## Yevamot Daf 88a

###### Yevamot 88a:1
[Yevamot 88a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:1)

מַאי טַעְמָא קָא מְחַיְּיבִי רַבָּנַן? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דִּמְהֵימַן — וְהָא תְּרֵי בְּעָלְמָא, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מַכְחִישׁ לְהוּ אִינְהוּ — מְהֵימְנִי, וְקָא פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא לָאו, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִישְׁתִּיק — וּשְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דָמְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
of the mishna, **what is the reason that** when he remains silent, **the Rabbis obligate** him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? **If we say** it is **because** the witness **is deemed credible, but** there is the case of **an ordinary pair** of witnesses, **where even though he contradicts their** claim **they are deemed credible, and** yet **the Rabbis exempt** him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. **Rather, is it not because he** remained **silent, and silence is considered like an admission?** If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted.


###### Yevamot 88a:2
[Yevamot 88a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:2)

אֶלָּא סְבָרָא הִיא, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַחֲתִיכָה סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וַאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד וְאָמַר: בָּרִי לִי, דְּשׁוּמָּן הוּא — דִּמְהֵימַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** this **is** evidently based on **logical reasoning: Just as it is in** the case of **a piece** of meat about which it is **uncertain** if it is **forbidden fat** and **uncertain** if it is **of** permitted **fat,** and there is no way of clarifying which it is, **and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is** permitted **fat,** the *halakha* is **that he is deemed credible.** Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty.


###### Yevamot 88a:3
[Yevamot 88a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:3)

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לָא אִיתַּחְזַק אִיסּוּרָא, הָכָא אִיתַּחְזַק אִיסּוּרָא דְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְאֵין דָּבָר שֶׁבְּעֶרְוָה פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנַיִם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not** been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas **here, the presumption of** the **prohibition** with regard **to a married woman is** established, **and** there is a principle that **nothing involving** those **with whom relations are forbidden** can be determined by **fewer than two** witnesses.


###### Yevamot 88a:4
[Yevamot 88a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:4)

הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לַחֲתִיכָה דְּוַדַּאי חֵלֶב, וַאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד וְאָמַר: בָּרִי לִי דְּשׁוּמָּן הֲוָה — דְּלָא מְהֵימַן! מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, אֲפִילּוּ אָתוּ בֵּי מְאָה לָא מְהֵימְנִי. הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּכִי אָתוּ בֵּי תְרֵי מְהֵימְנִי — חַד נָמֵי לְהֵימְנֵיהּ, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַטֶּבֶל, הֶקְדֵּשׁ, וְקֻוֽנָּמוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In fact, **this is comparable only to** a case involving **a piece** of meat **that** is **definitely** forbidden **fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is** permitted **fat,** as the *halakha* is **that he is not deemed credible.** The Gemara refutes this claim: **Is it comparable? There,** when it is established as forbidden fat, **even** if **one hundred** witnesses **come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two** witnesses **come** and say the husband is dead **they** would be **deemed credible, let us also deem one** witness **credible.** This is **just as it is in** the case of **untithed produce,** i.e., produce from which neither *teruma* nor tithe has been separated, **consecrated** property, **and *konamot*,** an alternative term for offerings [*korbanot*] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: *Konamot*.


###### Yevamot 88a:5
[Yevamot 88a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:5)

הַאי טֶבֶל, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְתַקְּנוֹ. אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, מַאי קָסָבַר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: With regard to **this** case of **untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If** it **is his,** and he testifies that *terumot* and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible **because it is within his power to prepare** the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. **Rather,** you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce **of another,** but if so, **what does** the anonymous Sage who cited this example **hold** in this case?


###### Yevamot 88a:6
[Yevamot 88a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:6)

אִי קָא סָבַר: תּוֹרֵם מִשֶּׁלּוֹ עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְתַקְּנוֹ, וְאִי קָסָבַר: צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים, וְאָמַר: אֲנָא יָדַעְנָא בֵּיהּ דִּמְתַקַּן, הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **If** he **holds** that **one who separates** tithes **from his** produce **for** that **of another does not require the owner’s knowledge,** and he can prepare his friend’s produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible **because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds** that **the owner’s knowledge is required** before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes **and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared,** in that case, **it itself,** this very *halakha*, **from where do we** derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband?


###### Yevamot 88a:7
[Yevamot 88a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:7)

הֶקְדֵּשׁ נָמֵי, אִי קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתוֹ. אִי קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף, אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ. אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, וְאָמַר: יָדַעְנָא בֵּיהּ דְּאִיתְּשִׁיל מָרֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ, הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Similarly, with regard to **consecrated** property **too,** if it is merely **sanctity** that inheres in its **value,** i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is **due to** the fact that **it is within his power to redeem it.** And **if** this is referring to **inherent sanctity,** the matter still remains to be clarified: **If** it is **his** offering, then the reason is **due to** the fact that **it is within his power to request** from a Sage **that** the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. **Rather,** you must say that it is referring to the offering **of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested** from a Sage **that** his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case **itself, from where do we** derive that he is deemed credible?


###### Yevamot 88a:8
[Yevamot 88a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:8)

קֻוֽנָּמוֹת נָמֵי, אִי קָסָבַר: יֵשׁ מְעִילָה בְּקֻוֽנָּמוֹת, וּקְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים נָחֲתָא לְהוּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתוֹ, וְאִי קָסָבַר: אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקֻוֽנָּמוֹת, וְאִיסּוּר בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּרָכֵיב לְהוּ אַכַּתְפֵּיהּ, אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In the case of ***konamot* too, if** he **holds** that **there is misuse** of consecrated objects **with regard to *konamot*,** i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a *konam* have the status of consecrated property, **and** that the **sanctity** that inheres in its **value applies to them,** then his claim is accepted **because it is within his power to redeem it. And if** he **maintains** that **there is no misuse** of consecrated objects **in** the case of ***konamot*, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders,** i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: **If** the property in question **is his,** it is permitted **because it is within his power to request** from a Sage **that** his vow be dissolved.


###### Yevamot 88a:9
[Yevamot 88a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:9)

אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, וְאָמַר: אֲנָא יָדַעְנָא דְּאִיתְּשִׁיל מָרֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ — הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** you will say that the *konam* must belong **to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested** from a Sage **that** his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this *halakha* **itself,** that one witness is deemed credible in this case, **from where do we** derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband?


###### Yevamot 88a:10
[Yevamot 88a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:10)

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מִתּוֹךְ חוֹמֶר שֶׁהֶחְמַרְתָּ עָלֶיהָ בְּסוֹפָהּ — הֵקַלְתָּ עָלֶיהָ בַּתְּחִלָּה. לָא לַיחְמַיר וְלָא לַיקֵּיל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her,** the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, **at the end,** i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the *halakha* is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, **you are lenient with her at the beginning,** by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us **not be stringent** at the end **and not be lenient** at the beginning.


###### Yevamot 88a:11
[Yevamot 88a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:11)

מִשּׁוּם עִיגּוּנָא אַקִּילוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Due to** the case of **a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her.** Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband’s death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts.


###### Yevamot 88a:12
[Yevamot 88a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:12)

תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּיסֵּת בְּעֵד אֶחָד, אֲבָל נִיסֵּת עַל פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים — לֹא תֵּצֵא. מַחֲכוּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: אֲתָא גַּבְרָא וְקָאֵי, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לֹא תֵּצֵא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, **she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught** this *halakha* **only if she married by** virtue of the testimony of **one witness, but** if **she married on the basis of** the testimony of **two witnesses, she does not** have to **leave** him. **They laughed at him in the West,** Eretz Yisrael: **The man,** the first husband, **has come and stands** before us, **and** yet **you say she does not** have to **leave** her second husband. The Gemara explains: **No,** it is **necessary** in a situation **when we do not know** the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband.


###### Yevamot 88a:13
[Yevamot 88a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:13)

אִי דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן לֵיהּ, בְּעֵד אֶחָד אַמַּאי תֵּצֵא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי וְאָמְרִי: אֲנַן הֲוֵינַן בַּהֲדֵיהּ מִכִּי נְפַק וְעַד הַשְׁתָּא, וְאַתּוּן הוּא דְּלָא יָדְעִיתוּ לֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּכֵּר יוֹסֵף אֶת אֶחָיו וְהֵם לֹא הִכִּירוּהוּ״, וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְלַמֵּד שֶׁיָּצָא בְּלֹא חֲתִימַת זָקָן, וּבָא בַּחֲתִימַת זָקָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If we do not know him,** even if she married **by one witness, why** should she **leave?** The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: **No,** it is **necessary** for a case **when two** others **came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him,** as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is **as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him”** (Genesis 42:8), **and Rav Ḥisda said** that this verse **teaches that** Joseph **left** his brothers **without a full beard, and he came with a full beard,** which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one’s appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him.


###### Yevamot 88a:14
[Yevamot 88a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/88a:14)

סוֹף סוֹף תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי נִינְהוּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Even in this case, **ultimately they are two** against **two.** Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?