## Yevamot Daf 7a

###### Yevamot 7a:1
[Yevamot 7a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:1)

וּמָה עֲבוֹדָה, שֶׁהִיא חֲמוּרָה וְדוֹחָה שַׁבָּת — רְצִיחָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתָהּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת״, שַׁבָּת, שֶׁנִּדְחֵת מִפְּנֵי עֲבוֹדָה — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּהֵא רְצִיחָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתָהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** the Temple **service,** which includes the sacrifice of offerings, **is** so **severe that it overrides Shabbat,** as offerings were brought on Shabbat, and yet the *halakha* of **murder overrides it,** i.e., the obligation to execute a sentenced convict overrides the Temple service, **as it is stated** with regard to one sentenced to death: **“You shall take him from My altar, that he may die”** (Exodus 21:14), then in the case of **Shabbat, which is overridden by** the Temple **service, is it not right that** the *halakhot* of **murder should** likewise override it?


###### Yevamot 7a:2
[Yevamot 7a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:2)

וּמַאי ״אוֹ אֵינוֹ״ דְּקָאָמַר — הָכִי קָאָמַר: קְבוּרַת מֵת מִצְוָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁדּוֹחָה אֶת הָעֲבוֹדָה, וְאֵין דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. הֲדַר אָמַר: קְבוּרַת מֵת מִצְוָה תִּדְחֶה שַׁבָּת מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁהִיא דּוֹחָה שַׁבָּת — קְבוּרַת מֵת מִצְוָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתָהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara analyzes a puzzling statement in the above *baraita*. **And what** is the meaning of the claim: **Or** perhaps **it is only** the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, **which** the *tanna* **stated** in an unexplained reversion to his previous suggestion? The Gemara explains that **this is what** he **is saying:** The *a fortiori* reasoning can be refuted, as the obligation **to bury a corpse with no one** available **to bury it [*met mitzva*] can prove** otherwise, **as** the obligation to bury a *met mitzva* **overrides** the Temple **service, and** yet **it does not override Shabbat.** The *tanna* **then** retracted his statement and **said** that one can claim that **the burial of a *met mitzva* overrides Shabbat by** means of the same ***a fortiori*** inference: **If** the Temple **service overrides Shabbat,** and **the burial of a *met mitzva* overrides** it.


###### Yevamot 7a:3
[Yevamot 7a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:3)

מִ״וּלְאַחוֹתוֹ״, שַׁבָּת שֶׁנִּדְחֵת מִפְּנֵי עֲבוֹדָה — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּהֵא קְבוּרַת מֵת מִצְוָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתָהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תְבַעֲרוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara pauses in the middle of the *a fortiori* inference to explain this last point. This is derived **from** the superfluous phrase **“or for his sister”** in the verse “He shall not make himself ritually impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die” (Numbers 6:7), which is referring to a nazirite. This verse teaches that even a nazirite on his way to sacrifice the Paschal lamb must render himself ritually impure to bury a *met mitzva*. The Gemara resumes the *a fortiori* inference: If so, as **Shabbat is overridden by** the Temple **service, is it not right that the burial of a *met mitzva* should override it?** Therefore, **the verse states: “You shall kindle no** fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day” (Exodus 35:3).


###### Yevamot 7a:4
[Yevamot 7a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:4)

וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּאָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, מַאי ״אוֹ אֵינוֹ״ דְּקָאָמַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This concludes Rav Shimi bar Ashi’s interpretation of the *baraita*, that the *tanna* suggested that a court-administered death penalty might override Shabbat not because of the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, but due to a potential *a fortiori* inference. The Gemara asks: **And according to that which entered his mind at the outset, that** the assumption of the *tanna* was indeed based on the principle that **a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, what** is the meaning of the clause: **Or** perhaps **it is only** the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, **that** the *tanna* **said?** How should the *baraita* be explained according to the initial interpretation?


###### Yevamot 7a:5
[Yevamot 7a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:5)

הָכִי קָאָמַר: מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״מְחַלְּלֶיהָ מוֹת יוּמָת״ — בִּשְׁאָר מְלָאכוֹת חוּץ מִמִּיתַת בֵּית דִּין. אֲבָל מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין דָּחֵי שַׁבָּת, דְּאָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains that **this is what** the *tanna* **is saying:** It would have been possible to say the following: **How do I establish** the verse **“Every one who profanes it shall surely be put to death”** (Exodus 31:14)? This applies **to other** prohibited **labors, except for court-imposed capital punishment. However, court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, as a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition.**


###### Yevamot 7a:6
[Yevamot 7a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:6)

הֲדַר אָמַר: אֵימַר דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּאָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה — לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה גְּרֵידָא, לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כָּרֵת מִי שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּדָחֵי? הֲדַר אָמַר: אַטּוּ ״עֲשֵׂה דּוֹחֶה אֶת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה״, לָאו לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה חָמוּר מִינֵּיהּ, וְקָאָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *tanna* **then** retracted his statement and **said:** You can **say that we stated** the principle **that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition,** yet this is true for a regular **prohibition alone.** However, **did you hear that it overrides a prohibition that includes *karet*?** The *tanna* **then said,** hinting at a counter-claim: **Is that not to say,** with regard to the principle that **a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition,** that **the prohibition is more stringent than** the positive mitzva? After all, the court punishes one who violates a prohibition with lashes, which is not the case for a failure to uphold a positive mitzva. **And** yet by Torah law **the positive mitzva comes and overrides it.**


###### Yevamot 7a:7
[Yevamot 7a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:7)

מָה לִי חוּמְרָא זוּטָא וּמָה לִי חוּמְרָא רַבָּה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תְבַעֲרוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If so, **what difference** is it **to me** if it is a case of **a minor stringency and what difference** is it **to me** if it is **a major stringency?** Once the Torah has stated that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition, there should be no difference between a relatively stringent prohibition and a lenient one. Therefore, **the verse states: “You shall not kindle.”** In sum, the Gemara has not found a clear proof for the opinion that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs *karet*.


###### Yevamot 7a:8
[Yevamot 7a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:8)

אֶלָּא [אִיצְטְרִיךְ], סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: תִּיהְוֵי הַאי אֵשֶׁת אָח דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל לְלַמֵּד — לֹא לְלַמֵּד עַל עַצְמוֹ יָצָא, אֶלָּא לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ יָצָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Consequently, the Gemara suggests a different interpretation. The superfluous phrase “with her” indeed teaches that the obligation of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden. However, this derivation is required not because one might have thought that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs *karet*. **Rather,** this phrase **is necessary** because it could **enter your mind to say: Let this** case of **a brother’s wife,** to whom the mitzva of levirate marriage applies, **be** treated in accordance with a well-established hermeneutical principle: **A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization.**


###### Yevamot 7a:9
[Yevamot 7a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:9)

דְּתַנְיָא: דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל וְכוּ׳, כֵּיצַד?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the application of this principle to the current case. Since the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife is included in the general prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden, it can be claimed that the *halakha* of levirate marriage renders not only a brother’s childless wife permitted, but in this case it renders permitted all women with whom relations are usually forbidden. **As it is taught** in a *baraita* that clarifies this hermeneutical principle: **A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged** to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization. **How so?**


###### Yevamot 7a:10
[Yevamot 7a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:10)

״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר מִזֶּבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים וְטוּמְאָתוֹ עָלָיו״, וַהֲלֹא שְׁלָמִים בִּכְלָל קֳדָשִׁים הָיוּ, וְלָמָּה יָצְאוּ — לְהַקִּישׁ אֲלֵיהֶן, וְלוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה שְׁלָמִים מְיוּחָדִים קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ — אַף כֹּל קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ. יָצְאוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* provides an example of this principle by citing a verse: **“But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings** that belong to the Lord, **with his ritual impurity upon him,** that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). **But aren’t peace-**offerings **included in** the general category **of** all **consecrated offerings? And why were they** explicitly **singled out** from of the rest in the above verse? **To draw an analogy between them and to say to you: Just as peace-**offerings **are unique** in that they are **consecrated for the altar, so too,** this *halakha* that one who eats of them is liable to receive *karet* applies to **all** food that is **consecrated for the altar,** which **excludes** objects that are **consecrated for the Temple maintenance.**


###### Yevamot 7a:11
[Yevamot 7a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:11)

הָכָא נָמֵי: הָא אֵשֶׁת אָח בִּכְלַל כׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת הָיְתָה, וְלָמָּה יָצְתָה — לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ, וְלוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה אֵשֶׁת אָח שַׁרְיָא — אַף כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת נָמֵי שַׁרְיָין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The above *baraita* provided an example of the principle that an item singled out from a general category teaches a *halakha* with regard to the entire category. **Here too,** one can argue: **This** case of **a brother’s wife was included in** the general category of **all** women **with whom relations are forbidden, and why was she singled out? To compare to her and say to you: Just as** a childless **brother’s wife is permitted, so too, all** women **with whom relations are forbidden are likewise permitted.**


###### Yevamot 7a:12
[Yevamot 7a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:12)

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם: כְּלָל בְּאִיסּוּר, וּפְרָט בְּאִיסּוּר. הָכָא: כְּלָל בְּאִיסּוּר, וּפְרָט בְּהֶיתֵּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises an objection: **Is** it **comparable? There,** in the case cited as an example of this hermeneutical principle, **the generalization,** i.e., all offerings, are included **in the prohibition** against eating offerings while ritually impure, **and the detailed** case of peace-offerings is also included **in the prohibition.** Consequently, it can be said that the specific case was singled out to teach about the entire category. By contrast, **here,** in the case of levirate marriage with forbidden relatives, **the generalization** is included **in the prohibition** against engaging in forbidden relations, **and** yet **the detailed case is permitted.** Therefore, it cannot be said that the detail has been singled out so as to clarify some aspect of the general category; rather, its *halakha* differs from the rest.


###### Yevamot 7a:13
[Yevamot 7a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:13)

הָא לָא דָּמֵי אֶלָּא לְדָבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל, וְיָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ — שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַחֲזִירוֹ לִכְלָלוֹ, עַד שֶׁיַּחְזִירֶנּוּ לְךָ הַכָּתוּב בְּפֵירוּשׁ. דְּתַנְיָא: דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל, וְיָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ — אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהַחְזִירוֹ לִכְלָלוֹ, עַד שֶׁיַּחְזִירֶנּוּ לְךָ הַכָּתוּב בְּפֵירוּשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Instead, this case **is comparable only to** those that fit a different hermeneutical principle, concerning **a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter.** If a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, **then you cannot return it to its generalization** even for other matters, to the extent that this case has been entirely removed from the general category **until the Torah explicitly returns it** to its generalization. **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter, you may not return it to its generalization until the Torah explicitly returns it** to its generalization.


###### Yevamot 7a:14
[Yevamot 7a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:14)

כֵּיצַד? ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת וְאֶת הָעוֹלָה בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ כִּי כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם הוּא לַכֹּהֵן״, שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״, וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**How so?** The *baraita* provides an example of this principle. With regard to the guilt-offering of a leper, the verse states: **“And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt-offering”** (Leviticus 14:13). **As** there is **no** need for **the verse to state: “As the sin-offering**…**so is the guilt-offering,”** since apparently this comparison does not teach anything new because the *halakhot* of guilt-offerings are already stated elsewhere (Leviticus 7:1–10), then **what** is the meaning when **the verse states: “As the sin-offering**…**so is the guilt-offering”?**


###### Yevamot 7a:15
[Yevamot 7a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/7a:15)

לְפִי שֶׁיָּצָא אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ, בְּבֹהֶן יָד וּבֹהֶן רֶגֶל הַיְמָנִית. יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִים לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Since the guilt-offering of a leper was specified** from the general category of all guilt-offerings **to discuss a new matter,** i.e., that the blood is placed on **the thumb** of the right hand **and the big toe of the right foot** of the leper, one **might** have thought that this guilt-offering **does not require placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar,** as for this guilt-offering the placement of blood on the leper is sufficient.