## Yevamot Daf 53b

###### Yevamot 53b:1
[Yevamot 53b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:1)

חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר וְנָתַן וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: נִגְזוֹר מַאֲמָר דְּבָתַר חֲלִיצָה אַטּוּ מַאֲמָר דְּקַמֵּי חֲלִיצָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן. אֶלָּא חָלַץ וְנָתַן גֵּט לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ It was taught in the mishna: If **he performed *ḥalitza* and** then proceeded to either **perform levirate betrothal, or give** a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second woman, nothing is effective after *ḥalitza*. The Gemara asks: **Granted, it was necessary** to teach that in the case of one who **performed *ḥalitza* and then performed levirate betrothal** the levirate betrothal is not effective. For **it might enter your mind to say** that **we should issue a decree** with regard to **levirate betrothal that** takes place **after *ḥalitza* due to levirate betrothal that** takes place **before *ḥalitza*,** and rule that all levirate betrothal is effective. The mishna therefore **teaches us that we do not issue a decree** in this case. **However,** the case of one who **performed *ḥalitza* and gave a bill of divorce, why do I** need this case? What novelty is there in the teaching that a bill of divorce after *ḥalitza* is not effective?


###### Yevamot 53b:2
[Yevamot 53b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:2)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט — בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: נִגְזוֹר גֵּט דְּבָתַר בְּעִילָה אַטּוּ גֵּט דְּקַמֵּי בְּעִילָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן, אֲבָל בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **And according to your reasoning,** that each new case must teach something new, **say the latter clause** of the mishna: If **he engaged in intercourse and** then proceeded to **perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform *ḥalitza*** with a second woman, nothing is effective. In this case the same question can be asked: **Granted, it was necessary** to teach the case of one who **engaged in intercourse and gave a bill of divorce.** This is because **it might enter your mind to say** that **we should issue a decree** with regard to **a bill of divorce that** is given **after intercourse, due to a bill of divorce that** is given **before intercourse,** and decree that this bill of divorce alone is insufficient and she requires *ḥalitza* as well. The mishna therefore **teaches us that we do not issue** such **a decree. But** the case of a *yavam* who **engaged in intercourse and performed levirate betrothal, why do I** need to state it? Once he has engaged in intercourse with her she is his wife in all regards; what difference does levirate betrothal make?


###### Yevamot 53b:3
[Yevamot 53b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:3)

אֶלָּא: אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר, תְּנָא נָמֵי בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר. וְאַיְּידֵי דְבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי בָּעַל וְנָתַן גֵּט, תְּנָא נָמֵי חָלַץ וְנָתַן גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** one must say that **since** the *tanna* **taught** the case of one who **performed *ḥalitza* and** then **performed levirate betrothal, he also taught** the case of one who **engaged in intercourse and** then **performed levirate betrothal,** due to the similarity between them. **And since he wished to teach** the case of one who **engaged in intercourse and** then **gave a bill of divorce, he also taught** the case of one who **performed *ḥalitza* and** then **gave a bill of divorce.** We should therefore not infer anything from these superfluous cases, as they are merely stated for stylistic reasons.


###### Yevamot 53b:4
[Yevamot 53b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:4)

בִּזְמַן שֶׁהִיא וְכוּ׳. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא יוֹסֵי בֶּן יוֹחָנָן אִישׁ יְרוּשָׁלַיִם אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אַחַת בְּעִילָה וְאַחַת חֲלִיצָה, בַּתְּחִלָּה — אֵין אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם, בָּאֶמְצַע וּבַסּוֹף — יֵשׁ אַחֲרֶיהָ כְּלוּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna taught: With regard to intercourse, **when it is** at the beginning nothing is effective after it, but if it was in the middle or at the end, something is effective after it. The Gemara comments: **The mishna is not in accordance with** the opinion of **this *tanna*. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Abba Yosei ben Yoḥanan, a man of Jerusalem, says in the name of Rabbi Meir:** With regard to **both intercourse and *ḥalitza*,** if one of them were performed **at the beginning, nothing is effective after it,** but if they were done **in the middle or at the end,** i.e., they were preceded by some other action, **something is** effective **after it.** According to the mishna, however, nothing is effective after *ḥalitza* regardless of when it was performed.


###### Yevamot 53b:5
[Yevamot 53b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:5)

וְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: בִּיאָה, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר — גָּזְרִינַן. חֲלִיצָה, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר — לָא גָּזְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** therefore it can be concluded that there are **three disputes with regard to** this **matter,** i.e., three opinions on this issue. **The first *tanna* holds:** In the case of **intercourse** that is preceded by a disqualifying action, **where there is** a reason **to issue a decree,** lest one violate a prohibition by engaging in intercourse after *ḥalitza* or intercourse was performed, **we issue a decree** establishing that invalid intercourse should not be as effective as valid intercourse. With regard to ***ḥalitza*,** however, **where there is no** reason **to issue a decree** as there is no concern of a prohibition even if an action is performed after *ḥalitza*, **we do not issue a decree.**


###### Yevamot 53b:6
[Yevamot 53b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:6)

וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה סָבַר: בִּיאָה נָמֵי לֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ לִיגְזוֹר בִּיאָה אַחַר הַגֵּט מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה אַחַר חֲלִיצָה — כֵּיוָן דַּחֲלִיצָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מִידָּע יָדְעִי. וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ לִיגְזוֹר בִּיאָה אַחַר מַאֲמָר מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה אַחַר בִּיאָה — כֵּיוָן דְּבִיאָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא מִידָּע יְדִיעִי. וְאַבָּא יוֹסֵי בֶּן חָנָן סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן דְּגָזְרִי בְּבִיאָה, וְגָזַר חֲלִיצָה מִשּׁוּם בִּיאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Neḥemya holds** that with regard to **intercourse there is also no** reason **to issue a decree. And as** for what **you said** in justification of your ruling, **that we should issue a decree** in a case of **intercourse after a bill of divorce due to intercourse after *ḥalitza*,** there is no cause for such a concern. **Since *ḥalitza*** is effective **by Torah** law, people **know** that it is fully effective and cannot be followed by anything, and they will not confuse it with laws instituted by the Sages. **And as** for what **you said that we should issue a decree** with regard to **intercourse after levirate betrothal due to intercourse after intercourse, since** the acquisition of **intercourse** is **by Torah** law, **this** matter **is known** by people, and they will not err in this regard. **And Abba Yosei ben Ḥanan holds in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis, who issue a decree with regard to intercourse,** but he adds **and issues a decree** with regard to ***ḥalitza* due to intercourse.** He therefore does not differentiate between *ḥalitza* and intercourse at all.


###### Yevamot 53b:7
[Yevamot 53b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:7)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל**


###### Yevamot 53b:8
[Yevamot 53b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:8)

**הַבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ**, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן, אֲפִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא מְזִידָה, הוּא מֵזִיד וְהִיא שׁוֹגֶגֶת, הוּא אָנוּס וְהִיא לֹא אֲנוּסָה, הִיא אֲנוּסָה וְהוּא לֹא אָנוּס. אֶחָד הַמְעָרֶה וְאֶחָד הַגּוֹמֵר — קָנָה. וְלֹא חִילֵּק בֵּין בִּיאָה לְבִיאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **One who had intercourse with his *yevama*, whether unwittingly,** i.e., he thought he was having intercourse with someone else, **or intentionally,** i.e., he knew she was his *yevama* and nevertheless had intercourse with her without intent to perform levirate marriage; **whether** due to **coercion or willingly; even if he** was **unwitting and her** participation was **intentional, his** participation was **intentional and she** was **unwitting, he was coerced and she was not coerced,** or **she was coerced and he was not coerced; both one who** merely **engages in the initial stage of intercourse and one who completes** the act of intercourse **has** thereby **acquired** his *yevama*. **And** similarly, the Torah **did not distinguish between** an act of **intercourse** in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, **and intercourse** in a typical manner.


###### Yevamot 53b:9
[Yevamot 53b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:9)

וְכֵן הַבָּא עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, אוֹ פְּסוּלוֹת, כְּגוֹן אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין פְּסָלָהּ — וְלֹא חִילֵּק בֵּין בִּיאָה לְבִיאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And so too,** with regard to a man **who had intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden [*arayot*]** by **the Torah or** with those who are **unfit for him** even though they are not in the category of *arayot*, **for example, a widow with a High Priest; a divorcée and a *yevama* who performed *ḥalitza* [*ḥalutza*] with a common priest; a *mamzeret*,** i.e., a woman born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, **or a Gibeonite woman with an Israelite; the daughter of an Israelite with a *mamzer* or a Gibeonite; he has disqualified her** from marrying into the priesthood through this act no matter how it was performed, **and** the Torah **did not distinguish between** the act of **intercourse** in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, **and intercourse** in a typical manner.


###### Yevamot 53b:10
[Yevamot 53b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:10)

**גְּמָ׳** מַאי ״אֲפִילּוּ״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks: **What is** the significance of the word **even** in the statement that begins with: Even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional? Since the mishna has already said that there is no halakhic difference whether the act of intercourse was performed intentionally, what is added by that statement?


###### Yevamot 53b:11
[Yevamot 53b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:11)

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר. לָא מִיבַּעְיָא הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא קָמִכַּוְּונָה לְמִצְוָה, אִי נָמֵי הוּא מֵזִיד וְהִיא קָמִכַּוְּונָה לְמִצְוָה, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹגֵג וְהִיא מְזִידָה, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ לָא קָמִכַּוְּונִי לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה — אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָנָה. תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם שׁוֹגְגִים, שְׁנֵיהֶם מְזִידִים, שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲנוּסִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The mishna is stated in the style of: **Needless to say.** It is **needless to say** that if **he** was **unwitting and she intended** to fulfill the **mitzva,** or **alternatively, he** acted **intentionally** without intent to fulfill the mitzva **and she intended** to fulfill the **mitzva,** he has acquired her. **However, even if he** was **unwitting and she** acted **intentionally, where both of them did not intend** to act **for the sake of the mitzva, he nevertheless acquires** her. Similarly, **Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Even** if **both of them** acted **unwittingly, intentionally,** or **were coerced,** he acquires the *yevama* through the act of intercourse.


###### Yevamot 53b:12
[Yevamot 53b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:12)

אָנוּס דְּמַתְנִיתִין הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא כְּשֶׁאֲנָסוּהוּ גּוֹיִם וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: אֵין אוֹנֶס לְעֶרְוָה! לְפִי שֶׁאֵין קִישּׁוּי אֶלָּא לְדַעַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances the mishna** is referring to when it mentions a man who **was coerced? If we say** that it is **when gentiles coerced him** by threatening to kill him if he did not have intercourse with her **and** he therefore **had intercourse with her, didn’t Rava say** that **there is no** such thing as **coercion** of a man to have intercourse with a woman **with whom relations are forbidden, because there is no erection** of the male organ **without intent?** Consequently, even if he acted due to the threat, his action is considered intentional.


###### Yevamot 53b:13
[Yevamot 53b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/53b:13)

אֶלָּא בְּיָשֵׁן. וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the mishna must be referring to **one who was sleeping** and became erect, and his *yevama* drew him onto herself. However, **didn’t Rav Yehuda say** that