## Zevachim Daf 107a

###### Zevachim 107a:1
[Zevachim 107a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:1)

רָבָא אָמַר: כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹנָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָה: אָתְיָא ״שָׁם״–״שָׁם״; מָה לְהַלָּן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said:** The prohibition can be derived **in accordance with** the statement **of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says:** It is **derived** from the verse: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word **“there”** in the first part of the verse to the word **“there”** in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that **just as there,** with regard to offering up, the Torah **did not prescribe punishment unless** it also **prohibited** it, **so too here,** with regard to slaughtering, the Torah **did not prescribe punishment unless** it also **prohibited** it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.


###### Zevachim 107a:2
[Zevachim 107a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:2)

אַשְׁכְּחַן מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁהֶעֱלָן לַחוּץ; מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁהֶעֱלָן לַחוּץ מִנַּיִן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The Gemara asks: **We have found** that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be **burned inside** the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, **which** one then **offered up outside** the courtyard. The verse states: “He will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. **From where** is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be **burned outside** the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, **that** one then **offered up outside?**


###### Zevachim 107a:3
[Zevachim 107a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:3)

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וַאֲלֵהֶם תֹּאמַר״ – עַל הַסְּמוּכִין תֹּאמַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Kahana said:** The beginning of that **verse states: “And to them [*va’alehem*] you shall say”** (Leviticus 17:8). The term “*alehem*,” to them, written with the letter *alef*, is phonetically similar to the term *alehem*, about them, written with the letter *ayin*. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: **About that which is** written in the **adjacent** passage **you shall say.** The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.


###### Zevachim 107a:4
[Zevachim 107a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:4)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: מִי כְּתִיב ״וַעֲלֵיהֶם״?! ״וַאֲלֵיהֶם״ כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וַאֲלֵהֶם תֹּאמַר״ – לְעָרֵב פָּרָשִׁיּוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? “And to them” is written,** and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. **Rather,** liability in this case is derived **as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:** The opening phrase: **“And to them you shall say,”** starts with the conjunction “and” **to mix** the **passages** of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.


###### Zevachim 107a:5
[Zevachim 107a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:5)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אָתְיָא הֲבָאָה–הֲבָאָה; מָה לְהַלָּן מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ, אַף כָּאן מוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** Liability in this case **is derived** through a verbal analogy between the reference to **bringing** stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to **bringing** stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that **just as there,** with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be **burned outside** the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, **so too here,** with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be **burned outside** the Temple, having been slaughtered there.


###### Zevachim 107a:6
[Zevachim 107a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:6)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב בִּיבִי, הָא דִּתְנַן: שְׁלֹשִׁים וְשֵׁשׁ כָּרֵיתוֹת בְּתוֹרָה – תְּלָתִין וְשַׁב הָוְיָין, דְּאִיכָּא הַמַּעֲלֶה וְהַמַּעֲלֶה! קַשְׁיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Beivai objects to** these suggestions: But what about **that which we learned** in a mishna (*Karetot* 2a): There are **thirty-six** cases **in the Torah** for which one is liable to receive ***karet*.** The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, **there are thirty-seven, as there is** one case of **one who offers up** an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, **and** the other case of **one who offers up** an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is **difficult.**


###### Zevachim 107a:7
[Zevachim 107a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:7)

וְהָדִתְנַן: הַזּוֹרֵק מִקְצָת דָּמִים בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, מְנָלַן? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּתַנְיָא: ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב״ – לְרַבּוֹת הַזּוֹרֵק. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹ זָבַח״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַזּוֹרֵק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. **And** concerning **that which we learned** in a mishna (110a): **One who sprinkles part of** the **blood** of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, **outside** the Temple courtyard, is **liable; from where do we** derive this? The *tanna* **derives it from that which is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: **“Blood shall be imputed** to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). This serves **to include** liability for **one who sprinkles** sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is **the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says:** It is derived from the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering **or sacrifice”** (Leviticus 17:8). The term “or” serves **to include** liability for **one who sprinkles** blood outside the Temple courtyard.


###### Zevachim 107a:8
[Zevachim 107a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:8)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, הַאי ״אוֹ זָבַח״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? לְחַלֵּק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this** term “or” in “a burnt offering **or sacrifice”?** It serves **to divide** them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.


###### Zevachim 107a:9
[Zevachim 107a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:9)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, לְחַלֵּק מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יְבִיאֶנּוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **Rabbi Akiva, from where does he** derive the *halakha* **to divide** them into two cases? **He derives it from** the next verse: “And **he will not bring it** to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “it” is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.


###### Zevachim 107a:10
[Zevachim 107a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:10)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: עַל הַשָּׁלֵם הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״לַּעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתוֹ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** as for **Rabbi Yishmael,** why does he not derive that *halakha* from the term “it”? The Gemara answers: According to him, **that** term **is necessary** as the source for the *halakha* that one **is liable for** offering up **a complete** animal, **but** one **is not liable for** offering up **an incomplete** animal. The term “it” indicates an animal in its entirety. **And** as for **Rabbi Akiva, he derives** this **from** the repetition of “it” in the continuation of the verse: “He will not bring it…**to sacrifice it** to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9).


###### Zevachim 107a:11
[Zevachim 107a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:11)

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – חַד לְמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ וְהֶעֱלָן בַּחוּץ, וְחַד לְמוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ. וְהָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל מוּקְטְרֵי פָּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ״ – עַל הַשָּׁלֵם חַיָּיב וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** as for **Rabbi Yishmael,** how does he explain the repetition of “it”? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: **One** is referring **to** offerings that are fit to be **burned inside** the Temple courtyard **that became incomplete and were** then **offered up outside. And** the other **one** is referring **to** offerings that are unfit and so will be **burned outside** the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, **that became incomplete and were offered up outside.** In both cases one is exempt. **And so it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yishmael says:** One **might** have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be **burned inside** the Temple courtyard and **that became incomplete and were** instead **offered up outside,** one would be **liable.** To dispel this notion, **the verse states: “To sacrifice it,”** which indicates that **for** offering up **a complete** animal one is **liable, but** one is **not liable for an incomplete** animal.


###### Zevachim 107a:12
[Zevachim 107a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:12)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוּ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ, חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Akiva,** who has already expounded both mentions of “it,” disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is **liable** for offerings that are fit to be **burned inside that became incomplete and were** instead **offered up outside.**


###### Zevachim 107a:13
[Zevachim 107a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:13)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הַאי ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? לְרַבּוֹת שְׁחִיטַת הָעוֹף. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵ״אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחָט״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse “Blood shall be imputed to that man.” The Gemara asks: **And** as for **Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this** verse: **“Blood shall be imputed** to that man”? He expounds it **to include** liability for the **slaughter of a bird** offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. **And** as for **Rabbi Yishmael, he derives** this *halakha* **from: “Or that slaughters** it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).


###### Zevachim 107a:14
[Zevachim 107a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:14)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ, הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: עַל הַשּׁוֹחֵט הוּא חַיָּיב, וְלֹא עַל הַמּוֹלֵק. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״זֶּה הַדָּבָר״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Akiva** could have **said to you** that he does not derive it from **that** verse, as he holds that it is **necessary to** teach that only **one who slaughters** a bird offering outside **is liable, but** one is **not liable for pinching its nape** outside. **And** as for **Rabbi Yishmael,** from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? **He derives it from** the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: **“This is the matter”** (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.


###### Zevachim 107a:15
[Zevachim 107a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:15)

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה; שָׁחַט עוֹף מְנָא לַן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחָט״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel **that slaughters** an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse **I have** derived liability **only** for one who **slaughters an animal** offering outside; **from where do we** derive that one is liable if he **slaughtered a bird** offering outside? **The verse states: “Or that slaughters,”** to include liability for slaughtering a bird.


###### Zevachim 107a:16
[Zevachim 107a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:16)

יָכוֹל אַף הַמּוֹלֵק? וְדִין הוּא: מָה שְׁחִיטָה דְּאֵין דֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירָהּ בִּפְנִים, חַיָּיב, מְלִיקָה שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ הֶכְשֵׁירָהּ בְּפָנִים, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֶה הַדָּבָר״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
One **might** have thought that **even one who pinches** the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. **And** there **is a logical inference** to support this: **If** with regard to the **slaughter** of a bird offering, **which is not** the valid **method of preparation inside** the Temple, one is nevertheless **liable** if he did it outside, then with regard to **pinching** the nape of a bird offering, **which is** the valid **method of preparation inside** the Temple, **is it not logical that** one **is liable** if he did it outside? To counter this, **the verse states: “This is the matter”** (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.


###### Zevachim 107a:17
[Zevachim 107a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:17)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ: הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Akiva** could have **said to you** that he does not derive it from **that** verse, as he holds that it is **necessary for** expounding as part of **a verbal analogy** with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: “This is the matter that the Lord has commanded” (Numbers 30:2).


###### Zevachim 107a:18
[Zevachim 107a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:18)

וְהָא דִּתְנַן: הַקּוֹמֵץ וְהַמְקַבֵּל דָּמִים בַּחוּץ פָּטוּר – מְנָלַן? וּמֵהֵיכָא תֵּיתֵי דְּחַיָּיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. **And** concerning **that which we learned** in a mishna (112b): **One who takes a handful** from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, **and one who collects** the **blood** of an offering in a vessel **outside** the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is **exempt; from where do we** derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: **But from where would** it **be derived that** one is **liable** for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?


###### Zevachim 107a:19
[Zevachim 107a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:19)

תֵּיתֵי מִשְּׁחִיטָה – מָה לִשְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁכֵּן נִפְסֶלֶת שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלִין בְּפֶסַח!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest **deriving** it **through** a comparison to **slaughtering** outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: **What** is notable **about slaughtering?** It is notable **in that with regard to a Paschal offering,** if one slaughters it with the intent that it be **for** the sake of **those who cannot eat** it, it is thereby **disqualified.** The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.


###### Zevachim 107a:20
[Zevachim 107a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/107a:20)

תֵּיתֵי מִזְּרִיקָה – מָה לִזְרִיקָה, שֶׁכֵּן זָר חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And if you suggest **deriving** it **through** a comparison to **sprinkling** blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: **What** is notable **about sprinkling?** It is notable **in that a non-priest** who sprinkles blood in the Temple is **liable** to be punished with **death** at the hand of Heaven **for** this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.