## Zevachim Daf 3b

###### Zevachim 3b:1
[Zevachim 3b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:1)

אִם הִצִּיל בְּמֵת חָמוּר – שֶׁכֵּן חֲלוּקָה בְּאוֹהָלִין, תַּצִּיל בִּכְלִי חֶרֶשׂ הַקַּל – שֶׁאֵין חֲלוּקִין בְּאוֹהָלִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** a partition **protects** an item **from** impurity imparted by **a corpse,** which is **severe,** this is only **because** such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and **tents are divided** by partitions. If so, **should** a partition **protect** food from impurity imparted **in an earthenware vessel, which,** although **mild, is not divided by** partitions, like **tents** are?


###### Zevachim 3b:2
[Zevachim 3b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:2)

הָתִינַח לְרַבָּנַן; לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-à-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel **works out well according to** the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But **according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer,** who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, **what can be said?** How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type?


###### Zevachim 3b:3
[Zevachim 3b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:3)

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קַל וָחוֹמֶר קָאָמַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **Rabbi Eliezer** agrees with this principle. Yet he **says** that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his ***a fortiori*** inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type.


###### Zevachim 3b:4
[Zevachim 3b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:4)

אִי הָכִי, הָתָם נָמֵי לֵימָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר: קֳדָשִׁים מְחַלְּלִין קֳדָשִׁים – חוּלִּין לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If that is so,** that an *a fortiori* inference overrides this principle, **let us say an *a fortiori*** inference **there as well,** with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other **sacrificial** animals **desecrates** those **sacrificial** animals, **all the more so** is it **not** clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of **non-sacred** meat desecrates them?


###### Zevachim 3b:5
[Zevachim 3b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:5)

אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּרַב – כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? ״וְלֹא יְחַלְּלוּ אֶת קׇדְשֵׁי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ לַה׳״ – קֳדָשִׁים מְחַלְּלִין קֳדָשִׁים, וְאֵין חוּלִּין מְחַלְּלִין קֳדָשִׁים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **Rather, the reasoning** behind the statement **of Rav** that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning** behind the statement **of Rav?** The verse: **“And they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord”** (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of **sacred items,** i.e., offerings, **desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred** intent **does not desecrate sacred items.**


###### Zevachim 3b:6
[Zevachim 3b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:6)

אַלְמָא אֲתָא קְרָא אַפְּקֵיהּ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר; הָכָא נָמֵי – לֵיתֵי ״תּוֹכוֹ״ לַפְּקֵיהּ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **Apparently,** an inference from **a verse** can **come to rule out** a conflicting ***a fortiori*** inference. If so, **here too,** with regard to a partition in an oven, **let** the verse “and every earthen vessel into **whose interior** any of them falls” **come to rule out** Rabbi Eliezer’s ***a fortiori*** inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure.


###### Zevachim 3b:7
[Zevachim 3b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:7)

הַאי ״תּוֹכוֹ״ – מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לָאֳוכָלִין שֶׁגִּיבְּלָן בְּטִיט, וְהִכְנִיסָן לַאֲוִיר תַּנּוּר. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּבִנְגִיעָה לֹא מְטַמֵּא, בַּאֲוִירוֹ נָמֵי לָא מְטַמּוּ [קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן].

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **This** expression: **“Whose interior,”** does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it **is necessary to** teach another *halakha*, namely, that **food that one kneaded with clay,** covering it from all sides, **and put in the airspace of an oven** that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might **enter your mind to say** that **since** the food **cannot become impure by touching** an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, **it also cannot become impure** by being put **in the airspace of** an impure oven. The phrase “in whose interior any of them falls” **teaches us** that the food does contract impurity.


###### Zevachim 3b:8
[Zevachim 3b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:8)

וְרַבָּנַן – הָנָךְ לָא צְרִיכִי קְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** as for **the Rabbis,** who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: **These** matters **do not need a verse** to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the *halakha* therefore is self-evident.


###### Zevachim 3b:9
[Zevachim 3b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:9)

רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר אַמֵּי רָמֵי שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ אַשִּׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים, וּמְשַׁנֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction** between Rav’s statement with regard to **deviation** with regard to the type **of offering,** i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, **and** Rav’s statement with regard to **deviation** with regard to the **owner,** i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, **and** he then **resolves** the contradiction.


###### Zevachim 3b:10
[Zevachim 3b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:10)

מִי אָמַר רַב: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת – כְּשֵׁירָה, לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה – פְּסוּלָה; אַלְמָא דְּלָאו מִינַהּ מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ, דְּמִינַהּ לָא מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The contradiction is as follows: **Did Rav say** that **a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of** another **sin offering,** i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is **fit,** but that if one slaughtered it **for the sake of a burnt offering** it is **unfit? Apparently,** slaughtering an offering with an improper intention **not of its type ruins it;** whereas intent that is **of its type does not ruin it.**


###### Zevachim 3b:11
[Zevachim 3b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:11)

וְהָאָמַר רַב: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה, עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁרָה; אַלְמָא דְּבַר מִינַהּ מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ, דְּלָאו מִינַהּ לָא מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But doesn’t Rav say** that **a sin offering that one slaughtered for** a person who is not its owner but **who** nevertheless **is obligated** to bring **a sin offering** is **unfit,** whereas if one slaughtered it **for** a person **who is obligated** to bring **a burnt offering,** it is **fit? Apparently,** an improper intention that is **of its type ruins** the offering, whereas intent **not of its type does not ruin it.**


###### Zevachim 3b:12
[Zevachim 3b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:12)

וּמְשַׁנֵּי: הָתָם ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַהֲרֵי חַטָּאת לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת נִשְׁחֲטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** he **resolves** the contradiction as follows: **There,** with regard to deviation from the type of offering, **the Merciful One states** in the Torah: **“And slaughter it for a sin offering”** (Leviticus 4:33). **And** here **a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering,** and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.


###### Zevachim 3b:13
[Zevachim 3b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:13)

הָכָא ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו״ כְּתִיב – עָלָיו וְלֹא עַל חֲבֵירוֹ; חֲבֵירוֹ דּוּמְיָא דִידֵיהּ, שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב כַּפָּרָה כְּמוֹתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Here,** concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it **is written** in the Torah concerning a sin offering: **“And he shall be forgiven”** (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically **he,** the owner, **but not another** person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. **The other** person to whom this is referring is presumably **similar to him,** the owner of the sin offering, in **that he is obligated** to make **atonement similar to** that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.


###### Zevachim 3b:14
[Zevachim 3b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:14)

רַב חֲבִיבָא רָמֵי שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים אַתּוֹךְ תּוֹכוֹ, וּמְשַׁנֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Ḥaviva raises a contradiction** between Rav’s statement concerning **deviation** with regard to the **owner and** the aforementioned *baraita* concerning **the interior of its interior,** i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, **and resolves** the contradiction.


###### Zevachim 3b:15
[Zevachim 3b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:15)

וּמִי אָמַר רַב: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב [חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה, עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב] עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁירָה; אַלְמָא דְּמִינַהּ מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ, לָאו מִינַהּ לָא מַחֲרִיב בַּהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The contradiction is as follows: **But did Rav say** that **a sin offering that one slaughtered for** a person other than its owner but **who is** also **obligated** to bring **a sin offering** is **unfit,** whereas if one slaughtered it **for** a person **obligated** to bring **a burnt offering,** it is **fit? Apparently,** an improper intention that is **of its type ruins it,** whereas intent that is **not of its type does not ruin it.**


###### Zevachim 3b:16
[Zevachim 3b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:16)

וְהָתַנְיָא: ״תּוֹכוֹ״ – וְלֹא תּוֹךְ תּוֹכוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ כְּלִי שֶׁטֶף מַצִּיל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita* that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel’s **interior** is rendered impure **but not the interior of its interior,** and **even a vessel** purified through **rinsing,** if placed in the earthenware vessel, **protects** food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type.


###### Zevachim 3b:17
[Zevachim 3b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:17)

וּמְשַׁנֵּי: אַרְבְּעָה ״תּוֹכוֹ״ כְּתִיבִי (תּוֹכוֹ) – ״תּוֹךְ״, ״תּוֹכוֹ״, ״תּוֹךְ״, ״תּוֹכוֹ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rav Ḥaviva **resolves** the contradiction as follows: The expression: **Whose interior [*tokho*], is written four** times. In other words, in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior [*tokho*] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [*tokho*] shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33), the word *tokho* is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [*tokh*] were mentioned four times: **Interior [*tokh*], whose interior [*tokho*], interior [*tokh*],** and **its interior [*tokho*].**


###### Zevachim 3b:18
[Zevachim 3b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:18)

חַד – לְגוּפֵיהּ; וְחַד – לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**One** of these is necessary **to** teach the matter **itself,** that an impure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; **and one** instance is used **for a verbal analogy** between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace.


###### Zevachim 3b:19
[Zevachim 3b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/3b:19)

חַד – תּוֹכוֹ שֶׁל זֶה וְלֹא תּוֹכוֹ שֶׁל אַחֵר; אִידַּךְ – ״תּוֹכוֹ״ וְלֹא תּוֹךְ תּוֹכוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ כְּלִי שֶׁטֶף מַצִּיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**One** indicates that **the interior** airspace **of this,** i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, **but not the interior of another** type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and **the other** instance indicates that **its interior, but not the interior of its interior,** imparts impurity, **and** that **even a vessel** purified through **rinsing,** if placed in the earthenware vessel, **protects** food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar *halakha* would apply to slaughter.