## Zevachim Daf 50b

###### Zevachim 50b:1
[Zevachim 50b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:1)

וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עוֹר וּבָשָׂר וָפֶרֶשׁ; מָה לְהַלָּן – עַל יְדֵי נִיתּוּחַ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהֶפְשֵׁט, אַף כָּאן – עַל יְדֵי נִיתּוּחַ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהֶפְשֵׁט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is stated below,** with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms **skin, flesh, and dung,** in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). **Just as below** it is prepared for burning **by means of cutting** it into pieces but **not by means of flaying,** as derived by the verbal analogy, **so too here** it is prepared for burning **by means of cutting** it into pieces but **not by means of flaying.** Evidently, a *halakha* derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another *halakha* via a verbal analogy.


###### Zevachim 50b:2
[Zevachim 50b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:2)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ – אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא, מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, הַמְלַמֶּדֶת בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּרַב פָּפָּא, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via a verbal analogy** can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via an *a fortiori*** inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with **an *a fortiori*** inference: **And just as** a matter derived via **a juxtaposition, which cannot** then **teach** its *halakha* **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **either from** the statement **of Rava or from** the statement **of Ravina** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference, as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), with regard to a matter derived via **a verbal analogy, which** can **teach** its *halakha* **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rav Pappa** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference?


###### Zevachim 50b:3
[Zevachim 50b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:3)

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **This works out well according to the one who accepts** the statement **of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept** the statement **of Rav Pappa,** i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, **what is there to say?**


###### Zevachim 50b:4
[Zevachim 50b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:4)

אֶלָּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ, שֶׁאֵין מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ – אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא, מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, הַמְלַמֶּדֶת בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה חֲבֶירְתָּהּ – מִדְּרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** this can be derived through a different ***a fortiori*** inference: **And just as** a matter derived via **a juxtaposition, which cannot** then **teach** its *halakha* **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **either from** the statement **of Rava or from** the statement **of Ravina** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference, as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), with regard to a matter derived via **a verbal analogy, which** can **teach** its *halakha* **via another verbal analogy,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rami bar Ḥama** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference?


###### Zevachim 50b:5
[Zevachim 50b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:5)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּבִנְיַן אָב? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via a verbal analogy** can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a paradigm?** The question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Zevachim 50b:6
[Zevachim 50b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:6)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵדָה בְּהֶיקֵּשָׁא מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּרַב פָּפָּא; קַל וָחוֹמֶר, הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via an *a fortiori*** inference can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a juxtaposition?** The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference: **And just as** a *halakha* derived via **a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rabbi Yoḥanan** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rav Pappa** (50a), with regard to a *halakha* derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference, which **can be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via a juxtaposition?**


###### Zevachim 50b:7
[Zevachim 50b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:7)

הָנִיחָא – לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **This works out well according to the one who accepts** the statement **of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept** the statement **of Rav Pappa,** i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, **what is there to say?** The Gemara comments: The question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Zevachim 50b:8
[Zevachim 50b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:8)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵידָה בְּהֶיקֵּשָׁא מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה מִדְּרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא; קַל וָחוֹמֶר, הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via an *a fortiori*** inference can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a verbal analogy?** The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference. **And just as** a *halakha* derived via **a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rabbi Yoḥanan** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a verbal analogy,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rami bar Ḥama** (50a), with regard to a *halakha* derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference, which **can be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via a verbal analogy?**


###### Zevachim 50b:9
[Zevachim 50b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:9)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ לְמֵידָה בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר כְּדַאֲמַרַן; קַל וָחוֹמֶר, הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via an *a fortiori*** inference can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via an *a fortiori*** inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference. **And just as** a *halakha* derived via **a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **of Rabbi Yoḥanan** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via an *a fortiori*** inference, **as we have said,** with regard to a *halakha* derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference, which **can be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference?


###### Zevachim 50b:10
[Zevachim 50b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:10)

וְזֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר בֶּן קַל וָחוֹמֶר. בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And this is an *a fortiori*** inference that is the **son of,** i.e., is derived from, another ***a fortiori*** inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: **It is** not the son of an *a fortiori* inference, but the **grandson of an *a fortiori*** inference, which cannot be used. The very fact that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can then teach its *halakha* via an *a fortiori* inference is itself derived from an *a fortiori* inference, as the Gemara stated.


###### Zevachim 50b:11
[Zevachim 50b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:11)

אֶלָּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה הֶיקֵּשׁ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ לָמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ – אִי מִדְּרָבָא אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא, מְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; קַל וָחוֹמֶר, הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ מִדְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר?! וְזֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר בֶּן קַל וָחוֹמֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* as to whether a matter derived via an *a fortiori* inference can teach its *halakha* to another matter via an *a fortiori* inference can be derived via another ***a fortiori*** inference. **And just as** a matter derived via **a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition,** as proven **either from** the statement **of Rava or from** the statement **of Ravina** (49b), can nevertheless **teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference, as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), with regard to a *halakha* derived via **an *a fortiori*** inference, which **can be derived** from another *halakha* derived **via a juxtaposition,** as proven **from** the statement **that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught** (50a), **is it not logical that it should teach** its *halakha* **via an *a fortiori*** inference? The Gemara comments: **And this is an *a fortiori*** inference that is the **son of** another ***a fortiori*** inference.


###### Zevachim 50b:12
[Zevachim 50b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:12)

דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בְּבִנְיַן אָב? אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תָּא שְׁמַע: מָלַק וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה בְּבֵית הַבְּלִיעָה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מְטַמְּאָה בְּבֵית הַבְּלִיעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the *halakha* as to whether **a matter derived via an *a fortiori*** inference can **teach** its *halakha* to another matter **via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come** and **hear** a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest **pinched** the nape of a bird offering properly **and it was** then **found** to be a bird **with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [*tereifa*],** which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, **Rabbi Meir says:** An olive-bulk of its meat **does not render** one who swallows it **ritually impure** when it is **in the throat,** as is the *halakha* concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. **Rabbi Yehuda says:** Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat **renders** one who swallows it **ritually impure** when it is **in the throat.**


###### Zevachim 50b:13
[Zevachim 50b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Zevachim/r/50b:13)

אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה, שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – שְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהֶרֶת טְרֵיפָתָהּ מִטּוּמְאָתָהּ; נְבֵילַת עוֹף, שֶׁאֵין מְטַמֵּא בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהֶרֶת טְרֵיפָתָהּ מִטּוּמְאָתָהּ?! מָה מָצִינוּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁמַּכְשַׁרְתָּהּ בַּאֲכִילָה –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna continues: **Rabbi Meir said:** My opinion can be proved via **an *a fortiori*** inference. **And just as** with regard to **the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity** to a person **through touching** it **and carrying** it, **its slaughter** nevertheless **purifies its *tereifa* from its impurity,** with regard to **the carcass of a bird,** which possesses less severe impurity, **as it does not transmit impurity through touching** it **and carrying** it, but only when it is in the throat, **is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its *tereifa* from its impurity?** And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a *tereifa*, it can be derived: **Just as we found with regard to** a bird’s **slaughter that it permits it for consumption**