## Yevamot Daf 117a

###### Yevamot 117a:1
[Yevamot 117a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:1)

שֶׁאֵין הָאַחִין נִכְנָסִין לַנַּחֲלָה עַל פִּיהָ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**that the brothers do not come into** the **inheritance** from the deceased brother **based on her** testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters.


###### Yevamot 117a:2
[Yevamot 117a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:2)

אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: וַהֲלֹא מִסֵּפֶר כְּתוּבָּה נִלְמוֹד, שֶׁהוּא כּוֹתֵב לָהּ: שֶׁאִם תִּנָּשְׂאִי לְאַחֵר תִּטְּלִי מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב לִיכִי. וְחָזְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְהוֹרוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this** *halakha* **from the scroll of the marriage contract, as** every husband **writes for her that: If you marry another** man, **take what is written for you** in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. **And Beit Hillel** again **retracted** their opinion, and decided **to teach in accordance with** the opinion of **Beit Shammai.**


###### Yevamot 117a:3
[Yevamot 117a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:3)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: נִתְיַיבְּמָה — יְבָמָהּ נִכְנָס לַנַּחֲלָה עַל פִּיהָ. הֵם דָּרְשׁוּ מִדְרַשׁ כְּתוּבָּה — אָנוּ לֹא נִדְרוֹשׁ מִדְרַשׁ תּוֹרָה?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **Rav Ḥisda said:** If the woman **entered into levirate marriage** based upon her own testimony, **her *yavam* comes into** the **inheritance** of the property of his dead brother **based on her** testimony. He adds: If Beit Shammai **taught** their *halakha* that she is entitled to her money, **by interpreting homiletically** the language of a **marriage contract, will we not teach by interpreting homiletically the Torah** itself?


###### Yevamot 117a:4
[Yevamot 117a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:4)

״יָקוּם עַל שֵׁם אָחִיו״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַהֲרֵי קָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ḥisda explains: **The Merciful One states** in the Torah: **“He shall succeed in the name of his** dead **brother”** (Deuteronomy 25:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to the right of inheritance of the brother who consummates the levirate marriage. **And** this man **did succeed** with respect to the marital relationship, as he consummated the levirate marriage based on the testimony of his *yevama* that her husband died. Consequently, he takes the place of his brother with respect to his inheritance as well.


###### Yevamot 117a:5
[Yevamot 117a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:5)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: בָּאת לְבֵית דִּין וְאָמְרָה ״מֵת בַּעְלִי, הַתִּירוּנִי לְהִנָּשֵׂא״ — מַתִּירִין אוֹתָהּ לְהִנָּשֵׂא וְנוֹתְנִין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. ״תְּנוּ לִי כְּתוּבָּתִי״ — אַף לְהִנָּשֵׂא אֵין מַתִּירִין אוֹתָהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא — אַדַּעְתָּא דִכְתוּבָּה אֲתַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Naḥman said:** A woman **came to the court and said: My husband died; permit me to marry.** The *halakha* is that after investigating the matter, **they permit her to marry, and** also **give her her marriage contract.** However, if she came and said: **Give me my marriage contract, they do not even permit her to marry. What is the reason?** Since **she came with** the money of the **marriage contract in mind,** she is suspected of lying, and her testimony is rejected.


###### Yevamot 117a:6
[Yevamot 117a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:6)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הַתִּירוּנִי לְהִנָּשֵׂא וּתְנוּ לִי כְּתוּבָּתִי״, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמְרָה כְּתוּבְּתַהּ — אַדַּעְתָּא דִכְתוּבָּה אֲתַאי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֹּל מִילֵּי דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ אָמַר לְהוּ לְבֵי דִינָא. [וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר כֹּל מִילֵּי דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ, אָמַר לְהוּ לְבֵי דִינָא] ״תְּנוּ לִי כְּתוּבָּתִי וְהַתִּירוּנִי לְהִנָּשֵׂא״, מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
However, the following **dilemma was raised before** the scholars. If she came and said: **Permit me to marry and give me my marriage contract, what is** the *halakha*? **Since she mentioned** the money from **her marriage contract,** this shows that **she came with the marriage contract in mind. Or perhaps every matter a person has** in his favor **he** will **say to the court,** even if it is not of particular importance. **And if you say** that the ruling in this case is in accordance with the principle: **Every matter a person has** in his favor **he** will **say to the court,** then in a case where she said: **Give me my marriage contract and permit me to marry, what is** the *halakha*?


###### Yevamot 117a:7
[Yevamot 117a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:7)

הָכָא וַדַּאי אַדַּעְתָּא דִכְתוּבָּה אֲתַאי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: הוֹאִיל דְּלָא יָדְעָה בְּמַאי מִשְׁתַּרְיָא?! תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: **Here she certainly came with the marriage contract in mind,** as she mentioned it first. **Or perhaps** she said it in this manner **since she does not know what will set her free.** In other words, she might have thought that taking the money guaranteed by her marriage contract is part of the process that enables her to remarry, but this does not prove that she is focused on the money. The Gemara states that the question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Yevamot 117a:8
[Yevamot 117a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:8)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין לְהַעִידָהּ, חוּץ מֵחֲמוֹתָהּ, וּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ, וְצָרָתָהּ, וִיבִמְתָּהּ, וּבַת בַּעֲלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **All are deemed credible** when they come **to give testimony with regard to** the death of a woman’s husband, **apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her *yavam*, and her husband’s daughter,** her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment.


###### Yevamot 117a:9
[Yevamot 117a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:9)

מָה בֵּין גֵּט לְמִיתָה — שֶׁהַכְּתָב מוֹכִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. **What,** then, **is the difference between a bill of divorce and death?** The mishna answers: The difference is **that** in the case of a bill of divorce **the writing proves** the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself.


###### Yevamot 117a:10
[Yevamot 117a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:10)

**גְּמָ׳** אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בַּת חָמִיהָ מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא אִימָּא דְּסָנְיָא לַהּ, הִיא נָמֵי סָנְיָא לַהּ, וְהָכָא לֵיכָּא אִימָּא דְּסָנְיָא לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **A dilemma was raised before** the scholars: With regard to **the daughter of her father-in-law,** who is not the daughter of her mother-in-law, **what is** the *halakha*? May she testify to the death of the woman’s husband, or is she also under suspicion? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: **The reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law** is suspected of lying is **because she has a mother who hates** her daughter-in-law, and therefore the daughter **also hates her. But here, there is no mother who hates her,** as she is not the mother-in-law’s daughter, and therefore she should be deemed credible.


###### Yevamot 117a:11
[Yevamot 117a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:11)

אוֹ דִלְמָא טַעְמָא דְּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ, דְּאָמְרָה: ״קָאָכְלָה לְגִירְסָנָא דְאִימָּא״, הָכָא נָמֵי קָאָמְרָה: ״אָכְלָה לְגִירְסָנָא דְּבֵי נָשַׁאי״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law** hates her is **that she says: She eats the food [*girsena*] that** my **mother** prepares. **Here too,** in the case of the daughter of her father-in-law, **she also says: She eats the food of my father’s house.**


###### Yevamot 117a:12
[Yevamot 117a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:12)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין לְהַעִידָהּ חוּץ מֵחָמֵשׁ נָשִׁים. וְאִם אִיתָא, שֵׁית הָוְיָין! דִּלְמָא טַעְמָא דְּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ, דְּאָמְרָה: ״קָאָכְלָה לְגִירְסָנָא דְּבֵי נָשַׁאי״, לָא שְׁנָא בַּת חֲמוֹתָהּ וְלָא שְׁנָא בַּת חָמִיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a resolution from the following *baraita*: **All are deemed credible** when they come **to testify with regard to her except for five women. And if it is so,** that the daughter of her father-in-law is also disqualified, **there are** actually **six** women. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof, as **perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law** is disqualified from testifying is **that she says: She eats the food of my father’s house,** and if so, the *halakha* **is no different** with regard to **her mother-in-law’s daughter and no different** with regard to **her father-in-law’s daughter.** Since the two women are disqualified for the same reason the Sages did not list these as two separate cases.


###### Yevamot 117a:13
[Yevamot 117a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:13)

וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: חוּץ מִשֶּׁבַע נָשִׁים! הָהִיא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא. דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף אַף אֵשֶׁת אָב וְהַכַּלָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a contradiction from another source. **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: **Apart from seven women** who are not trustworthy. Apparently that *tanna* added the daughter of her father-in-law as a separate category. The Gemara answers: **That** ruling **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yehuda adds also a father’s wife,** who hates her stepdaughter, **and a daughter-in-law,** who hates her mother-in-law.


###### Yevamot 117a:14
[Yevamot 117a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:14)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵשֶׁת אָב הֲרֵי הִיא בִּכְלַל בַּת הַבַּעַל, כַּלָּה הֲרֵי בִּכְלַל חֲמוֹתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Rabbis **said to** Rabbi Yehuda: **A father’s wife is included in** the category of **the husband’s daughter,** while **a daughter-in-law** is **included in** the category of **her mother-in-law.** In other words, just as a mother-in-law is suspicious of her daughter-in-law, a daughter-in-law is equally suspicious of her mother-in-law, and they need not be listed separately.


###### Yevamot 117a:15
[Yevamot 117a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:15)

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, בִּשְׁלָמָא חֲמוֹתָהּ סָנְיָא לַהּ לְכַלָּה, דְּאָמְרָה: קָאָכְלָה לְגִירְסָנַי. אֶלָּא כַּלָּה מַאי טַעְמָא סָנְיָא לַחֲמוֹתָהּ? בִּשְׁלָמָא בַּת הַבַּעַל דְּסָנְיָא לְאֵשֶׁת הָאָב, דְּאָמְרָה: קָאָכְלָה לְגִירְסָנֵי דְאֵם. אֶלָּא אֵשֶׁת הָאָב, מַאי טַעְמָא סָנְיָא לְבַת הַבַּעַל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yehuda,** who counts them separately, can answer: **Granted** that **her mother-in-law hates** the **daughter-in-law, as she says: She eats the food I** prepare; **but a daughter-in-law, what is the reason** that **she hates her mother-in-law?** Similarly, **granted the husband’s daughter, that she hates** her **father’s wife, as she says:** This woman **eats the food that** my **mother** prepared. **However, the father’s wife, what is the reason** that **she hates her husband’s daughter?**


###### Yevamot 117a:16
[Yevamot 117a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:16)

אֶלָּא מַאי מוֹסִיף תַּרְתֵּי? אֶלָּא: כַּלָּה מַאי טַעְמָא סָנְיָא לַחֲמוֹתָהּ — דִּמְגַלָּה לִבְנָהּ כֹּל דְּעָבְדָה, אֵשֶׁת אָב נָמֵי סָנְיָא לְבַת הַבַּעַל — דִּמְגַלָּה לְאָבִיהָ כֹּל דְּעָבְדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Rather, what is** the reason that Rabbi Yehuda **adds** these **two? Rather,** his logic is: In the case of **a daughter-in-law, what is the reason** that **she hates her mother-in-law? Because she reveals to her son everything** his wife **does.** And likewise **a father’s wife also hates the husband’s daughter, because she reveals to her father everything she does.** In each case the reason for this hatred is different from the reason for the hatred of the other woman, the mother-in-law or the husband’s daughter, and therefore they belong in a separate category.


###### Yevamot 117a:17
[Yevamot 117a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:17)

וְרַבָּנַן: ״כַּמַּיִם הַפָּנִים לַפָּנִים כֵּן לֵב הָאָדָם לָאָדָם״. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: הָהִיא בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה כְּתִיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the Rabbis,** who say that the reasons for the hatred are the same and therefore count only five disqualified women, how do they respond to this argument? They cite the verse: **“As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man”** (Proverbs 27:19). That is, if one person hates another, the feeling soon becomes mutual. Here too, there is no need for a separate reason in order that the hatred be reciprocated. The Gemara asks: **And Rabbi Yehuda,** why doesn’t he rely on this verse? Rabbi Yehuda would retort: **That** verse **was written about matters of Torah.** In other words, it means that the more one studies Torah, the more Torah he understands.


###### Yevamot 117a:18
[Yevamot 117a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/117a:18)

אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר עַוְיָא, בָּעוּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: חֲמוֹתָהּ הַבָּאָה לְאַחַר מִיכֵּן מַהוּ? מִי מַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ דְּמָיֵת בַּעַל וְנָפְלָה קַמֵּי יָבָם וְסָנְיָא לַהּ, אוֹ לָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Aḥa bar Avya says: They raise a dilemma in the West,** i.e., Eretz Yisrael. With regard to **her mother-in-law who comes afterward, what is** the *halakha*? This refers to the mother of the husband’s brother, but not her husband’s mother, i.e., the wife’s future mother-in-law if the wife enters into levirate marriage. Can this woman testify with regard to the future wife of her son? The Gemara clarifies: **Does it enter her mind that** if this woman’s **husband died,** the widow **will happen before the *yavam*,** her son, for levirate marriage, **and** as the widow, when she then married her son, would eat her food **she hates her** already, **or not?**