## Zevachim Daf 4a

###### Zevachim 4a:1
[Zevachim 4a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:1)

מְנָלַן דְּבָעֵינַן זְבִיחָה לִשְׁמָהּ? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם [שְׁלָמִים].

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive **that we require** that an offering’s **slaughter** be performed **for its own sake?** It is derived from a verse, **as the verse states: “And if his offering is a sacrifice [*zevaḥ*] of peace offerings”** (Leviticus 3:1), teaching **that slaughter [*zeviḥa*] must be** performed **for the sake of a peace offering.**


###### Zevachim 4a:2
[Zevachim 4a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:2)

וְדִילְמָא הַיְינוּ שְׁמַיְיהוּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **But perhaps** when the verse states: “A sacrifice of peace offerings,” “a sacrifice of peace offerings” **is** simply **the name of** this type of offering, and is not referring to intent of the one slaughtering it.


###### Zevachim 4a:3
[Zevachim 4a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:3)

מִדִּכְתִיב ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״, ״הַזּוֹרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – וְלָא כְּתִיב ״זֶבַח״; וְהָכָא כְּתִיב ״זֶבַח״; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **From** the fact **that it is written** in other verses: **“Who offers the blood of the peace offering”** (Leviticus 7:33), and: **“Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering”** (Leviticus 7:14), **and** the term: **A sacrifice [*zevaḥ*], is not written,** whereas **here,** in this verse, the term: **“A sacrifice [*zevaḥ*]** of peace offerings,” **is written, learn from it that** the **slaughter [*zeviḥa*] must be** performed **for the sake of a peace offering.**


###### Zevachim 4a:4
[Zevachim 4a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:4)

אַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for the *halakha* that **slaughter** must be performed for the sake of the offering being sacrificed. **From where do we** derive that the **other** sacrificial **rites,** i.e., collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar, must also be performed for the sake of the offering?


###### Zevachim 4a:5
[Zevachim 4a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:5)

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִזְּבִיחָה; מָה לִזְבִיחָה – שֶׁכֵּן נִפְסְלָה שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אוֹכְלִין בַּפֶּסַח!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive from** the fact that **slaughter** must be performed for the sake of the offering that the other sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of the offering as well, this derivation can be refuted, as slaughter has a unique element of stringency: **What** is unique **about slaughter?** It is unique **in that with regard to a Paschal offering,** the offering is **disqualified** if it is slaughtered **not for the sake of those who eat** it. If the Paschal offering is slaughtered for the sake of people who are incapable of eating it, such as one who is too ill to eat, it is disqualified. By contrast, performing other rites with this intent does not disqualify the offering. Therefore, one cannot assume that a *halakha* that applies to slaughter applies to other rites as well.


###### Zevachim 4a:6
[Zevachim 4a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:6)

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא קַבָּלָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rather, the verse states: “Who sacrifices [*hamakriv*] the blood of the peace offering”** (Leviticus 7:33), referring to the one who collects the blood of the offering, as the Gemara will explain. This phrase indicates **that** the **collection** of the blood **must be** performed **for the sake of a peace offering.**


###### Zevachim 4a:7
[Zevachim 4a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:7)

וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקַבָּלָה, וְלֵילַף שְׁחִיטָה מִינַּהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **And let the Merciful One write** this *halakha* in the Torah only **with regard to** the **collection** of the blood, **and we would derive from it** that **slaughter** must also be performed for the sake of the offering.


###### Zevachim 4a:8
[Zevachim 4a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:8)

מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ – מָה לְקַבָּלָה שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּלָה בְּזָר וְאִשָּׁה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Because** such a derivation **can be refuted** as follows: **What** is unique **about collection** of the blood? It is unique **in that it is not valid** if performed **by a non-priest or a woman,** whereas slaughter can be performed by any competent Jew. Therefore, one cannot assume that a *halakha* that applies to collection applies to slaughter as well.


###### Zevachim 4a:9
[Zevachim 4a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:9)

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה, זְרִיקָה מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for the *halakha* that **slaughter and collection** of the blood must be performed for the sake of the offering. **From where do we** derive that this *halakha* applies to the **sprinkling** of the blood as well?


###### Zevachim 4a:10
[Zevachim 4a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:10)

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מֵהָנֵי – מָה לְהָנֵי שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן, וְיֶשְׁנָן בְּחַטָּאוֹת הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive from these** rites, i.e., slaughter and collection, that this *halakha* applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well, this derivation can be refuted: **What** is unique **about these** rites? They are unique **in that** for offerings of the most sacred order, it is **required** that they be performed in the **north** of the Temple courtyard. **And** furthermore, these rites **are** performed **in the** sacrifice of **inner sin offerings** as well as standard sin offerings. The sprinkling of the blood on the external altar, by contrast, is performed in all portions of the Temple courtyard, and it is not performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, whose blood is sprinkled only in the Sanctuary.


###### Zevachim 4a:11
[Zevachim 4a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:11)

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״הַזּוֹרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְרִיקָה לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rather, the verse states: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering”** (Leviticus 7:14), indicating **that** the **sprinkling** of the blood **must be** performed **for the sake of a peace offering.**


###### Zevachim 4a:12
[Zevachim 4a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:12)

וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּזְרִיקָה, וְלֵילַף מִינַּהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **And let the Merciful One write** this *halakha* only **with regard to sprinkling, and we would derive from it** that it applies to slaughter and collection as well.


###### Zevachim 4a:13
[Zevachim 4a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:13)

מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ – מָה לִזְרִיקָה, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ זָר מִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: That would not be sufficient, **because** such a derivation **can be refuted,** as sprinkling has a unique element of stringency. **What** is unique **about sprinkling?** It is unique **in that a non-priest is liable to** be punished with **death** at the hand of Heaven **for** performing **it.**


###### Zevachim 4a:14
[Zevachim 4a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:14)

אַשְׁכְּחַן כּוּלְּהוּ, הוֹלָכָה מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for this *halakha* with regard to **all** four rites save **conveying** the blood to the altar. **From where do we** derive that this latter rite must also be performed for the sake of the offering?


###### Zevachim 4a:15
[Zevachim 4a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:15)

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִכּוּלְּהוּ; מָה לְכוּלְּהוּ – שֶׁכֵּן עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבַטְּלָהּ; תֹּאמַר בְּהוֹלָכָה – שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְבַטְּלָהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive from all** the other rites that conveying the blood must also be performed for the sake of the offering, this derivation can also be refuted: **What** is unique **about all of** the other rites? They are unique **in that** each of them is **an indispensable rite. Would you say** that any requirement that applies to those rites necessarily applies also **with regard to conveying** the blood, **which is dispensable?** If an offering is slaughtered by the side of the altar, it is unnecessary to convey its blood to the altar.


###### Zevachim 4a:16
[Zevachim 4a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:16)

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהִקְרִיב אֶת הַכֹּל הַמִּזְבֵּחָה״, וְאָמַר מָר: זוֹ הוֹלָכַת אֵבָרִים לַכֶּבֶשׁ; וְתַנְיָא: ״וְהִקְרִיבוּ״ – זוֹ קַבָּלַת הַדָּם; וְאַפֵּיק רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן הוֹלָכָה – לְמֵימְרָא דְּהוֹלָכָה לָא תַּפְּקַהּ מִכְּלַל קַבָּלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rather, the verse states: “And** the priest **shall sacrifice [*vehikriv*] the whole,** and make it smoke **upon the altar”** (Leviticus 1:13), **and the Master said** that **this** is referring to **conveying** the **limbs** of the offering **to the ramp** of the altar. **And it is taught** in a *baraita* with regard to the verse: **“And** Aaron’s sons, the priests, **shall present [*vehikrivu*]** the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), that **this** is referring to the **collection of the blood. And** one can infer that **the Merciful One expresses** collection of the blood **in the** same **language** used for **conveying, to say that you should not exclude conveying from the category of collection** of the blood. Therefore, the *halakhot* of collection apply to conveying.


###### Zevachim 4a:17
[Zevachim 4a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:17)

וְאַשְׁכְּחַן שִׁנּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, שִׁנּוּי בְּעָלִים מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks further: **And we found** a source for the *halakha* concerning **deviation** with regard to the type of **offering,** i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different type of offering. **From where do we** derive the *halakha* concerning **deviation** with regard to the **owner,** i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of one who is not the owner?


###### Zevachim 4a:18
[Zevachim 4a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:18)

אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה. אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – דְּנָפְקָא לַן מֵהָתָם; תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Ami, says: The verse states** with regard to a thanks offering: **“And the meat of the sacrifice [*zevaḥ*] of his thanksgiving peace offering** shall be eaten on the day of his offering” (Leviticus 7:15), apparently indicating **that** its **slaughter [*zeviḥa*] must be** performed **for the sake of a thanks offering.** And **if** this language **is not** needed **for the matter of deviation** with regard to the type of **offering,** and in fact it is not, **as we** already **derived** this *halakha* **from there,** i.e., the verse cited concerning peace offerings, **apply it** to the **matter of deviation** with regard to the **owner.** It is thereby derived that an offering must be slaughtered for the sake of its owner.


###### Zevachim 4a:19
[Zevachim 4a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:19)

וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו״ – אַבָּא חָנִין אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: בָּא לְלַמֵּד, תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלָה. מָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But does this** verse **come to** teach **this** *halakha*? **Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: Concerning the phrase **“and the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering,” Abba Ḥanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:** It **comes to teach** that **a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit;** whereas **a peace offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. What** is the **difference between this** offering **and that** offering? **A thanks offering is called a peace offering** in that verse, **but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.**


###### Zevachim 4a:20
[Zevachim 4a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:20)

אֲנַן מִ״זֶּבַח״ קָאָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **We are saying** that it is derived **from** the superfluous term: **“Sacrifice [*zevaḥ*],”** that the slaughter [*zeviḥa*] must be performed for the sake of the owner. The term “peace offering” teaches Abba Ḥanin’s ruling.


###### Zevachim 4a:21
[Zevachim 4a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:21)

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֶבַח״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara disputes this: **But** the term “sacrifice [*zevaḥ*]” is **still necessary** to serve as the source for another halakhic midrash: **From where** is it derived that the meat of **a sin offering and a guilt offering** may be eaten only on the day the animal is sacrificed and the following night, like a thanks offering? **The verse states:** “And the meat of the **sacrifice [*zevaḥ*]** of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering.” The phrase teaches that not only thanks offerings, but any slaughtered offering [*zevaḥ*] is subject to this time limit unless the Torah specifies otherwise.


###### Zevachim 4a:22
[Zevachim 4a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:22)

אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״וּבְשַׂר תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו [זֶבַח]״; מַאי ״זֶבַח״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **If that were so,** i.e., if the term “sacrifice” indicated only that a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only for the period of time for which a thanks offering may be eaten, **let the verse write: And the meat of his thanksgiving peace offering sacrifice. What** is indicated by the mention of the word **sacrifice** before the phrase “his thanksgiving peace offering”? Rather, **conclude two** conclusions **from it.**


###### Zevachim 4a:23
[Zevachim 4a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:23)

אַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We found** a source for the *halakha* that **slaughter** must be performed for the sake of the owner. **From where do we** derive that the **other** sacrificial **rites** must also be performed for the sake of the owner?


###### Zevachim 4a:24
[Zevachim 4a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:24)

וְכִי תֵּימָא לֵילַף מִזְּבִיחָה – מָה לִזְבִיחָה שֶׁכֵּן פּוֹסֵל שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אוֹכְלִין בַּפֶּסַח!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter** that the other rites must be performed for the sake of the owner as well, this derivation can be refuted: **What** is unique **about slaughter?** It is unique **in that with regard to a Paschal offering,** slaughter **not for the sake of those who eat** it **disqualifies** the offering, whereas performing the other rites not for the sake of the owner does not.


###### Zevachim 4a:25
[Zevachim 4a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:25)

נֶאֶמְרָה זְבִיחָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, וְנֶאֶמְרָה זְבִיחָה בְּשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים; מָה זְבִיחָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, אַף זְבִיחָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים – לֹא תְּחַלֵּק בָּהֶן בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: A term of **slaughter is stated with regard to deviation** from the type of **offering, and** a term of **slaughter is stated with regard to deviation** with regard to the **owner. Just as** concerning the term **slaughter stated with regard to deviation** from the type of **offering, you did not differentiate between slaughter and** the **other** sacrificial **rites,** and all four rites must be performed for the sake of the offering, **so too,** concerning the term **slaughter stated with regard to deviation** in the context of the **owner, you should not differentiate between slaughter and** the **other** sacrificial **rites.**


###### Zevachim 4a:26
[Zevachim 4a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:26)

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּלָהּ בְּגוּפָהּ, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara counters: This derivation **can be refuted: What** is unique **about deviation** from the type of **offering,** as opposed to deviation with regard to the owner? It is unique with regard to four matters: First, it is unique **in that its disqualification concerns** the essence of the offering **itself. And** second, it is unique in that deviation from the type of **offering applies to** the **four** sacrificial **rites,** whereas performing a rite for the sake of the owner is relevant only to the sprinkling of the blood, which atones for the owner.


###### Zevachim 4a:27
[Zevachim 4a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/4a:27)

וְיֶשְׁנוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** third, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering **applies** even **after** the **death** of the owner, when the owner’s heir brings the offering, whereas intent for the sake of the owner is irrelevant after the owner has died. **And** fourth, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering **applies with regard to communal** offerings **as well as with regard to individual** offerings, whereas employing the term owner is irrelevant with regard to communal offerings, which are owned by the public.