## Yevamot Daf 39a

###### Yevamot 39a:1
[Yevamot 39a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:1)

וְקָסָבַר אַבָּיֵי יָדוֹ כְּיָדָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Abaye holds** that according to Beit Hillel, with regard to the husband’s rights to his wife’s property, **his hand is like her hand,** but not any stronger. Accordingly, the *yavam* has a weaker hand in her property than she does, because the rights of a *yavam* are always weaker than those of the husband himself. Therefore, she is considered to be in possession of the property, and when she dies, her heirs, i.e., her father and his heirs, inherit it. However, Beit Shammai assume that the husband’s hand is stronger than his wife’s hand. Therefore, the hand of the *yavam*, which is weaker than the husband’s hand, is nevertheless equally as strong as the hand of the *yevama*, and therefore they rule that if she dies, the *yavam* and her heirs divide up the property.


###### Yevamot 39a:2
[Yevamot 39a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:2)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי דְּנָפְלִי לָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא תַּחְתָּיו דְּבַעַל — דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּיָדוֹ עֲדִיפָא מִיָּדָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to him:** I hold that **if** the property **was bequeathed to her when she was** still **under the** first **husband, everyone,** i.e., both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, **agrees that his hand is stronger than her hand,** and therefore the hand of the *yavam* will be equally as strong as that of the *yevama*, and if she dies the property will be divided between the two sides.


###### Yevamot 39a:3
[Yevamot 39a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:3)

אֶלָּא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּנָפְלוּ לָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם. רֵישָׁא דְּלָא עֲבַד בַּהּ מַאֲמָר, סֵיפָא דַּעֲבַד בַּהּ מַאֲמָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, Rava presents his own resolution to the apparent inconsistency in Beit Shammai’s rulings in the mishna: **Rather, both this** first clause **and that** latter clause concern cases in **which** property **was bequeathed to her when she was a widow waiting for her *yavam*. The first clause** concerns a case in **which** the *yavam* **had not performed a levirate betrothal with her,** and **the latter clause** concerns a case in **which he had performed a levirate betrothal with her.**


###### Yevamot 39a:4
[Yevamot 39a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:4)

וְקָסָבַר רָבָא מַאֲמָר לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי עוֹשֶׂה וַדַּאי אֲרוּסָה וּסְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה. וַדַּאי אֲרוּסָה — לִדְחוֹת בַּצָּרָה, וּסְפֵק נְשׂוּאָה — לַחְלוֹק בַּנְּכָסִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the rationale behind Rava’s explanation: **And Rava holds** that **according to Beit Shammai a levirate betrothal** with a *yevama* **affords** her a status equivalent in some aspects to a woman who is **definitely betrothed and** in other aspects to a woman about whom there is **uncertainty** whether she is **married.** The Gemara elucidates: She is similar to a woman who is **definitely betrothed** with regard **to nullifying** the levirate bond of **her rival wife,** so that the rival wife need not perform levirate marriage or *ḥalitza*. **And** she is similar to a woman about whom there is **uncertainty** whether she is **married** with regard to empowering the *yavam* **to divide up the property** that she attained while she was waiting for her *yavam*.


###### Yevamot 39a:5
[Yevamot 39a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:5)

אִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: An interpretation of the mishna **was stated in the name of Rabbi Elazar** that is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rava. And** an interpretation of the mishna **was stated in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina** that is **in accordance with** the opinion **of Abaye.**


###### Yevamot 39a:6
[Yevamot 39a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:6)

וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הָכִי? וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מַאֲמָר לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה אֶלָּא לִדְחוֹת בַּצָּרָה בִּלְבָד!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **And did Rabbi Elazar** actually **state this** interpretation that is in accordance with the opinion of Rava? **But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: According to Beit Shammai a levirate betrothal acquires** the *yevama* **only** with regard **to nullifying** the levirate bond of **a rival wife** so that she need not perform levirate marriage or *ḥalitza*? This implies that it does not acquire her with regard to enabling the *yavam* to inherit from her. This, then, stands in contrast to Rava’s interpretation.


###### Yevamot 39a:7
[Yevamot 39a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:7)

אֵיפוֹךְ. וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ — אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כִּי אֲמַרִי אֲנָא, דְּלָא סַגִּי לַהּ בְּגֵט אֶלָּא דְּבָעֵי נָמֵי חֲלִיצָה. לַחְלוֹק בַּנְּכָסִים דְּלָא קָנֵי — מִי אֲמַרִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers two possible solutions: **Reverse** the opinions, so that Rabbi Elazar is in accordance with Abaye, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, is in accordance with Rava. **And if you wish, say** instead: **Actually, do not reverse** the opinions, since Rabbi Elazar can be understood to be in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as **Rabbi Elazar** could have **said to you: When I said** the statement that implies that a levirate betrothal acquires in a very limited sense, the intention was only that its acquisition is limited in **that** giving her **a bill of divorce** is still **insufficient for her** in order to release her from the levirate bond; **rather, she also needs** to perform ***ḥalitza*.** But to suggest **that he does not acquire** her with regard **to dividing up** the **property** she attained, **did I say that?** Certainly not, as in fact a levirate betrothal acquires her to that extent as well, as Rava assumes.


###### Yevamot 39a:8
[Yevamot 39a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:8)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דִּיּוּקָא דְּמַתְנִיתִין כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקַשְׁיָא ״מֵתָה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said: The precise formulation of the mishna is in accordance with** the opinion of **Abaye, even though** according to his opinion **it is difficult** that the mishna discusses the case in which **she died.**


###### Yevamot 39a:9
[Yevamot 39a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:9)

דְּקָתָנֵי: נְכָסִים הַנִּכְנָסִים וְיוֹצְאִים עִמָּהּ, מַאי ״נִכְנָסִין״ וּמַאי ״יוֹצְאִין״? לָאו ״נִכְנָסִין״ — לִרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל, וְ״יוֹצְאִים״ — מֵרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל לִרְשׁוּת הָאָב,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains Rav Pappa’s statement: The precise formulation of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, **as it teaches:** Her **property that enters and leaves** the marriage **with her. What** is the meaning of: **That enters, and what** is the meaning of: **That leaves? Is it not: That enters into the domain of the husband and leaves the domain of the husband** when she dies, and then enters **into the domain of the father?** Interpreted in this way, the mishna explicitly considers the period in which she was still married to her first husband, and likewise, the case in which she came into the possession of property should be understood as referring to a case in which she did so while still married. This is consonant with Abaye’s interpretation, but not with Rava’s.


###### Yevamot 39a:10
[Yevamot 39a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:10)

וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקַשְׁיָא ״מֵתָה״, אַדְּמִפַּלְגִי בְּגוּפַהּ וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה, לִפַּלְגוּ בְּחַיֶּיהָ וּלְפֵירוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And when Rav Pappa said: **Even though** according to his opinion **it is difficult** that the mishna discusses the case in which **she died,** he meant as follows: **Instead of disputing** who has the rights to the property **itself,** which necessitates considering the case **after** her **death, let** Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai **dispute** the more immediate case **when she is** still **alive and** dispute who has the rights to the use and **produce** of the property.


###### Yevamot 39a:11
[Yevamot 39a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:11)

וְתוּ לָא מִידֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara concludes: **And there is nothing more** to say concerning this matter, i.e., as Rav Pappa noted, while it is undeniable that the mishna’s formulation supports Abaye’s interpretation, it is equally true that the case discussed by the mishna would appear to challenge his interpretation.


###### Yevamot 39a:12
[Yevamot 39a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:12)

כְּנָסָהּ הֲרֵי הִיא כּוּ׳. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: לוֹמַר שֶׁמְּגָרְשָׁה בְּגֵט וּמַחְזִירָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states: If the *yavam* **consummated the levirate marriage with her, then** her legal status is that of his wife in every sense. The Gemara asks: **With regard to what *halakha*** is this said? **Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:** It is **to say that** once they have consummated the levirate marriage, the only way to legally dissolve the marriage is if **he divorces her with a bill of divorce,** but *ḥalitza* is of no avail, **and** after divorcing her, he is permitted to **take her back** to be his wife, as the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife does not apply to her.


###### Yevamot 39a:13
[Yevamot 39a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:13)

מְגָרְשָׁה בְּגֵט, פְּשִׁיטָא? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וּכְתִיב: ״וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה וְיִבְּמָהּ״ — אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: וַעֲדַיִין יִבּוּמֵי הָרִאשׁוֹן עָלֶיהָ, בַּחֲלִיצָה — אִין, בְּגֵט — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara examines the first clause of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina’s statement: **Isn’t** it **obvious** that to sever his relationship with her, **he divorces her with a bill of divorce?** The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach this because **it could enter your mind to say** that **since it is written: “And take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), continuing to refer to the marriage as a levirate marriage even after the verse has stated that he took her as a wife, one might claim **the Merciful One is saying** that the **original levirate** bond **continues to be upon her,** and therefore, **with *ḥalitza*, yes,** they can sever the relationship, but **with a bill of divorce, no,** the relationship would not be severed. Therefore, the mishna **teaches us** that she is considered to be his wife to the extent that the relationship can be severed with a bill of divorce alone.


###### Yevamot 39a:14
[Yevamot 39a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:14)

מַחְזִירָהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, מִצְוָה דְּרַמְיָא רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ — עַבְדַּהּ, הַשְׁתָּא תֵּיקוּם עֲלֵיהּ בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara examines the second clause: **Isn’t** it **obvious** that after divorcing her, he is permitted to **take her back** to be his wife? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach this because **it could enter your mind to say** that the **mitzva that the Merciful One imposes upon him, he has performed,** and therefore **now** that there is no longer any mitzva to marry her, **she should** once again **be established** as forbidden **to him by the prohibition** against engaging in relations with one’s **brother’s wife.** To dispel this notion, the mishna **teaches us** that she is considered to be his wife to the extent that there is no longer any prohibition against remarrying her.


###### Yevamot 39a:15
[Yevamot 39a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:15)

וְאֵימָא הָכִי נָמֵי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁלְּקָחָהּ — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this ruling: **But** why not **say** that this **is indeed so,** that she should be forbidden to him? The Gemara explains: **The verse states: “And take her to him to be his wife”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), indicating that **once he has taken her,** her legal status is **that of his wife in every sense.**


###### Yevamot 39a:16
[Yevamot 39a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:16)

וּבִלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא — אִשָּׁה הִקְנוּ לוֹ מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states: The **only** exception to this is **that** her **marriage contract will** still **be** payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the *yavam*. The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for this? The Gemara explains: **A wife was acquired to him by Heaven,** and since he did not choose her as a wife, he did not obligate himself to pay her marriage contract.


###### Yevamot 39a:17
[Yevamot 39a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:17)

וְאִי לֵית לַהּ מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן — תַּקִּינוּ לַהּ מִשֵּׁנִי, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara qualifies the mishna’s ruling: **And if she has no** ability to collect her marriage contract **from the first** husband, since he died without leaving any property with which to pay it, the Sages **instituted an ordinance for her** benefit that she must receive a new marriage contract **from** her **second** husband, i.e., the *yavam*. This was instituted **so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that** he will easily **divorce her,** since doing so would incur a financial burden on his part.


###### Yevamot 39a:18
[Yevamot 39a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:18)

**מַתְנִי׳** מִצְוָה בְּגָדוֹל לְיַיבֵּם. לֹא רָצָה — מְהַלְּכִין עַל כׇּל הָאַחִין. לֹא רָצוּ — חוֹזְרִין אֵצֶל גָּדוֹל וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ, עָלֶיךָ מִצְוָה: אוֹ חֲלוֹץ, אוֹ יַיבֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The **mitzva** of levirate marriage **is for the eldest** of the brothers **to consummate the levirate marriage.** If the eldest **does not want** to do so, the court **goes to each of the** other **brothers** and requires them to do so. **If they do not want** to do so, the court **returns to** the **eldest** brother **and says to him:** The **mitzva is** incumbent **upon you; either perform *ḥalitza* or consummate the levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 39a:19
[Yevamot 39a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:19)

תָּלָה בְּקָטָן עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּיל, אוֹ בַּגָּדוֹל עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם, אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ אוֹ שׁוֹטֶה — אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ, אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: עָלֶיךָ מִצְוָה, אוֹ חֲלוֹץ אוֹ יַיבֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If a brother **made** his decision **dependent** upon the possibility that one of his other brothers will eventually consummate the levirate marriage, saying that he will do so only if they do not, then whether he makes it dependent **upon** a brother who is currently **a minor,** meaning that the *yevama* should wait **until he matures, or upon** his **eldest brother,** who is not currently present, meaning the *yevama* should wait **until he comes from overseas, or** upon a brother who is **a deaf-mute or an imbecile,** as perhaps they will recover from their disability, the court **does not listen to him; rather,** the judges of the court **say to him:** The **mitzva is** incumbent **upon you; either perform *ḥalitza* or consummate the levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 39a:20
[Yevamot 39a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:20)

**גְּמָ׳** אִיתְּמַר: בִּיאַת קָטָן, וַחֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל — פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, חַד אָמַר: בִּיאַת קָטָן עֲדִיפָא, וְחַד אָמַר: חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** An amoraic dispute **was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree with regard to** a case in which there is the choice between **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **[*katan*] or *ḥalitza*** performed **by** the **eldest** brother. **One said:** The **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **is preferable, and** the other **one said: *Ḥalitza*** performed by the **eldest** brother **is preferable.**


###### Yevamot 39a:21
[Yevamot 39a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:21)

מַאן דְּאָמַר בִּיאַת קָטָן עֲדִיפָא — דְּהָא מִצְוָה בְּיִיבּוּם. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא: בִּמְקוֹם גָּדוֹל — בִּיאַת קָטָן לָאו כְּלוּם הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: With regard to **the one who said** that **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **is preferable,** this is due to the fact **that** the **mitzva** of levirate marriage **is through** the actual **consummation of the levirate marriage,** and therefore preference is always given to consummation over the performance of *ḥalitza*. **And the one who said *ḥalitza*** performed **by** the **eldest** brother **is preferable,** this is because **in the presence of** the **eldest** brother, the **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **is** considered **nothing.**


###### Yevamot 39a:22
[Yevamot 39a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:22)

תְּנַן: לֹא רָצָה — מַחְזִירִין עַל כׇּל הָאַחִין. מַאי לָאו: לֹא רָצָה לְיַיבֵּם אֶלָּא לַחְלוֹץ, וְקָתָנֵי: מְהַלְּכִין אֵצֶל הָאַחִין, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בִּיאַת קָטָן עֲדִיפָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests proof for the first opinion: **We learned** in the mishna: If the eldest **does not want** to consummate the levirate marriage, the court **goes to each of the** other **brothers** and requires them to do so. The Gemara suggests: **What, is it not** that **he does not want to consummate the levirate marriage but** is willing **to perform *ḥalitza*? And** yet the mishna **teaches:** The court **goes to each of the** other **brothers** and requires them to consummate the levirate marriage. If so, **conclude from here** that the **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **is preferable.**


###### Yevamot 39a:23
[Yevamot 39a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:23)

לָא, לֹא רָצָה לַחְלוֹץ וְלֹא לְיַיבֵּם, דִּכְווֹתַהּ גַּבֵּי הָאַחִין: לֹא רָצוּ לֹא לַחְלוֹץ וְלֹא לְיַיבֵּם. אַמַּאי חוֹזְרִים אֵצֶל הַגָּדוֹל? לְמִיכְפְּיֵיהּ (לִכְפְּיֵיהּ) [לִיכְפִּינְהוּ] לְדִידְהוּ! כֵּיוָן דְּמִצְוָה עֲלֵיהּ דִּידֵיהּ רַמְיָא — לְדִידֵיהּ כָּיְיפִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the proof: **No,** the mishna might concern a case where the eldest **does not want** either **to perform *ḥalitza* or to consummate the levirate marriage,** and it is only because he is unwilling to do either that the other brothers are considered. The Gemara asks: If this is so, then **in the corresponding situation** in the mishna in which **the brothers do not want** to do so, the case must be that they do not want either **to perform *ḥalitza* or to consummate the levirate marriage.** But if so, **why should** the court invest the extra effort to **return to the eldest** brother **to force him** to fulfill his duty? **Let** the court **force** the other brothers to fulfill their duty. The Gemara responds: **Since** the **mitzva is incumbent upon** the eldest brother *ab initio*, **it is he who is forced.**


###### Yevamot 39a:24
[Yevamot 39a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:24)

תְּנַן: תָּלָה בְּקָטָן עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּיל אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְאִי בִּיאַת קָטָן עֲדִיפָא, אַמַּאי אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? נִינְטַר דִּלְמָא גָּדֵיל וּמְיַיבֵּם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests another proof: **We learned** in the mishna: If a brother makes his decision **dependent upon** a brother who is currently **a minor,** the court **does not listen to him.** The Gemara suggests: **And if** the **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a minor is preferable, why shouldn’t** the court **listen to him? Let** the court **wait,** as **perhaps he will mature and consummate the levirate marriage.** Rather, it would appear that the mishna assumes that consummation by a younger brother is not preferable.


###### Yevamot 39a:25
[Yevamot 39a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39a:25)

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, וּבְגָדוֹל עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ, אַמַּאי? נִינְטַר דִּלְמָא אָתֵי וְחָלֵיץ? אֶלָּא כֹּל שַׁהוֹיֵי מִצְוָה לָא מְשַׁהֵינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **But** even **according to your reasoning** that *ḥalitza* performed by an elder brother is preferable, what about the next case in the mishna, where a brother asks to wait **until the eldest brother comes from overseas?** In that case, as well, the mishna rules: **They do not listen to him;** but **why shouldn’t** they listen to him? **Let** the court **wait,** as **perhaps he will come and** at the very least **perform *ḥalitza*. Rather,** it is clear that the reason for the mishna’s ruling is that **we do not delay the performance of any mitzva;** therefore, if one of the brothers is currently unable to perform the mitzva, he is not considered at all. Consequently, no proof can be derived from the mishna.