## Yevamot Daf 36b

###### Yevamot 36b:1
[Yevamot 36b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:1)

וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ — לְעוֹלָם לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי יִרְשׁוּ שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית וּפְלוֹנִית שֶׁנְּתַתִּים לָהֶם בְּמַתָּנָה וְיִרָשׁוּם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan dispute whether one must state that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift with regard to each recipient, or whether stating it with regard to one of them is enough to indicate that it is true for all. **And Reish Lakish said:** The inheritors **will only ever acquire** the portions as defined by the owner of the possessions **once he says: So-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit such and such a field and such and such** a field **that I have given to them as a gift, and they shall inherit them,** i.e., he must state explicitly for each recipient that their receipt of the portions should be considered a gift. Rava ruled that in this dispute as well, the *halakha* is in accordance with Reish Lakish.


###### Yevamot 36b:2
[Yevamot 36b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:2)

וְאִידַּךְ, דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ, הָאָב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנְּתָנָן לַבֵּן, וְהַבֵּן אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב. מָכַר הָאָב — מְכוּרִין עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הוּא, מָכַר הַבֵּן — אֵין לַלּוֹקֵחַ כְּלוּם עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other** dispute concerns that **which we learned** in a mishna: In the case of **one who writes** a bill transferring ownership of **all of his possessions to his son** stating that the transfer should take effect immediately so that the son should gain the rights to use the possessions **after his death,** then although **the father** retained for himself the right to use the possessions until his death, he **is unable to sell** the possessions **due to** the fact **that he gave them to the son, and the son is unable to sell** the possessions **due to** the fact **that they are** still **in the father’s possession.** If **the father sold** the possessions, then **they are sold** to the extent that the purchaser may use them **until** the father **dies.** If **the son sold** the possessions during his father’s lifetime, **the purchaser does not** receive **any** rights to use the possessions **until the father dies.**


###### Yevamot 36b:3
[Yevamot 36b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:3)

וְאִיתְּמַר: מָכַר הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, וּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** an amoraic dispute **was stated** in the case in which **the son sold** the possessions **during the father’s lifetime, and** then **the son died during the father’s lifetime,** following which the father died as well. **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The purchaser does not acquire** anything, **and Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire** the possessions.


###### Yevamot 36b:4
[Yevamot 36b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:4)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ — קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains their reasoning: **Rabbi Yoḥanan said** that **the purchaser does not acquire** anything, because he holds that the **ownership of** the rights to an item and its **produce is tantamount to** the **ownership of the item itself,** i.e., the actual title to it. Since the father retained the rights to use the possessions until his death, as long as he lives he is considered to hold the title to them. Therefore, the son’s sale can be effective only after the father’s death, at which point the son becomes the title owner. However, if the son dies first, then since he never gained the title to the items, his sale can never come to fruition.


###### Yevamot 36b:5
[Yevamot 36b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:5)

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ — קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire** the possessions, as Reish Lakish holds that the **ownership of** the rights to an item and its **produce is not tantamount to** the **ownership of the item itself,** i.e., the actual title to it. Therefore, although the father is still alive, the son immediately gains the full title to the possessions, which he may sell to someone else. Nevertheless, since the father retains the rights to use the possessions, the purchaser may use the possessions he acquired only when the father dies.


###### Yevamot 36b:6
[Yevamot 36b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:6)

אֵין הַוָּלָד שֶׁל קַיָּימָא כּוּ׳. תָּנָא: מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ — יוֹצִיא בְּגֵט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states that if a *yavam* consummates a levirate marriage with his *yevama* while she is pregnant, if it emerges that **the offspring is not viable** then he may maintain her as his wife because his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. An opposing opinion **is taught** in a *baraita*: **In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said: He must send her out with a bill of divorce.** Although it emerged that the levirate marriage took effect, since at the time he consummated the levirate marriage it was prohibited to do so because the *yevama* was pregnant, he is therefore penalized and required to separate from her.


###### Yevamot 36b:7
[Yevamot 36b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:7)

אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָא דַּאֲמַרַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing,** i.e., they both expressed the same opinion that if one marries a woman whom he is prohibited from marrying, he is penalized and required to divorce her, even if the reason for the prohibition no longer applies. **Rabbi Eliezer’s** opinion was expressed in **this** ruling **we have** just **stated.**


###### Yevamot 36b:8
[Yevamot 36b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:8)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּתַנְיָא: לֹא יִשָּׂא אָדָם מְעוּבֶּרֶת חֲבֵירוֹ, וּמֵינֶקֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. וְאִם נָשָׂא — יוֹצִיא וְלֹא יַחְזִיר עוֹלָמִית, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יוֹצִיא, וְלִכְשֶׁיַּגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לִכְנוֹס — יִכְנוֹס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Where was **Rabbi Meir’s** opinion expressed? **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **A man may not marry a woman who is pregnant** with the child **of another** man, **nor a woman who is nursing** the child **of another** man. **And if he** transgressed and **married** her, he is penalized for violating the prohibition, and **he must divorce** her with a bill of divorce, **and he may never take** her **back;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He must send** her **out, and when the time comes** in which it is permitted **to marry** her, i.e., after the child is weaned, **he may** then **marry** her again.


###### Yevamot 36b:9
[Yevamot 36b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:9)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָכָא, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָפָגֵע בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל הָתָם דְּרַבָּנַן — כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to him: From where** do you deduce that they are of one opinion? **Perhaps that is not so,** as it is possible that **Rabbi Eliezer states** his ruling **only here,** in the case of a *yavam* who consummated a levirate marriage with his *yevama* while she was still pregnant, **due to** the fact that by doing so he risks the possibility that the offspring will be viable, in **which** case **he encounters the Torah prohibition against** engaging in relations with one’s **brother’s wife. However, there,** in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, **which is a rabbinic** prohibition, it is possible that **he holds in accordance with** the opinion of the **Rabbis** who argue with Rabbi Meir.


###### Yevamot 36b:10
[Yevamot 36b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:10)

אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָתָם, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הָכָא מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — מִפְרָשׁ פָּרְשִׁי מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively,** it is also possible that **Rabbi Meir states** his ruling **only there,** in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, **due to** the fact **that** doing so is a violation of a **rabbinic** prohibition, and therefore it is possible that this is one of the cases in which **the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater** severity **than** prohibitions of **Torah law** so that people would not treat them lightly. **However, here,** in the case of a *yavam* who consummated a levirate marriage with his *yevama* while she was still pregnant, where there was a risk of transgressing a prohibition written **in the Torah,** since people are generally careful to **distance themselves from** a Torah prohibition, there is no need to further penalize someone who nevertheless transgressed.


###### Yevamot 36b:11
[Yevamot 36b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:11)

אָמַר רָבָא, וּלְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים: יוֹצִיאָהּ בְּגֵט. אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״יוֹצִיא״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי: ״יַפְרִישׁ״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: According to the statement of the Rabbis** who dispute Rabbi Meir and require one who married a pregnant woman to send her out, the intention is that **he must send her out with a bill of divorce** and not merely separate from her. **Mar Zutra said:** The language the Rabbis used **is also precise, as** they **teach: He must send** her **out, and** they **do not teach: He must separate** himself from her. **Conclude from here** that Rava’s claim is correct.


###### Yevamot 36b:12
[Yevamot 36b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:12)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: הָתָם תְּנַן, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל שֶׁשָּׁהָא בְּאָדָם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — אֵינוֹ נֵפֶל. הָא לָא שְׁהָא — סְפֵיקָא הָוֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: We learned** in a *baraita* **there** that **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any human** baby **that survives for thirty days** after its birth **is not** to be considered **a stillbirth.** Rather, the baby is considered to be viable, and so the wife of the baby’s father is never subject to any obligation of levirate marriage. **But,** by inference, **were it not to survive** for thirty days, **there would be uncertainty** whether the baby was viable or not.


###### Yevamot 36b:13
[Yevamot 36b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:13)

וְאִיתְּמַר: מֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וְעָמְדָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** an amoraic dispute **was stated** in the case in which the only offspring of a man **died during** the first **thirty days** of its life, **and** the widow, under the misconception that she was exempt from any obligation of levirate marriage, **arose and was betrothed.**


###### Yevamot 36b:14
[Yevamot 36b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:14)

רָבִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: אִם אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל הִיא — חוֹלֶצֶת, וְאִם אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן הִיא — אֵינָהּ חוֹלֶצֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said in the name of Rava: If she** became the **wife of an Israelite,** i.e., the man who betrothed her was not a priest, then **she performs *ḥalitza*** with the *yavam* due to the uncertainty whether or not the offspring was viable, and then they may remain married. **But if she** became the **wife of a priest, she does not perform *ḥalitza*** with him because if she were to do so, she would become a *ḥalutza* and would therefore be prohibited from remaining married to her husband, who is a priest. Therefore, in this case, in order to allow her to remain married to her husband, the Sages did not require her to be concerned for the possibility that the offspring was not viable.


###### Yevamot 36b:15
[Yevamot 36b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:15)

רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ — חוֹלֶצֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites a different version of Rav’s opinion: **Rav Mesharshiyya said in the name of Rava: Both this** woman **and that** woman **perform *ḥalitza*,** even though by doing so, if she was betrothed to a priest, she would become forbidden to him.


###### Yevamot 36b:16
[Yevamot 36b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/36b:16)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said to Rav Mesharshiyya:**