## Yevamot Daf 54a

###### Yevamot 54a:1
[Yevamot 54a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:1)

יָשֵׁן לֹא קָנָה בִּיבִמְתּוֹ. אֶלָּא בְּנִתְקָע — וְהָא אָמַר רַבָּה: נָפַל מִן הַגָּג וְנִתְקַע — חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, וּבִיבִמְתּוֹ לֹא קָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**a sleeping** man **has not acquired his *yevama*,** as he did not intend to perform the act of intercourse at all? **Rather,** the mishna was referring **to one who was inserted** into his *yevama* by accident. But **didn’t Rabba say:** One who **fell from a roof and was inserted** into a woman due to the force of his fall **is liable** to pay **four** of the five **types of indemnity** that must be paid by one who damaged another: Injury, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as he did not intend to perform the act, **and if** she is **his *yevama*, he has not acquired** her in this manner.


###### Yevamot 54a:2
[Yevamot 54a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:2)

אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּון לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְקָפַתּוּ יְבִמְתּוֹ, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ. שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲנוּסִים דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּון לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְקָפוּהוּ גּוֹיִם וְדִבְּקוּם זֶה בָּזֶה, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is a case **where he intended** to have intercourse with **his wife** and became erect, **and his *yevama*** forcefully **grabbed hold of him and he had intercourse with her.** The Gemara further asks: If so, **what are the circumstances** of the case when **both of them were coerced** that was mentioned by **the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya?** The Gemara answers: It is a case **where he intended** to have intercourse with **his wife, and gentiles grabbed hold of him and pressed** him and his *yevama* **against each other, and he** thereby **had intercourse with her.**


###### Yevamot 54a:3
[Yevamot 54a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:3)

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״ — בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara inquires as to the source of these *halakhot*: **From where are these matters** derived? **As the Sages taught** with regard to the verse **“Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), that this indicates that the act of intercourse in this circumstance is **a mitzva,** i.e., it is preferable to the alternative, which is *ḥalitza*. **Alternatively,** the verse **“Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,”** indicates that it does not matter how he had intercourse with her, **whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether** due to **coercion or willingly.**


###### Yevamot 54a:4
[Yevamot 54a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:4)

וְהָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ לְמִצְוָה? לְמִצְוָה מִ״וְּאִם לֹא יַחְפּוֹץ הָאִישׁ״ נָפְקָא, הָא חָפֵץ — יִבֵּם, וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא: בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Didn’t you derive** from this phrase that the act of intercourse in this case is a **mitzva?** How can the same phrase also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: The fact that it is **a mitzva is derived from** the verse: **“And if the man does not wish** to take his *yevama*” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that if he **wishes, he performs levirate marriage,** which is preferable to *ḥalitza*. Therefore, **when** the **verse** cited above **came,** it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred **whether** the parties acted **unwittingly or intentionally, whether** due to **coercion or willingly.**


###### Yevamot 54a:5
[Yevamot 54a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:5)

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, כְּדַרְכָּהּ. ״וּלְקָחָהּ״ — שֶׁלֹּא ״כְּדַרְכָּהּ״. ״וְיִבֵּם״ — בִּיאָה גּוֹמֶרֶת בָּהּ, וְאֵין כֶּסֶף וּשְׁטָר גּוֹמְרִין בָּהּ. ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״ — בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג כּוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is taught** in **another** *baraita* that the phrase: **“Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** indicates that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in **typical** sexual intercourse. The next phrase, **“and take her,”** includes even **atypical,** i.e., anal, sexual intercourse. The concluding phrase of the verse, **“and consummate the levirate marriage,”** indicates that **sexual intercourse completes her** acquisition, **but money and a** marriage **document do not complete her** acquisition to him as his fully betrothed wife, in contrast to the regular *halakhot* of marriage. By emphasizing **“and consummate the levirate marriage with her,”** the verse teaches that he acquires her even if he acted **against her will. Alternatively: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** indicates that levirate marriage has occurred **whether** the parties acted **unwittingly** or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.


###### Yevamot 54a:6
[Yevamot 54a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:6)

וְהָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ לִכְדַרְכָּהּ! הָהוּא — מִ״לְּהָקִים לְאָחִיו שֵׁם״ נָפְקָא, בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁמֵּקִים שֵׁם. וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Didn’t you derive** from this phrase that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in **typical** sexual intercourse? How can it also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: **That** *halakha* **is derived from** a different verse: **“To establish a name for his brother”** (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that intercourse must occur **in the place where he establishes a name,** i.e., where it can lead to childbirth. Therefore, **when** the **verse** cited above **came,** it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred **whether** the parties acted **unwittingly or intentionally, whether** due to **coercion or willingly.**


###### Yevamot 54a:7
[Yevamot 54a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:7)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: יָשֵׁן — לֹא קָנָה בִּיבִמְתּוֹ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, עַד דִּמְכַוֵּין לַהּ לְשֵׁם בִּיאָה. וְהָתַנְיָא: בֵּין עֵר [בֵּין יָשֵׁן! אֵימָא: בֵּין עֵרָה בֵּין יְשֵׁנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara addresses **the** matter **itself** cited in the previous discussion. **Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping** man **has not acquired his *yevama*, as the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he does not acquire her **unless he intends** to act **for the sake of sexual intercourse.** Since a sleeping man does not intend to engage in sexual intercourse, he does not acquire his *yevama*. The Gemara asks: **Isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* that one acquires his *yevama* through sexual intercourse regardless of **whether he** was **awake or asleep?** The Gemara answers: **Say** the *baraita* in the following emended form: **Whether she** was **awake or asleep.** The woman’s awareness is not a necessary component in order to perform levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 54a:8
[Yevamot 54a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:8)

וְהָתַנְיָא: בֵּין עֵר] הוּא בֵּין יָשֵׁן הוּא, בֵּין עֵרָה הִיא בֵּין יְשֵׁנָה הִיא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּמִתְנַמְנֵם. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי מִתְנַמְנֵם? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִים וְלָא נִים תִּיר וְלָא תִּיר, כְּגוֹן דְּקָרוּ לֵיהּ וְעָנֵי, וְלָא יָדַע לְאַהְדּוֹרֵי סְבָרָא, וְכִי מַדְכְּרוּ לֵיהּ מִדְּכַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks further: **Wasn’t it taught** in another *baraita* that one acquires his *yevama* through sexual intercourse regardless of **whether he was awake or he was asleep** and regardless of **whether she was awake or she was asleep?** The Gemara answers: **With what are we dealing here** when the *baraita* says that a sleeping man acquires his *yevama*? It is referring to a man **who is dozing.** The Gemara asks: **What are the circumstances** of **dozing? Rav Ashi said:** One is **asleep but not asleep, awake but not awake, when,** if **they call him, he** will **answer, but he is unable to provide a reasonable** answer. **And when they** later **inform him** of what happened, **he remembers** it.


###### Yevamot 54a:9
[Yevamot 54a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:9)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבָּה: נָפַל מִן הַגָּג וְנִתְקַע — חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, וּבִיבִמְתּוֹ לֹא קָנָה. בְּנֵזֶק, בְּצַעַר, בְּשֶׁבֶת, בְּרִפּוּי. אֲבָל בּוֹשֶׁת לָא מִיחַיַּיב, דְּאָמַר מָר: אֵין חַיָּיב עַל הַבּוֹשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּון.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabba cited earlier in order to discuss **the** matter **itself** that Rabba addressed. **Rabba said:** One who **fell from a roof and was inserted** into a woman due to the force of his fall **is liable** to pay **four** of the five **types of indemnity** that must be paid by one who damaged another, **and if** she is **his *yevama* he has not acquired** her in this manner. He is liable to pay for **injury, pain, loss of livelihood,** and **medical costs. However, he is not liable** to pay for the **shame** he caused her, **as the Master said: One is not liable** to pay **for shame unless he intends** to humiliate his victim. Consequently, one who fell from a roof accidentally is not liable to pay for the shame he caused the woman.


###### Yevamot 54a:10
[Yevamot 54a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:10)

אָמַר רָבָא: נִתְכַּוֵּון לְהָטִיחַ בַּכּוֹתֶל וְהֵטִיחַ בִּיבִמְתּוֹ — לֹא קָנָה. לְהָטִיחַ בִּבְהֵמָה וְהֵטִיחַ בִּיבָמָה — קָנָה, דְּהָא קָמְכַוֵּין לְשֵׁם בִּיאָה בְּעוֹלָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** If **he intended to press** his sexual organ **into a wall, and he** accidentally **pressed** it **into his *yevama*, he has not acquired** her, as he did not intend to engage in an act of sexual intercourse. However, if he intended **to press** his sexual organ **into an animal, and he pressed** it **into his *yevama*, he has acquired** her, **as he** at least **intended** to act **for the purpose of sexual intercourse in general,** i.e., for some form of sexual intercourse.


###### Yevamot 54a:11
[Yevamot 54a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:11)

אֶחָד הַמְעָרֶה. אָמַר עוּלָּא: מִנַּיִן לְהַעֲרָאָה מִן הַתּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת אִשָּׁה דָּוָה וְגִלָּה אֶת עֶרְוָתָהּ אֶת מְקֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה״, מִכָּאן לְהַעֲרָאָה מִן הַתּוֹרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ We learned in the mishna that **both one who** merely **begins the act of intercourse** and one who completes it has acquired the *yevama* through this act. **Ulla said: From where** is it derived that **the initial stage of intercourse** is considered an act of sexual intercourse **by Torah law? As it is stated: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked [*he’era*] her fountain”** (Leviticus 20:18). The verse is referring to the first stage of intercourse, and **from here** it is derived that **the initial stage of intercourse [*ha’ara’a*]** is considered sexual intercourse **by Torah law.**


###### Yevamot 54a:12
[Yevamot 54a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:12)

אַשְׁכְּחַן נִדָּה, שְׁאָר עֲרָיוֹת מִנַּיִן? וְכִי תֵּימָא: נֵילַף מִנִּדָּה — מָה לְנִדָּה שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמְּאָה אֶת בּוֹעֲלָהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We have found** a source for this *halakha* in the case of **a menstruating woman,** the subject of the verse cited above. **From where** is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to **the rest of those with whom relations are forbidden? And if you say we should derive it from** the *halakha* with regard to **a menstruating woman, what** comparison can be made **to a menstruating woman,** concerning whom the *halakha* is more stringent than others with whom relations are forbidden, **in that she causes one who has intercourse with her to become ritually impure?**


###### Yevamot 54a:13
[Yevamot 54a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:13)

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵאֵשֶׁת אָח, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו נִדָּה הִיא״ — וְכִי אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו [לְעוֹלָם] נִדָּה הִיא? אֶלָּא כְּנִדָּה: מָה נִדָּה בְּהַעֲרָאָה — אַף אֵשֶׁת אָח בְּהַעֲרָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* in other cases **comes from** a verse about **a brother’s wife, as it is written: “And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity [*nidda*]”** (Leviticus 20:21). The word *nidda* generally refers to a menstruating woman, and so the Gemara asks: **Is his brother’s wife always menstruating? Rather,** it means that the *halakha* with regard to her is **like** that of **a menstruating woman: Just as** one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with **a menstruating woman through the initial stage of intercourse, so too,** one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with **a brother’s wife through the initial stage of intercourse.**


###### Yevamot 54a:14
[Yevamot 54a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:14)

מָה לְאֵשֶׁת אָח — שֶׁכֵּן בְּיָדוֹ לְרַבּוֹת, דְּאִי בָּעֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ וְאָזֵיל כִּי אַלְפָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** comparison can be made between **a brother’s wife** and other women with whom relations are forbidden? The prohibition with regard to a brother’s **wife is** more stringent in that **it is within his power to increase** the number of women forbidden by this prohibition, **as, if he wishes, he can go on betrothing a thousand** women, all of whom would be forbidden to his brother. Consequently, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife cannot serve as a model for other prohibitions.


###### Yevamot 54a:15
[Yevamot 54a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:15)

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְעֶרְוַת אֲחוֹת אִמְּךָ וַאֲחוֹת אָבִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה כִּי אֶת שְׁאֵרוֹ הֶעֱרָה״. אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם — שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* in other cases **comes from** a verse with regard to **a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as it is written: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [*he’era*] his kin”** (Leviticus 20:19). The Gemara asks: **It is** possible **to refute** this source as follows: **What** comparison can be made between other women with whom relations are forbidden and **a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, which are** unique in that they are prohibited due to **a prohibition that comes on its own?** The prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister does not stem from marriage, but from the biological fact that she is his father’s or mother’s sister. It is therefore dissimilar to prohibitions that result from marriage.


###### Yevamot 54a:16
[Yevamot 54a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:16)

מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי [חֲדָא] מִתַּרְתֵּי. מֵהֵי תֵּיתֵי? תֵּיתֵי מֵאֵשֶׁת אָח וַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם — מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן אֲסוּרִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁאֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara states: The principle that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse **does not come from** any **one** of the sources cited above. **Let it come** by deriving the *halakha* in any **one** other case **from** the common denominator of **two** of the sources mentioned above. The Gemara asks: **From which** two sources could this principle **come** to be derived? If you say it can **come** to be derived **from** the combination of the source with regard to **a brother’s wife and** the source with regard to **a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, what** comparison may be drawn from these cases, **which are** unique in that they are **prohibited because** they are **kin?**


###### Yevamot 54a:17
[Yevamot 54a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:17)

אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִנִּדָּה וַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם. מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו. אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִנִּדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח, דְּמַאי פָּרְכַתְּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, let it come from** the prohibition proscribing **a menstruating woman and** the prohibition with regard to **a father’s sister and a mother’s sister,** as a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a family relative. The Gemara raises a difficulty: **What** comparison may be drawn from these cases, **which are** each a **prohibition that comes of its own** accord, as neither one is created through marriage? **Rather, let it come from** the prohibition proscribing **a menstruating woman and** the prohibition proscribing **a brother’s wife. As, what** can you say to **refute** this teaching? These two cases do not share any unique features that might be cause for stringency.


###### Yevamot 54a:18
[Yevamot 54a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:18)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: מָה לְנִדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָן, תֹּאמַר בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ לָהּ הֶיתֵּר בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly objects to this: What** comparison may be drawn based upon the precedent of **a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife, which are** stringent in that **they cannot be permitted** to others for the duration of **the existence of the** factor **that renders them prohibited?** A menstruating woman is forbidden as long as she experiences a flow of menstrual blood, while a brother’s wife is forbidden for the duration of the brother’s lifetime. Can **you say** the same **with regard to a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who renders her prohibited,** i.e., if her husband divorces her?


###### Yevamot 54a:19
[Yevamot 54a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/54a:19)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אַטּוּ נִדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָן הוּא דְּאֵין לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר, אֲבָל לְאַחַר מִכָּאן יֵשׁ לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר? נִדָּה —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is that to say** that **it is** only during **the existence of the** factor **that renders them prohibited that a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife cannot be permitted** to others, **but afterward,** when the prohibiting factor has been resolved, **they can be permitted?** In the case of **a menstruating woman,**