## Yevamot Daf 119a

###### Yevamot 119a:1
[Yevamot 119a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:1)

**הָאִשָּׁה** שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וְצָרָתָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ״ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם עַד שֶׁתֵּדַע שֶׁמָּא מְעוּבֶּרֶת הִיא צָרָתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **a woman whose husband and rival** wife **traveled to a country overseas, and** witnesses **came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry** any other man, in case she requires levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, i.e., *yavam*, in which case she is prohibited from marrying anyone else. **And she** also **shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether she,** i.e., **her rival wife, is pregnant.** If her rival wife bears a child to her late husband, she does not have a levirate bond with her brother-in-law, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying him.


###### Yevamot 119a:2
[Yevamot 119a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:2)

הָיְתָה לָהּ חָמוֹת — אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. יָצְתָה מְלֵיאָה — חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If she had a mother-in-law** overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, **she need not be concerned** that a brother to her husband may have been born. But if her mother-in-law **departed** from her town **pregnant,** this widow **should be concerned** that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. **Rabbi Yehoshua says:** Even in such a case **she need not be concerned** and may marry whomever she wishes.


###### Yevamot 119a:3
[Yevamot 119a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:3)

**גְּמָ׳** מַאי ״הִיא צָרָתָהּ״? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לְהָא צָרָה הוּא דְּחָיְישִׁינַן, אֲבָל לְצָרָה אַחֲרִיתִי לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks: **What is** implied by the extra word: She, in the expression in the first clause of the mishna: Whether **she,** i.e., **her rival wife, is** pregnant? The Gemara answers that it **teaches us this: We are concerned** about a possible pregnancy of **this rival wife** who went overseas with her husband, **but we are not concerned about** the possibility that he married **another rival wife** overseas and sired a child by her.


###### Yevamot 119a:4
[Yevamot 119a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:4)

לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא יַבּוֹמֵי לָא, דְּדִלְמָא מִיעַבְּרָא, וְקָפָגְעָה בְּאֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אֶלָּא לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, אַמַּאי? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב נָשִׁים, וְרוֹב נָשִׁים מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
It was taught in the mishna: **She shall not marry** any other man **and shall not enter into levirate marriage** until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: **Granted,** she may **not enter into levirate marriage, because perhaps** her rival wife **is pregnant, and** if so, this widow **would encounter the Torah** prohibition proscribing **a brother’s wife.** If a child is born to her late husband, levirate marriage is not required and she is prohibited from marrying her brother-in-law. **But why** should she **not marry** another man? **Follow the majority of women, and** as **most women become pregnant and give birth,** it is probable that her rival wife did have a child.


###### Yevamot 119a:5
[Yevamot 119a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:5)

לֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Shall we say** that the mishna follows the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority?** There is a minority of women who do not give birth, and Rabbi Meir takes this minority into consideration and requires the widow to wait and clarify whether or not she is required to enter into levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 119a:6
[Yevamot 119a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:6)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא — רוּבָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת וְסַנְהֶדְרִי. אֲבָל רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן — לָא אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **You** can **even say** that the mishna follows the opinion of **the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, it is an evident majority,** which is extant and can be examined. **For example,** in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of **nine stores** selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, if it is not known from which store the meat came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. **And** similarly, **the Sanhedrin** reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its members. **But** with regard to **a non-evident majority,** which is based solely upon general statistical information, such as the assertion that most women become pregnant and give birth, even **the Rabbis do not follow the majority.**


###### Yevamot 119a:7
[Yevamot 119a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:7)

וַהֲרֵי קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, דְּרוּבָּא דְּלֵיתָא קַמַּן הִיא, וְאָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא! דְּתַנְיָא: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין. ״אִישׁ״ כְּתִיב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ. אֶלָּא מָה טַעַם אֵין מְיַיבְּמִין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **But** the case of **a minor boy or minor girl,** as pertains to levirate marriage, **is** dependent upon **a non-evident majority, and** nevertheless **the Rabbis follow the majority** in their ruling, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **A minor boy or minor girl may not perform *ḥalitza* and may not enter into levirate marriage;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir.** The Rabbis **said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform *ḥalitza*,** since **“man”** (Deuteronomy 25:7), i.e., an adult male, **is written in the section** of the Torah pertaining to *ḥalitza*. Though an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, **we employ** an analogy based on **juxtaposition** of **the woman to the man** and require that the female involved in *ḥalitza* be an adult as well. **But what is the reason that they may not enter into levirate marriage,** about which the Torah’s phraseology does not specifically indicate adults?


###### Yevamot 119a:8
[Yevamot 119a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:8)

אָמַר לָהֶם: קָטָן שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְלוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִים בְּעֶרְוָה. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא דִּקְטַנִּים, וְרוֹב קְטַנִּים לָאו סָרִיסֵי נִינְהוּ. זִיל בָּתַר רוֹב קְטַנּוֹת, וְרוֹב קְטַנּוֹת לָאו אַיְלוֹנִית נִינְהוּ. אֶלָּא, מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**He said to them:** I am concerned about **the minor boy, lest he be confirmed as a sexually underdeveloped man** when he grows up, and I am concerned about **the minor girl, lest she be confirmed as an *aylonit*,** a sexually underdeveloped woman, when she grows up. Then levirate marriage would not apply, and **they would end up encountering a forbidden relative** if they consummated the levirate marriage. **And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of minor boys, and most minor boys are not sexually underdeveloped** when they grow up. Likewise, **follow the majority of minor girls, and most minor girls are not** in the category of ***aylonit*** when they grow up. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority. **Rather, it is clear that the mishna is** following **Rabbi Meir,** who is concerned about the minority.


###### Yevamot 119a:9
[Yevamot 119a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:9)

בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתָּא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: הָיְתָה לָהּ חָמוֹת — אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. אַמַּאי? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב נָשִׁים, וְרוֹב נָשִׁים מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת, מִיעוּט מַפִּילוֹת, וְכׇל הַיּוֹלְדוֹת — מֶחֱצָה זְכָרִים וּמֶחֱצָה נְקֵבוֹת. סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא דְמַפִּילוֹת לְמֶחֱצָה נְקֵבוֹת, וְהָווּ לֵיהּ זְכָרִים מִיעוּטָא — וְלֵיחוּשׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **In what** manner **did you establish** the mishna? You established it **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir.** However, **say the latter clause: If she had a mother-in-law** overseas, **she need not be concerned** that her mother-in-law may have given birth to another son. **Why** should she not be concerned about this? **Follow the majority of women, and most women become pregnant and give birth.** The **minority** become pregnant and **miscarry. And** among **all women who give birth, half** of the children are **male and half** are **female.** Therefore, we can **join the minority who miscarry to the half** who give birth to **females, and then the male children** born **would be** only **the minority.** Nevertheless, if the mishna actually follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about minority circumstances, **let him be concerned** that a *yavam* might have been born, necessitating a levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 119a:10
[Yevamot 119a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:10)

דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִיחְזְקָה לַשּׁוּק, לָא חָיֵישׁ. רֵישָׁא דְּאִיחְזַק לְיִיבּוּם — תִּיַּיבַּם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **Perhaps, since** the widow **is** legally **presumed** to be permitted **to** marry a man from the general **public,** since her husband had no known brothers, Rabbi Meir **is not concerned** about the minority. The Gemara challenges: If so, in **the first clause** of the mishna, where the widow **is** legally **presumed to** require **levirate marriage,** as her husband had no children, **she should** be permitted to **enter into levirate marriage** without concern that her rival wife might have given birth.


###### Yevamot 119a:11
[Yevamot 119a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:11)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: רֵישָׁא דְּאִיסּוּר כָּרֵת — חָשְׁשׁוּ, סֵיפָא דְּאִיסּוּר לָאו — לֹא חָשְׁשׁוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that **Rav Naḥman said** that **Rabba bar Avuh said:** In **the first clause** of the mishna, **which** relates to **a prohibition** proscribing a brother’s wife when levirate marriage does not apply, which bears the punishment of ***karet*, they were concerned** about the minority possibility because of the severity of the prohibition. But in **the latter clause** of the mishna, **which** relates to **an ordinary prohibition,** that of a woman whose husband died childless marrying without performing *ḥalitza*, the prohibition is not so severe. Therefore, **they were not concerned** about the minority and relied upon the presumption.


###### Yevamot 119a:12
[Yevamot 119a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119a:12)

אָמַר רָבָא: מִכְּדֵי, הָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא וְהָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — מָה לִי אִיסּוּר כָּרֵת מָה לִי אִיסּוּר לָאו?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** in opposition to this contention: **Now since this** prohibition **is by Torah** law **and that** prohibition **is by Torah** law, **what** difference is it **to me** if it is **a prohibition** bearing the punishment of ***karet*** and **what** difference is it **to me** if it is **an ordinary prohibition?** If both prohibitions are by Torah law there is no justification for distinguishing between a severe prohibition and a minor one! **Rather, Rava said** that we must reject this contention, and say: