## Zevachim Daf 10a

###### Zevachim 10a:1
[Zevachim 10a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:1)

הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה; מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִבִּפְנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to **one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or** in order **to burn its** forbidden **fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** Deriving benefit from the animal is **prohibited,** as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because **one can have intention from** one **rite to** affect another **rite;** idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. **And** this *halakha* is derived from the *halakhot* of *piggul*, as **we derive** *halakhot* of idol worship, which are applicable even **outside** the Temple, **from** *halakhot* concerning intent that apply **inside** the Temple.


###### Zevachim 10a:2
[Zevachim 10a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:2)

רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת; אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Reish Lakish says:** Deriving benefit from the animal is **permitted. One cannot have intention from** one **rite to** affect another **rite, and we do not derive** *halakhot* applicable **outside** the Temple **from** *halakhot* that apply **inside** the Temple.


###### Zevachim 10a:3
[Zevachim 10a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:3)

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. **And if** the Sages **had taught us** the dispute only **with regard to that** issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that **Reish Lakish says** his opinion only **with regard to that** issue, as he maintains that *halakhot* applicable outside the Temple are not derived from *halakhot* applicable only inside the Temple. **But** with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might **say** that **he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan** that it is disqualified, as *halakhot* applicable **inside** the Temple can be derived **from** other *halakhot* applicable **inside** the Temple.


###### Zevachim 10a:4
[Zevachim 10a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:4)

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ; צְרִיכִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** the Sages **had taught us** the dispute only with regard to **this** issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says** his opinion only **with regard to this** issue, which concerns *halakhot* applicable inside the Temple. **But with regard to that** issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would **say** that **he concedes to** the opinion of **Reish Lakish** that *halakhot* applicable outside the Temple are not derived from *halakhot* applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements **are necessary.**


###### Zevachim 10a:5
[Zevachim 10a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:5)

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מֵתִיב רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael, **he said: Rav Yirmeya responds** to this dispute by eliciting evidence **to support** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila** elicits evidence **to support** the opinion of **Reish Lakish.**


###### Zevachim 10a:6
[Zevachim 10a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:6)

רַב יִרְמְיָה לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ – פָּסוּל, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Dimi elaborated: **Rav Yirmeya** elicits evidence **to support** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan** by an *a fortiori* inference: **Just as in** the **case** of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, **where if** the one slaughtering the offering **said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **beyond its** designated **time,** it is **fit,** and nevertheless, if he **slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its** designated **time,** it is **unfit,** so too, in the **case** of deviation from the type of offering, **where** even **if he said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **not for its sake,** it is **unfit, isn’t it logical that** if **he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?**


###### Zevachim 10a:7
[Zevachim 10a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:7)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי: מָה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן כָּרֵת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava bar Ahilai objects to this** inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. **What** is notable **about** intent **beyond its** designated **time?** It is notable **in that** one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with ***karet*,** whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.


###### Zevachim 10a:8
[Zevachim 10a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:8)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא בַּר אֲהִילַאי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says:** Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by *karet*. And **this** is what **he is saying: Just as** in the **case** of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, **where if** the one slaughtering the offering **said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **outside its** designated **area, it is fit,** and nevertheless, if he **slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its** designated **area,** it is **unfit,** so too, in the **case** of deviation from the type of offering, **where** even **if he said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that** if **he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?**


###### Zevachim 10a:9
[Zevachim 10a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:9)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מַה לְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים; תֹּאמַר בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בְּפֶסַח וְחַטָּאת?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi objects to this** inference: **What** is notable **about** intent to sprinkle the blood **outside its** designated **area?** It is notable **in that** the disqualification **applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say** that the same *halakhot* govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed **not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?**


###### Zevachim 10a:10
[Zevachim 10a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:10)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי״ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר, לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ (שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ) לְשֵׁם פְּלוֹנִי – פָּסוּל; מָקוֹם שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל, [שְׁחָטוֹ עַל מְנָת] לִזְרוֹק דָּמָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Ashi says: This** is what Rav Yirmeya **is saying: Just as in** the **case** of deviation with regard to the owner, **where, if** the one slaughtering the offering **said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit,** and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order **to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so,** it is **unfit,** so too, in the **case** of deviation from the type of offering, **where** even **if he said: I am hereby slaughtering** it **not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that** if **he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?** The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.


###### Zevachim 10a:11
[Zevachim 10a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:11)

רַבִּי אִילָא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא תֹּאמַר בִּזְרִיקָה, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מִבֵּינַיָּיא מִשְּׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה! לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא? לוֹמַר דְּאֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ila** elicits evidence **to support** the opinion of **Reish Lakish,** that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah **should not have stated** the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake **with regard to sprinkling** of the blood, **and** rather **should have** let one **derive** it **by an *a fortiori*** inference **from** the **common** element **of** two other rites, **from slaughter and collection** of the blood. If so, **for what *halakha* does the Merciful One write** this redundant requirement? It is in order **to say that one cannot have intention from** one **rite to** affect another **rite.**


###### Zevachim 10a:12
[Zevachim 10a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:12)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: וְדִלְמָא דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa objects to this** derivation: **But perhaps** the requirement is written to teach the opposite, **that one can have intention from** one **rite to** affect another **rite.** A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.


###### Zevachim 10a:13
[Zevachim 10a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:13)

אִם כֵּן, לִשְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִינֵּיהּ, וְתֵיתֵי מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to** sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, **and one could derive** that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite **from Rav Ashi’s** aforementioned ***a fortiori*** inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.


###### Zevachim 10a:14
[Zevachim 10a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:14)

וְאִידָּךְ פָּרֵיךְ הָכִי: מָה לְהָנָךְ – שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן, וְיֶשְׁנָן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other** *amora*, Rabbi Yoḥanan, **would refute** Rabbi Ila’s proof **like this:** It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. **What** is notable **about these?** They are notable **in that** in offerings of the most sacred order **they must** be performed in the **north** of the Temple courtyard. **And** furthermore, **they are** performed **in the** sacrifice of **inner sin offerings** as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.


###### Zevachim 10a:15
[Zevachim 10a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:15)

וְאִידַּךְ – הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא בִּשְׁלָמִים קַיָּימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other** *amora*, Reish Lakish, would respond that **now, in any event, we stand** in a discussion **with regard to peace offerings,** since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.


###### Zevachim 10a:16
[Zevachim 10a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:16)

אִיתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ, לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה. וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבָּה לְגַבֵּי רַב נַחְמָן, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב אָשֵׁי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
A parallel dispute **was stated:** If one **slaughtered** a sin offering **for its sake** but with intent **to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says** that the offering is **unfit,** and **Rabba says** that it is **fit. And Rabba retracted his** opinion, and conceded **to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s *a fortiori*** inference.


###### Zevachim 10a:17
[Zevachim 10a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:17)

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף (אֶת) הָאָשָׁם. תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, אַף אָשָׁם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – פָּסוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too,** is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this **it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for** committing **a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for** committing **a transgression. Just as a sin offering** sacrificed **not for its sake** is **unfit, so too, a guilt offering** sacrificed **not for its sake** is **unfit.**


###### Zevachim 10a:18
[Zevachim 10a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:18)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:** The inference is **not** valid. **If you say** this **with regard to a sin offering, whose blood** is sprinkled **above** the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?


###### Zevachim 10a:19
[Zevachim 10a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:19)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: פֶּסַח יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁדָּמוֹ לְמַטָּה, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove** the point, **as its blood is** sprinkled **below** the red line, **and** nevertheless, if one **slaughtered it not for its sake** it is **unfit.**


###### Zevachim 10a:20
[Zevachim 10a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:20)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מָה לְפֶסַח – שֶׁכֵּן זְמַנּוֹ קָבוּעַ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:** A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. **What** is notable **about a Paschal offering?** It is notable **in that its** designated **time is fixed.** A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.


###### Zevachim 10a:21
[Zevachim 10a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:21)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: חַטָּאת תּוֹכִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove** the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.


###### Zevachim 10a:22
[Zevachim 10a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/10a:22)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:**