## Yevamot Daf 36a

###### Yevamot 36a:1
[Yevamot 36a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:1)

דְּכׇל הָעוֹלֶה לְיִבּוּם — עוֹלֶה לַחֲלִיצָה, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין עוֹלֶה לְיִבּוּם — אֵינוֹ עוֹלֶה לַחֲלִיצָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**that anyone who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for *ḥalitza* and anyone who is not eligible for levirate marriage is not eligible for *ḥalitza*.** Therefore, the original understanding of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, that both the intercourse and the *ḥalitza* of a pregnant woman are valid, was accurate.


###### Yevamot 36a:2
[Yevamot 36a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:2)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הַכּוֹנֵס יְבִמְתּוֹ וְנִמְצֵאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא צָרָתָהּ, שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא. וּבִיאַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת לֹא שְׁמָהּ בִּיאָה, וַחֲלִיצַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת לֹא שְׁמָהּ חֲלִיצָה. וְהַוָּלָד אֵינוֹ פּוֹטֵר עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava therefore provides a different defense of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: **Rather, Rava said** that **this is what** the *baraita* **is saying:** In the case of **one who consummates** the levirate marriage **with his *yevama*** under the assumption that there is a mitzva to do so, **and** then **she is found to** have been **pregnant** at the time of the intercourse, **a rival wife of this** *yevama* **may not marry lest the offspring be viable, and intercourse with a woman pregnant** with viable offspring **is not considered** a valid consummation of levirate marriage through **intercourse, and *ḥalitza* of a woman pregnant** with viable offspring **is not considered** effective ***ḥalitza*. And** furthermore, even if **the offspring** is viable, it **does not release** her and her rival wives from the levirate bond **until it comes into the air of the world,** i.e., until it is actually born.


###### Yevamot 36a:3
[Yevamot 36a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:3)

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הַכּוֹנֵס יְבִמְתּוֹ וְנִמְצֵאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא צָרָתָהּ, שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְאֵין בִּיאָה וַחֲלִיצָה פּוֹטֶרֶת, אֶלָּא וָלָד פּוֹטֵר. וְהַוָּלָד אֵין פּוֹטְרָהּ עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rava:** In the case of **one who consummates** a levirate marriage with **his *yevama*, and** then **she is found to** have been **pregnant** at the time of the intercourse, **a rival wife of this** *yevama* **may not marry lest the offspring be viable.** This is because **intercourse or *ḥalitza*** with a woman pregnant with viable offspring **does not release** a *yevama* from the levirate bond; **rather,** the **offspring releases** her. **And** furthermore, even if **the offspring** is viable, it **does not release her** and her rival wives from the levirate marriage bond **until it comes into the air of the world.**


###### Yevamot 36a:4
[Yevamot 36a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:4)

טַעְמָא דְּשֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא הוּא, הָא לָא הָוֵי וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא מִיפַּטְרָא צָרָתָהּ, לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains that the *baraita* appears to contradict Reish Lakish’s opinion: According to the *baraita*, **the** only **reason** that levirate marriage with the pregnant *yevama* does not permit the rival wife to marry **is as** the *baraita* stated: **Lest the offspring be viable.** By inference, **were the offspring not viable, her rival wife would be released** from the levirate bond. If so, **let us say that** this *baraita* **is a conclusive refutation** of the opinion of **Reish Lakish.**


###### Yevamot 36a:5
[Yevamot 36a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:5)

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַכּוֹנֵס יְבִמְתּוֹ וְנִמְצֵאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא צָרָתָהּ, שֶׁמָּא לֹא יְהֵא הַוָּלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וַחֲלִיצַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת לֹא שְׁמָהּ חֲלִיצָה, וּבִיאַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת לֹא שְׁמָהּ בִּיאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara defends Reish Lakish’s opinion: **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you: This is what** the *baraita* **is teaching:** In the case of **one who consummates** a levirate marriage with **his *yevama*, and** then **she was found to** have been **pregnant** at the time of the intercourse, **a rival wife of this** *yevama* **may not marry lest the offspring not be viable,** which would mean that all the rival wives are bound by the levirate bond. **And** even if one of those wives has intercourse or performs *ḥalitza* with the *yavam*, it would be ineffective in releasing them from the levirate bond because ***ḥalitza* with a pregnant woman is not considered** effective ***ḥalitza*, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered** a valid consummation of levirate marriage through **intercourse.**


###### Yevamot 36a:6
[Yevamot 36a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:6)

וְאִם תֹּאמַר: הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב נָשִׁים, וְרוֹב נָשִׁים וָלָד מְעַלְּיָא יָלְדָן, וָלָד אֵין פּוֹטֵר עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Reish Lakish explains the need for the final clause of the *baraita*: **And** even **if you say:** Let the wives marry without the need for any levirate marriage or *ḥalitza* because one should **follow** the **majority of women, and** the **majority of women give birth to a full-fledged,** i.e., viable, **offspring,** and therefore one should presume no levirate bond exists, to counter this claim the *baraita* concludes: Even if the offspring will be viable, an **offspring does not release** a *yevama* and her rival wives from the levirate bond **until it comes into the air of the world.**


###### Yevamot 36a:7
[Yevamot 36a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:7)

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אֶפְשָׁר אִיתָא לְהָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ וְלָא תְּנַן לָהּ בְּמַתְנִיתִין? נְפַק, דַּק וְאַשְׁכַּח, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וְצָרָתָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם עַד שֶׁתֵּדַע שֶׁמָּא מְעוּבֶּרֶת הִיא צָרָתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Elazar said:** Is it **possible** that **there is** halakhic acceptance **of this** opinion **of Reish Lakish and it was not** hinted to by something **taught in the Mishna? He went out** of the study hall, carefully **checked** the *mishnayot*, **and found** one that supported Reish Lakish’s opinion, **as we learned** in a mishna: In the case of **a woman whose husband and rival wife went overseas, and** then witnesses **came and said to her: Your husband died,** and her husband had a brother, **this** woman **may neither marry** someone other than his brother, **nor may she enter into levirate marriage** with that brother, **until she knows** whether **perhaps her rival wife is pregnant.** If she discovers that her rival wife is not pregnant, she would then be able to perform levirate marriage or *ḥalitza*. If she discovers her rival wife is pregnant, she would have to wait to see if the pregnancy is viable. If it is found to be viable, only at that point would she be permitted to marry someone else.


###### Yevamot 36a:8
[Yevamot 36a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:8)

בִּשְׁלָמָא יַבּוֹמֵי לָא — שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְיִפְגַּע בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֶלָּא: לֹא תַּחְלוֹץ, אַמַּאי? בִּשְׁלָמָא תַּחְלוֹץ בְּתוֹךְ תִּשְׁעָה וְתִנָּשֵׂא בְּתוֹךְ תִּשְׁעָה — לָא, הַיְינוּ סָפֵק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Elazar explains how this mishna supports Reish Lakish’s opinion: **Granted, she may not enter levirate marriage** as **perhaps** her rival wife is pregnant and the **offspring will be viable, and** therefore by consummating the levirate marriage the *yavam* would **encounter the Torah prohibition against** engaging in relations with one’s **brother’s wife. But why may she not perform *ḥalitza*? Granted, she may not perform *ḥalitza* during the** first **nine** months following her husband’s death **and** then proceed to also **marry during** those **nine** months; **this is** prohibited due to the fact that there is the **uncertainty** whether her rival wife is pregnant with viable offspring, in which case she would be released from the levirate bond.


###### Yevamot 36a:9
[Yevamot 36a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:9)

אֶלָּא תַּחְלוֹץ בְּתוֹךְ תִּשְׁעָה, וְתִנָּשֵׂא לְאַחַר תִּשְׁעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But let her perform *ḥalitza* during the** first **nine** months following her husband’s death **and** then wait to **marry** until **after** those **nine** months. By that point in time, even if the rival wife was pregnant she would have already given birth. If the offspring was viable, then it emerges that there was never a levirate bond, and if it is not viable, then she was released from her levirate bond through the *ḥalitza* she performed. Either way, she would now be permitted to remarry. Why, then, does the mishna not consider this possibility? Rabbi Elazar claims that the only explanation for this is if the mishna assumes that *ḥalitza* performed while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant is not effective. As such, the mishna is a proof for Reish Lakish’s opinion.


###### Yevamot 36a:10
[Yevamot 36a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:10)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ: תַּחְלוֹץ וְתִנָּשֵׂא לְאַחַר תִּשְׁעָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects Rabbi Elazar’s proof: **But** even **according to your reasoning** that *ḥalitza* with a pregnant woman is not effective, the mishna should have considered an additional possibility: **Let her perform *ḥalitza* and marry,** doing both **after nine** months have passed since the death of her husband. Doing so should be effective according to both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan.


###### Yevamot 36a:11
[Yevamot 36a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:11)

אֶלָּא, בַּר מִינַּהּ דְּהַהִיא. דְּאַבָּיֵי בַּר אַבָּא וְרַב חִינָּנָא בַּר אַבָּיֵי דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְנִמְצָא אַתָּה מַצְרִיכָהּ כָּרוֹז לַכְּהוּנָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the discussion of this topic should be held **apart from that** mishna, as the true reason for that mishna’s ruling is **as** it is **Abaye bar Abba and Rav Ḥinnana bar Abaye who both say** that she is prohibited from performing *ḥalitza* while one of the wives of the deceased is pregnant because **perhaps** the **offspring will be viable,** in which case any *ḥalitza* performed would be entirely unnecessary and therefore meaningless, and she would remain permitted to marry into the priesthood, as the opening mishna of the chapter rules. However, in this situation people might not realize that the *ḥalitza* she performed was meaningless, and they would think she is a *ḥalutza*, who is prohibited from marrying a priest. **And it would** therefore **emerge** that if she were allowed to perform *ḥalitza* while pregnant, it is possible that **you will** ultimately **require a public announcement** to be made **for her** to attest to the fact that she is in fact still permitted **to** marry into the **priesthood.**


###### Yevamot 36a:12
[Yevamot 36a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:12)

וְלַצְרְכַהּ! דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא אִינִישׁ דְּהָוֵי בַּחֲלִיצָה וְלָא הָוֵי בְּהַכְרָזָה, וְאָתֵי לְמֵימַר: קָשָׁרֵי חֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara wonders why this poses a problem: **But** why not let her perform *ḥalitza* while still pregnant, and then if it becomes necessary, **require** a public announcement to be made **for her?** The Gemara explains why one should avoid having to rely on a public announcement: **Perhaps there were** some **people who were** present **at the *ḥalitza* and were not** present **at** the **public announcement, and** when the courts permit her to marry a priest **they might come to say** that **they are permitting a *ḥalutza*** to marry **a priest.**


###### Yevamot 36a:13
[Yevamot 36a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:13)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִידֵּי ״לֹא תַּחְלוֹץ וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם״ קָתָנֵי? ״לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם״ קָתָנֵי, בְּלֹא חֲלִיצָה, אֲבָל אִי חָלֵיץ לַהּ — הָכִי נָמֵי דְּשַׁרְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye suggests another rejection of Rabbi Elazar’s proof from that mishna: **Abaye said to** Rabbi Elazar: The very formulation of the mishna refutes Reish Lakish’s opinion, as **does** the mishna **teach** that **she may neither perform *ḥalitza* nor enter into levirate marriage?** No, the mishna **teaches** only that **she may neither be married nor enter into levirate marriage,** which implies only that she may not marry **without** first performing ***ḥalitza*, but if** the *yavam* **performs *ḥalitza* with her, she would indeed be permitted** to marry after nine months have passed since her husband’s death. This understanding of the mishna undermines the basis of Rabbi Elazar’s proof from the mishna.


###### Yevamot 36a:14
[Yevamot 36a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:14)

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַחוֹלֵץ לִמְעוּבֶּרֶת וְהִפִּילָה — צְרִיכָה חֲלִיצָה מִן הָאַחִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Even if that mishna does not support Reish Lakish’s opinion, nevertheless **it is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Reish Lakish:** In the case of **one who performs *ḥalitza* with a pregnant woman and she miscarries, she requires** another ***ḥalitza* with the brothers** in order to release her from the levirate bond. The *baraita* assumes that the original *ḥalitza* is ineffective because it was done while she was still pregnant, which is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish.


###### Yevamot 36a:15
[Yevamot 36a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:15)

אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ בְּהָנֵי תְּלָת: חֲדָא — הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. אִידַּךְ, דִּתְנַן: הַמְחַלֵּק נְכָסָיו עַל פִּיו, רִיבָּה לְאֶחָד וּמִיעֵט לְאֶחָד, וְהִשְׁוָה לָהֶם אֶת הַבְּכוֹר — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: The *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion **of Reish Lakish in these three** disputes: **One, this** dispute **that we** already **stated** with regard to the *ḥalitza* of a pregnant woman. **The other** dispute concerns that **which we learned** in a mishna: In the case of **one who verbally divides up his possessions** among his descendants, stating how he wishes his estate to be divided after his death, if **he increases** the proportion of his estate that should go **to one** of his children **or decreases** the proportion of his estate that should go **to** another **one** of his children, **or** if **he equally** distributes **between them** the double portion of **the firstborn,** then **his words are binding.**


###### Yevamot 36a:16
[Yevamot 36a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36a:16)

וְאִם אָמַר מִשּׁוּם יְרוּשָּׁה — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. כָּתַב, בֵּין בַּתְּחִלָּה בֵּין בַּסּוֹף בֵּין בָּאֶמְצַע, מִשּׁוּם מַתָּנָה — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But if he said** explicitly that the receipt of those portions should be considered **as an inheritance,** then it as though the verbal division of his property that **he said is nothing,** i.e., it is non-binding, since his words directly contradict the *halakhot* of inheritance as they are written in the Torah. However, if he wrote a will and somewhere therein **he wrote, whether at the beginning, whether at the end, or whether in the middle,** that the receipt of the portions should be considered **as a gift,** as opposed to an inheritance, then **his words are binding.**