## Yevamot Daf 104b

###### Yevamot 104b:1
[Yevamot 104b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:1)

אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: ״כָּכָה יֵעָשֶׂה״ — כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה מְעַכֵּב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה? ״כָּכָה יֵעָשֶׂה לָאִישׁ״ — כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה בָּאִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Elazar said to him:** The verse states: **“So shall it be done** to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). “So” is an exclusionary term indicating that only precisely in this fashion is *ḥalitza* valid. Therefore, **any term that constitutes an action** for *ḥalitza* **is indispensable. Rabbi Akiva said to him:** You derive **proof from there?** But it states: **“So shall it be done to the man”** indicating that only **a term constituting an action toward the man,** namely any aspect of *ḥalitza* that concerns the man’s body, such as removal of his shoe, is indispensable. But spitting, which does not involve the man, although it takes place in his presence, is not indispensable.


###### Yevamot 104b:2
[Yevamot 104b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:2)

הַחֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנֶּחְלַץ, וְהַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁחָלְצָה, וְחוֹלֶצֶת לְקָטָן — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה. קְטַנָּה שֶׁחָלְצָה — תַּחְלוֹץ מִשֶּׁתַּגְדִּיל, וְאִם לֹא חָלְצָה — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה. חָלְצָה בִּשְׁנַיִם אוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְנִמְצָא אֶחָד מֵהֶן קָרוֹב אוֹ פָּסוּל — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר מַכְשִׁירִין. וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁחָלַץ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ בְּבֵית הָאֲסוּרִים, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְהִכְשִׁיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna lists additional *halakhot* with regard to *ḥalitza*. **If a deaf-mute man underwent *ḥalitza*, or a deaf-mute woman performed *ḥalitza*, or if an** adult **woman performs *ḥalitza* with a male minor, her *ḥalitza* is invalid** and the woman may not marry. **If a female minor performed *ḥalitza*, she must perform *ḥalitza*** a second time **once she becomes an adult, and if she does not perform** the second ***ḥalitza*, her** first ***ḥalitza* is invalid. If she performed *ḥalitza* before two or three** judges **and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified** as a judge for some other reason, **her *ḥalitza* is invalid. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler validate** the *ḥalitza* in this case. **And an incident** occurred **involving a certain** person **who performed *ḥalitza* between him and her alone in prison,** i.e., not in the presence of others, **and the case came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated** it.


###### Yevamot 104b:3
[Yevamot 104b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:3)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר רָבָא: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ קְרִיאָה לָא מְיעַכְּבָא, לְפִיכָךְ אִלֵּם וְאִלֶּמֶת שֶׁחָלְצוּ — חֲלִיצָתָן כְּשֵׁירָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **Rava said: Now that you have said** that **recitation** of the text **is not indispensable** in order for the *ḥalitza* to be valid, **therefore** if **a mute man or a mute woman performed *ḥalitza*, their *ḥalitza* is valid.** Although the statements should be recited *ab initio*, since the recitation is not indispensable, mute individuals can perform *ḥalitza*.


###### Yevamot 104b:4
[Yevamot 104b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:4)

תְּנַן: חֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנֶּחְלַץ, וְהַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁחָלְצָה, וְהַחוֹלֶצֶת מִן הַקָּטָן — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא — לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא בְּנֵי קְרִיָּיה נִינְהוּ! לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָאו בְּנֵי דֵעָה נִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: But **we learned** in the mishna above: **If a deaf-mute man underwent *ḥalitza*, or a deaf-mute woman performed *ḥalitza*, or if a woman performs *ḥalitza* with a male minor, her *ḥalitza* is invalid. What is the reason** that the *ḥalitza* is invalid? **Is it not because they are not competent to recite** the text, thereby indicating that the recitation is necessary even after the fact? The Gemara rejects this assertion: **No,** the reason for disqualifying a deaf-mute man and woman is **because they are not** considered **to have intellectual capacity,** and therefore their actions do not have halakhic significance.


###### Yevamot 104b:5
[Yevamot 104b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:5)

אִי הָכִי, אִלֵּם וְאִלֶּמֶת נָמֵי! אָמַר רָבָא: אִלֵּם וְאִלֶּמֶת בְּנֵי דֵעָה נִינְהוּ, וּפוּמַּיְיהוּ הוּא דְּכָאֵיב לְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If that is so,** let us **also** say that **a mute man and woman** do not have intellectual capacity. **Rava said: A mute man and woman do have intellectual capacity.** Rather, **it is their mouth that hurts them.** Mute individuals have full intellectual capacity; they merely lack a means of expression. The deaf-mute, on the other hand, is not considered to have the mental capacity to speak.


###### Yevamot 104b:6
[Yevamot 104b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:6)

וְהָא אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּ״אָמַר״ ״וְאָמְרָה״! אֶלָּא, כִּי אִתְּמַר דְּרָבָא אַסֵּיפָא אִתְּמַר: חֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנֶּחְלַץ, וְהַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁחָלְצָה, וְהַחוֹלֶצֶת מִן הַקָּטָן — חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges again: **But didn’t** the scholars from the **house** of study **of Rabbi Yannai say** that a deaf-mute man and woman are disqualified from participation in *ḥalitza* **because they cannot** fulfill the requirements **of “he says”** (Deuteronomy 25:8) **and “she shall say”** (Deuteronomy 25:9), and not due to insufficient intellectual capacity? **Rather, when that** first statement **of Rava was said, it was stated** concerning **the latter clause** of the mishna: **If a deaf-mute man underwent *ḥalitza*, or a deaf-mute woman performed *ḥalitza*, or if a woman performs *ḥalitza* on a male minor, her *ḥalitza* is invalid.**


###### Yevamot 104b:7
[Yevamot 104b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:7)

אָמַר רָבָא: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ קְרִיָּיה מְעַכְּבָא, לְפִיכָךְ אִלֵּם וְאִלֶּמֶת שֶׁחָלְצוּ — חֲלִיצָתָן פְּסוּלָה. וּמַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבִּי זֵירָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: You have now said** that **recitation is indispensable,** as can be inferred from the mishna disqualifying the deaf-mute. **Therefore, if a mute man or woman performed *ḥalitza*, their *ḥalitza* is invalid.** And **the mishna,** which indicates in its first clause that recitation is not indispensable, but later states that *ḥalitza* performed by someone incapable of recitation is invalid, is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Zeira** with regard to a meal-offering. A meal-offering is generally a mixture of flour and oil. If flour is added to the oil but they are not mixed, they are considered to be fitting to be mixed so long as there is not an excessive amount of flour.


###### Yevamot 104b:8
[Yevamot 104b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:8)

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לְבִילָּה — אֵין בִּילָּה מְעַכֶּבֶת בּוֹ. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לְבִילָּה — בִּילָּה מְעַכֶּבֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This is that **which Rabbi Zeira said: Whatever is fitting to be mixed, mixing is not indispensable to it,** and it is valid even if it is not mixed. **And whatever is not fit to be mixed,** e.g., if the quantity of flour is so great that the ingredients cannot be properly mixed, **mixing is indispensable for it** and it is invalid if it has not been mixed. From here one may learn a general *halakhic* principle: There are some actions for which their actual performance is not indispensable, provided they are capable of being performed. An action becomes indispensable only if one is unfit or unable to perform it. With regard to recitation of the verses, although it is not indispensable, a mute person is disqualified from performing *ḥalitza* because he is not capable of reciting the verses.


###### Yevamot 104b:9
[Yevamot 104b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:9)

שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ לַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: יְבָמָה שֶׁרָקְקָה — תַּחְלוֹץ. מִכְּלָל דְּאִיפַּסְלָא לַהּ מֵאַחִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**They sent** the following teaching from Eretz Yisrael **to the father of Shmuel:** Once **a *yevama* has spat she must perform** a complete ***ḥalitza*** and may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara comments: **By inference,** you may learn **that** even though the spitting did not permit her to marry outside the family, **she is disqualified from** entering into levirate marriage with any of **the brothers,** and must therefore complete the *ḥalitza*.


###### Yevamot 104b:10
[Yevamot 104b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:10)

מַנִּי? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם מִצְוָה, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַאֵימוּרִים, דְּכִי לֵיתַנְהוּ — לָא מְעַכְּבִי,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is** this *halakha* taught? **If we say it is** in accordance with **Rabbi Akiva,** who stated in the mishna that spitting is not required after the fact, it is difficult, as the following *a fortiori* reasoning indicates: **Now if** even in a case **where there is a mitzva** of *ḥalitza*, and the *yevama* is still around and capable of fulfilling the Torah command of spitting, **and one might say** that spitting should be treated just **as it is with** regard to **the** fatty **portions** of offerings that are to be consumed on the altar, where the *halakha* is **that when they are not** present for offering, i.e., they were lost or became ritually impure, they are **not** considered **indispensable** to permit the consumption of the offering.


###### Yevamot 104b:11
[Yevamot 104b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:11)

וְכִי אִיתַנְהוּ — מְעַכְּבִי,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
When the fats of the offering are no longer present for offering, it is permitted for the sacrificial meat to be eaten by the priests through the sprinkling of blood alone, even without offering the fatty portions on the altar. **But when** the fatty portions **are present** and extant, then they are considered **indispensable,** and the priests are not permitted to eat their portions of the offering until the fatty portions are burned on the altar.


###### Yevamot 104b:12
[Yevamot 104b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:12)

אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לָא מְעַכְּבָא, מֵאַחִין אִיפַּסְלָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Based on an analogy to the fatty portions of offerings, one would have said regarding the spitting of a *yevama* that even if it is not indispensable after the fact, so long as the *yevama* is around, one would expect that her spitting is indispensable. Yet even so, **Rabbi Akiva said** in the mishna that spitting is **not indispensable** to *ḥalitza* even in such a case, and the *ḥalitza* is validated by the removal of the shoe alone. Since Rabbi Akiva seems to accord little significance to the spitting, he cannot be the basis for this *halakha*, as if spitting is never indispensable, could spitting alone **disqualify her from** entering into levirate marriage with one of **the brothers?**


###### Yevamot 104b:13
[Yevamot 104b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:13)

וְאֶלָּא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But rather,** one might say that this teaching is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar,** who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva and states in the mishna that spitting is indispensable for validating *ḥalitza* and is necessary alongside the removal of the shoe. Since he accords significance to the spitting, one might have thought that the teaching prohibiting the *yevama* from levirate marriage is in accordance with his view.


###### Yevamot 104b:14
[Yevamot 104b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:14)

וְהָא שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים הַמַּתִּירִין נִינְהוּ, וּשְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים הַמַּתִּירִין — אֵין מַעֲלִין זֶה בְּלֹא זֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** that is difficult as well, as according to Rabbi Elazar, removal of the shoe and spitting are both necessary, and therefore, they **are** considered **two permitting factors** that must be completed in order to fulfill an obligation. **And** there is a principle accepted by Rabbi Elazar with regard to offerings that should be applicable here: Whenever **there are two permitting factors** that are indispensable for an offering to be valid, **one** of those factors **cannot elevate one** of the subordinate components of the offering to consecrated status **without the other.** Similarly, since Rabbi Elazar holds that *ḥalitza* and spitting are both indispensable, if she performs only one of these actions, such as spitting, it is only one of two permitting factors and therefore should not disqualify her for levirate marriage with one of the other *yevamin*.


###### Yevamot 104b:15
[Yevamot 104b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:15)

אֶלָּא כְּרַבִּי. דְּתַנְיָא: כִּבְשֵׂי עֲצֶרֶת — אֵין מְקַדְּשִׁין הַלֶּחֶם אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** one must say that this teaching is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, who is of the opinion that even one of two permitting factors can effect a change in status without performance of the other factor, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **The lambs** sacrificed on the festival **of Assembly,** i.e., *Shavuot*, **consecrate the loaves** that accompany them **only by** means of their **slaughter,** as the slaughtering of the lambs consecrates the bread.


###### Yevamot 104b:16
[Yevamot 104b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:16)

כֵּיצַד? שְׁחָטָן לִשְׁמָן, וְזָרַק דָּמָן לִשְׁמָן — קָדַשׁ הַלֶּחֶם. שָׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, וְזָרַק לִשְׁמָן — לֹא קָדַשׁ הַלֶּחֶם. שְׁחָטָן לִשְׁמָן, וְזָרַק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן — קָדוֹשׁ וְאֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**How so?** If **one slaughtered** the lambs **for their own sake,** i.e., as lambs for *Shavuot*, **and** the priest **sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated.** However, if **one slaughtered** them **not for their own sake, and** the priest **sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated,** as the factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were not properly performed. If **one slaughtered them for their own sake, and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake,** the fact that the lambs were properly slaughtered renders the loaves partially consecrated. Therefore, the loaves **are consecrated** to the extent that they cannot be redeemed, **but they are not consecrated** to the extent that they may be eaten. **This is the statement of Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi.


###### Yevamot 104b:17
[Yevamot 104b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:17)

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט לִשְׁמָן וְיִזְרוֹק דָּמָן לִשְׁמָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Actually,** the loaves **are consecrated only when one slaughters** the offerings **for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake,** i.e., only if both factors indispensable in rendering the offering valid were properly performed. If so, the teaching sent from Eretz Yisrael seems to be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion that even if only one of the two permitting factors of slaughter and sprinkling was performed, the loaves will still be consecrated. Likewise, with respect to *ḥalitza*, where there is a need for two permitting factors, spitting and removal of the shoe, performing one factor such as spitting is sufficient to disqualify the *yevama* from subsequently entering into levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 104b:18
[Yevamot 104b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/104b:18)

וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא רְקִיקָה לָא פָּסְלָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: חָלְצָה וְלֹא

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the previous assumption with regard to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion on the matter: **But did Rabbi Akiva say that spitting does not disqualify** the *yevama* from a later levirate marriage to one of the other brothers? **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: **If she removed** the shoe **but did not**