי לי את הנייר דפרק מי שאחזו (שם) דהתם ס"ד דכל האומר ע"מ לאו כאומר מעכשיו דמי ונמצא שאינה מגורשת עד שמחזרת הנייר ואז אינו שלה אבל הכא סבר דכל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו דמי:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"If he did not return [the etrog], he did not fulfil [his obligation]." Problem: Why [did Rava have to say that] he did not fulfil his obligation—[the guy] didn't make a double stipulation (tnai kaful, of the form "If you do Z, then X; but if you don't do Z, then Y", which is required for a valid stipulation)! Solution: There are stipulations that don't need doubling, such as here, since his intention was for his fellow to bless on his etrog. Even more so, they say (Kiddushin 49b) "about this man that sold his property with the intention of making aliyah but didn't say anything explicitly about this, and in the end he didn't go up and wants to renege on the deal, and Rav Huna: These are words in the heart which are not effective;" and if so, it seems that this [Rav Huna] is specifically because he didn't specify, so if he did specify [and said "I'm selling you this land with the understanding that I'm going to make aliyah"] then it is a[n effective] stipulation even if he didn't double it [even according to Rav Huna]. This is also in Mi She-Met (Baba Batra 147a) regarding "the guy on his deathbed who said, 'I thought that my wife is pregnant, but now that she is not pregnant, my property goes to Ploni', but in the end it is revealed that she was pregnant", and it says there that it isn't an effective gift because from the outset he didn't intend to give it to that Ploni if his wife were pregnant—here too we don't need a double stipulation, since his intention was for this. New problem: If he didn't return [the etrog], why [does it say] he didn't fulfil his obligation—for it is a case where the stipulation and deed are the same thing (in this case: the etrog), and the stipulation should be void! Just as we say there (Gittin 75a): "All [rules of] stipulations, from where do we derive [them]? From the stipulations of Gadites and Reuvenites, and there the stipulation was one thing (to fight with the other Israelites) and the deed was something else (to receive the land of Gilead)!" Solution: This is not the conclusion [of the sugya] there, since there are other solutions. Alternative solution: This situation, when the stipulation and deed are about the same thing, is not effective [only] when [the stipulation and deed] contradict each other, like the case of chapter Mi She-Ahazo (in Gittin 75a): [One who gives a get saying] "with the understanding that you return to me the paper", for there [the Talmud] thinks that anyone who says "with the understanding of" is not like one who says "from now" (i.e. retroactively effective after the return, see 75b), so it turns out that she isn't divorced until she returns the paper but then it isn't hers [and she needs to own the document in order for it to be a valid get]; but here it thinks that anyone who says "with the understanding of" is like someone who says "from now" [and therefore the deed and stipulation do not contradict each other, since, once the fellow returns the etrog, he would have retroactively owned it and fulfilled his obligation].


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:13:2
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:13:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:13:2)

ואם לאו לא יצא - והא דאמר במסכת סוכה (דף מא:) אתרוג היה לו לר"ג נטלו ר' יהושע ויצא בו ונתנו לר"ע ויצא בו ר"ע והחזיר לר"ג ודייקי' מינה מתנה על מנת להחזיר שמה מתנה אע"פ שר' יהושע לא החזירו לר"ג דעתו של ר"ג היה לכך שלא היה חושש אלא שיחזור לידו אחר שיצאו כולם:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"But if he didn't, he did not fulfil his obligation." [Implied problem:] As for what it said in Sukkah 41b: "Rabban Gamliel had an etrog, Rabbi Yehoshua took it and he fulfilled his obligation with it, and he gave it to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Akiva fulfilled his obligation with it, and returned it to Rabban Gamliel", and we infer from this that a gift with the understanding of returning it is an effective gift, even though Rabbi Yehoshua didn't return it to Rabban Gamliel [though it seems that our sugya implies he would have had to in order for it to be a valid gift], [solution:] Rabban Gamliel intended this, that he wasn't concerned about it being returned to him until after everyone had fulfilled their obligation.


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:14:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 6b:14:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/6b:14:1)

לבר מאשה לפי שאין אשה נקנית בחליפין - וא"ת במאי דמו לחליפין אי משום דחליפין הדרי הא בחליפין גופייהו אמר בנדרים פרק השותפין (נדרים דף מח:) דאי תפיס לה מיתפסי ונראה לר"י דלאו חליפין הוא ומדרבנן הוא דלא הוו קידושין לפי שדרך העולם להחזיר חליפין והני כעין חליפין דמי ואתי למימר אשה נקנית בחליפין הילכך אפקעינהו רבנן לקידושין מינה תדע דאי כחליפין דמו במכר היאך קנה בהאי מנה הא אין מטבע נעשה חליפין וכן בפדיון הבן למה יהא בנו פדוי בחליפין הלא כסף ה' שקלים כתיב ולא חליפין:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"[A gift with the understanding of returning it works for all of the items in the list] except for a wife since a wife is not acquired with exchange." Problem: In what way is [a gift with the understanding of returning it] similar to exchange [which is an underlying assumption of Rav Ashi's point]? If it is because in an exchange he returns [the symbolic exchange item, normally a cloth (sudra), which means in both cases there is a thing that is returned], even for actual exchange it says in Nedarim 48b, chapter Ha-Shutafin, "that if he seized it, he seized it" [and keep it, it became his in the transfer of ownership]! [Solution:] It seemed to Rabbenu Yitzhak that [a gift with the understanding of returning it] is not exchange, but de-rabbanan it is not [valid] kiddushin because it is the way of the world to return the [symbolic] exchange [item], and so it is similar to a kind of exchange, and people will come to say that a wife can be acquired with exchange [which is false]; therefore, the rabbis cancelled [this form of] kiddushin from her [a wife]. Know [this also from this proof]: That if it were similar to exchange, with sales how could one acquire with this maneh—coins can't be exchanged! And also with redemption of the firstborn, how could his son be redeemed with exchange—isn't it written 5 shekels, i.e. not exchange?!