## Yevamot Daf 102a

###### Yevamot 102a:1
[Yevamot 102a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:1)

גֵּר דָּן אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ״. ״עָלֶיךָ״ הוּא דְּבָעֵינַן ״מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ״, אֲבָל גֵּר דָּן אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ גֵּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**By Torah law a convert may judge his fellow** convert, **as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you, whom the Lord your God shall choose; one from among your brothers you shall set king over you”** (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Gemara deduces from the terminology of the phrase **“over you,”** i.e., when presiding over Jews by birth either as a king, a judge, or any other official, that from here it **is where we require** that the official must be: **“From among your brothers,”** meaning a Jew by birth. **However, a convert may judge his fellow convert,** as the requirement of “one from among your brothers” doesn’t apply when presiding over fellow converts.


###### Yevamot 102a:2
[Yevamot 102a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:2)

וְאִם הָיְתָה אִמּוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל — דָּן אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל. וּלְעִנְיַן חֲלִיצָה עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנִקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if the** convert’s **mother was from Israel, he may even** preside as a judge in a court to **adjudicate** legal matters involving a native-born **Jew. But with regard to *ḥalitza*,** he may not act as a judge **unless both his father and his mother were from Israel** from birth, **as it is stated** with regard to *ḥalitza*: **“And his name shall be called in Israel:** The house of he who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10), implying that he must be born as a member of the Jewish people from both of his parents.


###### Yevamot 102a:3
[Yevamot 102a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:3)

אָמַר רַבָּה אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר רַב: אִם יָבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְיֹאמַר: ״חוֹלְצִין בְּמִנְעָל״ — שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. ״אֵין חוֹלְצִין בְּסַנְדָּל״ — אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ, שֶׁכְּבָר נָהֲגוּ הָעָם בְּסַנְדָּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rabba said** that **Rav Kahana said** that **Rav said: If Elijah** the Prophet **should come and say: One may perform *ḥalitza* using** a soft leather **shoe,** the Rabbis **would listen to him.** But if he says: **One may not perform *ḥalitza* using** a hard leather **sandal, they would not listen to him, for the people already have** established **the practice of** performing *ḥalitza* **using a sandal.**


###### Yevamot 102a:4
[Yevamot 102a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:4)

וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר רַב: אִם יָבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְיֹאמַר: ״אֵין חוֹלְצִין בְּמִנְעָל״ — שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. ״אֵין חוֹלְצִין בְּסַנְדָּל״ — אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ, שֶׁכְּבָר נָהֲגוּ הָעָם בְּסַנְדָּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Yosef said** that **Rav Kahana said** that **Rav** said: **If Elijah** the Prophet **should come and say: One may not perform *ḥalitza* using** a soft leather **shoe, they would listen to him.** But if he says: **One may not perform *ḥalitza* using** a hard leather **sandal, they would not listen to him, for the people already have** established **the practice of** performing *ḥalitza* **using a sandal.**


###### Yevamot 102a:5
[Yevamot 102a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:5)

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מִנְעָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the practical **difference between** these two opinions? Seemingly, they both say the same thing. The Gemara answers: **The** practical difference **between them** is with respect to performing *ḥalitza* with a soft leather **shoe *ab initio*.** According to Rabba’s opinion, one may not perform *ḥalitza* this way *ab initio*, as Rabba said that only if Elijah comes and permits it would he be heeded, implying that until Elijah does so one may not perform *ḥalitza* this way. According to Rav Yosef’s opinion, one may perform *ḥalitza* with a soft leather shoe until Elijah comes and teaches us otherwise.


###### Yevamot 102a:6
[Yevamot 102a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:6)

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְהָתְנַן: חָלְצָה בְּמִנְעָל — חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה. דִּיעֲבַד אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to the one who says** that one may **even** perform *ḥalitza* with a soft leather shoe ***ab initio*, didn’t we learn** in the mishna (101a): **If she performed *ḥalitza* with** a soft leather **shoe, her *ḥalitza* is valid,** and the past tense wording indicates **after the fact, yes, but it is not** valid ***ab initio*?**


###### Yevamot 102a:7
[Yevamot 102a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:7)

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְאַיְּידֵי דְבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא בְּאַנְפִּילְיָא חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא דִּיעֲבַד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **The same is** true that one may perform *ḥalitza* with a soft leather shoe **even *ab initio*, but since** the *tanna* **wished to teach in the latter clause** of that mishna: If **an *anpileya*,** a soft shoe made of cloth, was used for *ḥalitza*, **her *ḥalitza* is disqualified even after the fact, he also taught the first clause** of the mishna using wording that indicates validity **after the fact,** even though it is in fact permitted even *ab initio*.


###### Yevamot 102a:8
[Yevamot 102a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:8)

וּמִנְעָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: פַּעַם אַחַת הָלַכְתִּי לִנְצִיבִין, מָצָאתִי זָקֵן אֶחָד. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: כְּלוּם אַתָּה בָּקִי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא? אָמַר לִי: הֵן, וְעַל שׁוּלְחָנִי הוּא תָּדִיר. כְּלוּם רָאִיתָ שֶׁחָלַץ בִּיבָמָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** performing *ḥalitza* with a soft leather **shoe *ab initio* is** a dispute between ***tanna’im*, as it is taught** in a *baraita*, **Rabbi Yosei said: One time I went to** the city of **Netzivin** in Babylonia, and **I found** there **a certain Elder. I said to him: Do you know Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,** who was from Netzivin? **He said to me: Yes, and he is** a **frequent** visitor **at my table.** I asked the Elder: **Have you ever seen if he** conducted **the *ḥalitza* of a *yevama*?**


###### Yevamot 102a:9
[Yevamot 102a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:9)

אָמַר לִי: רָאִיתִי שֶׁחָלַץ הַרְבֵּה פְּעָמִים. בְּמִנְעָל אוֹ בְּסַנְדָּל? אָמַר לִי: וְכִי חוֹלְצִין בְּמִנְעָל?! (וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״נַעֲלוֹ״, וְלֹא מִנְעָלוֹ), אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: אִם כֵּן, מָה רָאָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר לוֹמַר חָלְצָה בְּמִנְעָל חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁירָה?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**He said to me: I saw that he** conducted ***ḥalitza* many times.** I asked him: **Using a** soft leather **shoe or a** hard leather **sandal? He said to me: Does anyone** allow **performing *ḥalitza* with a** soft leather **shoe? But the Torah said: “His shoe [*na’alo*]”** (Deuteronomy 25:9) **and not: His shoe [*minalo*]. I said to him: If so, what did Rabbi Meir see that** made **him say** that if **a woman performed *ḥalitza* using** a soft leather **shoe her *ḥalitza* is valid?**


###### Yevamot 102a:10
[Yevamot 102a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:10)

רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ: חוֹלְצִין בְּמִנְעָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא, מַאי טַעְמָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ya’akov says in the name** of Rabbi Meir: **One may perform *ḥalitza* using** a soft leather **shoe *ab initio*.** The Gemara explains: **And for the one who said one may not** perform *ḥalitza* with a soft leather **shoe *ab initio*, what is the reason** for this?


###### Yevamot 102a:11
[Yevamot 102a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:11)

אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוְיָא פַּנְתָּא מֵעַל וְאַרְקְתָא מֵעַל דְּמֵעַל, וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״מֵעַל״, וְלֹא מֵעַל דְּמֵעַל — אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If we say** that a soft leather shoe is disqualified **because the upper side of the** soft leather **shoe [*panta*] is on** his foot directly, **and the straps** [***arketa***] tied around the upper portion of the shoe **are** like a second shoe **on top** of the shoe that is directly **on top** of his foot, **and the Torah says:** “Remove the shoe **from on** his foot,” indicating that the entire shoe must be “on his foot” **but not from on** something else **that is on** his foot, **if so,** then **even after the fact as well,** it should **not** be fit for use. If a soft leather shoe is unfit for *ḥalitza* by Torah law, it should be prohibited under all circumstances.


###### Yevamot 102a:12
[Yevamot 102a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:12)

גְּזֵירָה מִשּׁוּם מִנְעָל מְרוּפָּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rather, it is **a** rabbinic **decree due to** the concern that one might use a **torn** soft leather **shoe,** which may nevertheless be worn if torn due to its softness but is prohibited as it does not cover his foot. No similar concern exists with regard to a torn sandal, as due to its hard exterior it would never be worn if torn, and therefore there is no concern that it will be used for *ḥalitza*.


###### Yevamot 102a:13
[Yevamot 102a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:13)

אִי נָמֵי מִשּׁוּם חֲצִי מִנְעָל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively,** it is a rabbinic decree **due to** concern that one might perform *ḥalitza* with **a half shoe,** as the *ḥalitza* shoe must cover most of the foot, yet there are some who wear soft leather shoes that cover only half of the foot. Therefore, there is a prohibition against using a soft leather shoe for *ḥalitza ab initio* for fear that a half shoe might also accidentally be used. No similar fear exists with a hard leather sandal as a half sandal is never worn.


###### Yevamot 102a:14
[Yevamot 102a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:14)

אָמַר רַב: אִי לָאו דַּחֲמֵיתֵיהּ לְחַבִּיבִי דַּחֲלַץ בְּסַנְדָּל דְּאִית לֵהּ שִׁינְצִין, אֲנָא לָא הֲוַאי חָלֵיצְנָא אֶלָּא בְּסַנְדָּלָא דְטַיָּיעָא דְּמִיהַדַּק טְפֵי. וְהַאי דִּידַן, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית בֵּיהּ חוּמַרְתָּא, קָטְרִינַן בֵּיהּ מִיתְנָא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּתֶהְוֵי חֲלִיצָתָהּ מְעַלַּיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav said: If I had not seen my beloved** uncle, Rabbi Ḥiyya, **conduct a *ḥalitza* using a sandal with laces, I would not have conducted *ḥalitza* with anything other than a sandal of Arabs, which is more tight fitting** and snug. The Gemara explains: **And** with regard to **this** sandal **of ours,** i.e., the customary sandal of that day, **although it does have a ring [*ḥumrata*]** on top to ensure that it will not fall off the foot easily, **we tie a strap to it** during *ḥalitza* in order to make it tighter, **so that her *ḥalitza* will be** of the **highest standard.** The strap is tied on so that the sandal will not come off by itself, to ensure that the *yevama* will have to untie the strap in order to remove the sandal.


###### Yevamot 102a:15
[Yevamot 102a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:15)

סִימַן: הַתָּרַת יְבָמָה סַנְדָּל. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַתָּרַת יְבָמָה לַשּׁוּק — בִּשְׁמִיטַת רוֹב הֶעָקֵב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara presents **a mnemonic** device for the following three *halakhot* that Rav Yehuda taught in the name of Rav: ***Hatarat*,** meaning release of; ***yevama*; *sandal*.** This mnemonic serves as a reminder that the release of a *yevama* is done through removing a sandal. **Rav Yehuda said** that **Rav said: The release of a *yevama*** to enable her marriage **to** a member of **the public occurs when most of the heel is removed** from the shoe. Even though the shoe has not been entirely removed, or even removed from most of the *yavam’s* foot; it is still permitted for her to remarry.


###### Yevamot 102a:16
[Yevamot 102a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:16)

מֵיתִיבִי: הוּתְּרוּ רְצוּעוֹת מִנְעָל וְסַנְדָּל, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַט רוֹב הָרֶגֶל — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** from the following *baraita*: **If the straps of** a soft leather shoe **or** a hard leather **sandal were untied,** but not through the actions of the *yevama*, **or if** the *yavam* **removed most of his foot** from the shoe himself before the *yevama* completed the removal, **her *ḥalitza* is disqualified.**


###### Yevamot 102a:17
[Yevamot 102a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:17)

טַעְמָא דְּשָׁמַט הוּא, הָא שָׁמְטָה הִיא — חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה. רוֹב הָרֶגֶל אִין, רוֹב הֶעָקֵב לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara infers: **The reason** her *ḥalitza* is disqualified **is** specifically **that he removed** most of his foot and she only completed the removal, **but had she removed** most of the foot from the shoe, then **her *ḥalitza*** would be **valid.** The Gemara continues: If so, **yes,** only when the *yevama* removes **most of the foot** is the *ḥalitza* valid, but if she removed only **most of the heel,** it would **not** be sufficient.


###### Yevamot 102a:18
[Yevamot 102a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:18)

לֹא: הַיְינוּ רוֹב הָרֶגֶל, הַיְינוּ רוֹב הֶעָקֵב. וְאַמַּאי קָרוּ לֵיהּ רוֹב הָרֶגֶל — דְּכוּלָּא חֵיילָא דְכַרְעָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּחִיס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this question: **No, most of the foot is** the same as **most of the heel,** and therefore the inference should be that even if she removed most of the heel from the shoe the *ḥalitza* is valid. **And why do they call it: Most of the foot? Because the whole weight of the leg puts pressure on** the heel.


###### Yevamot 102a:19
[Yevamot 102a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:19)

מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יַנַּאי: דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי בֵּין שֶׁהִתִּיר הוּא וְשָׁמְטָה הִיא, בֵּין שֶׁהִתִּירָה הִיא וְשָׁמַט הוּא — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה, עַד שֶׁתַּתִּיר הִיא וְתַשְׁמִיט הִיא. בָּעֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: קְרָעַתְהוּ, מַהוּ? שְׂרָפַתְהוּ, מַהוּ? גַּלּוֹיֵי כַּרְעָא בָּעֵינַן, וְהָאִיכָּא? אוֹ דִלְמָא חֲלִיצָה בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **This** *baraita* **supports Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai said: Whether he unties** the shoe **and she removes it,** or **whether she unties it and he removes it, her *ḥalitza* is disqualified unless she both unties it and takes it off.** And on the same topic, **Rabbi Yannai asked: If she** did not remove the sandal, but instead **ripped it** off him, **what is** the *halakha*? **If she burned it** using coals, **what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara presents the real issue in question: Is **exposure of the foot** the essential act of *ḥalitza* **that we require,** through any act of removing that which covers the foot, **which exists** here? **Or perhaps it is removal** of the shoe from over the foot **that we require, which is lacking** here? No answer was found to this question, so the Gemara concludes: The question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Yevamot 102a:20
[Yevamot 102a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/102a:20)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה מֵרַבָּה: שְׁנֵי מִנְעָלִים זֶה עַל גַּב זֶה, מַהוּ? הֵיכִי דָמֵי: אִילֵּימָא דִּשְׁלַפְתֵּיהּ לְעִילַּאי וְקָאֵי תַּתַּאי — ״מֵעַל״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא מֵעַל דְּמֵעַל. לָא צְרִיכָא: דִּקְרַעְתֵּיהּ לְעִילַּאי וּשְׁלַפְתֵּיהּ לְתַתַּאי, וְקָאֵי עִילַּאי, מַאי? חֲלִיצָה בָּעֵינַן, וְהָא אִיכָּא? אוֹ דִלְמָא גַּלּוֹיֵי כַּרְעָא בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Neḥemya asked Rabba** the following question: If the man was wearing **two shoes, one on top of the other, what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** of the case? **If we say** that **she removed the outer shoe and the inner shoe remains in place,** but **the Merciful One states** in the Torah: **“From on** his foot” **and not: From on that which is on** his foot. The Gemara answers: **No,** this question wasn’t asked in a case where the inner shoe remained on his foot. Rather, **it is necessary** in a case **where she tore the outer shoe and took off the inner shoe, and the outer one still remains** on his foot although it is torn. The question centers around the previous one with regard to the nature of *ḥalitza*: **What** is the *halakha* for valid *ḥalitza*? Is it **removal** of the shoe that **we require, which we have** brought about in this example? **Or perhaps** it is **exposing the foot** that **we require, which is lacking** here, as the foot is still covered by the torn outer shoe.