## Yevamot Daf 30b

###### Yevamot 30b:1
[Yevamot 30b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:1)

קִנְיָן גָּמוּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
as **a full-fledged acquisition.** According to that opinion, the unrelated woman does not even require *ḥalitza*, since she is considered to be a rival wife of a forbidden relative. This mishna **teaches us that** the *halakha* **is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Beit Shammai.**


###### Yevamot 30b:2
[Yevamot 30b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:2)

וּלְרַב נַחְמָן — קַשְׁיָא דְּרַב אָשֵׁי! וְכִי תֵּימָא: הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ מֵת וְאַחַר כָּךְ גֵּירַשׁ — צָרָתָהּ מוּתֶּרֶת, אֶלָּא ״זוֹ הִיא״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי כָּנַס וְאַחַר כָּךְ גֵּירַשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a question from the opposite perspective: **And according to Rav Naḥman,** who deduced from the earlier mishna that the levirate bond is not substantial, the deduction **of Rav Ashi** that the levirate bond is substantial is **difficult. And if you would** try to resolve this in a similar manner and **say:** With regard to the ruling in the present mishna, which states that the sister’s **rival wife,** i.e., the unrelated woman, **is permitted, the same is true even if** Levi had **died and** then **afterward** the brother married to the other sister **divorced** his wife, there is a difficulty. If that is the case, then **what does** the phrase **this is,** cited at the end of the mishna, come **to exclude?** If we follow this explanation then the same ruling would hold true in all cases. The Gemara responds: **It excludes** the case where Shimon first **married** the unrelated woman **and** only **afterward divorced** the sister, as in such circumstances the unrelated woman is most certainly a rival wife of Reuven’s wife’s sister and is therefore not permitted.


###### Yevamot 30b:3
[Yevamot 30b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:3)

הָנִיחָא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, דְּאָמַר: תַּבְרָא, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara states: **This works out well if he holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yirmeya, who said** with regard to a seeming contradiction between this mishna and an earlier mishna (13a): The *mishnayot* are **disjointed; he who taught this** mishna **did not teach that** mishna. The earlier mishna established the principle that if a man was married to two women, one of whom was a forbidden relative, and he divorced the forbidden relative before he died, then the rival wife is no longer prohibited to the brothers.


###### Yevamot 30b:4
[Yevamot 30b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:4)

וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר מִיתָה מַפֶּלֶת, וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר נִישּׂוּאִין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים מַפִּילִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This dispute is based upon the following: **This *tanna*** from the earlier mishna **holds that death determines** her status when **she happens** before the brothers, i.e., the crucial moment for determining whether the prohibition relating to rival wives applies is the moment at which the brother dies. In other words, whether the *yevama* is permitted to the *yavam* is determined by the status of the *yevama* at that given moment. Therefore, in the case where he had married a forbidden relative and later divorced her, the rival wife would be permitted. **And this *tanna*** of our present mishna **holds that the original marriage determines** her status when **she happens** before the brothers. If, at the time the woman was married to the deceased brother she was forbidden as a close relative, and her rival wife was likewise forbidden as the rival wife of a forbidden relative, then even though the status of the relative had changed at the time of the death of the brother, both she and her rival wife remain forbidden.


###### Yevamot 30b:5
[Yevamot 30b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:5)

״זוֹ הִיא״ לְמַעוֹטֵי כָּנַס וּלְבַסּוֹף גֵּירַשׁ. אֶלָּא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: לְעוֹלָם חַד תַּנָּא הוּא, וְ״זוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר זוֹ״ קָתָנֵי, ״זוֹ הִיא״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? עַל כׇּרְחָךְ כְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
According to this opinion, it is indeed possible to state that the phrase **this is** comes **to exclude** the case where **he married** one woman **and ultimately divorced** the other. According to this mishna, in that case, the rival wives would be prohibited. **However, if he holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rava, who said: Actually,** understand **this** to be the opinion of **a single *tanna*, and he teaches** the mishna employing the style: **This, and it is unnecessary to say that,** a difficulty remains. According to Rava, both *mishnayot* maintain the position that in the case where the *yavam* married one woman and ultimately divorced the other, the rival wife would be permitted. If that is the case, **what** does the phrase **this is** come **to exclude?** In what case would the rival wife be prohibited to the *yavam*? The Gemara responds: **Perforce** Rav Naḥman **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yirmeya** with regard to his interpretation of the *mishnayot*.


###### Yevamot 30b:6
[Yevamot 30b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:6)

וּלְרָבָא, הָנִיחָא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב אָשֵׁי — ״זוֹ הִיא״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מֵת בְּלֹא גֵּירֵשׁ. אֶלָּא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב נַחְמָן, ״זוֹ הִיא״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? עַל כׇּרְחָךְ כְּרַב אָשֵׁי סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a question from a different perspective: **And according to Rava,** who maintains that in both cases the rival wife is permitted, **this works out well if he holds in accordance** with the opinion **of Rav Ashi** that the levirate bond is substantial. In that case the phrase **this is** comes **to exclude** the case where **he died without divorcing his wife.** In this case the rival wife is forbidden because the entire time she was the rival wife of a forbidden relative by levirate bond. **If, however, he holds in accordance** with the opinion of **Rav Naḥman** in this matter, **what** does the phrase **this is** come **to exclude?** The Gemara answers: **Perforce** Rava **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav Ashi.** Accordingly, with regard to this *halakha* there is a connection between the various opinions as to how to interpret the *mishnayot* and the dispute.


###### Yevamot 30b:7
[Yevamot 30b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:7)

**מַתְנִי׳** וְכוּלָּן שֶׁהָיוּ בָּהֶן קִדּוּשִׁין אוֹ גֵרוּשִׁין בְּסָפֵק — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ הַצָּרוֹת חוֹלְצוֹת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבְּמוֹת. כֵּיצַד סְפֵק קִדּוּשִׁין? זָרַק לָהּ קִדּוּשִׁין, סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ — זֶהוּ סְפֵק קִדּוּשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **And** if **any of these** fifteen women who are prohibited as forbidden relatives **had undergone a betrothal or divorce** whose status **is uncertain** with the deceased brother, **then those** women who were their **rival wives** must **perform *ḥalitza* and may not enter into levirate marriage** since they are possibly the rival wives of forbidden relatives. The mishna elaborates: **How** could there be a situation of **uncertainty** with regard to **betrothal?** If in the public domain **he threw her** an item for the purpose of **betrothal** and there were eight cubits between them, and the item **was possibly closer to him** and did not enter into her domain, and **possibly closer to her,** i.e., within four cubits of her, whereby she could acquire the object, **this is** a case of **uncertainty** with regard to **betrothal.**


###### Yevamot 30b:8
[Yevamot 30b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:8)

סְפֵק גֵּרוּשִׁין — כָּתַב בִּכְתַב יָדוֹ וְאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים, יֵשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים וְאֵין בּוֹ זְמַן, יֵשׁ בּוֹ זְמַן וְאֵין בּוֹ אֶלָּא עֵד אֶחָד, זֶהוּ סְפֵק גֵּרוּשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Uncertainty** with regard to **divorce** occurs when, for instance, **he wrote a** bill of divorce **in his handwriting but there are no** signatures of **witnesses on** the document, or **there are** the signatures of **witnesses** on the document **but there is no date** written **in it,** or **the date is** written **in it but there is only** the signature of **a single witness.** Since there is doubt as to whether these three kinds of bills of divorce are valid, a woman who was divorced through them is only possibly divorced, and so **this** case **is** called **uncertainty** with regard to **divorce.**


###### Yevamot 30b:9
[Yevamot 30b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:9)

**גְּמָ׳** וְאִילּוּ בְּגֵרוּשִׁין, סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ לָא קָתָנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara remarks: **But yet when** discussing **divorce, it does not teach** the case where it is **uncertain** if the bill of divorce **is closer to him, and uncertain if it is closer to her.** It would have been appropriate to describe this case, as it parallels the case involving the object of betrothal. He could have tossed it in such a way that it was not clear to whom the bill was closer.


###### Yevamot 30b:10
[Yevamot 30b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:10)

מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבָּה: אִשָּׁה זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת הֶיתֵּר לַשּׁוּק עוֹמֶדֶת, וּמִסָּפֵק אַתָּה בָּא לְאוֹסְרָהּ — אַל תַּאַסְרֶנָּה מִסָּפֵק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** the mishna did not present this situation as well? **Rabba said:** When this type of uncertainty exists, the performance of *ḥalitza* is not mandatory, as **this woman,** the rival wife, **has the presumptive status of being permitted** to marry a man **from the** general **public.** At the time of her marriage she was rendered a rival wife of a forbidden relative. **And due to an uncertainty** alone **would you render her forbidden** to the general public until she performs *ḥalitza*, simply because it is unclear to us whether or not the forbidden relative had indeed been divorced? **Do not render her forbidden due to an uncertainty.** This is not, however, the case with the various bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna, for they are all certainly considered effective bills of divorce, even if the circumstances involved raise some questions or doubts.


###### Yevamot 30b:11
[Yevamot 30b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:11)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אִי הָכִי, בְּקִדּוּשִׁין נָמֵי נֵימָא: אִשָּׁה זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת הֶיתֵּר לַיָּבָם עוֹמֶדֶת, וּמִסָּפֵק אַתָּה בָּא לְאוֹסְרָהּ — אַל תַּאַסְרֶנָּה מִסָּפֵק!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to him: If that is so, let us say** in the case of **betrothal as well** that **this woman,** the rival wife, **has the presumptive status of being permitted to the *yavam*** before he betrothed the forbidden relative, **and due to the uncertainty** whether she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative **would you come and render her forbidden? Do not render her forbidden due to an uncertainty.** Consequently, you should permit her to enter into levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 30b:12
[Yevamot 30b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:12)

הָתָם, לְחוּמְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **There,** with regard to betrothal, the *halakha* follows **the stringent ruling,** because the rival wife is certainly his wife and requires levirate marriage. As there is uncertainty with regard to the betrothal with the forbidden relative, the ruling is stringent; she may not enter into levirate marriage and must only perform *ḥalitza*.


###### Yevamot 30b:13
[Yevamot 30b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:13)

הַאי — חוּמְרָא דְּאָתֵי לִידֵי קוּלָּא הוּא. זִימְנִין דְּאָזֵיל הוּא, וּמְקַדֵּשׁ לַהּ לַאֲחוֹתַהּ קִדּוּשֵׁי וַדַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: Yet **this is a stringency that might bring about a leniency** in another scenario. How so? **Sometimes** that same man who betrothed the forbidden relative might **go and betroth her sister** with **a betrothal** whose status is **certain.** If one says that due to a stringency the rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage due to her possible status as the rival wife of a forbidden relative, people might come to assume that the betrothal with the forbidden relative was a valid betrothal, and that the subsequent betrothal with her sister was not valid, since she is his wife’s sister. This would be assumed because they would not know that the status of the first betrothal was itself uncertain and that only due to a stringent ruling is the rival wife not allowed to enter into levirate marriage. In fact, the status of the betrothal with the sister of the forbidden relative is also uncertain. As a result of this ruling, however, people might be led to think that a man’s wife, i.e., the sister of the forbidden relative, is in fact permitted.


###### Yevamot 30b:14
[Yevamot 30b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/30b:14)

וְאִי נָמֵי, זִימְנִין דְּאָתֵא אַחֵר וּמְקַדֵּשׁ לַהּ לְדִידַהּ קִדּוּשֵׁי וַדַּאי, וְכֵיוָן דְּאָסַר לַהּ מָר לְצָרָה לְיַיבּוֹמֵי, אָמְרִי: דְּקַמָּא — קִדּוּשִׁין, וּדְבָתְרָא — לָאו קִדּוּשִׁין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively, sometimes another man might come and betroth** the forbidden relative **herself** with **a betrothal** whose status is **certain, and since the Master** rendered it **prohibited** for **the rival wife to enter into levirate marriage,** people would **say** that the betrothal **of the first** man, i.e., the deceased brother, was a fully effective **betrothal, and** that the betrothal **of the latter** man **was not** a valid **betrothal.** If she was married to the first man, then she is forbidden to the second as the man’s wife, and betrothal cannot take effect with her. However, since the status of her betrothal to the first man was uncertain, then she is also considered possibly betrothed to the second man and would require a divorce from him as well. As a result, one can find a situation that would lead people to think that a man’s wife is in fact permitted.