## Zevachim Daf 108b

###### Zevachim 108b:1
[Zevachim 108b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:1)

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס וּמוּטְעֶה. אִי הָכִי, הָכָא נָמֵי מִיבְּעֵי לְמַעוֹטֵי אָנוּס, שׁוֹגֵג וּמוּטְעֶה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**to exclude** from the liability for *karet* one whose violation was **unwitting,** or who was **compelled to act, or** who was **mistaken.** The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive *karet*. The Gemara challenges: **If so, here too,** with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is **necessary to exclude** one whose violation was **unwitting,** or who was **compelled to act, or** who was **mistaken.** How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?


###### Zevachim 108b:2
[Zevachim 108b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:2)

תְּרֵי ״הָהוּא״ כְּתִיבִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, **two** instances of the term **“that** man” **are written:** “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive *karet*, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.


###### Zevachim 108b:3
[Zevachim 108b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:3)

וְאֶלָּא ״לַה׳״ לְמָה לִי? לְהוֹצִיא שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “*ish ish*.” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: **But why do I** need the term **“to the Lord”?** The Gemara explains: It is written **to exclude** from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur **scapegoat** outside the courtyard.


###### Zevachim 108b:4
[Zevachim 108b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:4)

חוֹמֶר בְּהַעֲלָאָה כּוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: The **greater stringency** with regard to **offering up** outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.


###### Zevachim 108b:5
[Zevachim 108b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:5)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּאֵבֶר וְהֶעֱלוּ, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין. שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁחַיָּיב – שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטוּ, פְּטוּרִין; הַמַּעֲלֶה לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁפָּטוּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ, פְּטוּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The Sages taught** in a *baraita*: **What** *halakha* is alluded to when **the verse states: “Any man [*ish ish*]…**that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that **two people who grasped a limb** of an offering **and offered** it **up** together outside the courtyard are **liable.** It is necessary for the verse to teach this, **as** one **might** have thought to say: **Could this not be** derived through an *a fortiori* **inference: If** with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, **one who slaughters for** the sake of **an ordinary** purpose is **liable,** and nevertheless, **two who grasped a knife and** together **slaughtered** an offering are **exempt,** then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where **one who offers up for** the sake of **an ordinary** purpose is **exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped** a limb and offered it up will also be **exempt?** To counter this, **the verse states “*ish ish*”** to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is **the statement of Rabbi Shimon.**


###### Zevachim 108b:6
[Zevachim 108b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:6)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: ״הַהוּא״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִּלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei says** that the *halakha* concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term **“that [*hahu*]** man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only **one** who acts alone is liable, **but not two** who act together. The *baraita* asks: **If so, what** *halakha* is alluded to when **the verse states “*ish ish*”?** The *baraita* explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “*ish ish*” is that **the Torah spoke in the language of people,** and no *halakhot* are to be derived from it.


###### Zevachim 108b:7
[Zevachim 108b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:7)

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הַאי ״הַהוּא״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס, מוּטְעֶה. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מֵ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And Rabbi Shimon,** what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: **This** term: **“That** man,” **is necessary to exclude** from liability one whose violation was **unwitting,** or who was **compelled to act, or** who was **mistaken.** The Gemara notes: **And Rabbi Yosei** derives that *halakha* **from** the fact that the verse could have stated ***hu*** and instead stated **“*hahu*.”** The Hebrew word for: That, *hahu*, is formed of the definite article *ha* and the pronoun *hu*. **And Rabbi Shimon does not expound** any *halakhot* **from** the fact that the verse could have stated ***hu*** and instead stated **“*hahu*.”** He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.


###### Zevachim 108b:8
[Zevachim 108b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:8)

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מִדְּהַאי ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, הָהוּא ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ נָמֵי דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. וְאֶלָּא הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט מְנָא לֵיהּ דְּחַיָּיב? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – וַאֲפִילּוּ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לָאִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **Rabbi Yosei, from** the fact **that** he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase **“*ish ish*”** written with regard to offering up, as he holds that **the Torah spoke in the language of people,** then **also** with regard to **that** phrase: **“Any man [*ish ish*]”** (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that **the Torah spoke in the language of people,** he should not derive any *halakhot* from it. **But** if so, **from where** does he derive **that one who slaughters** outside **for** the sake of **an ordinary** purpose is **liable?** The Gemara answers: **He derives it from** the verse: **“Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood”** (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that **even one who slaughters for** the sake of an ordinary **man** is liable.


###### Zevachim 108b:9
[Zevachim 108b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:9)

הֶעֱלָה וְחָזַר וְהֶעֱלָה כּוּ׳.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly **offered up** part of an offering outside the courtyard **and then** in a different lapse of awareness **offered up** other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.


###### Zevachim 108b:10
[Zevachim 108b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:10)

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵבָרִים; דְּמָר סָבַר: כִּי כְּתִיב ״לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ״ – עַל הַשָּׁלֵם הוּא חַיָּיב וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר, אַכֹּל בְּהֵמָה כְּתִיב; וּמָר סָבַר: אַכֹּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר כְּתִיב. אֲבָל אֵבֶר אֶחָד – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. **Reish Lakish says:** The **dispute** in the mishna **concerns four or five limbs** that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. **As** one **Sage,** Rabbi Yosei, **holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it”** (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the *halakha* that **for** offering up **a complete** item one is **liable but** that one is **not liable for** offering up **an incomplete** item, **it is written with regard to a whole animal.** Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. **And** the other **Sage,** Rabbi Shimon, **holds** that that verse **is written with regard to each and every limb** of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. **But** with regard to the offering up of **one limb** in parts, **everyone agrees** that a person is **liable** to bring **only one** sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.


###### Zevachim 108b:11
[Zevachim 108b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:11)

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר אֶחָד – דְּמָר סָבַר: מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (והעלו) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר – פָּטוּר; אֲבָל בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵיבָרִין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The **dispute** in the mishna **concerns one limb** from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. **As** one **Sage,** Rabbi Shimon, **holds** that for offerings **that are** fit to be **burned inside** the Temple, **that became incomplete and were** instead **offered up outside** the Temple, one is **liable.** Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. **And** the other **Sage,** Rabbi Yosei, **holds** that one is **exempt** for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. **But with regard to** offering up **four or five limbs, everyone agrees** that one is **liable for each and every limb,** as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.


###### Zevachim 108b:12
[Zevachim 108b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:12)

וּפְלִיגָא דְּעוּלָּא, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – שֶׁחַיָּיב. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי בַּחוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Yoḥanan **disagrees** with the opinion **of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone** in the mishna **concedes with regard to** offerings **that are** fit to be **burned inside** the Temple courtyard **that became incomplete and were** instead **offered up outside** the courtyard, **that** one is **liable. They disagree only with regard to** offerings that, having been slaughtered outside **are** unfit and so will be **burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As** one **Sage,** Rabbi Yosei, **holds** that one is **exempt, and** the other **Sage,** Rabbi Shimon, **holds** that one is **liable.**


###### Zevachim 108b:13
[Zevachim 108b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:13)

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר, לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ, דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who say** there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. **Ulla says: Everyone** in the mishna **concedes with regard to** offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple **are** unfit and so will be **burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to** offerings **that are** fit to be **burned inside that became incomplete and were** instead **offered up outside. As** one **Sage,** Rabbi Yosei, **holds** that one is **exempt, and** the other **Sage,** Rabbi Shimon, **holds** that one is **liable.**


###### Zevachim 108b:14
[Zevachim 108b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:14)

(וּפְלִיגִי) [וּפְלִיגָא] דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אַלִּישָּׁנָא קַמָּא דְּעוּלָּא; דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: כְּמַאן מַהְדְּרִינַן פּוֹקְעִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ? כְּמַאן – דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the statement **of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s** statement, **as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose** opinion **do we restore** limbs **that were dislodged** from upon the altar **to the altar? In accordance with whose** opinion? It is **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei** recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.


###### Zevachim 108b:15
[Zevachim 108b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:15)

וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן נֹחַ מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: **And** one is **liable** for offering up an offering outside the courtyard **only once he offers** it **up** upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. **Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord,** and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.


###### Zevachim 108b:16
[Zevachim 108b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:16)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים וְאֶת הַמִּנְחָה וַיַּעַל עַל הַצּוּר לַה׳״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord”** (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.


###### Zevachim 108b:17
[Zevachim 108b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:17)

וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״! הַהוּא גּוּבְהָה בְּעָלְמָא. וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ״! הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains how each *tanna* interprets the verse that supports the other. **But also** according to **the other** opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, **isn’t it written: “And** Noah **built an altar to the Lord”?** How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: **That** verse is referring **merely** to **an elevated place** and not specifically to an altar. **But also** according to **the other** opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, **isn’t it written: “And Manoah took**…and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in **that** case **was a provisional edict** issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative *halakha* from it.


###### Zevachim 108b:18
[Zevachim 108b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:18)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״מִזְבֵּחַ פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״; וְאֵין מִזְבֵּחַ בְּבָמָה; לְפִיכָךְ הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that **the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Shimon says** that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the **altar** of the Lord **at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”** (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, **but** a specifically erected **altar is not** required in order to offer up **on** a private **altar** during periods when it is permitted to do so. **Therefore, one who offered up** outside the courtyard **on a rock or on a stone** is **liable.**


###### Zevachim 108b:19
[Zevachim 108b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:19)

יָצָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! הָכִי קָאָמַר: לְפִיכָךְ בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת – הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן, חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the formulation of the *baraita*: If the *baraita* was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it **should have** concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has **fulfilled** his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: **This** is what the *baraita* **is saying:** Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, **therefore, during a period when** the use of private **altars is prohibited,** one who **offers up** outside **on a rock or on a stone** is **liable.**


###### Zevachim 108b:20
[Zevachim 108b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:20)

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וִיסוֹד וְרִיבּוּעַ – מַהוּ שֶׁיְּעַכְּבוּ בְּבָמָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma:** Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the **corner,** the **ramp** leading to the altar, the **base** of the altar, **and** the **square shape. What is** the *halakha* with regard to **whether they are** also **indispensable for** the validity of a private **altar** during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?


###### Zevachim 108b:21
[Zevachim 108b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/108b:21)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תַּנְיָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וְרִיבּוּעַ וִיסוֹד – מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה, וְאֵין מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה קְטַנָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught** in a *baraita*: The **corner,** the **ramp,** the **base, and** the **square shape are** all **indispensable for** the validity of **a great** public **altar, but they are not indispensable for** the validity of **a small** private **altar.**