## Yevamot Daf 40a

###### Yevamot 40a:1
[Yevamot 40a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:1)

שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה הָיְתָה עָלָיו בִּכְלַל הֶיתֵּר. נֶאֶסְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְהוּתְּרָה, יָכוֹל תַּחְזוֹר לְהֶיתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מַצּוֹת תֵּאָכֵל בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ״ — מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**as initially,** before the flour was consecrated, **it was among** all other foods that are **permitted to him,** and then when the flour was consecrated as a meal-offering, **it became forbidden** to him, **and** then once a handful of the offering was brought on the altar, **it reverted** from its forbidden status **and became permitted to him.** One **might** have thought that **it would revert to its original permitted status;** therefore, **the verse states: “It shall be eaten unleavened in a sacred place”** (Leviticus 6:9), which indicates that it is **a mitzva** to eat it.


###### Yevamot 40a:2
[Yevamot 40a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:2)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא דְּאָמַר הָא מַנִּי רַבָּנַן הִיא — הָכָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״מַצּוֹת תֵּאָכֵל בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ״ — מִצְוָה. שֶׁבַּתְּחִלָּה הָיְתָה עָלָיו בִּכְלַל הֶיתֵּר, רָצָה — אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — אֵינוֹ אוֹכְלָהּ (נֶאֶסְרָה, חָזְרָה וְהוּתְּרָה, יָכוֹל תַּחְזוֹר לְהֶיתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן), רָצָה — אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — אֵינוֹ אוֹכְלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Granted, according to Rava, who said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis;** according to him, **here,** in the first clause, **this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: “It shall be eaten unleavened in a sacred place”** indicates that it is **a mitzva** for the priest who prepares the offering to eat it himself. **As, initially,** before the flour was consecrated, **it was among** all other foods that are **permitted to him:** If **he wishes, he may eat it, and if he wishes, he may** choose **not** to **eat it.** When the flour was consecrated, **it became forbidden** to him, **and** then once a handful was brought on the altar, **it reverted** from its forbidden status **and became permitted to him.** One **might** have thought that **it would revert to its original permitted status,** so that if **he wishes, he may eat it, and** if **he wishes, he may** choose **not** to **eat it.**


###### Yevamot 40a:3
[Yevamot 40a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:3)

רָצָה אֵינוֹ אוֹכְלָהּ?! וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְאָכְלוּ אֹתָם אֲשֶׁר כֻּפַּר בָּהֶם״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַכֹּהֲנִים אוֹכְלִים וּבְעָלִים מִתְכַּפְּרִין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara interjects that the logic of this last statement seems implausible: Could it be that if **he wishes, he may** choose **not** to **eat it? But isn’t it written: “And they shall eat those things through which atonement is attained”** (Exodus 29:33), which **teaches that the priests eat** portions of the offering **and** by their doing so **the owners** who brought the offering **attain atonement?** Clearly, then, the eating of the offerings is not volitional.


###### Yevamot 40a:4
[Yevamot 40a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:4)

אֶלָּא: רָצָה — הוּא אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — כֹּהֵן אַחֵר אוֹכְלָהּ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מַצּוֹת תֵּאָכֵל בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ״ — מִצְוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *baraita* should be understood as saying: One might have thought that if **he wishes, he may eat it, and if he wishes, another priest may eat it;** therefore, **the verse states: “It shall be eaten unleavened in a sacred place”** (Leviticus 6:9), to teach that it is **a mitzva** for the priest who prepares the offering to eat it himself. This explanation of the first clause of the *baraita* is entirely consistent with Rava’s explanation of the latter clause concerning the mitzvot of levirate marriage. In his opinion, both clauses demonstrate that there is a mitzva to perform an action in a case where one might have thought there was none.


###### Yevamot 40a:5
[Yevamot 40a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:5)

אֶלָּא לְרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי, דְּאָמַר אַבָּא שָׁאוּל הִיא, הָכָא מַאי תְּרֵי גַוְונֵי אִיכָּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**However, according to Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, who said** that the *baraita* **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Abba Shaul** and explained the *baraita* accordingly as teaching the correct manner in which the mitzva is to be performed, **here,** in the first clause concerning the meal-offering, **what two manners** of eating **are there** of which one would be prohibited?


###### Yevamot 40a:6
[Yevamot 40a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:6)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: רָצָה — לְתֵאָבוֹן אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — אֲכִילָה גַּסָּה אוֹכְלָהּ, אֲכִילָה גַּסָּה מִי שְׁמָהּ אֲכִילָה? וְהָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָאוֹכֵל אֲכִילָה גַּסָּה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים פָּטוּר מִ״לֹּא תְעֻנֶּה״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that the *baraita* might refer to two types of eating and is saying: One might have thought that if **he wishes he may eat it with an appetite, and if he wishes he may eat it** though an act of **excessive eating,** forcing himself to eat despite already being fully satiated; perforce this is not correct, as does **excessive eating have the** legal **status of** an act of **eating? Didn’t Reish Lakish say: One who eats** through an act of **excessive eating on Yom Kippur is exempt from** the punishment of *karet* indicated in the verse: “For whatever soul it be that **shall not be afflicted** in that same day shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29)? From this it is apparent that excessive eating does not have the legal status of an act of eating.


###### Yevamot 40a:7
[Yevamot 40a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:7)

אֶלָּא: רָצָה — מַצָּה אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — חָמֵץ אוֹכְלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara therefore suggests a different interpretation of the *baraita* that is consistent with Rav Yitzḥak’s opinion: **Rather,** say the *baraita* is referring to two different manners in which the meal-offering was prepared: If **he wishes he may eat it unleavened,** and if **he wishes he may eat it leavened.**


###### Yevamot 40a:8
[Yevamot 40a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:8)

וְהָכְתִיב: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״, וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וַאֲפִילּוּ חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ! אֶלָּא: רָצָה — מַצָּה אוֹכְלָהּ, רָצָה — חָלוּט אוֹכְלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara interjects that the logic of this last statement seems implausible: Could it be that if he wishes, the offering could be leavened? **But isn’t it written: “Their portion shall not be baked leavened”** (Leviticus 6:10), **and Reish Lakish said** that both the handful brought on the altar **and even the** priest’s **portion shall not be baked leavened? Rather,** the *baraita* should be understood as saying: One might have thought that if **he wishes he may eat it unleavened,** and if **he wishes he may eat it** even if it was prepared by being **boiled.** Therefore, the verse taught that one must eat it unleavened. Understood in this way, this clause of the *baraita* is also consistent with Rav Yitzḥak’s opinion.


###### Yevamot 40a:9
[Yevamot 40a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:9)

הַאי חָלוּט הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי מַצָּה הִיא — הָא מַצָּה הִיא, וְאִי לָא מַצָּה הִיא — ״מַצּוֹת״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: With regard to **this** possibility of eating the meal-offering **boiled, what are the circumstances,** i.e., how is it classified? **If it is** considered to be **unleavened** because it is presumed that the flour never managed to rise before it was cooked, **then it is unleavened** and there is no reason to prohibit its use; **and if it is not** considered to be **unleavened** because it is presumed that the flour managed to rise before it was cooked, then it is certainly disqualified from use because **the Merciful One states** that the offering must be **“unleavened”** (Leviticus 10:12). How, then, could one ever have questioned whether it is permitted to eat the meal-offering if it was boiled?


###### Yevamot 40a:10
[Yevamot 40a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:10)

לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מַצָּה הִיא, וּלְהָכִי תְּנָא בֵּיהּ קְרָא — לְעַכֵּב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **No; actually, I** could **say to you** that the boiled meal-offering **is** considered to be **unleavened, and** nevertheless it is disqualified because it is **for this** very reason that **the verse repeated** the requirement that it be unleavened, in order **to invalidate** a meal-offering that was boiled.


###### Yevamot 40a:11
[Yevamot 40a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:11)

אֶלָּא חָלוּט מַצָּה הִיא דְּקָאָמְרִינַן, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לוֹמַר שֶׁאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּפֶסַח, אַף עַל פִּי דְּחַלְטֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר אַפְיֵיהּ בְּתַנּוּר — ״לֶחֶם עוֹנִי״ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** if boiled flour is invalid as a meal offering, then with regard to this statement **that we said** that **boiled** flour **is unleavened, for what *halakha*** is it relevant? The Gemara answers: It is **to say that a person fulfills his obligation with it on Passover.** This is because **even though he initially boiled it, since he subsequently baked it in an oven, it is called “bread of affliction”** (Deuteronomy 16:3), **and** therefore **a person fulfills his obligation with it on Passover.**


###### Yevamot 40a:12
[Yevamot 40a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:12)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין לַנַּחֲלָה. וְאִם יֵשׁ שָׁם אָב — נְכָסִים שֶׁל אָב. הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ — זָכָה בִּנְכָסִים שֶׁל אָחִיו. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ, אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם אָב — נְכָסִים שֶׁל אָב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **One who performs *ḥalitza* with his *yevama* is like** any **one of the** other **brothers with respect to** the **inheritance** of the deceased brother’s estate, i.e., each of the brothers takes an equal share of the inheritance. **And if there is a father** of the deceased, who is still alive, **the property** of the deceased **belongs to the father. One who consummates** levirate marriage with **his *yevama*** thereby **acquires his** deceased **brother’s property** solely for himself. **Rabbi Yehuda says: In either** case, whether he consummated the levirate marriage or performed *ḥalitza*, **if there is a father** who is still alive, **the property belongs to the father.**


###### Yevamot 40a:13
[Yevamot 40a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:13)

**גְּמָ׳** פְּשִׁיטָא! סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא חֲלִיצָה בִּמְקוֹם יִבּוּם קָיְימָא, וְנִשְׁקוֹל כּוּלְּהוּ נִכְסֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks with regard to the opening clause of the mishna: The fact that one who performs *ḥalitza* does not gain any special rights to the inheritance of the deceased brother **is obvious;** why did the mishna teach it? The Gemara answers: **It could enter your mind to say** that the ***ḥalitza* takes the place of the levirate marriage and** therefore the brother who performs *ḥalitza* **should take all the property** in the same way as one who consummates the levirate marriage. Therefore, the mishna **teaches us** that this is not the case.


###### Yevamot 40a:14
[Yevamot 40a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:14)

אִי הָכִי, הֲרֵי הוּא כְּאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִים — אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִים מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so,** that the mishna’s point is to teach that by performing *ḥalitza* one is not afforded any additional rights to the inheritance, why is the mishna formulated as: **He is like** any **one of the** other **brothers,** placing the emphasis on what he gains? **It should have** instead taught: **He is** still **only like one of the** other **brothers,** which would emphasize the mishna’s point that by performing *ḥalitza* he does not gain any additional rights.


###### Yevamot 40a:15
[Yevamot 40a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:15)

אֶלָּא, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאַפְסְדַהּ מִיִּבּוּם, לִקְנְסֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the mishna needs to teach the opening clause in this manner because **it could enter your mind to say** that **since** by performing *ḥalitza* with his *yevama* **he caused her to forfeit** the possibility of consummating the **levirate marriage, he should be penalized** and should forfeit any entitlement to his brother’s property. Therefore the mishna **teaches us** that this is not so.


###### Yevamot 40a:16
[Yevamot 40a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:16)

אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם אָב. דְּאָמַר מָר: אָב קוֹדֵם לְכׇל יוֹצְאֵי יְרֵכוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states: **If there is a father** of the deceased, who is still alive, the property of the deceased belongs to the father. The Gemara explains: **As the Master said** with regard to the laws of inheritance (*Bava Batra* 115a): **A father** of the deceased **takes precedence over all** the father’s **descendants.** Therefore, since the father is still alive, the brothers do not inherit at all.


###### Yevamot 40a:17
[Yevamot 40a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:17)

הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ וְכוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא — ״יָקוּם עַל שֵׁם אָחִיו״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַהֲרֵי קָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna states: **One who consummates** levirate marriage with his *yevama* thereby acquires his deceased brother’s property. The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for this? **The Merciful One states** in the Torah: **“He shall succeed in the name of his** dead **brother”** (Deuteronomy 25:6), **and he has succeeded** him by marrying his wife; consequently, he succeeds him by acquiring his property as well.


###### Yevamot 40a:18
[Yevamot 40a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:18)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר וְכוּ׳. אָמַר עוּלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna continues by citing an opposing opinion. **Rabbi Yehuda says:** In either case, whether he consummated levirate marriage or performed *ḥalitza*, if there is a father who is still alive, the property belongs to the father. The Gemara cites a ruling on this dispute: **Ulla said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda. And similarly, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: The *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Yevamot 40a:19
[Yevamot 40a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:19)

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָיָה הַבְּכוֹר אֲשֶׁר תֵּלֵד״ — כִּבְכוֹר, מָה בְּכוֹר אֵין לוֹ בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב — אַף הַאי נָמֵי אֵין לוֹ בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Ulla said, and some say** that it was **Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa** who said: **What is the reason** for the opinion **of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And it shall be that the firstborn that she bears** shall succeed in the name of his dead brother” (Deuteronomy 25:6). The term “firstborn” is understood to be a reference to the *yavam*. By referring to him in this way the Torah indicates that his rights to his brother’s estate are **like** those of **a firstborn** child’s rights to his father’s estate: **Just as a firstborn has no** rights to any of his father’s estate **during the lifetime of the father,** and he may take his double portion only upon the father’s death, **so too, this** *yavam* **as well has no** rights to any of his brother’s estate **during the lifetime of the father.**


###### Yevamot 40a:20
[Yevamot 40a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:20)

אִי: מָה בְּכוֹר נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב, אַף הַאי נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If** there is truly a comparison between the *yavam* who consummated the levirate marriage and a firstborn, then one should also say that **just as the firstborn takes a double portion** of his father’s estate **after the death of the father, so too, this** *yavam* **should** become entitled to **take a double portion** of the father’s estate **after the father’s death,** i.e., the portion due to him as a son, and that portion that would have been awarded to his brother. However, this is not the case; if the *yavam* is not actually the father’s firstborn then he receives only an equal portion of the inheritance together with the other brothers.


###### Yevamot 40a:21
[Yevamot 40a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:21)

מִידֵּי ״יָקוּם עַל שֵׁם אָבִיו״ כְּתִיב? ״יָקוּם עַל שֵׁם אָחִיו״ כְּתִיב, וְלֹא ״עַל שֵׁם אָבִיו״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **Is it written** in the Torah: **He shall succeed in the name of his father?** No, **it is written: “He shall succeed in the name of his dead brother,”** which indicates that he succeeds his brother **but not in the name of his father,** i.e., the Torah never granted him any special entitlement to his father’s estate, and so he should not receive a double portion of it.


###### Yevamot 40a:22
[Yevamot 40a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:22)

אֵימָא: הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא אָב דְּלִשְׁקוֹל נַחֲלָה — תִּתְקַיֵּים מִצְוַת יִבּוּם, הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא אָב [דְּלָא] שָׁקֵיל נַחֲלָה — לֹא תִּתְקַיֵּים מִצְוַת יִבּוּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Yehuda holds that the *halakha* that the *yavam* inherits from his brother, which is stated in the verses describing levirate marriage, applies only when the father is no longer alive, perhaps the other *halakhot* in those verses also apply only when the father is no longer alive, and accordingly one should **say: When there is no father** who is still alive, which means **that** the *yavam* **takes the inheritance,** only then **should the mitzva of levirate marriage apply,** but **when there is a father** who is still alive, which means **that** the *yavam* **does not take the inheritance,** in that case **the mitzva of levirate marriage should not apply.**


###### Yevamot 40a:23
[Yevamot 40a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:23)

מִידֵּי יִבּוּם בְּנַחֲלָה תְּלָה רַחֲמָנָא? יַבּוֹמֵי מְיַבְּמִי, וְאִי אִיכָּא נַחֲלָה — שָׁקֵיל, וְאִי לָא — לָא שָׁקֵיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the possibility of saying this: **Does the Merciful One make** the mitzva of **levirate marriage dependent upon inheritance?** Certainly not; rather, in all cases the *yavam* **should consummate the levirate marriage, and** then **if there is an inheritance** to which he is entitled, **he takes** it, **and if not, he does not take** it.


###### Yevamot 40a:24
[Yevamot 40a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:24)

יְתֵיב רַבִּי חֲנִינָא קָרָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוֹק קְרִי קְרָיָיךְ לְבָרָא, אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ḥanina Kara,** the Bible expert, **was sitting before Rabbi Yannai, and he was sitting and saying:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.** Rabbi Yannai **said to him: Leave** the study hall **and recite your verses outside,** as you are incorrect in your ruling; in fact, the ***halakha* is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Yevamot 40a:25
[Yevamot 40a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:25)

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא, קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֶלָּא כְּמַאן, כְּרַבָּנַן? פְּשִׁיטָא, יָחִיד וְרַבִּים הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In another incident, **a *tanna*** who would recite *baraitot* in the study hall **taught** a *baraita* **before Rav Naḥman:** The ***halakha* is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Naḥman said to him: But** then it follows that **in accordance with whose** opinion is the *halakha*? It is the opinion of **the Rabbis.** The Gemara asks: But this fact **is obvious,** as in a dispute between **one** individual Sage **and many** other Sages, the ***halakha*** is always decided in accordance with the opinion of **the many.**


###### Yevamot 40a:26
[Yevamot 40a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:26)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֶסְמְיַיהּ?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אַתְּ — הֲלָכָה אַתְנְיֻיךְ, וּמִקְשָׁא הוּא דְּאִקְּשִׁי לָךְ, וַאֲפַכְתְּ. וּלְמַאי דַּאֲפַכְתְּ, שַׁפִּיר אֲפַכְתְּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *tanna* **said to him:** Are you saying that this statement in the *baraita* is unnecessary and so **I should remove that** ruling from the *baraita* when I recite it in the future? Rav Naḥman **said to him: No,** do not remove it, as although the statement is unnecessary, it is correct. Rav Naḥman explained further: It must be that originally the *baraita* that **you were taught** stated: The ***halakha*** is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and **that** ruling **was difficult for you** because you knew that the *halakha* is always decided in accordance with many, **and** so **you reversed** the statement of the *baraita* to say, as you presently recited it, that the *halakha* is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. **And** with regard to the manner in **which you reversed it, you reversed it well,** and therefore you should leave it in its current form.


###### Yevamot 40a:27
[Yevamot 40a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/40a:27)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ — הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, וְהִיא אֲסוּרָה בִּקְרוֹבָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who performs *ḥalitza* with his *yevama*,** by rabbinic decree it is as though she had been married to him and then he divorced her. Consequently, **he is forbidden** to engage in relations **with her relatives and she is forbidden** to engage in relations **with his relatives.**