## Yevamot Daf 119b ###### Yevamot 119b:1 [Yevamot 119b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:1) רֵישָׁא, חֲזָקָה לְיִיבּוּם, וְרוּבָּא לַשּׁוּק. וַחֲזָקָה לָא עֲדִיף כִּי רוּבָּא. וְאַיְיתִי מִיעוּטָא דְּמַפִּילוֹת סְמוֹךְ לַחֲזָקָה, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ פַּלְגָא וּפַלְגָא — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם. **William Davidson Edition - English:** In **the first clause** of the mishna, **the** legal **presumption** is that this widow **is** obligated **to** enter into **levirate marriage, but** in **a majority** of cases she will actually be permitted **to** marry a man from the general **public,** because it is statistically probable that her rival wife had a child. **A** legal **presumption is not** as **significant as a majority,** meaning that the majority carries more weight than the presumption, and she should be permitted to marry immediately. **But bring the minority who miscarry** into consideration, and **join** this **to the** legal **presumption, and it becomes** similar to an even balance of **half and half.** Those who miscarry detract from the strength of the majority, causing it to be equal in legal significance to the legal presumption. Therefore, the ruling is that **she shall not marry** any man who is not her *yavam* **and she shall not enter into levirate marriage** either. ###### Yevamot 119b:2 [Yevamot 119b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:2) סֵיפָא, חֲזָקָה לַשּׁוּק, וְרוּבָּא לַשּׁוּק. וְהָוֵי לֵיהּ זְכָרִים מִיעוּטָא דְמִיעוּטָא, וּמִיעוּטָא דְמִיעוּטָא — לָא חָיֵישׁ רַבִּי מֵאִיר. **William Davidson Edition - English:** However, in **the latter clause, the** legal **presumption is** that the widow is permitted **to** marry a man from the general **public,** since her late husband had no brothers initially. **And** in **a majority** of cases her mother-in-law will not have had another son, and therefore the widow will actually be permitted **to** marry a man from the general **public.** Consequently, the possibility that her husband has a brother, necessitating levirate marriage, **is** not taken into account because it is **a minority of a minority,** i.e., it is a minority and it contradicts the legal presumption, **and** even **Rabbi Meir is not concerned about a minority of a minority.** ###### Yevamot 119b:3 [Yevamot 119b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:3) לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם וְכוּ׳. וּלְעוֹלָם! **William Davidson Edition - English:** § It was taught in the mishna that in the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas and then her husband died, **she shall not marry and shall not enter into levirate marriage** until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. The Gemara asks: **But** must she wait **indefinitely?** She should be permitted to perform *ḥalitza* on account of the uncertainty and then marry another man. ###### Yevamot 119b:4 [Yevamot 119b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:4) אָמַר זְעֵירִי: לְעַצְמָהּ — שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ — תִּשְׁעָה, וְחוֹלֶצֶת מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ. **William Davidson Edition - English:** **Ze’eiri said:** In order **for herself [*le’atzma*]** to be permitted to marry, she must wait **three months** after performing *ḥalitza*, since every woman must wait three months after her husband’s death before she marries again. Additionally, due to the concern **for** the possibility that **her fellow** wife may be pregnant, she must wait **nine** months, after which time that wife would have given birth had she been pregnant, **and** then **she performs *ḥalitza* whichever way you** look at it. If her rival wife gave birth in the meantime, she is permitted to marry anyone she wishes, and the *ḥalitza* is superfluous; if her rival wife did not give birth, necessitating levirate marriage, she is exempted by the *ḥalitza*. However, she may not perform *ḥalitza* earlier because *ḥalitza* performed while any wife of the deceased husband is pregnant is ineffective. ###### Yevamot 119b:5 [Yevamot 119b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:5) רַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר: לְעַצְמָהּ — שְׁלֹשָׁה, לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ — לְעוֹלָם. וְתַחְלוֹץ מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ! **William Davidson Edition - English:** **Rabbi Ḥanina said: For** those concerns relating to **herself** she must wait **three** months, as explained, but **for** concerns related to **her fellow** wife’s possible pregnancy she must wait **indefinitely,** until it is verified whether or not that wife gave birth. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion: **But let her perform *ḥalitza* whichever way you** look at it, since, whatever happened, after nine months she may certainly perform *ḥalitza*. ###### Yevamot 119b:6 [Yevamot 119b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:6) אַבָּיֵי בַּר אָבִין וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר אָבִין אָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְנִמְצָא אַתָּה מַצְרִיכָהּ כָּרוֹז לַכְּהוּנָּה. **William Davidson Edition - English:** **Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avin both say** in explanation of Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion: **It is** a rabbinic **decree lest there be viable offspring** of that other wife. If so, her *ḥalitza* is superfluous, since she was exempt from both levirate marriage and *ḥalitza*; **and** then **it transpires** that **you necessitate an announcement** on **her** behalf stating that she is permitted **to the priesthood,** as a woman who has undergone *ḥalitza* is forbidden to a priest, but in this case it has become clear retroactively that she did not undergo *ḥalitza*. ###### Yevamot 119b:7 [Yevamot 119b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:7) וְלַיצְרְכַהּ? דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא דְּהָוֵי בַּחֲלִיצָה וְלָא הָוֵי בְּהַכְרָזָה, וְאָמְרִי: קָשָׁרוּ חֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן. **William Davidson Edition - English:** The Gemara asks: **And so let an announcement be necessary for her** if a viable offspring is found. The Gemara answers: **Perhaps there will be** people **who were** present **at the *ḥalitza*** ceremony **but were not** present **at the announcement** that she is permitted to marry a priest, **and** if this woman marries a priest **they will** mistakenly **say: They are permitting a *ḥalutza* to** marry **a priest.** ###### Yevamot 119b:8 [Yevamot 119b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:8) תְּנַן: ״נִיתַּן לִי בֵּן בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם״, וְאָמְרָה: ״מֵת בְּנִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ בַּעְלִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. ״מֵת בַּעְלִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ בְּנִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת, וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לִדְבָרֶיהָ, וְחוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. **William Davidson Edition - English:** The Gemara deliberates further about this: **We learned** in a mishna (*Yevamot* 118b): If a woman says: **A son was born to me in a country overseas, and she** also **said: My son died, and then my husband died, she is deemed credible.** However, if she said: **My husband died and then my son died, she is not deemed credible** about the sequence of events, **but** even so **one** must **be concerned about her statement** that her husband died childless. Consequently, **she** must **perform *ḥalitza*, but she may not enter into levirate marriage.** ###### Yevamot 119b:9 [Yevamot 119b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:9) וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא אָתוּ עֵדִים וְאָמְרִי כִּדְקָאָמְרָה, וְנִמְצָא אַתָּה מַצְרִיכָהּ כָּרוֹז לַכְּהוּנָּה! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בִּגְרוּשָׁה. רַב חִיָּיא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר, בְּאָמְרָה: ״אֲנִי וָהוּא נֶחְבֵּאנוּ בִּמְעָרָה״. **William Davidson Edition - English:** The Gemara says: Just as there is concern about an announcement for the priesthood, **let us be concerned** that **perhaps witnesses** will eventually **come and testify** that the sequence of events was **as she said,** rendering her *ḥalitza* superfluous. **And** then **it transpires** that **you necessitate an announcement** on **her** behalf stating that she is permitted **to the priesthood,** and nevertheless the mishna instructs her to perform *ḥalitza*. **Rav Pappa said:** There it is referring only **to a divorced woman,** who was divorced from a previous husband, so that she is already prohibited from marrying a priest in any case. **Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, said:** It is referring to a case **where she said: He and I were hiding** alone with our son **in a cave.** Consequently, there is no concern that witnesses will come and testify about the sequence of the events. ###### Yevamot 119b:10 [Yevamot 119b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:10) **מַתְנִי׳** שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת, זוֹ אוֹמֶרֶת: ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״, וְזוֹ אוֹמֶרֶת: ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״. זוֹ אֲסוּרָה מִפְּנֵי בַּעְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ, וְזוֹ אֲסוּרָה מִפְּנֵי בַּעְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ. **William Davidson Edition - English:** **MISHNA:** If there are **two sisters-in-law** married to two childless brothers who testify about their marital status, and **this one says: My husband died, and that one says: My husband died,** although each one of them is deemed credible with regard to her own status as a widow, **this one is prohibited** from marrying **due to** the possibility that **the husband of that** other sister may be alive, obligating her in levirate marriage, **and that one is prohibited** from marrying **due to the husband of this** sister, according to the same rationale. Although each is accorded credibility as to her own husband’s death, the *halakha* is that sisters-in-law are among the five types of women not accorded credibility with regard to each other’s permissibility to marry because of possible conflicts of interest. ###### Yevamot 119b:11 [Yevamot 119b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:11) לָזוֹ עֵדִים, וְלָזוֹ אֵין עֵדִים. אֶת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים — אֲסוּרָה, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עֵדִים — מוּתֶּרֶת. לָזוֹ בָּנִים, וְלָזוֹ אֵין בָּנִים. אֶת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים — מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — אֲסוּרָה. **William Davidson Edition - English:** If **this one has witnesses** to her husband’s death, **and that one does not have witnesses,** then **the one who has witnesses is prohibited** from marrying, as there are no witnesses to the death of her *yavam* to exempt her from levirate marriage; **but the one who has no witnesses is permitted** to marry based on her own testimony that her husband died combined with the witnesses’ testimony exempting her from levirate marriage. If **this one has children and that one has no children,** then **the one with children is permitted** to marry, as she herself is deemed credible with regard to her husband’s death, and her children exempt her from levirate marriage. **But the one without children is prohibited** from marrying, as the death of her *yavam* has not been corroborated independently of her sister-in-law’s testimony. ###### Yevamot 119b:12 [Yevamot 119b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:12) נִתְיַיבְּמוּ, וּמֵתוּ הַיְּבָמִין — אֲסוּרוֹת לְהִנָּשֵׂא. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוּתְּרוּ לַיְּבָמִין — הוּתְּרוּ לְכׇל אָדָם. **William Davidson Edition - English:** If there were two additional *yevamin* with whom these two widows **entered into levirate marriage, and** then **the *yevamin* died** childless, the women **are prohibited from marrying,** since the concern about an additional living *yavam* still remains. **Rabbi Elazar says: Since** these women **were permitted to** marry **the** living **brothers-in-law,** as the testimony of each was deemed credible with regard to her own status, **they are permitted,** from then on, **to** marry **any man** because their statements, taken together, indicate that neither one is obligated to enter into levirate marriage. ###### Yevamot 119b:13 [Yevamot 119b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:13) **גְּמָ׳** תָּנָא: לָזוֹ עֵדִים וּבָנִים, וְלָזוֹ לֹא עֵדִים וְלֹא בָּנִים — שְׁתֵּיהֶן מוּתָּרוֹת. **William Davidson Edition - English:** **GEMARA:** It was **taught** in a *baraita*: If **this one has witnesses** that her husband died **and** also has **children, and the other has neither witnesses nor children, they are both permitted** to marry. This is because the woman who has children is exempt from levirate marriage, and the woman who has no children may rely upon the witnesses’ testimony that her *yavam* died. ###### Yevamot 119b:14 [Yevamot 119b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:14) נִתְיַיבְּמוּ וּמֵתוּ הַיְּבָמִין — אֲסוּרִין לְהִנָּשֵׂא. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוּתְּרוּ לַיְּבָמִין — הוּתְּרוּ לְכׇל אָדָם. **William Davidson Edition - English:** It was taught in the mishna: If **they** both **entered into levirate marriage and** then **the *yevamin*** they married **died, they are prohibited from marrying. Rabbi Elazar says: Since they were permitted to** marry **the *yevamin*, they are permitted to any man.** ###### Yevamot 119b:15 [Yevamot 119b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:15) בָּעֵי רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר צָרָה מְעִידָה לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהִיא לָא מְקַלְקְלָא נַפְשַׁהּ. **William Davidson Edition - English:** **Rava raised a dilemma: What is Rabbi Elazar’s reasoning?** Is it **because he holds** in general that one **rival wife may testify for another** rival wife about her husband’s death, and he similarly holds that all of the five types of women who are presumed to have a conflict of interest with each other may testify for one another nonetheless? **Or perhaps** it is **because she would not cause herself injury.** Although she would be suspected of lying and saying that her husband died in order to harm her rival wife, if she herself enters into levirate marriage it can be assumed that she was telling the truth, because if she does so while her husband is actually alive, she would be committing incest with her brother-in-law. Consequently, her rival wife is also permitted to marry on the basis of her testimony. ###### Yevamot 119b:16 [Yevamot 119b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/119b:16) לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? **William Davidson Edition - English:** The Gemara asks: **What is the practical difference** between the two reasons?