## Yevamot Daf 38b

###### Yevamot 38b:1
[Yevamot 38b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:1)

זִיקַּת נְשׂוּאָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
and a levirate **bond** formed **with a married woman affords** her a status equivalent to that of **a woman** for whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **married,** i.e., when her husband dies, the same level of relationship that existed with the first husband is created with the *yavam*. However, since the new relationship exists only by virtue of a levirate bond, it exists to a lower degree, and so the rights afforded to the *yavam* are more limited than those the first husband would have enjoyed; the rights granted to the *yavam* are equivalent to the rights of husband in a case where there is uncertainty whether that level of relationship exists at all.


###### Yevamot 38b:2
[Yevamot 38b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:2)

זִיקַּת אֲרוּסָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק אֲרוּסָה — דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ וַדַּאי אֲרוּסָה, מוֹדִים בֵּית הִלֵּל שֶׁמּוֹכֶרֶת וְנוֹתֶנֶת וְקַיָּים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara proceeds to demonstrate this: It must be that a levirate **bond** formed **with a betrothed woman affords** her a status equivalent to that of **a woman** for whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **betrothed, because if it enters your mind** to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of **a definitely betrothed woman, would Beit Hillel concede that she may sell or give** away her property *ab initio*, **and that** if she does the transfer **is valid?**


###### Yevamot 38b:3
[Yevamot 38b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:3)

וְהָתְנַן: נָפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים מִשֶּׁנִּתְאָרְסָה, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: תִּמְכּוֹר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר. אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ מוֹדִים שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה — קַיָּים. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: זִיקַּת אֲרוּסָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק אֲרוּסָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Ketubot* 78a): If **property was bequeathed to** a woman **after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell** that property, **and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell** that property. However, **both agree that if she sold** it **or gave** it **away,** the transfer **is valid.** The mishna clearly states that according to Beit Hillel, a woman who is definitely betrothed may not sell the property *ab initio*. **Rather, conclude from here,** from the fact that here Beit Hillel permit the *yevama* to sell her property *ab initio*, that a levirate **bond** formed **with a betrothed woman affords** her a status equivalent to that of **a woman** for whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **betrothed.**


###### Yevamot 38b:4
[Yevamot 38b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:4)

זִיקַּת נְשׂוּאָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ וַדַּאי נְשׂוּאָה, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים יַחְלוֹקוּ יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Similarly, it must be that a levirate **bond** formed **with a married woman affords** her a status equivalent to that of **a woman** for whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **married, because if it enters your mind** to suggest that her status is equivalent to that of **a definitely married woman,** would **Beit Shammai say** that **the husband’s heirs should divide up** the property **together with the father’s heirs?**


###### Yevamot 38b:5
[Yevamot 38b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:5)

וְהָתְנַן: נָפְלוּ לָהּ נְכָסִים מִשֶּׁנִּישֵּׂאת, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ מוֹדִים שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה — שֶׁהַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: זִיקַּת נְשׂוּאָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Ketubot* 78a): If **property was bequeathed to** a woman **after she was married, both** Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai **agree that if she sold** the property **or gave** it **away,** then **the husband repossesses** it **from the purchasers. Rather, conclude from here,** from the fact that here Beit Shammai assume the rights of the *yavam* are limited, that a levirate **bond** formed **with a married woman affords** her a status equivalent to **a woman** for whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **married.**


###### Yevamot 38b:6
[Yevamot 38b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:6)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה: אַדְּמִפַּלְגִי בְּגוּפַהּ וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה, לִפַּלְגוּ בְּחַיֶּיהָ וּלְפֵירוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba challenges Ulla’s understanding of the mishna: **Rabba said to him:** If your explanation is correct, then in the latter clause, **instead of disagreeing** with regard to who has the rights to the property **itself,** which necessitates considering the case **after** her **death, let** Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai **disagree with regard to** the more immediate case **when she is** still **alive and** dispute who has the rights **to** the use and **produce** of the property.


###### Yevamot 38b:7
[Yevamot 38b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:7)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבָּה: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּנָפְלָה כְּשֶׁהִיא נְשׂוּאָה, וְזִיקַּת נְשׂוּאָה עוֹשָׂה סְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה. רֵישָׁא דְּאִיהִי קָיְימָא — הָוְיָא לַהּ אִיהִי וַדַּאי וְאִינְהוּ סָפֵק, וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rabba said** a different resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai’s rulings: Both **this** first clause **and that** latter clause of the mishna concern a case in **which she happened** before her *yavam* for levirate marriage **once she was** already **a married woman, and** a levirate **bond** formed **with a married woman affords** her a status equivalent to that of **a woman** about whom there is an **uncertainty** whether she is **married.** The distinction between the two clauses is as follows: In the **first clause, where she is alive, she has a certain** claim to the property, **while they,** i.e., the *yavam*, are considered to have only **an uncertain claim** to the property, as she has the status of a woman for whom there is an uncertainty whether she is married. **And** since one who has **an uncertain claim cannot extract** property **from** one who has **a definite** claim to it, she therefore retains full possession of the property.


###### Yevamot 38b:8
[Yevamot 38b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:8)

סֵיפָא דְּמֵתָה, הַלָּלוּ בָּאִין לִירַשׁ, וְהַלָּלוּ בָּאִין לִירַשׁ — וְיַחְלוֹקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In **the latter clause,** however, **where she died,** neither party has a definite claim; rather, **these** heirs of the father **come to inherit, and those** heirs of the husband **come to inherit, and** therefore **they should divide up** the property.


###### Yevamot 38b:9
[Yevamot 38b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:9)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּלְבֵית שַׁמַּאי אֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי? וְהָתְנַן: נָפַל הַבַּיִת עָלָיו וְעַל אָבִיו, עָלָיו וְעַל מוֹרִישָׁיו, וְהָיוּ עָלָיו כְּתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה וּבַעַל חוֹב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye raised an objection to** Rabba’s opinion: **But** is it true that **according to Beit Shammai,** one with **an uncertain claim cannot extract** property **from** one who has **a definite** claim to it? **Didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Bava Batra* 157a): In a case where **a house collapsed upon** a person **and upon his father,** or **upon him and upon those** from **whom he stood to inherit, and there were** outstanding debts **against** that person from his **wife’s marriage contract and** to **a creditor,** but he had no money with which to pay those debts, and it is not known who died first, the following situation arises: If the father died first, then before the son died he had already inherited the father’s property and therefore the son’s creditors gained a lien over that property and have the rights to collect their debts from that property even after the son’s death.


###### Yevamot 38b:10
[Yevamot 38b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:10)

יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב אוֹמְרִים: הַבֵּן מֵת רִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת הָאָב, וּבַעַל חוֹב אוֹמֵר: הָאָב מֵת רִאשׁוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת הַבֵּן —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Accordingly, the father’s heirs and the creditor offer opposing claims: **The father’s heirs say: The son died first and** only **afterward the father died.** Therefore, the creditor never gained any rights to collect from the property. **And the creditor says: The father died first and** only **afterward the son died.** Therefore, the father’s property was liened to the son’s debts, and the creditor has a right to collect.


###### Yevamot 38b:11
[Yevamot 38b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:11)

בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: יַחְלוֹקוּ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: נְכָסִים בְּחֶזְקָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna continues: **Beit Shammai say: They should divide up** the property between them. **And Beit Hillel say:** The **property** retains **its** previous ownership **status,** which in this case means that since the last known possessor was the father, so the father’s heirs gain full rights to it.


###### Yevamot 38b:12
[Yevamot 38b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:12)

וְהָא הָכָא, יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב וַדַּאי, וּבַעַל חוֹב סָפֵק, וְקָאָתֵי סָפֵק וּמוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye explains his proof: **Isn’t** it the case **here** that **the father’s heirs** have a **definite** claim **and the creditor** has only **an uncertain** claim? Therefore, since Beit Shammai rule that the property should be divided up, it is apparent that they hold that one with **an uncertain claim can extract** property **from** one who has **a definite** claim to it.


###### Yevamot 38b:13
[Yevamot 38b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:13)

קָסָבְרִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba rejects the proof: Beit Shammai’s ruling in this case cannot be adduced as a proof because **Beit Shammai hold:** A debt recorded in **a bill** of debt **that is awaiting collection is as though it was already collected** to the extent that the creditor is considered to be in possession of the debt. Therefore, the creditor is considered to be in possession of the property to the same extent as the father’s heirs; consequently, the property is divided between them.


###### Yevamot 38b:14
[Yevamot 38b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:14)

וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא, דִּתְנַן: מֵתוּ בַּעֲלֵיהֶן עַד שֶׁלֹּא שָׁתוּ — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: נוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָּתָן וְאֵינָן שׁוֹתוֹת. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אוֹ שׁוֹתוֹת אוֹ לֹא נוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָּתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And from where do you say** that Beit Shammai hold this opinion? **As we learned** in a mishna (*Sota* 24a): A married woman who secluded herself with another man after her husband had warned her not to do so is suspected of having committed adultery. To establish her guilt or innocence she is brought to the Temple, where she drinks the bitter waters. With regard to such women, if **their husbands died before they drank** the bitter waters, **Beit Shammai say: They collect** the money assured to them in **their marriage contracts and do not drink** the waters. **And Beit Hillel say: Either they drink,** and if they survive they collect their marriage contracts, **or** they do not drink and **they cannot collect their marriage contracts,** and all the husband’s property passes to his heirs.


###### Yevamot 38b:15
[Yevamot 38b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:15)

אוֹ שׁוֹתוֹת?! ״וְהֵבִיא הָאִישׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֵיכָּא! אֶלָּא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלֹּא שׁוֹתוֹת לֹא נוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָּתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies the statement of Beit Hillel: Did Beit Hillel really mean: **Either they drink,** which implies they may actually choose to drink? But doesn’t **the Merciful One state: “And the man shall bring his wife”** (Numbers 5:15), which indicates that the ritual of drinking the bitter waters applies only when the husband is still alive, **and** in this case **there is no** husband to do so; consequently, she should not be able to drink. **Rather,** Beit Hillel’s intent is as follows: The only means by which a suspected adulteress is able to collect her marriage contract is by drinking the bitter waters and proving her innocence. Therefore, where this is not possible due to the death of the husband, **since** the wives **do not drink, they cannot collect their marriage contracts.**


###### Yevamot 38b:16
[Yevamot 38b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:16)

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּסָפֵק הוּא: סָפֵק זַנַּאי סָפֵק לָא זַנַּאי, וְקָאָתֵי סָפֵק וּמוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba explains his proof from this mishna: **Isn’t** it the case **here that** the wife’s claim to her marriage contract **is uncertain** because there is **uncertainty whether she was unfaithful or whether she was not unfaithful, and** so it would appear that one with **an uncertain** claim **is coming and undermining** the **definite** claim of the husband’s heirs? This is untenable, as even were one to hold that someone with an uncertain claim can extract property from someone who has a definite claim to it, that would only allow for the money to be divided between the two sides, whereas in this case Beit Shammai rule that the creditor collects the entire debt. **Rather, conclude from** that mishna that Beit Shammai hold that a debt recorded in **a bill** of debt **that is awaiting collection is** considered **as though it were already collected** to the extent that the one who is owed the money is considered to be in possession of the debt. It is due to this reason that she is empowered to be able to collect her marriage contract.


###### Yevamot 38b:17
[Yevamot 38b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:17)

וְאַבָּיֵי, לוֹתְבֵיהּ מֵהָא! דִּלְמָא כְּתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה שָׁאנֵי, מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** why did **Abaye** object to Rabba’s opinion based on the mishna in tractate *Bava Batra*? **Let him object to** Rabba’s opinion **based on this** mishna in tractate *Sota* since based on Abaye’s assumption that a bill of debt is not considered as though it were already collected, this mishna perforce demonstrates that Beit Shammai hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it. The Gemara answers: Abaye did not object based on this mishna because he reasoned that **perhaps a woman’s marriage contract is different** from a regular bill of debt in that the Sages uniquely reinforced a woman’s hold over the debt in her marriage contract **due to** the increased **desirability** that this would bring her when trying to remarry. This would ensure that she would bring some money with her into a new marriage.


###### Yevamot 38b:18
[Yevamot 38b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:18)

וְלוֹתְבֵיהּ כְּתוּבָּה דְמַתְנִיתִין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks again concerning Abaye’s decision to object to Rabba’s opinion based on the mishna in *Bava Batra*: **Let him object to** Rabba’s opinion **based on** the case of the **marriage contract in the mishna** here (38a). In its latter clause, the mishna states that if a widow waiting for her *yavam* dies, Beit Shammai rule that her marriage contract and other property are divided between her father’s heirs and the *yavam*. In that case, the *yavam* has certain possession of that property, and the father’s heirs come with an uncertain claim to collect the value of the marriage contract. The fact that Beit Shammai rule that they should divide up the value of the marriage contract between them demonstrates that they hold that one with an uncertain claim can extract property from one who has a definite claim to it.


###### Yevamot 38b:19
[Yevamot 38b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:19)

לָא פְּלִיגִי. וְלָא?! וְהָא קָתָנֵי: מֵתָה, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ וּבִנְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִים וְיוֹצְאִין עִמָּהּ — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: יַחְלוֹקוּ יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: נְכָסִים בְּחֶזְקָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: In truth, Beit Shammai **do not disagree** on that point. The Gemara challenges this claim: Do they **not** disagree? **But it is** explicitly **taught** in the mishna that they disagree in that case: If the widow waiting for her *yavam* **died, what should be done with** the money assured to her in **her marriage contract, and with** her **property that enters and leaves** the marriage **with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband’s heirs should divide up** the property **together with the father’s heirs. And Beit Hillel say:** The **property** retains **its** previous ownership **status.**


###### Yevamot 38b:20
[Yevamot 38b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:20)

הָכִי קָאָמַר: מֵתָה, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, וְשַׁבְקַהּ. נְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִים וְהַיּוֹצְאִים עִמָּהּ — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: יַחְלוֹקוּ יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: נְכָסִים בְּחֶזְקָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This is what** that mishna **is saying:** If she **died, what should be done with** the money assured to her in **her marriage contract? And** the *tanna* then **left** this question unanswered, and addressed an additional case: What should be done with her **property that enters and leaves** the marriage **with her? Beit Shammai say: The husband’s heirs should divide up** the property **together with the father’s heirs. And Beit Hillel say:** The **property** retains **its** previous ownership **status.**


###### Yevamot 38b:21
[Yevamot 38b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:21)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא — דְּקָתָנֵי: יַחְלוֹקוּ יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב. וְלָא קָתָנֵי: יוֹרְשֵׁי הָאָב עִם יוֹרְשֵׁי הַבַּעַל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said:** The language of **the mishna is also precise** according to this interpretation, **as it teaches:** Beit Shammai say that **the husband’s heirs should divide up** the property **together with the father’s heirs,** which implies that the father’s heirs had de facto possession of the property and the husband’s heirs then came and divided that property with them. This is true with regard to her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her. **And** the mishna **does not teach** using the reverse formulation: Beit Shammai say that **the father’s heirs should divide up** the property **together with the husband’s heirs,** which would imply that the husband’s heirs had *de facto* possession of the property; this is true with regard to the payment of the marriage contract. **Conclude from here** that Beit Shammai did not rule what should be done with the payment of the marriage contract, as the Gemara claimed.


###### Yevamot 38b:22
[Yevamot 38b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/38b:22)

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: רֵישָׁא דְּנָפְלוּ לָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם, סֵיפָא דְּנָפְלוּ לָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא תַּחְתָּיו דְּבַעַל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara presents a third resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai’s rulings in the mishna: **Abaye said: The first clause** concerns a case in **which** property **was bequeathed to her when she was** still **a widow waiting for her *yavam*** to perform levirate marriage or *ḥalitza*, and **the latter clause** concerns a case in **which** property **was bequeathed to her when she was** still **under,** i.e., married to, **her** first **husband,** before he died.