## Tosafot on Kiddushin Daf 7a

###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:6:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:6:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/7a:6:1)

אם כן הו"ל נכסים שיש להם אחריות - פי' בקונטרס דאדם הוקש לקרקעות דכתיב והתנחלתם אותם לרשת אחוזה וקשה דההוא קרא כתיב בעבד אבל בן חורין לא איתקש אלא דוקא בדמי עלי לפי ששמין אותו כעבד כדאיתא בפ"ק דסנהדרין (דף טו.) ועבד נמי פלוגתא היא בפ"ק דב"ק (דף יב.) אי כמקרקעי אי כמטלטלי דמי ונראה דלאו דוקא יש להם אחריות אלא אף כי נמי אין להם אחריות לא מצינו מטלטלין נקנין אגב מטלטלין דנכסים שאין להם אחריות לא שייך בהו אגב א"נ י"ל דה"ק ע"כ אי אשה נקנית אגב מטלטלין שדה נמי נקנה אגב מטלטלין שהרי קנין כסף דאשה ילפינן משדה קיחה קיחה ואם אין שדה נקנה מהיכא תיתי באשה:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"If so, then it would be property that has capacity for mortgage [i.e. the wife, that is bought along with property that doesn't, i.e. the maneh, which doesn't work]!" Rashi's explanation: "Because humans are compared to land, as it is written, 'You will inherit them [Canaanite slaves] as an inheritance holding [a phrase normally applied to land]'. Problem: This verse is written about a slave, but a freeman is not compared [to land] except only in [the case of one who vowed to bring to the Temple by saying] "My own value is upon me", since [that person] is evaluated like a slave as we see in the first chapter of Sanhedrin (15b), and a slave [being similar to land] is anyway subject to a dispute in the first chapter of Baba Kama (12a) whether they are similar to land or moveable property! Solution: [Rav Ashi's objection] is not specifically [based on the fact that people] have capacity for mortgage, but even if they don't have capacity for mortgage, there is no case where moveables can be acquired "on the back of" moveables [unlike land, for which you can acquire all the moveables "on its back"], since [the idea of] "on its back" is not relevant for property that doesn't have capacity for mortgage. Alternative solution: This is what he meant to say: You're forced to say, if a wife is acquired "on the back of" moveables, a field could also be acquired "on the back of" moveables, for we derive the acquisition of money for a wife from the field [of Efron] from [the ג״ש of] "purchase" "purchase", and if a field can't be acquired [in this way], from where would you derive it for a wife!?


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:13:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:13:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/7a:13:1)

ונפשטו קידושי בכולה מי לא תניא כו' - תימה דבריש תמורה (דף יא:) יליף רגלה של זו עולה ובדבר שהנשמה תלויה בו מקרא דכתיב כל אשר יתן ממנו לה' וגבי אשה לא כתיב קראי וא"כ מאי פריך הא לא דמו להדדי ונראה שלכך דקדק רש"י ופירש דהא מקודשת בלשון הקדש קאמר לה וכדאמר בריש פירקין דאסר לה אכ"ע כהקדש שאדם עושה אותה כהקדש לפיכך יש להיות דינה כהקדש אבל אם היה אומר מאורסת או חד מהנהו לישני דלעיל (קידושין דף ו.) על זה לא היה מקשה ונפשטו קידושי בכולה לפירוש זה:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"Let the kiddushin spread through all of her! Is it not taught etc." Problem: Terumah 11b derives [the law in the case of] "This [animal's] leg is an olah" and "with regard to a vital organ" from a verse, as it is written, "Anything that he gives from it to God", but regarding a wife there are no verses written [to derive this information]. If this is so, how [can Mar Zutra] challenge "Aren't they not similar!?" Solution: It is because of this that Rashi was particular and explained that this "mekudeshet" that [the man] said to [his prospective wife] is the terminology of "sanctified property (hekdesh)" [and did not mean "betrothed"], and this is like at the beginning of this chapter [of Kiddushin] that [kiddushin is like hekdesh through analogy] "he forbade her to everyone else like hekdesh", that a man can make her like hekdesh. Therefore, it is possible that the ruling of this case could be like hekdesh [since this is what the man in the case actually said]. However, if he had said "engaged" or any of the other earlier formulae [for betrothing a woman, see Kiddushin 6a], then it would not have been possible [for Mar Zutra] to raise the challenge "Let the kiddushin spread through all of her".


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:14:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:14:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/7a:14:1)

ואפי' למאן דאמר אין כולה עולה - התם (תמורה יא:) מפרש למאן דאמר דאין כולה עולה מה יעשה ממנה וקאמר דימכרנה לצרכי עולות חוץ מדמי הרגל שהקדיש ופריך היאך יפטר זה מעולתו הא הויא ליה עולה חסירה ומשני כגון דאמר הרי עלי עולה כמו שאמצאנה:

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"Even according to the one who said it is not all an olah". There in Temurah 11b it is explained that according to the one who said it is not all olah, what does he do with it? And it says that he sells it except for the value of the leg that was sanctified [and gives the money to the Temple] for the needs of [buying] olot. And it challenges: How can he be exempt from his olah [that he promised to bring by doing this]—this is a lacking olah [since the leg is excluded]! And it responds: This is like one who said "Behold this will be upon me as an olah however I find it" [i.e. including if it were missing a leg].


###### Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:16:1
[Tosafot on Kiddushin 7a:16:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Tosafot%20on%20Kiddushin/r/7a:16:1)

וחזר ולקחה - הא דנקט וחזר ולקחה ולא נקט בהמה של שני שותפין שהקדיש כל אחד חציה משום דלא שייך התם ועושה תמורה ותמורתה כיוצא בה דשותפין אין ממירין כדאמר בתמורה (דף יג.) ובפ"ק [דזבחים] (דף ו.):

**Sefaria Community Translation:**
"He came back and bought [the other half]". The reason [R. Yohanan's case] is specifically "He came back and bought it" and isn't "A cow owned by 2 partners, each of which made their half hekdesh", is because that, for that case, the line [later in R. Yohanan] "if he made an exchange then its exchange is the same" would not be relevant since partners can't make exchanges, as is said in Temurah 13a and in the first chapter of Zevahim 6a.