## Yevamot Daf 87b

###### Yevamot 87b:1
[Yevamot 87b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:1)

סְרִיקָא וְהַשְׁתָּא גּוּפָא מַלְיָא. אֲבָל ״זֶרַע אֵין לָהּ״, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא גּוּפָא סְרִיקָא וְהַשְׁתָּא גּוּפָא סְרִיקָא — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
was **empty, and now** her **body** is **full** with the child, and therefore she is no longer “as in her youth.” **But** in a situation where **“she has no child,” when at the outset** her **body** was **empty and now** her **body** is also **empty,** as she has given birth, you might **say** that she should **not** be disqualified. Therefore, it is **necessary** to write both verses.


###### Yevamot 87b:2
[Yevamot 87b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:2)

[סִימָן: (אָמַר לֵיהּ) לֹא נַעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂיהָ בְּמִיתָה נַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא נַעֲשֶׂה בְּוָלָד יִבֻּם וּתְרוּמָה יִבּוּם וּתְרוּמָה — סִימָן].

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Parenthetically, the Gemara lists terms signifying the following discussions, to serve as **a mnemonic** device: **Said to him, we should not make, by death, we should make and not make, by a child, *yavam* and *teruma*, levirate marriage and *teruma*.** This list of terms, taken from the introductions or key phrases in each of the ensuing discussions, is the **mnemonic.**


###### Yevamot 87b:3
[Yevamot 87b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:3)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה מִדִּאסְקַרְתָּא לְרָבָא: לֹא נַעֲשֶׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְעִנְיַן יִבּוּם מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁעָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לְפוֹסְלָהּ מִן הַתְּרוּמָה — לֹא עָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים; מָקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לְפוֹטְרָהּ מִן הַיִּיבּוּם — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשֶׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yehuda from De’iskarta said to Rava,** in continuation of the discussion of the *baraita*: Should **we not make the** *halakha* concerning **dead** children **like the** *halakha* concerning **living** children **with regard to levirate marriage by an *a fortiori*** inference, and say: **And if in a place where** the Torah **made** the *halakha* with regard to **a child from the first** husband **like** the *halakha* with regard to **a child from the second** husband, **to disqualify her from *teruma*,** for as long as she has a child who is not a priest she is prohibited from partaking of *teruma*, the Torah nevertheless **did not make dead** children **like living** ones; therefore, in a **place where** the Torah **did not make a child from the first** husband **like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage, is it not right that we should not make the dead like the living?** Why, then, is a *yevama* exempt from levirate marriage if her late husband’s only child dies?


###### Yevamot 87b:4
[Yevamot 87b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:4)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״דְּרָכֶיהָ דַרְכֵי נוֹעַם וְכׇל נְתִיבוֹתֶיהָ שָׁלוֹם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The verse states: “Her ways are the ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace”** (Proverbs 3:17). In other words, since the ways of Torah are those of pleasantness, the Torah would not obligate a woman who has married in the meantime to subsequently perform *ḥalitza*, as this might demean her in her husband’s eyes.


###### Yevamot 87b:5
[Yevamot 87b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:5)

וְנַעֲשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְעִנְיַן תְּרוּמָה מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לְפוֹטְרָהּ מִן הַיִּיבּוּם — עָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים; מָקוֹם שֶׁעָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לְפוֹסְלָהּ מִן הַתְּרוּמָה — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים?! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְזֶרַע אֵין לָהּ״, וְהָא אֵין לָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara inquires: **And let us make** the *halakha* with regard to **dead** children **like** the *halakha* with regard to **living** ones **with regard to *teruma*, from an *a fortiori*** inference: **And if in a place where** the Torah **did not make a child from the first** husband **like a child from the second to exempt her from levirate marriage,** it nevertheless **made the living like the dead,** as a woman whose husband died and left a child is exempt from levirate marriage even if that child subsequently dies; then, in **a place where** the Torah **made a child from the first like a child from the second to disqualify her from *teruma*, is it not right that we should make the living like the dead?** The Gemara responds: Therefore, **the verse states “and she have no child,** she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth” (Leviticus 22:13), **and** here **she does not** currently **have** children.


###### Yevamot 87b:6
[Yevamot 87b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:6)

וְנַעֲשֶׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לְעִנְיַן יִבּוּם מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְעִנְיַן תְּרוּמָה — עָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי; מָקוֹם שֶׁעָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְעִנְיַן יִבּוּם — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי?! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּבֵן אֵין לוֹ״, וְהָא אֵין לוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara further suggests: **And let us make** her **child from the first** husband **like** her **child from the second** one **with regard to levirate marriage,** again **from an *a fortiori*** inference: **And if in a place where** the Torah **did not make the living like the dead with regard to *teruma*,** it still **made a child from the first** husband **like a child from the second,** then in **a place where it made the living like the dead, with regard to levirate marriage, is it not right that we should make a child from the first** husband **like a child from the second,** and thereby exempt her from levirate marriage? The Gemara answers: **The verse states** about levirate marriage: **“And he has no child”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), **and** in fact **he had none** at the time of his death.


###### Yevamot 87b:7
[Yevamot 87b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:7)

וְלֹא נַעֲשֶׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי לִתְרוּמָה מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר: מָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁעָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְפוֹטְרָהּ מִן הַיִּיבּוּם — לֹא עָשָׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי; מָקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מֵתִים כְּחַיִּים לְעִנְיַן תְּרוּמָה — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשֶׂה וָלָד מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּוָלָד מִן הַשֵּׁנִי?! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֵין לָהּ״, וְהָא יֵשׁ לָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers another possibility: **And should we make a child from the first** husband **not like a child from the second** one **with regard to *teruma*, from an *a fortiori*** inference: **If in a place where** the Torah **made the living like the dead to exempt her from levirate marriage,** it still **did not make a child from the first** husband **like a child from the second,** then in **a place where** the Torah **did not make the living like the dead, with regard to *teruma*, is it not right that we should not make** the **child from the first** husband **like** the **child from the second?** The Gemara responds: Therefore, **the verse states:** “And **she have no** child,” **but** in fact this woman **has** children.


###### Yevamot 87b:8
[Yevamot 87b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:8)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ יֵשׁ מוּתָּרוֹת**


###### Yevamot 87b:9
[Yevamot 87b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:9)

**הָאִשָּׁה** שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ״, וְנִיסֵּת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעְלָהּ — תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וּצְרִיכָה גֵּט מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** With regard to **a woman whose husband went overseas, and** witnesses **came and** they **said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married** another man on the basis of this testimony, **and afterward her husband came** back from out of the country, **she must leave** both **this** man **and that** one, as they are both forbidden to her. **And she requires a bill of divorce from this** one **and that** one.


###### Yevamot 87b:10
[Yevamot 87b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:10)

וְאֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, וְלֹא פֵּירוֹת, וְלֹא מְזוֹנוֹת, וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת — לֹא עַל זֶה וְלֹא עַל זֶה. וְאִם נָטְלָה מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה — תַּחְזִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** furthermore, **she has** a claim to **neither** payment of her **marriage contract, nor** the **profits** of her property used by either of them, **nor sustenance, nor** the **worn clothes** she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims **neither against this** man **nor against that** one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. **And if she took** any of these items **from this** man **or from that** one, she must **return** them to him.


###### Yevamot 87b:11
[Yevamot 87b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:11)

וְהַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה. וְלֹא זֶה וָזֶה מִטַּמֵּא לָהּ, וְלֹא זֶה וָזֶה זַכָּאִים לֹא בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וְלֹא בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וְלֹא בַּהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the offspring is a *mamzer* from this** one **and from that** one. Her child from the second husband is a definite *mamzer*, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a *mamzer*. **And neither this** man **nor that** man **may become impure for her** upon her death, if they are priests. **And neither this** one **nor that one is entitled** to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: **Neither to her found** articles, **nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows.**


###### Yevamot 87b:12
[Yevamot 87b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:12)

הָיְתָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל — נִפְסְלָה מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. וּבַת לֵוִי — מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר, וּבַת כֹּהֵן — מִן הַתְּרוּמָה. וְאֵין יוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה וְיוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה יוֹרְשִׁין אֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. וְאִם מֵתוּ — אָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה וְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If she **was** a regular **Israelite woman, she is disqualified from** marrying into **the priesthood,** as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, **and** the **daughter of a Levite** is disqualified **from** partaking of the first **tithe, and** the **daughter of a priest** is disqualified **from** partaking of ***teruma*. And neither** the **heirs of this** man nor the **heirs of that** one **inherit her marriage contract,** as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. **And if they** both **died** childless, **the brothers of this** one **and the brothers of this** one must **perform *ḥalitza* and they do not enter into levirate marriage.**


###### Yevamot 87b:13
[Yevamot 87b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:13)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹן זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּיאָתָהּ אוֹ חֲלִיצָתָהּ מֵאָחִיו שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ. וְאֵין הַוָּלָד מִמֶּנּוּ מַמְזֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei** disagrees with the first *tanna* and **says** that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of **her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first** husband **is entitled to her found** articles, **to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows.** Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. **Rabbi Shimon says** an even more far-reaching ruling: **Her sexual relations or her *ḥalitza* with the brothers of the first** husband **exempts her rival wife,** as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or *ḥalitza*, and certainly she does not require *ḥalitza* from the brother of the second husband. **And** if she returns to her first husband, **the child from him is not a *mamzer*.**


###### Yevamot 87b:14
[Yevamot 87b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:14)

וְאִם נִיסַּת שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ. נִיסֵּת עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין — תֵּצֵא, וּפְטוּרָה מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
All these *halakhot* refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. **But if she married without** the **consent** of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is **permitted** for her **to return to** her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If **she married by** permission of **the court, she must leave** both of them **and she is exempt from** bringing **the offering,** i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress.


###### Yevamot 87b:15
[Yevamot 87b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:15)

לֹא נִיסֵּת עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין — תֵּצֵא, וְחַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן. יִפָּה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין, שֶׁפּוֹטְרָהּ מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן. הוֹרוּהָ בֵּית דִּין לִינָּשֵׂא, וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה — חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן, שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּהָ אֶלָּא לִינָּשֵׂא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If, however, **she did not marry by** permission of **the court, she must leave** her second husband **and is liable to** bring **an offering** for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the **power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from** bringing **an offering.** If the **court instructed her to marry** on the basis of inaccurate testimony, **and she went and ruined** herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, **she is liable to** bring **an offering, as they permitted her only to marry,** and not to engage in licentious relations.


###### Yevamot 87b:16
[Yevamot 87b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:16)

**גְּמָ׳** מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: נִשֵּׂאת שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת בֵּית דִּין, אֶלָּא בְּעֵדִים. מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא בִּרְשׁוּת בֵּית דִּין, וּבְעֵד אֶחָד. אַלְמָא עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **From** the fact **that the latter clause** of the mishna **teaches:** If **she married without** the **consent** of the court she is **permitted to return to him,** this indicates that she did so **not by** the **consent** of the **court, but** rather **by witnesses,** i.e., as there are two witnesses, she does not require special permission from the court. With this in mind, **it may be inferred that the first clause** of the mishna, which speaks of one who acted **with the consent of** the **court,** is referring to a situation **when** there was **one witness. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible** when he testifies about a husband’s death, i.e., the court will permit a wife to marry on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.


###### Yevamot 87b:17
[Yevamot 87b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:17)

וּתְנַן נָמֵי: הוּחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, וְאִשָּׁה מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, וְאִשָּׁה מִפִּי עֶבֶד וּמִפִּי שִׁפְחָה. אַלְמָא עֵד אֶחָד מְהֵימַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we also learned** in a mishna (122a): **They established** that **they would** allow a woman to **marry** if her husband was reported dead by one **witness,** based solely on what he learned **from the mouth of** another **witness,** i.e., hearsay testimony, **and** also the testimony of **a woman** who heard **from** another **woman, and** even the testimony of **a woman** who heard **from a slave or from a maidservant. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible** in this regard, as whenever hearsay testimony is accepted, the testimony of one witness is also valid.


###### Yevamot 87b:18
[Yevamot 87b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:18)

וּתְנַן נָמֵי: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ — פָּטוּר. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״, הָא אִישְׁתִּיק — מְהֵימַן. אַלְמָא עֵד אֶחָד מְהֵימַן מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we also learned** in a mishna (*Karetot* 11b) that if **one witness says** to someone: **You ate forbidden fat, and** the accused **says: I did not eat** it, the accused is **exempt** from bringing an offering. The Gemara infers: **The reason** he is exempt **is that** the individual in question **said: I did not eat** it, which indicates that if **he** had been **silent** and failed to deny the accusation, the lone witness is **deemed credible. Apparently, one witness is deemed credible by Torah** law with regard to certain issues.


###### Yevamot 87b:19
[Yevamot 87b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:19)

מְנָא לַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ״. וְלֹא שֶׁיּוֹדִיעוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים. יָכוֹל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכְחִישׁוֹ יְהֵא פָּטוּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו״ — מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this? The Gemara answers: **As it is taught** in a *baraita* that the verse states: **“Or if his sin be known to him”** (Leviticus 4:23, 28). This indicates that he himself must be aware of his sin, **and not if it was made known to him by others.** In other words, one is not obligated to bring an offering due to the testimony of others, even if they testify that he had transgressed. I **might** have thought **he should be exempt even though he does not contradict** the witness’s claim. Therefore, **the verse states: If his sin be known to him,** which indicates that **in any case,** however he comes by this knowledge, he is liable.


###### Yevamot 87b:20
[Yevamot 87b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:20)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דַּאֲתוֹ תְּרֵי וְלָא קָא מַכְחִישׁ לְהוּ, קְרָא לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא לָאו — חַד, וְכִי לָא קָא מַכְחִישׁ לֵיהּ — מְהֵימַן, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן. וּמִמַּאי דְּמִשּׁוּם דִּמְהֵימַן? דִּלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא שָׁתֵיק, וּשְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דָמְיָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies this *halakha*. **What are the circumstances? If we say that two** witnesses **came** and informed him **and** he **does not contradict them, why do I** need a **verse** to teach this ruling? After all, the testimony of two witnesses is always accepted. **Rather, is it not** referring to **one** witness, **and** yet **if he does not contradict** the sole witness, that witness is **deemed credible?** One can **learn from this** that **one witness is deemed credible** with regard to prohibitions. The Gemara refutes this claim: **And from where** do you infer **that** the reason is **due to** the fact that the one witness **is deemed credible? Perhaps** the accused must bring an offering **because** he remains **silent, as** there is a principle that **silence is considered like an admission.**


###### Yevamot 87b:21
[Yevamot 87b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:21)

תֵּדַע, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אָמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ — פָּטוּר. רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב. אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לִידֵי מִיתָה חֲמוּרָה — לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לִידֵי קׇרְבָּן הַקַּל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And you should **know** that this is the reason, **as the latter clause** of **that** same *baraita* **teaches** that if **two** witnesses **said** to him: **You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat** it, he is **exempt,** and **Rabbi Meir obligates** him to bring an offering. **Rabbi Meir said** that this is **an *a fortiori*** inference: **If two** witnesses **can bring him to** the **severe** penalty of **death** by testifying that he had committed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, should they **not bring him to** the **more lenient** obligation of **an offering?**


###### Yevamot 87b:22
[Yevamot 87b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/87b:22)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מָה אִם יִרְצֶה לוֹמַר ״מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי״! רֵישָׁא

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Rabbis **said to him:** There is a difference between the two cases, as with regard to an offering, **what** is the *halakha* **if he would choose to say: I was an intentional** sinner? One who sins intentionally is not liable to bring an offering. Since the accused in the latter clause of the *baraita* can negate the testimony that would have rendered him liable to bring an offering, he can likewise deny the act itself, whereas if witnesses testify that he performed an action that incurs the death penalty, his denial has no bearing on the case. The Gemara clarifies: In **the first clause**