## Yevamot Daf 94a

###### Yevamot 94a:1
[Yevamot 94a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:1)

דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנֵיתוּהָ. אָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בְּנֵךְ״ וְנִשֵּׂאת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״חִילּוּף הָיוּ הַדְּבָרִים״ — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**hates** the *yavam*, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him. **Rav Sheshet said to them** that **you learned it** in the mishna. If **they said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, and she married** another man, **and afterward they said to her** that **the matters were reversed, she must leave** the other man, **and the first child and the last one** are each **a *mamzer*.**


###### Yevamot 94a:2
[Yevamot 94a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:2)

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי: אִילֵּימָא תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי — מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי, סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי? וְעוֹד, מַמְזֵר? סְפֵק מַמְזֵר הוּא. וְכִי תֵּימָא לָא דָּק — הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: הָרִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵר וְהָאַחֲרוֹן אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּדַוְקָא קָתָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Again, Rav Sheshet analyzes the case: **What are the circumstances? If we say** that they are **two and two,** i.e., the account of two witnesses was contradicted by two other witnesses, **what did you see** to make **you rely on these** second witnesses when you can equally **rely on those?** Why should she have to leave this man? **And furthermore,** why should the child be **a *mamzer*?** At worst **he is** an individual whose status as **a *mamzer*** is **uncertain,** as there is no proof that the second witnesses are more reliable. **And if you would say** that the *tanna* of the mishna was **not precise** in his language, **but from** the fact **that it teaches** in **the latter clause** of the mishna: **The first is a *mamzer* and the last is not a *mamzer*,** one can **learn from here** that the mishna **was taught specifically** in this manner.


###### Yevamot 94a:3
[Yevamot 94a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:3)

אֶלָּא לָאו: חַד, וְטַעְמָא דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְּרֵי אַכְחֲשׁוּהּ, הָא לָאו הָכִי — מְהֵימַן! לָעוֹלָם תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, is it not** the case that this is referring to **one** witness, **and the reason** is **that two** others **came and contradicted him.** It may be inferred from this that if it was **not so,** the sole witness is **deemed credible.** The Gemara refutes this proof: **Actually,** the mishna is speaking of a case when **two** witnesses came first, followed by another **two** witnesses, **and** the ruling is **as Rav Aḥa bar Manyumi said,** with regard to a different issue, that it is referring **to witnesses of** false, **conspiring testimony.** In other words, the second set of witnesses did not offer an alternative account of the same incident. Rather, they claimed that the first witnesses lied, as they were with them, elsewhere, during the time that they supposedly witnessed the husband’s death. In this case, the first witnesses are entirely disqualified, as the account of the second pair is accepted.


###### Yevamot 94a:4
[Yevamot 94a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:4)

הָכָא נָמֵי בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Here too,** we are dealing **with witnesses of** false, **conspiring testimony.** Consequently, the question of whether the court believes one witness who testifies that a *yavam* is dead cannot be resolved from the mishna.


###### Yevamot 94a:5
[Yevamot 94a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין הָאִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת לוֹמַר מֵת יְבָמִי, שֶׁאֶנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא מֵתָה אֲחוֹתִי, שֶׁאֶכָּנֵס לְבֵיתָהּ. הִיא נִיהִי דְּלָא מְהֵימְנָא, הָא עֵד אֶחָד — מְהֵימַן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi, and some say** it was **Rav Aḥa** who **said to Rav Ashi: Come** and **hear** a proof from a different source (*Yevamot* 118b): **A woman is not deemed credible** if she **says: My *yavam* is dead, so that I may marry,** i.e., to permit herself to marry another man. **And** she is **not** deemed credible if she says: **My sister is dead, so that I may enter her house,** i.e., to marry her husband. The Gemara infers: It is **she herself who is not deemed credible.** It may be inferred from this that if **one witness** issues this report, he is **deemed credible.**


###### Yevamot 94a:6
[Yevamot 94a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:6)

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֵין הָאִישׁ נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר מֵת אָחִי, שֶׁאֲיַיבֵּם אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא מֵתָה אִשְׁתִּי, שֶׁאֶשָּׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ. הוּא נִיהוּ דְּלָא מְהֵימַן, הָא עֵד אֶחָד — מְהֵימַן, בִּשְׁלָמָא גַּבֵּי אִשָּׁה, מִשּׁוּם עִיגּוּנָא אַקִּילוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן, אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי אִישׁ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this argument. **And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause** of that same mishna: **A man is not deemed credible** if he **says: My brother is dead, so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife. And** he is **not** deemed credible when he says: **My wife is dead, so that I may marry her sister.** Following the above reasoning, it is **he himself** who **is not deemed credible,** which indicates that **one witness is deemed credible.** Yet this cannot be correct: **Granted, with regard to a woman, due to** the concern that she be left **a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient in her** case, by allowing her to rely on a single witness. **However, with regard to a man, what can be said?** There is no concern that he will be left deserted, as a man can marry more than one woman, so he certainly cannot marry a woman on the basis of such flimsy testimony.


###### Yevamot 94a:7
[Yevamot 94a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:7)

אֶלָּא, כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ — לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא יֵשׁ מַמְזֵר מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין, אֵימָא חָיְישָׁא אַקִּלְקוּלָא דְזַרְעַאּ וְדָיְיקָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן (דְּאַקִּלְקוּלָא דִידַהּ חָיְישָׁא, אַקִּלְקוּלָא דְזַרְעַאּ לָא חָיְישָׁא).

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the case of one witness cannot be decided from the mishna, as **when is** this *halakha* that a woman is not deemed credible when she says that her *yavam* is dead **necessary** to be stated? It **is necessary for** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva.** The Gemara explains: It might **enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Akiva said** that the offspring born of intercourse **for which** one **is liable** for violating **a prohibition is a *mamzer*,** which indicates that even the offspring of a *yevama* who unlawfully wed another man is a *mamzer*, one might **say** that **she is concerned for the ruin of her offspring and is** consequently **exacting** in her investigation and would marry only if she received clear, unambiguous testimony. The *tanna* therefore **teaches us that** she **is concerned for her own ruin,** e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether her husband died, which would force her to leave both him and her second husband, but **she is not** as **concerned for the ruin of her offspring,** and in this case she is likelier to marry unlawfully.


###### Yevamot 94a:8
[Yevamot 94a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:8)

רָבָא אָמַר: עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בִּיבָמָה מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר. לְאִיסּוּר כָּרֵת הִתַּרְתָּ, לְאִיסּוּר לָאו לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: הִיא עַצְמָהּ תּוֹכִיחַ, דִּלְאִיסּוּר כָּרֵת הִתַּרְתָּ — לְאִיסּוּר לָאו לֹא הִתַּרְתָּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava said: One witness is deemed credible** in the case **of a *yevama* by** means of **an *a fortiori*** inference: If **for a prohibition involving *karet*,** i.e., adultery of a married woman, **you permitted** the testimony of one witness, then **for a** regular **prohibition,** that of a *yevama* to another man, is it **not all the more so? One of the Sages said to Rava: She herself,** a woman who testifies with regard to herself, **can prove** otherwise: **For a prohibition involving *karet* you permitted** her, i.e., if she testifies that her husband is dead she may marry another man and there is no concern that she might still be a married woman, and yet **for** a regular **prohibition you did not permit** her, as she is not deemed credible when she claims that her *yavam* is dead.


###### Yevamot 94a:9
[Yevamot 94a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:9)

וְאֶלָּא אִיהִי מַאי טַעְמָא לָא מְהֵימְנָא, דְּכֵיוָן דְּזִימְנִין דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ, לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, עֵד אֶחָד נָמֵי: דְּכֵיוָן דְּזִמְנִין דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ, לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But rather, she** herself, **what is the reason** that **she is not deemed credible? Since sometimes** the woman may **hate him, she is not exacting** in her examination of the matter **and marries.** With regard to **one witness,** the same concern **also** applies: **Since sometimes** the woman may **hate him, she is not exacting** in her investigation before she **marries** again. The court believes one witness only because they assume that she herself is careful to examine the matter. The *a fortiori* inference is therefore groundless, and the question remains unresolved.


###### Yevamot 94a:10
[Yevamot 94a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:10)

זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן מַתְיָא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמִדְרַשׁ בֵּיהּ מַרְגָּנִיתָא וּדְרַשׁ בֵּיהּ חַסְפָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states that **this was an exposition taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya:** The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7). This teaches that a woman is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood by a bill of divorce she receives from a man other than her husband. **Rav Yehuda said** that **Rav said: Rabbi Elazar should have taught** this verse as **a pearl but** in fact **he taught it as an earthenware shard.** In other words, he could have arrived at a more significant conclusion.


###### Yevamot 94a:11
[Yevamot 94a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:11)

מַאי מַרְגָּנִיתָא — דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ״, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אֶלָּא מֵאִישָׁהּ — פְּסוּלָה לַכְּהוּנָּה, וְהַיְינוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט דְּפוֹסֵל בִּכְהוּנָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What pearl** does he mean? **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: “Neither shall they take **a woman divorced from her husband,” even** if she **was divorced only from her husband.** Even if the woman was separated from her husband and was not permitted to marry anyone else, e.g., if her husband wrote in the bill of divorce: This is your bill of divorce but you are not permitted to any other man, this document is certainly not considered a full-fledged bill of divorce, and yet she is **disqualified from the priesthood.** If her husband later passes away, she has the status of a divorcée, not a widow, which means that she is prohibited from marrying a priest. **And this is the trace of a bill of divorce, which** is not an actual bill of divorce and yet **disqualifies from the priesthood.**


###### Yevamot 94a:12
[Yevamot 94a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Yevamot/r/94a:12)

**מַתְנִי׳** מִי שֶׁהָלְכָה אִשְׁתּוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, בָּאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵתָה אִשְׁתְּךָ״, וְנָשָׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאת אִשְׁתּוֹ — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one whose wife went overseas** and people **came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came** back from overseas, the original wife **is permitted to return**