## Yevamot Daf 39b

###### Yevamot 39b:1
[Yevamot 39b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:1)

אִית דְּאָמְרִי: בְּבִיאָה, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּבִיאַת קָטָן עֲדִיפָא. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בַּחֲלִיצַת קָטָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who say** that the dispute is more limited: **When** there is the possibility of **consummating** the levirate marriage, **everyone agrees that** the **consummation of** the levirate marriage by **a younger** brother **is preferable** to the *ḥalitza* of the eldest brother. **When they disagree** it is **with regard to the** significance of the ***ḥalitza* of a younger** brother.


###### Yevamot 39b:2
[Yevamot 39b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:2)

וְהָכִי אִיתְּמַר: חֲלִיצַת קָטָן וַחֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי. חַד אָמַר: חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא, וְחַד אָמַר: כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And this** is how the dispute **was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree with regard to** a case in which there is choice between the ***ḥalitza* of a younger** brother **or** the ***ḥalitza* of** the **eldest** brother. **One said:** The ***ḥalitza* of** the **eldest** brother **is preferable. And** the other **one said:** The two options **are equivalent.**


###### Yevamot 39b:3
[Yevamot 39b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:3)

מַאן דְּאָמַר חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא — דְּהָא מִצְוָה בַּגָּדוֹל. וְאִידַּךְ — כִּי אָמְרִינַן מִצְוָה בַּגָּדוֹל לְעִנְיַן יִבּוּם, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן חֲלִיצָה — כַּהֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: With regard to **the one who said** that the ***ḥalitza* of** the **eldest** brother **is preferable,** this is due to the fact **that** the **mitzva** of levirate marriage and *ḥalitza* **is** incumbent **upon** the **eldest** brother. **And the other** Sage would respond to this claim by saying that **when we say** that the **mitzva is** incumbent **upon** the **eldest** brother, that is only **with regard to** the consummation of the **levirate marriage; however, with regard to** performing ***ḥalitza*,** all the brothers **are equivalent.**


###### Yevamot 39b:4
[Yevamot 39b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:4)

תְּנַן: לֹא רָצוּ — חוֹזְרִין אֵצֶל גָּדוֹל. מַאי לָאו: לֹא רָצוּ לְיַיבֵּם, אֶלָּא לַחְלוֹץ. וְקָתָנֵי: חוֹזְרִין אֵצֶל גָּדוֹל, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests a proof for the first opinion: **We learned** in the mishna: If the younger brothers **do not want** to consummate the levirate marriage, the court **returns to** the **eldest** brother and demands that he at least perform *ḥalitza*. The Gemara suggests: **What, is it not** that the other brothers **did not want to consummate the levirate marriage but** are willing **to perform *ḥalitza*? And** yet the mishna **teaches:** The court **returns to** the **eldest** brother so that he can perform *ḥalitza*. If so, **conclude from here** that the ***ḥalitza* of** the **eldest** brother **is preferable.**


###### Yevamot 39b:5
[Yevamot 39b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:5)

לָא, לֹא רָצוּ לֹא לַחְלוֹץ וְלָא לְיַיבֵּם, דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי גָּדוֹל: לֹא רָצָה לֹא לַחְלוֹץ וְלֹא לְיַיבֵּם. אֶלָּא אַמַּאי חוֹזְרִין אֵצֶל גָּדוֹל? לְמִכְפְּיֵיהּ (לִכְפְּיֻיהוּ) [נִכְפִּינְהוּ] לְדִידְהוּ! כֵּיוָן דְּמִצְוָה עֲלֵיהּ דִּידֵיהּ רַמְיָא — לְדִידֵיהּ כָּיְיפִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the proof: **No,** the mishna might concern a case where the other brothers **did not want** either **to perform *ḥalitza* or to consummate the levirate marriage,** and it is only because they are unwilling to do either that the court returns to the eldest brother. The Gemara asks: If this is so, then **in the corresponding** situation in which the mishna states: The **eldest** brother **does not want** to do so, the case must be that he does not want either **to perform *ḥalitza* or to consummate the levirate marriage. But** if so, when the younger brothers also refuse, **why should** the court invest the extra effort to **return to** the **eldest** brother **to force him** to fulfill his duty? **Let** the court **force them,** i.e., the younger brothers, to fulfill their duty. The Gemara responds: **Since the mitzva is incumbent upon** the eldest brother *ab initio*, **it is he who is forced.**


###### Yevamot 39b:6
[Yevamot 39b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:6)

תָּא שְׁמַע: תָּלָה בַּגָּדוֹל עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם — אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ חֲלִיצַת גָּדוֹל עֲדִיפָא, אַמַּאי אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? נִינְטַר דִּלְמָא אָתֵי וְחָלֵיץ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Come** and **hear** another proof from the mishna: If a younger brother makes his decision **dependent upon** the **eldest brother,** who is currently unavailable, suggesting that the *yevama* wait **until he comes from overseas,** the court **does not listen to him. And if it enters your mind** to suggest that the ***ḥalitza* of** the **eldest** brother **is preferable, why doesn’t** the court **listen to him? Let** the court **wait,** as **perhaps he will come and perform *ḥalitza*.** Rather, it would appear that the mishna assumes that with regard to performing *ḥalitza*, all the brothers are equivalent.


###### Yevamot 39b:7
[Yevamot 39b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:7)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, בְּקָטָן עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּיל, אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ — אַמַּאי? נִינְטַר דִּלְמָא גָּדֵיל וּמְיַיבֵּם. (אִי נָמֵי אָתֵי אִיהוּ וּמְיַיבְּמַהּ.) אֶלָּא: כֹּל שַׁהוֹיֵי מִצְוָה לָא מְשַׁהֵינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this: **But** even **according to your reasoning,** you certainly agree that the possibility of consummating the levirate marriage is always preferable. If so, what about the previous case in the mishna, where the eldest brother asks to wait **until** his brother who is **a minor will mature?** In that case as well the mishna rules: The court **does not listen to him;** but **why shouldn’t** the court **listen to him? Let** the court **wait,** as **perhaps he will come and consummate the levirate marriage. Alternatively,** in the case where the eldest brother is overseas, let the court wait, as perhaps **he will come and consummate the levirate marriage with her. Rather,** it is clear that the reason for the mishna’s ruling is that **we do not delay the performance of a mitzva.** Therefore, if one of the brothers is currently unable to perform the mitzva, he is not considered at all. Consequently, no proof can be derived from the mishna.


###### Yevamot 39b:8
[Yevamot 39b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:8)

תְּנַן הָתָם: מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה. עַכְשָׁו שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, אָמְרוּ: מִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת יִבּוּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **We learned** in a mishna **there** (*Bekhorot* 13a): The **mitzva of** consummating the **levirate marriage takes precedence over** the **mitzva of** performing ***ḥalitza*;** this applied **initially, when** *yevamin* **would have intent for the sake of** fulfilling **the mitzva. Now, that they do not have intent for the sake of** fulfilling **the mitzva,** the Sages **say:** The **mitzva of** performing ***ḥalitza* takes precedence over** the **mitzva of** consummating the **levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 39b:9
[Yevamot 39b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:9)

אָמַר רַב: אֵין כּוֹפִין. כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי בָּעֵית — חֲלוֹץ, אִי בָּעֵית — יַיבֵּם. בְּדִידָךְ תְּלָא רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְאִם לֹא יַחְפּוֹץ הָאִישׁ״, הָא אִם חָפֵץ, אִי בָּעֵי — חָלֵיץ, אִי בָּעֵי — יְיַבֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav said:** Nevertheless, the court **does not force** a *yavam* to perform *ḥalitza*, and if he wishes it is still permitted to consummate the levirate marriage. The Gemara relates: **When** a *yavam* and a *yevama* **would come before Rav, he would say to them: If you want, perform *ḥalitza*,** and **if you want, consummate the levirate marriage, as the Merciful One makes** the matter **dependent upon your** will, as it is stated: **“And if the man does not wish** to take his *yevama*” (Deuteronomy 25:7) then he should perform *ḥalitza*. This implies that the Torah requires him to perform *ḥalitza* only if he does not wish to consummate the levirate marriage, **but if he wishes** to do so, then the matter is dependent upon him, and **if he wants, he performs *ḥalitza*,** or **if he wants, he consummates the levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 39b:10
[Yevamot 39b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:10)

וְאַף רַב יְהוּדָה סָבַר אֵין כּוֹפִין. מִדְּאַתְקֵין רַב יְהוּדָה בְּגִיטָּא דַחֲלִיצָה: אֵיךְ פְּלוֹנִית בַּת פְּלוֹנִי אַקְרִבַת יָת פְּלוֹנִי יְבָמַהּ קֳדָמַנָא לְבֵי דִינָא, וְאִשְׁתְּמוֹדְעִינְהוּ דַּאֲחוּהּ דְמִיתָנָא מֵאַבָּא נִיהוּ, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִי צָבֵית לְיַבֵּם — יַבֵּם, וְאִי לָא — אַיטְלַע לַהּ רִגְלָיךְ דְּיַמִּינָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **And even Rav Yehuda holds** that the court **does not force** a *yavam* to perform *ḥalitza* if he wishes to consummate the levirate marriage. This is apparent **from** the fact **that Rav Yehuda enacted** in his court that the following formulation should be used **in the bill of *ḥalitza*: That so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, brought so-and-so, her *yavam*, before the court; and we identified him, that he was** indeed **the paternal brother of the deceased, and we said to him: If you desire to consummate the levirate marriage,** then **consummate the levirate marriage, and if not, extend your right foot toward** your *yevama* so that she may perform *ḥalitza* by removing your shoe.


###### Yevamot 39b:11
[Yevamot 39b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:11)

וְאַיטְלַע לַהּ רִגְלָא דְיַמִּינָא, וּשְׁרָת סֵינֵיהּ מַעַל רַגְלוֹהִי, וִירַקַת בְּאַנְפּוֹהִי רוּקָּא דְּמִתְחַזְיָא לְבֵי דִינָא עַל אַרְעָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The bill of *ḥalitza* would continue with the account of what transpired: **And he extended [*itla*] his right foot toward her and she removed his shoe from upon his foot and she spat toward his face spittle, which was visible to the court,** and which landed **upon the ground.**


###### Yevamot 39b:12
[Yevamot 39b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:12)

וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַוְיָא מְסַיֵּים בַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה: וְאַקְרִינְהוּ מָה דִּכְתִיב בִּסְפַר אוֹרָיְיתָא דְמֹשֶׁה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avya in the name of Rav Yehuda would conclude** the formulation of the bill of *ḥalitza* with an additional sentence: **And we dictated to** the *yavam* **that which is written in the book of the Torah of Moses,** i.e., those declarations that the *yavam* and the *yevama* are required to make.


###### Yevamot 39b:13
[Yevamot 39b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:13)

אִשְׁתְּמוֹדְעִינְהוּ, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא, חַד אָמַר: בְּעֵדִים, וְחַד אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ קָרוֹב, אֲפִילּוּ אִשָּׁה. וְהִלְכְתָא: גַּלּוֹיֵי מִילְּתָא בְעָלְמָא הוּא, וַאֲפִילּוּ קָרוֹב וַאֲפִילּוּ אִשָּׁה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies the intention of the phrase: **And we identified him** as the brother of the deceased. **Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree concerning** this phrase: **One said** that this identification must be made **through** legally valid **witnesses, and** the other **one said** that **even** the testimony of **a relative** and **even** the testimony **a woman** is accepted in this case. The Gemara concludes: **And the *halakha* is** that the identification of the brother is considered to be **merely revealing** the facts of **the matter,** and therefore, **even a relative and even a woman** may tender this information.


###### Yevamot 39b:14
[Yevamot 39b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:14)

בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה — מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, אָמְרוּ: מִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת יִבּוּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara paraphrases the mishna from tractate *Bekhorot*: **Initially, when** *yevamin* **would have intent for the sake of** fulfilling **the mitzva** of consummating the levirate marriage, **the mitzva of** consummating the **levirate marriage took precedence over the mitzva of** performing ***ḥalitza*. And now that they do not have intent for the sake of** fulfilling **the mitzva,** the Sages **say: The mitzva of** performing ***ḥalitza* takes precedence over the mitzva of** consummating the **levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 39b:15
[Yevamot 39b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:15)

אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר מִצְוַת יִבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אִכַּשּׁוּר דָּרֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rami bar Ḥama said** that **Rabbi Yitzḥak said:** In later generations **they went back to** once again **saying** that **the mitzva of** consummating the **levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of** performing ***ḥalitza*. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him** in wonderment: Could it be that **the** later **generations improved** their spiritual level and now intend to consummate the levirate marriage solely for sake of fulfilling the mitzva?


###### Yevamot 39b:16
[Yevamot 39b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:16)

מֵעִיקָּרָא סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל, וּלְבַסּוֹף סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains that this does not mean that the later generations improved themselves; rather, **initially they held in accordance with** the opinion of **Abba Shaul,** and so the mitzva of performing *ḥalitza* took precedence, **and in the end they held in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis,** and so the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage took precedence.


###### Yevamot 39b:17
[Yevamot 39b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:17)

דְּתַנְיָא, אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ לְשֵׁם נוֹי, וּלְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, וּלְשׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר — כְּאִילּוּ פּוֹגֵעַ בְּעֶרְוָה. וְקָרוֹב אֲנִי בְּעֵינַי לִהְיוֹת הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Abba Shaul says** that **one who consummates** a levirate marriage **with his *yevama* for the sake of** her **beauty, or for the sake of marital relations, or for the sake of another matter,** e.g., he wishes to inherit her husband’s estate, **it is** considered **as though he encountered a forbidden relation, and I am inclined to view the offspring** born from such a union **as a *mamzer*.** Since the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife is overridden only for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of consummating the levirate marriage, when one does not have the intention to fulfill that mitzva, the baseline prohibition applies, and so any offspring from the union will be *mamzerim*. **The Rabbis say:** The Torah states: **“Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he should do so **in any case,** even if his intentions are not solely for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva.


###### Yevamot 39b:18
[Yevamot 39b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:18)

מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״ — מִצְוָה! שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה הָיְתָה עָלָיו בִּכְלַל הֶיתֵּר. נֶאֶסְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְהוּתְּרָה, יָכוֹל תַּחְזוֹר לְהֶתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Who** is the *tanna* who **taught** the following *baraita* **that the Sages taught:** The Torah states: **“Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5); this is to be considered **a mitzva, as initially,** before she was married to his brother, **she was among** all other women who are **permitted to him,** and then when she married his brother **she became forbidden** to him, **and** when his brother died without offspring **she reverted** from her forbidden status **and became permitted to him.** One **might** have thought that **she would revert to her original permitted status;** therefore, **the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** to teach that it is in fact **a mitzva** to do so.


###### Yevamot 39b:19
[Yevamot 39b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:19)

מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: אַבָּא שָׁאוּל הִיא. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה. שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה הָיְתָה עָלָיו בִּכְלַל הֶיתֵּר. רָצָה לְשֵׁם נוֹי — כּוֹנְסָהּ, רָצָה לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת — כּוֹנְסָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Who** is the *tanna* **who taught** this *baraita*? **Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: It is Abba Shaul, and this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** teaches that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with her only when his intention is to fulfill **a mitzva, as initially,** before she was married to his brother, **she** was **among** all other women who are **permitted to him,** and so, if **he wished,** then even **for the sake of** her **beauty he** was permitted to **marry her, or** similarly, if **he wished,** then even **for the sake of marital relations he** was permitted to **marry her.**


###### Yevamot 39b:20
[Yevamot 39b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:20)

נֶאֶסְרָה, חָזְרָה וְהוּתְּרָה. יָכוֹל תַּחְזוֹר לְהֶתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, לְמִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
When she married his brother **she became forbidden** to him, and when his brother died without offspring **she reverted** from her forbidden status **and became permitted to him.** One **might** have thought that **she would** fully **revert to her original permitted status;** therefore, **the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** to teach that he is permitted to marry her only when his intention is **for the mitzva.**


###### Yevamot 39b:21
[Yevamot 39b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:21)

רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה. שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה הָיְתָה בִּכְלַל הֶיתֵּר. רָצָה כּוֹנְסָהּ, רָצָה אֵינוֹ כּוֹנְסָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: You** can **even say** that the *baraita* is in accordance with **the Rabbis, and this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** indicates that it is **a mitzva** to consummate the levirate marriage, **as initially,** before she was married to his brother, **she was among** all other women who are **permitted to him,** and so if **he wished, he** was permitted to **marry her, or** if **he wished, he** was permitted to choose **not to marry her.**


###### Yevamot 39b:22
[Yevamot 39b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:22)

נֶאֶסְרָה, חָזְרָה וְהוּתְּרָה. יָכוֹל תַּחְזוֹר לְהֶתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן, רָצָה — כּוֹנְסָהּ, רָצָה — אֵינוֹ כּוֹנְסָהּ. רָצָה אֵינוֹ כּוֹנְסָהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
When she married his brother **she became forbidden** to him, and when his brother died without offspring **she reverted** from her forbidden status **and became permitted to him.** One **might** have thought that **she would** fully **revert to her original permitted status,** so that if **he wishes, he may marry her, or** if **he wishes, he may** choose **not to marry her.**


###### Yevamot 39b:23
[Yevamot 39b:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:23)

הָא אֲגִידָה בֵּיהּ, בִּכְדִי תִּיפּוֹק? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: רָצָה — כּוֹנְסָהּ, רָצָה — חוֹלֵץ לָהּ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara interjects that the logic of this last statement seems implausible: Does he really have the option to do as he wishes? **Isn’t she bound to him** with a levirate bond? Could it be that **she will be released** from that bond **without** doing **anything? Rather,** emend the previous argument and instead **say:** One might think that if **he wishes, he may marry her, or** if **he wishes** not to do so, **he performs *ḥalitza* with her.** Therefore, **the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,”** to teach that it is now **a mitzva** to consummate the marriage, and doing so is preferable to performing *ḥalitza*.


###### Yevamot 39b:24
[Yevamot 39b:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/39b:24)

אֵימָא רֵישָׁא: ״מַצּוֹת תֵּאָכֵל בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ״ — מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* under discussion also presents another case that follows a similar model of initially being permitted, then prohibited, and then once again permitted. The Gemara analyzes the explanations of Rav Yitzḥak and Rava based on that clause of the *baraita*: **Say the first clause** and try to explain it in a way consistent with the various explanations of the latter clause: The Torah states concerning the meal-offerings eaten by the priests: **“It shall be eaten unleavened in a sacred place”** (Leviticus 6:9); this indicates that doing so is **a mitzva,**