## Zevachim Daf 14a

###### Zevachim 14a:1
[Zevachim 14a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:1)

כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ עַל מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן כִּשְׁלָמִים – אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
that **any** offering **whose** blood **is not** sprinkled **on the external altar like a peace offering is not subject to** the *halakhot* of ***piggul*?** If so, *piggul* does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.


###### Zevachim 14a:2
[Zevachim 14a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:2)

אֶלָּא הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַחִיצוֹנוֹת, כָּאן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** both **this** *baraita* **and that** *baraita* are in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis; and** the apparent contradiction between them is **not difficult. Here,** the *baraita* that maintains that one cannot render the offering *piggul* while dipping his finger in the blood is referring **to the external sin offerings,** since dipping one’s finger in order to sprinkle the blood on the external altar is not considered an essential rite. **There,** the *baraita* that maintains that one can render the offering *piggul* while performing this rite is referring **to the inner sin offerings.**


###### Zevachim 14a:3
[Zevachim 14a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:3)

חַטָּאוֹת הַחִיצוֹנוֹת – פְּשִׁיטָא, לָא כְּתִיב בְּהוּ ״וְטָבַל״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it **obvious** that one cannot render the offering *piggul* while dipping his finger in the blood of **the external sin offerings?** The statement: **“And** the priest **shall dip** his finger in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), **is not written with regard to** these offerings. Since it is clearly not an essential rite, why was it necessary for the *baraita* to teach that improper intent while performing it cannot render the offering *piggul*?


###### Zevachim 14a:4
[Zevachim 14a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:4)

אִצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּכְתִיב ״וְלָקַח״ – וְאִי אָתֵי קוֹף רָמֵי לְהוּ אַיְּדֵיהּ בָּעֵי לְמִישְׁקַל זִימְנָא אַחֲרִיתִי – כְּמַאן דִּכְתִיב ״וְטָבַל״ דָּמֵי;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It **was necessary** for the *baraita* to teach this, as otherwise it might **enter your mind to say** that **since it is written** with regard to an external sin offering: **“And** the priest **shall take** of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:34), **and** therefore **if a monkey comes** and **places** blood **on the hand of** the priest the priest **must take** blood from the vessel **again** to perform the mitzva as stated in the verse, **it is considered as though** the statement: **And** the priest **shall dip** his finger in the blood, **is written** with regard to an external sin offering as well.


###### Zevachim 14a:5
[Zevachim 14a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:5)

קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לְהָכִי לָא כְּתִיב ״וְטָבַל״ – דְּמַשְׁמַע הָכִי וּמַשְׁמַע הָכִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, the *baraita* **teaches us** that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an external sin offering is an inessential rite and one cannot render the offering *piggul* while performing it. As it is **for this** reason that the phrase: **And** the priest **shall dip** his finger in the blood, **is not written** with regard to this offering, but rather: And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, **which indicates this** *halakha*, that the priest must actively take the blood in his hand, **and** also **indicates that** *halakha*, that dipping one’s finger in the blood is not an essential rite and cannot render the offering *piggul*.


###### Zevachim 14a:6
[Zevachim 14a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:6)

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁיר בְּהִילּוּךְ. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּהוֹלָכַת חַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בָּהּ, הוֹאִיל וַעֲבוֹדָה שֶׁאֵין יָכוֹל לְבַטְּלָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that **Rabbi Shimon deems** the offering **fit** if the prohibited intent was **during** the rite of **conveying** the blood to the altar. **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that** prohibited **intent during the conveying of** the blood of **the inner sin offerings disqualifies them, since** with regard to those offerings, it is **an indispensable rite.** Because the blood must be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the offering cannot be slaughtered inside the Sanctuary, conveying the blood into the Sanctuary is always necessary for such offerings.


###### Zevachim 14a:7
[Zevachim 14a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:7)

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ עַל מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן כִּשְׁלָמִים, אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say** that with regard to **any** offering **whose** blood **is not** sprinkled **on the external altar like a peace offering, one is not liable** to be punished with *karet* **for** eating **it, due to** the prohibition of ***piggul*?** In other words, the *halakha* of *piggul* does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.


###### Zevachim 14a:8
[Zevachim 14a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:8)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מוֹדֶה הָיָה לִפְסוֹל מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר – וּמָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, שֶׁהוּכְשְׁרוּ בִּשְׁלָמִים – פָּסוּל בְּחַטָּאת; חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁפּוֹסֵל בִּשְׁלָמִים – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיִּפְסוֹל בְּחַטָּאוֹת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says:** Rabbi Shimon **concedes** that although intent to consume an inner sin offering after its designated time does not render it *piggul*, it **disqualifies** the offering, **due to an *a fortiori*** inference: **Just as** sacrifice **not for its sake, which is valid in** the case of **a peace offering,** is nevertheless **not valid in** the case of **a sin offering,** as stated in the mishna (2a), so too, **isn’t it logical that** sacrifice with intent to consume it **beyond its** designated **time, which disqualifies peace offerings, should disqualify sin offerings?**


###### Zevachim 14a:9
[Zevachim 14a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:9)

וְאַשְׁכְּחַן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And we found** a source for the *halakha* that intent to consume an inner sin offering **beyond its** designated **time** disqualifies it according to Rabbi Shimon. **From where do we** derive that intent to consume it **outside its** designated **area** also disqualifies it?


###### Zevachim 14a:10
[Zevachim 14a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:10)

אִי מִחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – מָה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן כָּרֵת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** we derive it **from** the case of intent to consume it **beyond its** designated **time,** one may respond: **What** is notable **about** intent to consume it **beyond its** designated **time?** It is notable **in that** it can render an offering *piggul*, for partaking of which one is liable to receive ***karet*.**


###### Zevachim 14a:11
[Zevachim 14a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:11)

אִי מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּבָמָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** we derive it **from** the case of intent **not for its sake,** one may respond: What is notable about sacrifice not for its sake? It is notable **in that** this disqualification **applies** even **to** sacrifice on a private **altar** during the era when such altars were permitted. By contrast, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is irrelevant to sacrifice on a private altar, which has no designated area.


###### Zevachim 14a:12
[Zevachim 14a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:12)

(חִיּוּב) שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן בְּמַאי נוֹהֵג – בְּפֶסַח וְחַטָּאת; פֶּסַח וְחַטָּאת בְּבָמָה לֹא קָרְבוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **With regard to what** offering **does** disqualification due to intent **not for its sake apply?** It applies **to a Paschal offering and a sin offering.** Since **a Paschal offering and a sin offering may not be sacrificed on** a private **altar,** this factor is irrelevant. One may therefore derive from the case of intent not for its sake that intent to consume the offering outside its designated area disqualifies it.


###### Zevachim 14a:13
[Zevachim 14a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:13)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הֶקֵּישָׁא הוּא; ״שְׁלִישִׁי״ – זֶה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, ״פִּיגּוּל״ – זֶה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** that **it is** derived from the **juxtaposition** of the *halakha* of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time with the *halakha* of intent to consume it outside its designated area. The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [*piggul*]” (Leviticus 7:18). **This** statement: “On the **third** day, it shall not be accepted,” is referring to intent to consume the offering **beyond its** designated **time;** and **this** seemingly superfluous statement: “Neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be ***piggul*,”** is referring to intent to consume it **outside its** designated **area.** Such juxtaposition indicates that there are parallel *halakhot* in the two cases even if they are dissimilar.


###### Zevachim 14a:14
[Zevachim 14a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:14)

אָמַר רָבָא: אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כִּבְרֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: בֵּין הָאוּלָם וְלַמִּזְבֵּחַ – צָפוֹן; אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת בְּהוֹלָכַת חַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת, אֶלָּא מִפֶּתַח אוּלָם וְלִפְנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava says: If you say** that **Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with** the opinion of **his son** Rabbi Elazar, **who says** that the area **between the Entrance Hall and the altar** is considered part of the **north** of the Temple courtyard, the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, he must also hold that prohibited **intent while conveying** the blood of **the inner sin offerings is effective** to disqualify them **only from the doorway of the Entrance Hall inward.** Prohibited intent before the priest reaches the doorway of the Entrance Hall does not disqualify the offering, as conveying the blood to the doorway is not necessary; the offering could have been slaughtered at the doorway in the first place.


###### Zevachim 14a:15
[Zevachim 14a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:15)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: תּוֹךְ עֲזָרָה מְקַדֵּשׁ; אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת בְּהוֹלָכַת סִילּוּק בָּזִיכִין, אֶלָּא מִפֶּתַח הֵיכָל וְלַחוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** that Rabbi Shimon **holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says** that the **interior of the Temple courtyard sanctifies** offerings, i.e., that offerings can be sacrificed on the courtyard floor as if it were part of the altar, prohibited **intent while conveying** the **removed bowls** of frankincense from the table in the Sanctuary to burn them on the external altar **is effective** to disqualify them **only** while **conveying** them **from the doorway of the Sanctuary outward** to the Entrance Hall. Since the table can be placed anywhere in the Sanctuary, conveying the bowls of frankincense in the Sanctuary itself is unnecessary, and once the priest exits the Entrance Hall to the Temple courtyard, the frankincense could theoretically be burned immediately.


###### Zevachim 14a:16
[Zevachim 14a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:16)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, סָבַר: קְדוּשַּׁת הֵיכָל וְאוּלָם – חֲדָא הִיא; אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת אֶלָּא מִפֶּתַח אוּלָם וְלַחוּץ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava continues: **And if you say** that Rabbi Shimon also **holds** that **the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall are one** and the same, and the table can be placed in the Entrance Hall as well, prohibited **intent is effective only** while conveying the frankincense **from the doorway of the Entrance Hall outward,** i.e., in the doorway of the Entrance Hall itself.


###### Zevachim 14a:17
[Zevachim 14a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:17)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר תּוֹךְ הַפֶּתַח כְּלִפְנִים; אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת אֲפִילּוּ פְּסִיעָה אַחַת, אֶלָּא בִּכְדֵי הוֹשָׁטַת יָדוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** that he also **holds** that **inside the doorway is** considered **like inside** the Entrance Hall, then the table can be placed in the doorway too, and prohibited **intent is not effective** while conveying the frankincense **even one step. Rather,** it is effective only during the moment when the frankincense is taken out of the doorway to the courtyard, the time it takes the priest **to stretch out his hand** to place the bowls on the courtyard floor.


###### Zevachim 14a:18
[Zevachim 14a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:18)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, סָבַר: הוֹלָכָה שֶׁלֹּא בָּרֶגֶל – לֹא שְׁמָהּ הוֹלָכָה; אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת כְּלָל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** that he also **holds** that **conveying** an offering **not by foot is not considered conveying,** prohibited **intent is not effective at all** while conveying the bowls of frankincense.


###### Zevachim 14a:19
[Zevachim 14a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:19)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְאָמוֹרֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: הוֹלָכָה בְּזָר – מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda’s interpreter: Ask Rav Ḥisda** for me: **What is** the *halakha* with regard to **a non-priest conveying** the blood? Is the offering disqualified, as in a case where a non-priest performs any other sacrificial rite that may performed only by priests?


###### Zevachim 14a:20
[Zevachim 14a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:20)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּשֵׁרָה, וּמִקְרָא מְסַיְּיעֵנִי – ״וַיִּשְׁחֲטוּ אֶת הַפֶּסַח, וַיִּזְרְקוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים אֶת הַדָּם מִיָּדָם, וְהַלְוִיִּם מַפְשִׁיטִים״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ḥisda **said to him:** The offering remains **fit, and a verse supports my** ruling: **“And they slaughtered the Paschal offering, and the priests sprinkled the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them”** (II Chronicles 35:11). Apparently, priests are required only for the sprinkling of the blood on the altar and later rites. Just as slaughter may be performed by non-priests, so can the collection and conveying of the blood be performed by them.


###### Zevachim 14a:21
[Zevachim 14a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/14a:21)

מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: זָר, וְאוֹנֵן,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet raises an objection** from a *baraita*: If **a non-priest, or an acute mourner,**