## Zevachim Daf 115a

###### Zevachim 115a:1
[Zevachim 115a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:1)

וְלֹא?! וַהֲרֵי פֶּסַח בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה – דְּאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ, וְכָשֵׁר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ! פֶּסַח בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה – שְׁלָמִים נִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
the **Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year,** i.e., not on the fourteenth of Nisan after midday, when it is fit to be sacrificed, **which is not fit** if it was sacrificed **for its sake, but is fit** if it was sacrificed **not for its sake.** The Gemara responds: The **Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year is** considered to be **a peace offering,** not a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not for its sake.


###### Zevachim 115a:2
[Zevachim 115a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:2)

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מוֹצִיא אַף עוֹלַת מְחוּסַּר זְמַן בִּבְעָלִים, וַאֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that the following *baraita* **supports** the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard, not for its own sake, is liable: One **might** have thought **that I exclude** from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering outside the courtyard **even** one who slaughters **a burnt offering whose time has not yet** arrived **due to** its being premature **for its owner,** e.g., a woman after childbirth whose term of impurity is not yet finished, **and** one who slaughters **the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper** before they are fit to sacrifice their offerings.


###### Zevachim 115a:3
[Zevachim 115a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:3)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שׁוֹר״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, ״כֶּשֶׂב״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, ״עֵז״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. וְאִילּוּ חַטָּאת – שַׁיְּירַהּ;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To counter this, **the verse states** with regard to slaughter outside the courtyard: “Whatever person there be of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). **“Ox”** indicates **in any case** of an ox, **“lamb”** indicates **in any case** of a lamb, and **“goat”** indicates **in any case** of a goat, that one is liable for slaughtering them outside the courtyard; **while a sin offering** was **omitted** from the cases in the *baraita* where one who slaughters the offering outside the courtyard is liable.


###### Zevachim 115a:4
[Zevachim 115a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:4)

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בִּזְמַנּוֹ – מַאי אִירְיָא אָשָׁם? אֲפִילּוּ חַטָּאת נָמֵי! אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא לִזְמַנּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What are we dealing with** in this *baraita* when it discusses the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper? **If we say** that it is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard **at its** proper **time, why** state that one is liable **specifically** for **a guilt offering?** One would be liable for slaughtering **a sin offering** outside the courtyard at its time **as well. Rather,** it is discussing a guilt offering that was slaughtered **not at its time,** i.e., when the nazirite or leper’s time had not yet arrived.


###### Zevachim 115a:5
[Zevachim 115a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:5)

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לִשְׁמוֹ – אָשָׁם אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? אֶלָּא לָאו שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ? לְעוֹלָם בִּזְמַנּוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **And what** is the *baraita* dealing **with? If we say** that it is dealing with one who slaughtered it **for its sake, why** would he be **liable** for **a guilt offering** that was slaughtered outside the courtyard if it is not fit for sacrifice? **Rather, is** the *baraita* **not** dealing with one who slaughtered it **not for its sake,** and the *baraita* states that one would be liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya? The Gemara rejects this: **Actually,** the *baraita* is dealing with one who slaughtered a guilt offering outside the courtyard **at its** proper **time and not for its sake.**


###### Zevachim 115a:6
[Zevachim 115a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:6)

וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מַקְּשִׁינַן אָשָׁם לְחַטָּאת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** although there is ostensibly no need for an additional verse from which to derive the *halakha* in this case, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake inside the courtyard is fit for sacrifice, the *baraita* **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer, who says: We juxtapose a guilt offering with a sin offering** in the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; there is one law for them” (Leviticus 7:7), from which it may be derived that they have equivalent halakhic status. Therefore, a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, and consequently one might say that one who slaughters a guilt offering not for its sake outside the Temple courtyard is exempt, as it is not fit for sacrifice. Therefore, the derivation from the verse is necessary.


###### Zevachim 115a:7
[Zevachim 115a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:7)

וּתְנָא טָפֵל, וְהוּא הַדִּין עִיקָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the *tanna* of the *baraita* **taught:** Guilt offering, which, in this context, is **secondary** to the sin offering, as it is derived from the latter. **But the same is true** of the **primary,** i.e., the sin offering: One who slaughters it outside the courtyard not for its sake is liable.


###### Zevachim 115a:8
[Zevachim 115a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:8)

תָּא שְׁמַע: יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה עוֹלַת מְחוּסַּר זְמַן – בְּגוּפָהּ, וְחַטָּאת – בֵּין בְּגוּפָהּ בֵּין בִּבְעָלִים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a *baraita* in support of Rabbi Ḥilkiya: One **might** have thought **that I include** in liability even one who slaughters **a burnt offering whose time has not yet** arrived because it is **intrinsically** lacking, i.e., eight days have not yet passed; **and** one who slaughters **a sin offering** whose time has not yet arrived, **whether** because it is **intrinsically** lacking **or** because it is premature for **the owner.**


###### Zevachim 115a:9
[Zevachim 115a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:9)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״ – כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָבֹא בְּפֶתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד, אֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן. וְאִילּוּ אָשָׁם – שַׁיְּירֵהּ;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To counter this, **the verse states** with regard to one who slaughters outside the courtyard: **“And** has not brought it **to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”** (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that for **any** sacrifice **that is unfit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for** slaughtering it outside the courtyard. **But a guilt offering** whose time has not yet arrived was **omitted** by the *tanna*, from which it can be inferred that one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the courtyard is liable.


###### Zevachim 115a:10
[Zevachim 115a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:10)

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא לִשְׁמוֹ – אָשָׁם נָמֵי לִיפְטְרֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What are we dealing with? If we say** that the *baraita* is dealing with a case where one slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard **for its sake,** then one who slaughters **a guilt offering should also be exempt,** as it is an offering whose time has not yet arrived. **Rather, is it not** dealing with a case of one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard **not for its sake?** In this case, one would be exempt for slaughtering it outside the courtyard, as if it is slaughtered inside the courtyard not for its sake it is disqualified. But in the case of a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived one would be liable, since it is fit for sacrifice, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.


###### Zevachim 115a:11
[Zevachim 115a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:11)

לְעוֹלָם שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא – דְּמַקֵּישׁ אָשָׁם לְחַטָּאת. תְּנָא עִיקָּר, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן לְטָפֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **Actually,** the *baraita* is dealing with one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard **not for its sake. And** nevertheless, it may not be inferred that in the case of a guilt offering one would be liable, as this *baraita* may **be** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer, who juxtaposes a guilt offering with a sin offering;** and one who slaughters a guilt offering is also exempt. The *tanna* of the *baraita* omitted mention of a guilt offering because he **taught:** Sin offering, which is the **primary** case of the disqualification of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, **and all the more so** it applies **to** the **secondary** case, i.e., the guilt offering.


###### Zevachim 115a:12
[Zevachim 115a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:12)

תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר, תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי לֵיוַאי: יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מוֹצִיא אַף עוֹלַת מְחוּסַּר זְמַן בִּבְעָלִים, אֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע; מִנַּיִן? וְנָסֵיב לְהוּ תַּלְמוּדָא לְחִיּוּבָא, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** another proof for the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, **as when Rav Dimi came** to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael **he said** that **the school of Rabbi Livai taught** a *baraita*: One **might** have thought **that I exclude** from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard **even** one who slaughters **a burnt offering whose time has not yet** arrived **due to** its being premature **for its owner,** or who slaughters **a guilt offering of a nazirite or the guilt offering of a leper** whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner. **From where** is it derived that one is liable for doing so? Rav Dimi added: **And** the Sages **brought a derivation** from a verse to prove that one is **liable, but I do not know what** the derivation **is.**


###### Zevachim 115a:13
[Zevachim 115a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:13)

מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא? אָמַר רָבִינָא: ״שׁוֹר״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, ״כֶּשֶׂב״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, ״עֵז״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. הָא מַאי רוּמְיָא? כִּדְאָמְרַתְּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What is the** biblical **derivation? Ravina said** that it is derived from the verse cited above with regard to offerings that are slaughtered outside the courtyard, where **“ox”** indicates **in any case** of an ox, **“lamb”** indicates **in any case** of a lamb, and **“goat”** indicates **in any case** of a goat. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as the *baraita* is discussing a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived that is slaughtered not for its sake, and contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara asks: **What contradiction** is **this?** It can be resolved **as you stated** earlier: That the *baraita* is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake at the proper time, and is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.


###### Zevachim 115a:14
[Zevachim 115a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:14)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מִשּׁוּם דְּרָמֵי דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי לֵיוַאי אַדְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: אֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁירִין, וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman said** that according to the opinion of Rav Dimi, the *baraita* cannot be interpreted as dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered at its proper time, **because he raises a contradiction between** the *baraita* **that the school of Rabbi Livai taught** and a *baraita* **that Levi taught: The guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for their sakes are fit, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.**


###### Zevachim 115a:15
[Zevachim 115a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:15)

שְׁחָטָן מְחוּסַּר זְמַן בִּבְעָלִים, אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ בְנֵי שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים וּשְׁחָטָן – פְּסוּלִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If one **slaughtered them** in a case where the offering was **premature due to its owner, or** if the lambs **were in their second year** when one **slaughtered them,** and not in their first year as required, they **are disqualified,** and one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable. This contradicts the *baraita* taught by the school of Rabbi Livai.


###### Zevachim 115a:16
[Zevachim 115a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:16)

וּמְשַׁנֵּי רַב דִּימִי: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן לִשְׁמוֹ, כָּאן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Dimi answers:** This is **not difficult. Here,** in the *baraita* that states that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is exempt, it is referring to a case where the animal whose time has not yet arrived was slaughtered **for its sake; there,** in the *baraita* that teaches that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is liable, it is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered **not for its sake.**


###### Zevachim 115a:17
[Zevachim 115a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:17)

רַב אָשֵׁי רָמֵי מַתְנִיתִין אַבָּרַיְיתָא, וּמְשַׁנֵּי: כָּאן לִשְׁמוֹ, וְכָאן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Likewise, **Rav Ashi raises a contradiction between the mishna,** which teaches that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the courtyard is exempt, **and the *baraita*,** which teaches that one who does so is liable. **And** Rav Ashi **answers: Here,** the mishna that teaches that one is exempt is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered **for its sake. And there,** the *baraita* that teaches that one is liable is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered **not for its sake,** in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.


###### Zevachim 115a:18
[Zevachim 115a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:18)

לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara says: If so, **shall we say** that this **is a conclusive refutation** of the opinion **of Rav Huna,** who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived not for its sake outside the courtyard is exempt?


###### Zevachim 115a:19
[Zevachim 115a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/115a:19)

אָמַר לְךָ רַב הוּנָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִפְרִישׁ שְׁתֵּי אֲשָׁמוֹת לְאַחְרָיוּת, דְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא עוֹלָה הִיא;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara replies that **Rav Huna** could have **said to you: What are we dealing with here,** in the *baraita* that deems one liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake? We are dealing with a case **where** one **separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee,** so that atonement would be achieved through the sacrifice of the second if the first was lost, but before the proper time arrived he slaughtered one of them as a burnt offering rather than as a guilt offering. In this case there would be liability for slaughtering outside the courtyard, as is the case with one who slaughters a burnt offering outside the courtyard, **since one of them,** i.e., the one that will not effect atonement, **is a burnt offering from the outset.**