## Yevamot Daf 93b

###### Yevamot 93b:1
[Yevamot 93b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:1)

אֶלָּא לָאו, כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא אַקְרְיוּן בְּחֶלְמָא ״קָנֶה רָצוּץ״, מַאי לָאו, הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לִי: ״הִנֵּה בָטַחְתָּ לְּךָ עַל מִשְׁעֶנֶת הַקָּנֶה הָרָצוּץ הַזֶּה״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, is it not** referring to **a case like this,** of one who tithed an entity that was not yet in the world, in honor of Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai **said to** Rabbi Ḥiyya: **But they read before me in a dream** these two words: **Bruised reed. What, is it not** the case that **they said to me as follows: “Behold you trust upon the staff of this bruised reed”** (II Kings 18:21)? In other words, you rely on an unsubstantiated idea.


###### Yevamot 93b:2
[Yevamot 93b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:2)

לָא, הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לָךְ: ״קָנֶה רָצוּץ לֹא יִשְׁבּוֹר וּפִשְׁתָּה כֵהָה לֹא יְכַבֶּנָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: **No;** The dream referred to a different verse, one that deals with the Messiah, as **they said to you as follows: “A bruised reed he shall not break and the dimly burning wick he shall not quench;** according to truth he shall bring forth justice” (Isaiah 42:3). In other words, Rabbi Yannai acted correctly, in accordance with the ways of truth. This exchange shows that both Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yannai agree that an entity not in the world can be acquired.


###### Yevamot 93b:3
[Yevamot 93b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:3)

רַבִּי — דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תַסְגִּיר עֶבֶד אֶל אֲדוֹנָיו״, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּלוֹקֵחַ עֶבֶד עַל מְנָת לְשַׁחְרְרוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֲךָ — הֲרֵי עַצְמְךָ קָנוּי לְךָ מֵעַכְשָׁיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, his opinion is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: **“You shall not deliver a slave to his master”** (Deuteronomy 23:16). **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says: The verse is speaking of one who buys a slave on the condition to free him.** This owner may not keep his acquisition as a slave. The Gemara clarifies: **What are the circumstances? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:** It is referring to a case **where one wrote to** a slave in the document of acquisition: **When I acquire you** as a slave, **you are acquired by yourself from now.** In this case, the buyer transfers ownership of an entity not yet in the world, as the slave did not yet belong to him.


###### Yevamot 93b:4
[Yevamot 93b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:4)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר — דִּתְנַן, הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Meir,** his opinion is **as we learned** in a mishna (*Bava Metzia* 16b): **One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; after your *yavam* performs *ḥalitza* with you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir says she is betrothed,** as the acquisition of a betrothal applies even to an entity not yet in the world, in this case, a woman available for betrothal.


###### Yevamot 93b:5
[Yevamot 93b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:5)

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — דְּתַנְיָא: יָתֵר עַל כֵּן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: אֲפִילּוּ אִם אָמַר ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים יְהוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה מְחוּבָּרִים״, אוֹ ״פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה מְחוּבָּרִים עַל פֵּירוֹת זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין, לִכְשֶׁיָּבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְיִתָּלְשׁוּ״, וְהֵבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov,** his opinion is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said** that **even if one said:** The **detached fruit of this garden bed shall be *teruma* for** the currently **attached fruit of** this **garden bed** when its fruit will be detached, **or** if he said: The **attached fruit of** this **garden bed** shall be *teruma* **for** the currently **detached fruit of this garden bed when** the fruit **reach a third** of their growth, i.e., a third of their ripeness, **and are detached, and** if **they** actually **reached a third and were detached,** then **his words are upheld** and the *teruma* takes effect, despite the fact that the stipulation was issued before the attached fruit had ripened and before the obligation of *teruma* applied to the detached fruit. This *halakha* shows that one can acquire an entity not yet in the world; in this case he acquires the fruit by applying the sanctity of *teruma* to it.


###### Yevamot 93b:6
[Yevamot 93b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:6)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא — דִּתְנַן: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״ — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יֶתֶר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Akiva,** his opinion is **as we learned** in the aforementioned mishna, that if a wife says: ***Konam* that I will prepare for your mouth,** the husband **is not required to nullify** the vow. **Rabbi Akiva says:** He should **nullify** the vow, **lest she exceed more than is fitting for him,** as he maintains that the vow applies even to entities not yet in the world.


###### Yevamot 93b:7
[Yevamot 93b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:7)

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: עֵד אֶחָד בִּיבָמָה, מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד — מִשּׁוּם דְּמִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר, וְהָכָא נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר. אוֹ דִלְמָא: טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם — דְּאִיהִי דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא. וְהָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּזִימְנִין דְּרָחֲמָא לֵיהּ — לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet:** In a case of **one witness** who testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, **with regard to a *yevama*, what is** the *halakha*? Can the court rely on this witness? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is **the reason** that the testimony of **one witness** in the case of a missing husband is accepted **because** one **does not lie about something that will be discovered, and here, too,** he will **not lie,** in case the husband later arrives? **Or, perhaps the reason for** the eligibility of **one witness is because** the woman herself **is exacting** in her investigation before she **marries** again. **But here, since** she **sometimes loves** the *yavam*, as she already knew him beforehand, **she is not exacting** in her investigation before she **marries** again.


###### Yevamot 93b:8
[Yevamot 93b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:8)

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנֵיתוּהָ, אָמְרוּ לָהּ: מֵת בְּנֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְנִתְיַיבְּמָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ חִילּוּף הַדְּבָרִים — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר. הֵיכִי דָמֵי: אִילֵּימָא תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי — מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי, סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned** the answer to this question in the mishna: If **they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her** that **the matters were reversed, she must leave** her husband, **and the first child and the last one** are each **a *mamzer*.** Rav Sheshet analyzes this case: **What are the circumstances? If we say** they are **two and two,** i.e., two witnesses came first and said one account, followed by two other witnesses who claimed the reverse, **what did you see** to make **you rely on these** second witnesses when you can equally **rely on** the first pair? The first witnesses do not lose their credibility merely due to the testimony of the second pair, so why should she have to leave the *yavam*?


###### Yevamot 93b:9
[Yevamot 93b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:9)

וְעוֹד, מַמְזֵר? סְפֵק מַמְזֵר הוּא. וְכִי תֵּימָא לָא דָּק, וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: הָרִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵר וְהָאַחֲרוֹן אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דַּוְקָא קָתָנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore,** why should the child be a definite ***mamzer*?** At worst **he is** an individual whose status as **a *mamzer*** is **uncertain,** as there are two conflicting sets of testimonies. **And if you would say** that the *tanna* of the mishna **was not precise** in his failure to distinguish between a definite *mamzer* and one of uncertain status, **but from** the fact **that it teaches** in **the latter clause** of the mishna: **The first is a *mamzer* and the last is not a *mamzer*,** one can **learn from here** that the mishna **was taught specifically** in this manner, i.e., the *mamzer* the *tanna* referred to is a definite *mamzer*.


###### Yevamot 93b:10
[Yevamot 93b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:10)

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: חַד. וְטַעְמָא דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי אַכְחֲשׁוּהּ, הָא לָאו הָכִי — מְהֵימַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, isn’t it** correct to **conclude from** here that only **one** witness testified at first, **and the reason** for the *halakha* is **that two** people **came and contradicted him,** as the testimony of two witnesses certainly overrules that of a single witness? It may be inferred from this that if it were **not so,** the lone witness is **deemed credible.** This shows that the court will accept the testimony of one witness even to allow a woman to enter into levirate marriage.


###### Yevamot 93b:11
[Yevamot 93b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:11)

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמַר: הָא לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ דַּאֲפִילּוּ אִיהִי נָמֵי מְהֵימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה מֵת בַּעְלִי — תִּנָּשֵׂא. מֵת בַּעְלִי — תִּתְיַיבֵּם. כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ לְמִישְׁרֵי יְבָמָה לְעָלְמָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara provides an alternative version of the discussion. **And some** Sages maintain another version that **says: Let the dilemma not be raised, as even** a wife herself **is also deemed credible** when she says her husband is dead, **as we learned** in a mishna (114b): With regard to **a woman who said: My husband is dead, she may marry.** Likewise, if she claimed: **My husband is dead, she should enter into levirate marriage.** If so, one witness is certainly deemed credible when he says her husband has died. The case **where you** could **raise the dilemma** is with regard **to permitting a *yevama* to all** other men, if a witness claims that the *yavam* is dead.


###### Yevamot 93b:12
[Yevamot 93b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/93b:12)

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד — מִשּׁוּם דְּמִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר, הָכָא נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר. אוֹ דִלְמָא: טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיהִי דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, וְהָא לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא — דְּמִיסְנָא הוּא

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In this case as well, the Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma: **What is the reason that one witness** is deemed credible? Is it **because** one **does not lie about something that will be discovered,** and therefore **here too he** would **not lie? Or, perhaps the reason for** accepting the testimony of **one witness** is **because** the wife **is exacting** in her investigation before she **marries** again, **but this** *yevama* **is not exacting** in her investigation before she **marries** again. Why not? **Because** she