Milk from a non-kosher or terefah animal, and its whey, etc., are forbidden. This is explicit in the first chapter of Bechorot (7a) that milk from a non-kosher animal and its whey are prohibited. The prohibition of milk from a terefah animal is clear in the 25th chapter (116b) and in the chapter "Behemah HaMakshah" (Chullin 69a). Similarly, the Rif and the Rosh wrote this in the chapter "Elu Treifot."

The Rambam wrote in the third chapter of Ma'achalot Assurot that although milk from a non-kosher animal is forbidden by Torah law, one does not receive lashes for it, as it is stated, "You shall not eat of their flesh"—it is the flesh for which one is liable to lashes, but not the milk.

In the first chapter of Bechorot (7a), they asked Rav Sheshet about the urine of a donkey: is it permitted or forbidden? They also asked about horses and camels since these animals are not discussed. The question was whether the urine of a donkey, which is dark and resembles milk, is like the milk that exits from it or not.

Rav Sheshet answered that the Tannaitic teaching is: "That which comes from a non-kosher animal is forbidden." This applies specifically to non-kosher animals, and the urine of a donkey, which is also considered non-kosher, is thus forbidden.

Rashi explains that it is forbidden because it comes from a non-kosher animal. Others say that the question was only about the urine of a donkey since people do drink it, and thus it was asked about it specifically. Rav Sheshet’s response that "that which comes from a non-kosher animal is forbidden" implies that all such liquids from non-kosher animals are forbidden, including those of a donkey.

The Rosh writes that the halacha follows the latter opinion, which is stricter for Torah laws. However, the Rambam in the fourth chapter of Ma'achalot Assurot states that the skin of a donkey’s face is permitted because it is like a membrane, and thus the urine of a donkey is also permitted. This is surprising, as even if one follows the stricter view, it would only apply to the urine of horses and camels. But how can one permit the urine of a donkey even according to the lenient opinion?

The Mordechai in Shmona Sharatzim and the responses of the Rashba (siman 817) state that according to B"H (Beit Hillel), the urine of a person or a non-kosher animal is permitted.

Cheeses made from the milk of animals that are found to be treif, etc., as discussed in the first chapter of Chullin (11b). Regarding the statement, “From where do we know this matter? The Rabbis say, go according to the majority and bring it from a red heifer which must be burned while still whole,” and there is concern that it might be treif. This is not because we say, “go according to the majority.” The Tosafot wrote, “And if you say, since a cow is two years old, perhaps this is because it is established as not being treif according to the opinion that a treif animal is not alive,” and it can be said that any presumption that has not been clarified or known, even for a single moment, we do not follow. From this, one can learn a practical halacha: if cheeses were made from the milk of several animals, and afterwards one was slaughtered and found to be treif, all are prohibited. We cannot rely on the assumption that the cow was not treif and say that it is only now that it is treif. The Rosh wrote their opinion and then wrote, “It can be said that according to what we conclude, that we follow the majority, all animals are assumed to be kosher, even within a year, because most animals are kosher and the majority is stronger than a presumption.” Rabbeinu (Rashba) followed this explanation, and so did Rabbeinu Yerucham in section 31. The Rashba and the Ran, after writing the Tosafot’s reasoning, wrote in the name of Rabbi Shimshon that one should not prohibit the cheeses based on this reason. Even if it is said that we do not follow such a presumption, here it is different because it is a presumption that comes from the majority, and most animals are kosher. Therefore, we say that it is only now that it has become treif, as explained in the matter of presumptions in the first chapter of Ketubot (12b) regarding a man who married a woman and did not find her to be a virgin, and in the chapter “Ha-modir” (Ketubot 76a) regarding blemishes. Even R’ Yonah agreed to permit them, as it is said that if slaughtered, it remains in a state of permissibility until it is known what made it treif. This shows that an animal in its lifetime is presumed not to be treif; therefore, if we find it to be treif now, we say it has only recently become so. In the glosses of Maimonides on the third chapter of Ma'akhalot Asurot, he brought these reasons in the name of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (SMG) but did not decide between them. However, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan (SMK) in section 71 ruled according to Rabbi Shimshon’s opinion and Rabbi Yonah’s opinion.

And what our Rabbi wrote: "But if it is known that before milking it was already treif, such as having a member that was treif or having a wound with a blister, etc." — so wrote the Rashba and the Ran based on the words of Rabbi Yonah who agreed with Rabbi Shimshon's view, that if we now find it to be treif, we say that it is only now that it has become treif. However, this applies to cases where it is possible to say that it only recently became treif near the time of slaughter. But for cases of clear treifot or other types of treifot where it is impossible to attribute it to the time of slaughter, it is definitely prohibited because once it has lost its status of being kosher, we cannot determine how much time it had before becoming treif. This is similar to what is said (Nidda 56b) about stains that if they are found on a garment, it defiles retroactively until you can say that you examined the garment and did not find a stain, or until the time of laundering. Rabbeinu (the Rosh) who wrote that all cheeses are prohibited implies that he prohibits even cheeses made before three days, according to the view of Rabbi Yonah, the Rashba, and the Ran, who say that since it left its life with a presumed status of being kosher and you do not know how long it has been so, we are stringent. This is contrary to the opinion of the Sefer Mitzvot Katan (SMK) in Siman 1 that even if a wound was discovered, cheeses made before three days are permitted. The reason we differentiate between a wound that was discovered and one that was not discovered is based on the Talmudic teaching in the first chapter of Chullin (51b) and in the first chapter of Ketubot (76b) regarding a needle found in the thickness of a cup, which if the wound was discovered, it is known to be at least three days prior to slaughter. It seems from the words of the Ran that he agrees with this view of Rabbi Yonah, but in the first chapter of Chullin regarding a case where there is a doubt about treifot, it seems from his words that he holds according to the Tosafot’s opinion, that any presumption that was not clear at the time is not a valid presumption, and therefore, according to him, all cheeses are prohibited. From the Rashba’s Talmudic commentary, it appears that he leans towards the view of Rabbi Yonah, but in the short Talmudic commentary, there is no clear decision. He wrote: "In the case where cheese was made from a known animal and then the animal was slaughtered and found to be treif, such as if a needle is found in the thickness of a cup or in one of the places that make it treif, if the wound was discovered, it is known that it was at least three days before slaughter. Therefore, all cheeses and milk that were milked within three days before slaughter are definitely prohibited. But if the wound was not discovered, it is a doubt. Similarly, if the wound was discovered and cheeses were made from its milk before three days, there are some great scholars who prohibited it. Although it is a Torah-level presumption, it can be said that we maintain the animal on its presumed status, which is only a presumption and not a clear status like the case of a virgin woman at the time of birth. But an animal's kosher status is not known unless twelve months pass, after which it is known that it was not treif when it was born. Thus, any presumption that does not have a clear time is not relied upon. Some permit it and give reasons for their view, according to which since most animals are kosher, we follow the majority, and the current status is that it is treif. Since it was slaughtered with a presumed status of being permitted until we know what caused it to become treif. Nevertheless, in cases of clear treifot where it is impossible to say that it has recently become treif, it is prohibited. Since you really know that it was not treif at the time, this means it has already left its life with a presumed status of being kosher, and how much it had already left is unknown. In the case of Torah-level doubts, we are stringent. This is also supported by what some Geonim wrote that if an animal is found to be treif, the cheeses made from its milk are prohibited retroactively." And you should know that in the long Talmudic commentary, he wrote in this manner. Regarding cheese that was made from a known animal and then the animal was slaughtered, and even if he made cheese from several animals and one was found to be treif, the milk of that animal is not nullified among the others. If it is known that it was treif on the day its milk was used, all are prohibited. Therefore, if within three days from which the cheese was made, the animal was slaughtered and found to have a discovered wound that was known to be three days before slaughter, it is as stated. And he wrote in his responsa, Siman 118, that he was surprised why the milk of the treif animal was not nullified in sixty. He replied that he is not mistaken, but that it is something that even children know. His intention was that if the cheese is significant and like something that is not nullified, we should be stringent about it, as if it were definitely treif. Therefore, within three days, it is certainly treif and the intention was not to prohibit all mixtures but to treat it as if it was definitely treif. The proof is that he wrote that the milk of that animal is not nullified (if it were to nullify all mixtures, he would have said so), and his intention was to state that the cheese is not nullified. What I wrote that the milk is not nullified is a mistake; it should have been written that the cheese from that treif animal is not nullified. This is to avoid confusion and clarify that the cheese from that treif animal is not nullified." In the short Talmudic commentary, he wrote that if many animals are involved and one of them is found to be treif, we follow the measure of sixty like other prohibitions.

“And if it is in a herd with other animals and its milk got mixed with others, all the cheeses are prohibited” — as it is written afterward. And the Rashba wrote that we follow the measure of sixty, etc. This implies that according to the first opinion, even more than sixty is also prohibited. I do not understand why there is a stricter concern with this milk compared to other prohibitions. It is possible that the initial statement was not a separate opinion but rather the beginning of the discussion to say that this milk prohibits its mixture, and he intended to conclude that it only prohibits up to sixty. However, since the Rashba wrote this explicitly, it was included in his name. Even though, according to this, it would be proper to write “And the Rashba wrote,” and not just “the Rashba wrote,” which implies disagreement, our Rabbi is not particular about this detail, as he often writes “the Rashba” even if he does not disagree.

And if it became treif due to a sore, the Rashba wrote that since it is impossible to say that it became treif right now, [the cheese] is prohibited. And if it is known that it did not become treif right now, etc., the words of Rabbeinu (the Rosh) are not well explained and leave room for misunderstanding. For the case of becoming treif due to a sore, the Rashba wrote this explicitly, and not for other types of treifot. He had previously written the law for other treifot but did not provide this reason for them. This reason applies to all types of treifot where it cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter. As I have already cited his words and the words of the Ran, which apply to all types of treifot where it cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter. The Rosh, however, seems to consider that since the law of other treifot where it cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter implies that there is no disagreement on this, he wrote it generally. For the case of becoming treif due to a sore, which has a disagreement, he wrote in the name of the Rashba that it is prohibited and provided the reason. In truth, it was not necessary to write this reason separately. Just as he relied on the reason for other treifot where it cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter as being evident from the rationale, so too he should have relied on this for the case of becoming treif due to a sore. If he wanted to write the reason at least, he should have written it earlier regarding other treifot where it cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter, and from there we would learn the reasoning for the case of becoming treif due to a sore according to those who prohibit it, as it is a single rationale.

And the Aharonim wrote to permit [cheese] from animals that became treif due to a sore, etc., in the first chapter of Chullin, and the Tosafot also wrote this there, even though they are stringent regarding all other types of treifot as I have written above. The Mordechai also wrote this in chapter 19. It is puzzling why the Rashba and the Ran prohibited [cheese from animals with a sore] since it is a doubt. They should have ruled leniently. It is possible that the Rashba and the Ran mentioned the case of a sore specifically because it is a type of treifot that cannot be attributed to the time of slaughter and they did not intend to argue about it. It seems to them that there is only a single doubt in this case. But if there were two doubts, there is no doubt they would agree that we rely on the lenient view. Moreover, it seems that since for milk that was milked three or four days before slaughter there is only a single doubt — namely, whether it was treif at the time of milking, since it cannot be said that it became treif after these days — surely a sore more than three or four days old could develop. And since it has left its life with a presumed status of being kosher, and we do not know how long it has been so, it remains in a state of presumed prohibition until it is known that it was not treif at the time of milking.

The term 'Yali d’ikhmorita' is permitted in the first chapter of Bekhorot (7). It says there that the seed of a male deer follows the female deer, and since the milk is sour and not needed, it follows the 'Yali d’ikhmorita' and becomes treif. Rashi explains that 'Yali d’ikhmorita' means: When a large amount of seed is poured out and it congeals. It seems that the reason it is permitted is because it is merely a form of coagulation.

The hide that comes from the face of a donkey is permitted, as it is a mere 'perisha' (excrement), and the reason is explained because it is considered merely a form of excrement. The HaMa'ari (He'emat HaMelech) in the fourth chapter of Maimonides' Mishneh Torah, writes that he is surprised by the Ramban, who rules in the laws of firstborns according to Rav Sheshet, that the excrement of the feet (מי רגלים) is prohibited, while the hide from the face of a donkey is permitted because it is considered a mere excrement and not food at all. This is unlike the case of the excrement of the feet. It seems to me that the Ramban's words are consistent, for when he says 'unlike the excrement of the feet,' it clearly indicates that he holds the excrement of the feet is not a complete form of excrement. For we see that people drink the excrement of a donkey’s feet and consider it a medicinal remedy. Although the excrement of other animals and creatures is not used in this way, this is because they are not known to be beneficial. However, since we find that donkey’s feet excrement is not a complete form of excrement, we learn that this is true for all types of excrement, according to the latter opinion of Rav Sheshet. But the hide from the face of a donkey is a complete form of excrement, and therefore it is permitted.

**"Milk from pure animals and their excrement is permitted,**and it does not have the prohibition of 'ever min ha-chai' (a limb taken from a living animal), as stated in the first chapter of Bekhorot (6). It is derived from the verse, 'And the ten holes of milk' (Leviticus 7:35), and the verse, 'A land flowing with milk and honey' (Exodus 3:8). If not permitted, the verse would be praising something that is not fit for consumption. The verse, 'Go, break the bread and eat it' (Isaiah 55:1), and 'Go, break without money and without price wine and milk' (Isaiah 55:1), also indicates that milk is permitted. Our Rabbi learned from this that excrement is permitted and does not have the prohibition of 'ever min ha-chai.' Certainly, this is the case because it is not more stringent than milk. However, according to Rabbi Eliezer, who prohibited milk from a live animal nearby, it seems that the same would apply to excrement from a live animal, as it is considered to come from a living being. It is puzzling, though, what Rabbi Eliezer requires from Rav Sheshet regarding excrement from a donkey. He should deduce that even if it is pure, it is still prohibited because it comes from a living animal. Perhaps it can be explained that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that excrement is not prohibited because it is considered merely a form of excrement, unlike milk. In the chapter ‘Behema ha-mekushesh’ (Chullin 69), the question is asked about drinking milk from a fetus that was removed from its mother’s womb before the mother was slaughtered, and then the mother was slaughtered. Is that milk forbidden because it is considered a limb taken from a living animal, or is it permitted because it is just regular milk? It is not clear whether the prohibition is due to the fact that it was extracted from a living being and then the mother was slaughtered, or if there is no prohibition due to slaughter. The resolution was left in doubt, and the halachic authorities ruled stringently since it is a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition. Rabbi wrote about this in Siman 14."

**"Rabbi Eliezer wrote that only milk permitted by the Torah is permitted,**but milk of excrement is forbidden. Rabbi Simcha permits it, and this is how we practice. The words of our Rabbi are unclear as he did not explain why 'milk of excrement' is called so — whether it refers to the liquid left after cooking or to water that remains after the food has been removed from the cooked liquid. Since it is written, 'This is how we practice,' it seems that he is referring to the liquid left after cooking. For in other cases, we have not seen anyone who drinks it at all because it is not considered significant. In truth, Rabbi Eliezer did not forbid the liquid left after cooking, but rather other types of water, as it is stated in the Talmud (Kiddushin 25) that cooking with milk does present a prohibition, as it is used in making a condiment (kotach) from milk excrement. I say that the liquid from milk is forbidden by Torah law, while the milk that is left over from making cheese is considered merely water. The Rambam was stringent about consuming it, as in the first chapter of Bekhorot, where a verse is required to permit milk because anything that comes from a living animal is forbidden. Here, it is stated that the liquid from milk is not considered milk, and there is no verse to permit it since it comes from a living animal and is therefore forbidden. Rabbi Simcha responded that in terms of eating meat and milk, it is not considered like milk, as the verse refers to the milk from the mother as it comes from the mother mixed with the food. However, for other matters, it is considered like milk, as it is stated in the Mishnah (Mikvaot 6) that the liquid from milk is considered like milk, and R'la (Rabbi Levi) says that it is only to permit seeds, but in terms of cooking, the liquid from milk is not like milk."

"A treifah (a non-kosher animal) that nursed from a kosher animal, the milk found in its stomach is permitted, etc. In chapter 25 of Bekhorot (62b), it is taught that if a kosher animal nursed from a treifah, its stomach is forbidden. However, if a treifah nursed from a kosher animal, its stomach is permitted because it is absorbed into its digestive tract. In the Gemara there, it is concluded that a kosher animal that nursed from a treifah should be treated as if the milk is absorbed in its stomach. Certainly, if a treifah nursed from a kosher animal, it is permissible because the milk collected in it is only considered a superficial layer. The Rashba wrote about this that this is the interpretation of the Rif, and he explained in this context that the case of a stomach cooked in its milk is forbidden before it has been returned and repeated. However, it seems from his wording that a kosher animal that nursed from a treifah and a treifah that nursed from a kosher animal are treated together, and the reason given for both is that it is absorbed in its digestive tract. Rashi did not include this in his text, and the wording does not strongly support the Rif’s interpretation. Later editions of the books have corrected this. R’T (Rabbi Tam) said that according to this interpretation, there is a distinction: the term ‘superficial layer’ refers to milk that has congealed in the stomach, and the Mishnah’s case of a kosher animal nursing from a treifah refers to clear milk found in the stomach, which is considered complete milk. The difficulty in the Rif’s interpretation is that the Gemara asks on the Mishnah's statement that the stomachs of non-Jewish and dead animals are forbidden. But the Mishnah says that if a treifah nursed from a kosher animal, its stomach is permitted. The Gemara answers that this is not a contradiction: the Mishnah’s first part refers to before it was returned (repeated), while the second part refers to after it was returned. The Rashba and the Rosh were also puzzled by the Rif’s text and wrote that R’T’s answer to distinguish between clear and congealed milk is correct. The reason is that clear milk that comes from a treifah is still clear and not considered a superficial layer. But once it has congealed, it is considered superficial. This is supported by the Tosafot. However, the Rif’s opinion was that according to the last Mishnah, the stomach cooked in its milk is permitted, indicating that even clear milk is allowed. The Rambam's view aligns with the Rif's, stating in the fourth chapter of the laws of Ma'achilot Asurot that the stomach of a non-Jewish or a non-kosher animal is permitted because it is similar to other waste in the body. Therefore, it is permitted to use the stomach of an animal slaughtered by a non-Jew and the stomach of a non-kosher animal, but the skin of the stomach is like other intestines and is forbidden. The Kesef Mishnah wrote that according to the Rambam and the Geonim, even clear milk is considered a superficial layer. This is consistent with the Rambam’s words in the ninth chapter. Regarding the law, since both the Rif and the Rambam agree to permit even clear milk, we follow their view, and this is the practice."

"Human milk is permitted in the context where it is expressed from a woman who has milked it, etc., until it becomes like milk from a rodent. In the first chapter of Ketubot (62b), it is taught: A baby who nurses from a woman up to 24 months, and from then on, is like nursing from a rodent according to Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says that even after 4 or 5 years, if he has weaned after 24 months and then returns to nursing, it is like nursing from a rodent. The Gemara questions this, asking if the milk from a creature that walks on two legs is considered impure. It is taught that the verse specifies "he" (the creature) to exclude such milk. Rav Sheshet said that even when the milk is expressed, there is no issue; that is, the Rabbis did not enact a prohibition. The difference is: when it has been expressed and when it has not been. Rashi explains that the term "permitted when expressed" refers to milk that has been expressed into a vessel from the woman’s breast, and nursing from the breast is considered as nursing from a pest according to Rabbinic law. The Rosh adds that the reason is that if the milk has not been expressed, there is a concern that it might be mixed with the milk of a non-kosher animal since it is not common to eat human flesh. Thus, it might be confused with milk from a non-kosher animal. However, if it has been expressed, it is permitted. It seems that Rashi's mention of "expressed into a vessel" is not limited to this scenario alone; it also includes cases where the milk is expressed directly into the mouth. This implies that if it is expressed from the breast or into the mouth, it is considered as not having been expressed properly. What our Rabbi wrote about an older child who nurses from his mother being subject to corporal punishment, the Rambam also wrote in the third chapter of the laws of Ma'achilot Asurot. It is clear that this is the case for those who violate the words of the Sages."

"What is mentioned that [a child is considered] healthy up to four years and sick up to five years — this is the interpretation given by the Tosafot in the chapter Be’Me’ah She’ah (Shabbat 62b) regarding a nailed sandal."

"And what he wrote, 'But if he has weaned, etc.' —

In the chapter Even HaEzer (in Ketubot 60a), it is explained that after 24 months, if the child returns to breastfeeding, it is as if he is consuming something detestable. And how long [after weaning] is it considered detestable? Shmuel said, three days. The Rosh wrote that the Yerushalmi [states]: Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, three days is the limit.

When is this said? When the child was weaned while healthy. But if he was weaned due to illness, he can return to breastfeeding unless it is a matter of danger, in which case even after several days, he can return to breastfeeding. The Rif also cited this Yerushalmi but did not conclude with a distinction between a case of danger and one without danger. The Rambam in Chapter 3 of Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot did similarly. It seems that the reason is because it is obvious that in a case of danger, the child can return to breastfeeding, as there is nothing that stands in the way of preserving life.

Note that the Rambam wrote in the aforementioned chapter as follows: A child can nurse for even four or five years. But if he was weaned for three days or more due to his health, and not because of illness, he should not return to breastfeeding, provided that he was weaned after 24 months. But if he was weaned within this period, even if it was for a month or two, he is permitted to return to breastfeeding until the end of 24 months.

From his precise language, it seems that when it is said that a child can nurse for four or five years, this only applies if he was never weaned at all. However, if he was weaned within 24 months, although he may return to nursing, he is only permitted to nurse until the end of 24 months. This reasoning is logical, but I do not know from where the Rambam derived this."

"Honey from bees is permitted, and it does not involve the prohibition of Ever Min HaChai (a limb from a living animal). This means it also does not involve the prohibition of something that comes from a non-kosher animal. This ruling is clear in the first chapter of Bechorot (7b), and it will be explained further shortly, with God's help."

Although the bodies of the insects are mixed in, etc. Thus wrote the Mordechai in the chapter Beitza (1:4) in the name of the Ra’ah, and he concluded there with the Semag and added that the bodies [of the insects] are like a decayed carcass from the outset, which is permitted even according to the opinion that no'atin ta’am le-fgam (the taste that is unappealing) is forbidden.

This was also written by the Ge’ot Maimon in the third chapter in his name, and the Tosafot wrote in the last chapter of Avodah Zarah (61b): It is astonishing how we eat honey when the legs of insects are mixed in the honey. Although it is a blemish, nonetheless, the insect itself, since it is a blemish, is forbidden according to everyone.

According to Rashi, the legs of insects, since they are merely bones, are permitted, as bones are pure, as taught in Masechet Yadayim (4:6) that the bones of a donkey are pure. The legs of insects are like the bones of a donkey. Thus also wrote the Ran, the Rosh, and the Mordechai in the name of Rashi.

However, it means that they are like the legs of a donkey, which have no taste and are repugnant and are blemishes. But it is explicitly stated in the Gemara that the legs of a donkey are forbidden."

Rashi writes that it is permitted, etc. In the first chapter of Bechorot (7b), it is asked regarding the droppings of a donkey whether they are permitted, and it was answered that they are forbidden.

The Gemara then asks: Why did they say that honey from bees is permitted? Because it is taken into their bodies and is not extracted from their bodies. It answers that this is because Rabbi Yaakov says that honey is permitted because the Torah permits it explicitly. As it is taught, Rabbi Yaakov says, ‘You shall not eat any creeping thing, which is a creeping thing, but you may eat what a creeping thing produces,’ and what is that? Honey from bees. You might say that honey from locusts and grasshoppers should be excluded, as it has a separate status. This is because the verse does not mention honey explicitly but only by inference. However, honey from locusts and grasshoppers is considered in this category.

And Rashi explains that Rabbi Yaakov’s reason is not because honey is taken into their bodies but because the Torah explicitly permits it. What is produced by a non-kosher creeping thing, such as honey, is excluded by analogy. Honey from bees is commonly called honey, and it appears in the Gemara that a beehive is only for bees, as Rashi also wrote there.

It is puzzling why Rabbi Yaakov excludes honey from locusts and grasshoppers when the verse does not specifically mention honey but only by analogy. Rabbi Asher and Rabbi Channanel ruled that it is not according to Rabbi Yaakov since the general ruling in Mishna is not in accordance with him.

However, it is surprising that Rabbi Asher ruled according to the Mishna since Rav Sheshet did not agree with him, as Rav Sheshet follows Rabbi Yaakov. It could be that Rabbi Asher only mentioned that Rabbi Yaakov’s opinion is in the later interpretation, but in the earlier interpretation, he only forbids honey from a donkey but permits honey from horses, which is not similar to honey from bees that is extracted from the body. However, honey from bees is not extracted from the body, and the same applies to honey from locusts and grasshoppers.

Nevertheless, according to the Rosh’s usual practice, we follow the stricter opinion, and the ruling is that honey from locusts and grasshoppers is forbidden. However, the Rambam in the third chapter rules that honey from locusts is permitted according to the general Mishna, even though he does not mention locusts specifically. Since the general ruling is that there is no distinction between locusts and grasshoppers, and since one is permitted, it follows that the other is also permitted. The Rambam follows this opinion and has explained the reasons for his rulings extensively.

The Ramban, on the other hand, ruled to be stringent and forbade honey from locusts, and it is stated that some follow this opinion. However, honey from locusts and grasshoppers is not commonly found, and for mixtures, there is no concern according to all opinions, as noted by the Maharil."