ואלה המשפטים, “and these are the ordinances, etc.” according to Rashi whenever the word אלה appears, it signals a break with what preceded, whereas when the word ואלה appears it signals a continuation or addition of the subject that had been discussed previously. In other words, the correct translation of the word: אלה is: “these opposed to what preceded it,” whereas ואלה should be translated as “and these as well as the preceding verses.” The author warns the reader not to challenge Rashi by quoting the word אלה in Leviticus 27,34, or the same word in Numbers 36,13, and Numbers 30,17 nor the same word in Deuteronomy 28,69, as in those instances as well as in others like it, the previously mentioned subject has been concluded. ואלה המשפטים, Rabbi Avahu, quoting Rabbi Yossi ben Zimra said that the word אלה represents a break with what was written previously, whereas when the word appears with the prefix letter ו it signals some type of continuation. He quotes Exodus 15,25, as an example, where the Torah had written: שם שם לו חוק ומשפט ושם נסהו, “there He made for them a fixed rule and gave them social laws, there He put them to a test.” המשפטים, prior to this paragraph the Torah spoke about aspects of being G-d fearing, whereas from now on it concentrates on laws that enable living in the land of Israel as a civilised nation. An alternate interpretation: previously the Torah spelled out prohibitions as warnings, as for instance: “do not commit murder; do not commit adultery;” from here on in the Torah repeats the prohibitions but adds the type of penalty that applies to violating these prohibitions deliberately. As to the commentary by Rashi here, who poses the question why we read here about the details of an altar, something entirely different from the subjects the Torah deals with here, he bases himself on the Mechilta, which suggests that this is a hint that the High Court should have its office near the Temple and that all these laws had been told to Moses while he was on the Mountain. The altar was after all also close to the Temple, immediately in front of its eastern entrance. Logic dictates that the whole paragraph commencing with 21,2 “when you purchase a Jewish slave, etc., until chapter 23,10, ושש שנים תזרע, “and during six consecutive years you may plant seeds,” are all laws that G-d taught Moses while he was on the Mountain before the people had heard the Ten Commandments. Concerning all these laws, Rashi has written: these laws are a continuation of the earlier laws.” He is referring to the laws listed in Parshat B’har in the Book of Leviticus.

לפניהם “before them;” on this word Rashi comments: “before the Israelites and not before the gentiles,” even if you know that the gentile judges are experts in the section of law concerned in the litigation. When someone submits his legal problems to gentile judges he thereby desecrates the name of G-d, and simultaneously honours the reputation of the deity whom these judges worship. If the Jewish judges have given a ruling on the case and his Jewish opponent has not submitted to that judgment, the party deemed in the right may then appeal to gentile judges who have more power to enforce their ruling. [If both Jewish parties concerned are living in the Diaspora. Ed.]

כי תקנה עבד עברי, “If you acquire a Jewish slave, etc.;” the reason why the Torah commences its list of social laws with this particular law is that the Israelites had recently been redeemed from slavery themselves, so that they had good reason to understand how important it is not to treat one of their own as they had been treated in Egypt. Even if an Israelite had committed a crime for which he had been sold, the maximum length of time he was allowed to have his freedom to choose his employer restricted was six years. Even during these six years, his master, who did not own him bodily even then, was not allowed to force him to perform menial tasks. כי תקנה, “when you purchased etc.” Rashi explains that the “slave” the Torah speaks about was not purchased at a public auction, but was acquired as a servant from a duly elected Jewish Court whose task it also is to ensure that a thief’s victim is compensated by his victim. If he cannot do so from his own means he is “sold,” i.e. his labour is sold for a maximum of six years, his victim being paid the wages that this servant would earn during the next six years if he had not been “sold,” and is given by the court to his victim. [This editor has rounded out the picture based on the Talmud, for the benefit of readers totally unfamiliar with this subject.] There was some discussion in the Mechilta if our verse deals with an Israelite who had fallen on hard times and accumulated debts that he could not repay and who “sold himself,” (based on Leviticus 25,39). According to that view an Israelite “sold” by the court would not automatically be able to terminate his employment after 6 years maximum. This view is in apparent contrast with what the Torah wrote in Deuteronomy. According to Leviticus 25,46, gentile slaves who are owned bodily by Jews may be inherited by their children. The words ונמכר לך, “and he has been sold to you,” refer to an Israelite “sold” by the court. The Torah continues by decreeing that such a “slave” must not be required to perform menial tasks for his “master.” Clearly, this rule does not apply to gentile slaves whose bodies are owned by their Israelite masters. Deuteronomy 15,12 makes it quite clear that the law of releasing a slave after 6 years applies only to Jews who have been sold by the court. The passive form of yimacher, is absolutely clear. The Mechilta does not disagree, but derives the rule from a different type of exegesis. The author there (Rabbi Yishmael) uses a method known as gezeyrah shaveh. [I have slightly abbreviated our author’s presentation of this subject. Ed.] שש שנים יעבוד, “he is to serve for six years.” The number “6” in this verse is viewed also as an allegorical reference to six empires that at one time or another will enslave the Jewish people. They are: “Egypt, Ashur, Babylon, the Medes, the Greeks, and the Romans, (descendants of Edom). According to this interpretation, after the collapse of the Roman Empire the Jewish people, [as a whole, Ed.] will not again experience enslavement. This is based on the end of the verse: “and in the seventh year he will be released unconditionally.”

יעבוד, “he will serve.” The word refers here to ordinary household chores etc., not to backbreaking labour.

ובשביעית, “and in the seventh year;” at the beginning of his seventh year of service. The reference is to the beginning of the seventh year after this servant had been “sold.” and not to Shemita-Seventh Year. This is true both for the Jew who has been sold by a Court and for the Jew who sells himself because of his extreme poverty. Release at the onset of the Jubilee year applies to any Jewish slave who has not yet completed his six years of service, as well as to the slave who has voluntarily extended his servitude “forever” by having his ear pierced on a door post (Exodus 21.5-6).

יצא לחפשי, “he will exit to freedom.” G-d, so to speak, is quoted as saying: “I have redeemed the Israelites from Egypt from the house of slavery (Exodus 20,2). My intention was that they will henceforth be free men. They are therefore not “free” to sell themselves into servitude.” This is the meaning of Leviticus 25,10: “for the Children of Israel are My servants.” My document proving that they are Mine has preceded anyone’s subsequent document, which is thereby rendered legally invalid.

לחפשי, some commentators claim that the letter ל at the beginning of this word, meaning “to” is superfluous, just as that letter is superfluous in Chronicles I 3,2: והשלישי לאבשלום, which means nothing other than והשלישי אבשלום, “the third: Absalom.” Here too the Torah had to write only: יצא חפשי, “will go free.” The letter י in the word חפשי, is a preposition just as in the word: הקדמוני in Ezekiel 10,19, which converts that word to mean: “which is at the eastern gate.” It is similar to the words: שלישי, רביעי, “third, fourth, etc. Other commentators understand the prefix letter ל in לחפשי as converting its meaning to a noun: “לחופש, to freedom.” They compare it to expressions such as “to דרור.” If so, then the letter י at the end of the word: לחפשי would be superfluous, just as the letter י in the words: ,היושבי, המגביהי המשפילי in Psalms 23,1, 113,5 and 113,6 are superfluous. [seeing that there we deal with poetic form of expressions, it is not fair to declare these words as superfluous. Ed.] The word: חנם, “without compensation to the master,” is the Torah‘s way of informing us of this condition. חנם, without bureaucratic delays such as a document proving that the “slave” had been released by his master. Neither did he have to compensate the master for any hours of work not actually served during any part of those six years (such as the time when he was sick).

אם בגפו יבא, בגפו ילך, according to the plain meaning of the text the meaning is: “he will leave in the same condition as when he had begun his term of service.” The Torah proceeds to illustrate this by quoting examples of how his personal status might have changed during these six years. Even though his master might have given him a gentile slave to live with and to have children with, the “wife” and children remain the property of his master.

בגפו יצא, “he will leave alone.” According to Rashi, the line means that if this “slave” entered service while single, he will also leave while single. If he had been married before, his master can give him a gentile slave for the duration of his service. The reason is that if his master were to “give” him a gentile slave of his as a “wife,” and he would have children with her, he might grow so fond of her and her children, that at the end of the six years he would choose to remain with his master rather than to rejoin his Jewish wife. The chances of this happening to married man, is more remote. He presumably longs for his former family life, and he will leave as soon as is legally possible. His plea of preferring his gentile “family” under such circumstances is not acceptable by the Torah.

ואם בעל אשה, “but if he was married, to a Jewish wife“ at the time the court had ‘sold’ him,” his wife will leave with him; the wording means that he had consummated the marriage before being sold, not that he was only engaged, or that he was betrothed to the widow of a brother who had died without ever having had children. On this verse Rashi explains that the purchaser of a Jewish “slave,” is legally obligated to assume responsibility for said “slave’s” wife and children if any. Although nothing of that kind is written here, seeing that the Torah only writes that “he will leave with his wife,” Rashi deduced it from a verse in Leviticus 25,41: ויצא מעמך הוא ובניו עמו, “he together with his children will leave.” In that verse no mention is made of his wife. We combine both verses in order to get the true meaning of the Torah.

אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, “If his ‘master’ will give him a wife;” according to Rashi, the “wife” is a gentile slave of his master, and this verse is the halachic source that this is not only permitted, but that he may insist on his servant having a woman with whom he, and only he, performs marital union. (Mechilta, chapter 2, on this verse) The logic according to our author appears to be that seeing that the master is at any rate obligated to provide for the Jewish wife and children of such a “slave,” he may recover some of the expense giving this Jewish “slave” a Canaanite slave-woman and the children from such a union shall remain his property. Targum Onkelos adds to his translation that the master is not permitted to “give” a female Jewish salve to such a “slave”, as no Jewish woman may be forced to marry someone. If the “slave” had married a Jewish slave of his master during his stay there she will leave with him without the master receiving any compensation. Rashi points out here that proof that the master has no control over the body of a Jewish slave is that the Torah legislates that if such a Hebrew slave sold by her father reaches earlier than usual puberty, she immediately can leave her master. He quotes 21,7 as well as Deuteronomy 15,12 as his proof.

האשה וילדיה, “the woman and her children;” children are always mentioned after their mother; Compare Psalms 116,16: אני עבדך בן אמתך, “I, Your servant, son of Your servant maid.”

ואם אמר יאמר העבד, “and in the event that the ‘slave’ will say insistently, etc.;” from this verse we learn that he must express this wish already during those six years, and repeat it at the end of his term of service.

העבד, the Torah means that such a person deserves to remain a “slave,” as his actions reflect the kind of actions that the Canaanites are known for. If someone prefers the status of servitude, abandoning his choices in life, he acts like Canaanite slaves.

אל הדלת או אל המזוזה, “against the door or doorpost of the courthouse; we find an example of this in Deuteronomy 17,5: והוצאת את האיש ההוא אל שעריך, “you are to take out that man to your gates, (court);” This procedure is designed to give publicity to the irrational behaviour of this Jewish “slave;” let all the people passing the courthouse know who it is that has preferred life as a slave with a gentile slave to life as a free Israelite. He will have no chance to escape this status before the next Jubilee year.

או אל המזוזה, “or against the doorpost;” Rashi comments on this that the Torah draws a parallel between “door” and “doorpost;” both are upright. What Rashi means is that the doorpost is compared to the door only in respect of their both being upright. The definitive aspect of this procedure is found in Deuteronomy 15,17, where the Torah stipulates that the ear of the person who is going to have it pierced is to be adjacent to the door at that time. This is proved by the Jerusalem Targum which translates the word או in our verse as meaning אשר, “which is;” there are similar constructions to this, as in 21,36 או נודע כי שור נגח הוא, where the word או also means אשר, i.e. “an ox which is known to be aggressive.” The author quotes more examples. In our verse here, Rashi prefers an allegorical explanation based on the Mechilta, i.e. the ear which had heard G-d say at Mount Sinai: ”do not steal,” and which had heard G-d say: “the Children of Israel are My slaves,” needs to be reminded of this by being pierced after having opted to ignore both of these statements by G-d. Our author corrects the reference to “do not steal” from the Ten Commandments, as that commandment speaks of stealing persons, i.e. kidnapping. Therefore the version found in Leviticus 19,11 is preferred as there the Torah speaks of the theft of objects. Also, the prohibition in the Ten Commandments carries a death penalty as opposed to the version of theft discussed in Leviticus. In that version the ordinary penalty is to make restitution of twice the value of the stolen objects; if the thief is unable to come up with the money, then he [his labour, Ed.] is sold by the court to someone willing to buy him and to abide by the Torah’s rules concerning how to treat him. The reason why Rashi chose the prohibition of stealing when he had so many others to choose from, is because the thief displayed greater fear of the Lord than many other kinds of sinners, as he committed his sin in secret when insulting G-d by being more afraid of the police seeing him than of G-d seeing what he did. Moreover, the Jewish servant choosing to continue serving his master in spite of living with a non Jewish mate and raising non Jewish children, has demonstrated that he does not care what G-d had said nor what G-d’s servant, his master, has said. Hence his deliberately “faulty” hearing is being punished.

ורצע אדוניו, “and his master will proceed to pierce his ear;” the practical use of this procedure is that if he were to escape from his master during the years to come, the mark left on his ear will serve as evidence that he is an escaped slave. He will also not be confused with a Canaanite, as Jewish law forbids mutilating any part of a gentile’s body. Besides, when it comes to proving this when the escaped slave is positioned against the door where his ear had been pierced, the height of the hole in the door will match the hole in the slave’s ear when he is positioned there.

את אזנו, “his ear;” the reason why this part of the body has been chosen by the Torah for this procedure is that if the slave were to protest that he had inflicted this hole upon himself, he would not be believed, as it is impossible for him to have done so.

את אזנו, it was customary to mark someone who had not conducted himself as he should, by piercing his ear. From this custom evolved the practice to do this to thieves.

במרצע, “with an awl;” I have heard the following allegorical explanation of why this tool was chosen by the Torah for this procedure; (Compare Torah shleymah by Rabbi Menachem Kasher on the source item # 137) The cost of an awl used to be 400 coins of a certain denomination. G-d had decreed 400 years for Abraham’s descendants to be strangers and slaves, but He had subsequently decreased the length of their serfdom. This slave who could have gotten his freedom, instead volunteered to lengthen his period of serfdom.

ועבדו, ”and he is to serve him (his master)” only for his original master, not his son or daughter, if he dies prematurely. This verse is the source of the statement in the Mechilta :“A Jewish “slave” serves his master (during the first six years) or his master’s son, but not his master’s daughter. If he had his ear pierced, or if it was a female Jewish “slave,” neither will serve after the master has died.

לעולם, according to Rashi, this word does not mean: “forever, i.e. the rest of his life,” but until the onset of the next Jubilee year. To the question that possibly the Torah did indeed mean that the “slave” in question would now have to remain a “slave” for the remainder of his life, the question is that in that event what was the point of the Torah having to write in Leviticus 25,46: והתנחלתם אותם, “you may leave them as an inheritance to your children,” (Canaanite slaves)? If even a Jewish “slave” could be inherited by your children, surely the Torah did not have to tell us that the same was true for bodily owned Canaanite slaves? Clearly therefore the Torah meant that such a Jewish slave would continue to the end of his natural life, usually no longer than seventy years in the status he had acquired as a result of having had his ear pierced. The Torah’s example here assumes that the thief had been about 20 years of age at the time he committed his crime, so that he had a life expectancy of another 50 years. It follows that the term לעולם, is another way of saying “for up to 50 years.” If the Torah had written: לעולם ועד, it would have meant: “until he dies.” This could have been supported by Samuel I 1,22, where the mother of Samuel tells her husband that she will hand over her son to the High Priest Eli, and she clearly meant by that “for the rest of his life.” In the event, Samuel died at 52 years of age, 50 years after having been handed over to Eli. Rashi, on that verse, explains that she prophesied that Samuel would die at that age, without having been aware that her words had been a prophecy. He adds that 50 years are considered a euphemism for “a lifetime.”Furthermore, as stated previously, Leviticus 25,10 in which a slave is included in the possessions that must be restored to their original status, the Jubilee year, the fiftieth in a cycle, is described as such a radical turning point in his life.

וכי ימכור איש את בתו, “in the event that a father ‘sells’ his daughter, etc.;” the reason why the father here has been described as איש, “a man,” is to make clear that a mother is not allowed to “sell” her daughter.

את בתו, “his daughter,” but not his son.

לא תצא כצאת בעבדים, “she will not leave her “master’s” employ according to the same rules as does a male “slave.” Rashi explains the word עבדים in this verse as referring to Canaanite slaves. If someone had thought that it referred to Jewish slaves, consider the fact that the Torah had separately legislated what the terms are when Jewish slave leaves his “master” in Deuteronomy 15,12. The conditions for releasing Jewish “slaves” had stipulated there that no difference is made between males and females. If you were to ask why the same rule does not apply regarding releasing a Jewish boy “servant” when he displays signs of puberty, seeing that we have a principle that the exegetical tool known as heckesh, a comparison spelled out in the Torah, must not be applied in an arbitrary manner, the reason is that there cannot be a situation in which such a comparison could be legally valid, as there is no situation when the Torah provides for a male’s puberty resulting in such a change of his status. If he had sold himself as a minor, the sale would not have been recognised as legally valid. We have already learned that his father was also not legally empowered to sell him. Rashi explains further that the comparison that the Torah made between a female Jewish “slave” and a male one, applies to the fact that neither of them obtain their release by having lost one or more of their organs, including even the loss of a tooth. This law applies only to gentile slaves. If you were to argue that we did not need to have this spelled out for us as we could have arrived at this conclusion by using simple logic, i.e. if a female Jewish ”slave,” who is released after displaying signs of puberty, is not released when losing an organ, it is clear that a male Jewish slave who is not released from service when displaying signs of puberty, is most certainly not released either when he loses an organ. We must therefore conclude that this socalled logic is faulty, as an opposite conclusion could be arrived at by using the “same” logic in reverse. What is the disadvantage a female Jewish “slave” labours under? She does not get her release as a result of losing an organ. Seeing that she had not been sold as a result of having committed theft, her male counterpart would certainly not be released under similar circumstances as he had been sold as a penalty for having committed theft. In order not to arrive at the wrong conclusion by using “our” logic, the Torah therefore wrote: “the male Jew or the female Jew” in Deuteronomy 15,12. לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “the rules for her release are not the same as that for her male counterparts.” According to the plain meaning of this verse the Torah here is inserting a rule of civilised behaviour, derech eretz. Men are sent on errands all over the earth, by day and night, and encounter all kinds of temptation while doing so. If women had to doo this, this would be considered a great disgrace for them. The Torah therefore states that female Jewish servants are to be used by their masters only for tasks that do not require tem to leave their immediate environment, the master’s home. In Psalms 45,14 this is summed up under the heading of: כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, “the entire glory of the King’s daughter is within her,” (not on public display) Furthermore, the female Jewish “slaves” under discussion here are all minors. An alternate approach: Whereas the male “slaves” leave the master’s employ unaccompanied by children they had sired while in his employ, (as discussed earlier) the female Jewish “slave,” if her master wants to have children by her, must first marry her, in which case she ceases to be a “slave” anyways. If the marriage does not work out, she will be divorced and take her children with her, like any normal woman who is divorced from her husband and gets a financial settlement.

אבל אם רעה, “but if she is ugly, etc.” the term רעה while often used to describe moral ugliness, is also used to describe physical ugliness, i.e. being “sourfaced,” as we know from when Joseph asked the baker and cupbearer who had dreamt dreams which had upset them. Compare Genesis 40,7: ?מדוע פניכם רעים היום, “why do you look so crestfallen today?” בעיני אדוניה, “in her master’s eyes;” so that he does not wish her to remain in his house as a prospective bride until she will have completed her years of service;

יעדה, based on the word מועד, “appointed time;” it is used here as in Samuel II 20,5: מן המועד אשר יעדו, “from the appointed time that he (David) had set for him.” The spelling and reading of this word are יעדה and יעדו respectively. The first word in the phrase is written in the Torah לא but read as לו. Since the sound of the two words is identical, we use both words in the interpretation: “She was not meant for him.”

והפדה, “in order to release her.” Seeing that neither her master nor his son are prepared to marry her, and he does not want her to release herself, but prefers for her to continue to work for him on a socially demeaning level, he has to release her and pay her some compensation. [We must remember that her master had paid her father in advance for up to six years service. Ed.]

והפדה, according to Rash,i he must contribute to the cost of cancelling her contract, i.e. that she must repay for the years of the contract she had not fulfilled her part of. The master must forfeit part of what he could have claimed, as his contribution. You might well ask what the difference is between גרעון and סיוע? (verse 10) Since she has repaid the master for the years she has not worked, what loss did the master experience? Her value as a maid increased with every she grew closer to puberty. We might therefore have assumed that the value of her work is not based on the same amount each year. By not getting back more per year for the last three years this girl did not work, than for the each of the first three years when she was quite young, the master actually did experience a loss, גרע, by releasing her from her contract early.

לעם נכרי, “to an unrelated person;” (compare Ibn Ezra) to anyone other than her master he must not “sell her” to have dominion over her.

לא ימשול למכרה, “he must not abuse his position of mastery to marry her off to someone other than himself or to his son.” למכרה, “to hand her over.” We find this term used in this sense also in Judges 4,9: כי ביד אשה ימכור ה' את סיסרא, “for the Lord will hand over Siserah into the hand of a woman.”

בבגדה בה “seeing he had betrayed her trust.” By not going through with his promise to marry her when she was old enough, he had betrayed her trust. The expression “betrayal” occurs often in relationships between husband and wife. It describes usually the break up, severance of married life with a partner. Our author quotes verses from Maleachi 2,14, and Jeremiah 3,20, where the prophet in each case refers to Israel having betrayed its relationship with Hashem. Some commentators understand the words: לעם נכרי as referring to a Canaanite, seeing that Canaanites are referred to as נכרי in Judges 19,12: אל עיר נכרי אשר לא מבני ישראל המה, “to a foreign city that does not belong to the Children of Israel.” Also in Kings I 8,41: ובא הנכרי אשר לא מעמך הוא, “or if a foreigner who is not a member of your people comes, etc;” there too the reference is to the Canaanite. Some commentators explain the words as follows: the subject of the word והפדה, is not the girl’s master but her father; he will have the right to cancel the contract and get his daughter released from its terms seeing that he who had purchased her has reneged on his promise to marry her.

לעם נכרי, “to any other nation;” i.e. the father does not have the right to sell his daughter to anyone but a Jewish master. He might have been under the impression that since the Torah permitted him to sell his daughter while she is a minor, it does not matter to whom he sells her. After all, seeing that the Torah did not forbid him to sell himself to a gentile if his fellow Jews did not help him to stay financially afloat, so why could he not do the same with his daughter? Therefore the Torah had to expressly forbid him to do this.

בבגדו בה, “for having betrayed her,” as it was not proper for him to sell her, but he did sell her.”

כמשפט הבנות, “according to the norms applying to daughters.” Normally, men betroth attractive girls to themselves and marry them, and celebrate the wedding with joy and decor, not like when one takes a lowly maid as a wife.

ועונתה, some commentators believe that the root of this word here is עון as in Isaiah 13,22: וענה איים באלמנותיו “ and the wild beasts of the islands shall cry in their desolate palaces.” The letter מ in the word מעון having been replaced similar to the way it has been in the words: מלון, מזון and מדון our verse then would prescribe that if, after marrying the young girl he married additional wives, she continues to be entitled to receive from her husband food, clothing and housing.

ואם שלש אלה, “if he fails to provide any of these three items, she will leave his house without paying the master any compensation for leaving his employ before her contract had been completed.” (Ibn Ezra)

ויצאה חנם, “she will leave, with the consent of the court;” the Torah here does not specify a particular point in time, but does so at a later time in Deuteronomy 15,12, where we read: כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים, “when your brother the Hebrew is forced to sell himself to you or your sister a female Hebrew, he/she is to serve (work for) you for six years.” אין כסף, “if she falls sick at the end of her six years and is unable to leave, and her master supplies her with food, she need not compensate him for this. (Based on Torah shleymah by Rabbi Menachem Kasher Mishpatim, quoting Jerusalem Talmud, item 230 on our verse.) According to the simple meaning of the text, the words: אין כסף which are superfluous after the word חנם, “without compensation,” are a way of underlining the statement, just as the statement מת את ולא תחיה, “you are dead and will not live.”

מכה איש ומת, “if someone strikes a man and he dies as a result;” Rashi explains this as being based on Leviticus 24,17: ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות ימות, “if a man strikes a lethal blow on another human being it is a capital offence and the attacker will be subject to execution.” If you were to ask: “where did we ever hear that if a person strikes another and he does not die as a result, that he is still subject to execution? After all, even if he did cause his victim to lose a limb, he is only liable for monetary compensation? Some commentators have provided what is a very forced answer by saying that if the injury to the victim of the blow is such that he will die within 12 months that the attacker will be subject to the death penalty. Alternately, the verse could have meant that death resulted from a blow with an instrument not meant to cause death. Since we could have thought that he would still be guilty of the death penalty as it is the result that counts, the Torah had to write that unless the weapon used was of a kind that is used as a lethal weapon the killer is not liable to the death penalty.

The reason why this paragraph follows closely after the paragraph dealing with how to treat a slave, is because most masters are in the habit of hitting slaves when they do not perform their duties diligently. The expression: מות יומת “he must certainly be executed,”by decree of the court, is meant to exclude the legislation applicable to a gentile slave

והאלוקים אנה לידו, “and it was a result of divine will;” in other words, the person becomes guilty of death at the hands of heaven. Rashi on this verse understands it as referring to an inadvertent killing, which was the result of inadequate precautions being taken by the person who caused it. He interprets it as a demonstration of the verse: מרשעים יצא רשע, “wicked people will cause wicked acts.” What is meant is that if someone has committed a serious sin unobserved and intentionally, so that he could not be brought to trial, providence sees to it that he will have to atone for this by committing unintentional death of an apparently innocent person. The example quoted is that the “sinner” was ascending a ladder, a rung of which broke and caused him to hit someone standing nearby in his fall. On our verse, Rashi comments: “this refers to unintentional killing.” He interprets the verse from Samuel I 24,13, by providing an illustration. The person sitting under the ladder had once killed intentionally, but no witnesses were present who could testify against him in a Court that would condemn him to death. On the other hand, the person falling from the ladder had once killed unintentionally when there were no witnesses who would have forced him to take refuge in the city set aside for such situation. Now, through divine intervention, both had received their penalties, each appropriate to his sin. Alternately, the scenario should be as follows: the party who had previously committed deliberate murder, fell onto someone holding a knife in his hand at the time. If we would not explain the verse in this manner, the person who had been guilty of execution by the sword would not have died by the proper type of execution, i.e. the sword. The example quoted also teaches that a person cannot become guilty having to go to the city of refuge twice. The reason is that once you have killed someone if in the process you have killed someone also unintentionally, you are penalised only for the more serious crime.

ושמתי לך מקום, “I set aside for you a special place;” this commandment would not become effective until the people took up residence in their homeland. It is a hint of the cities of refuge to be legislated and introduced still during Moses’ lifetime.

מעם מזבחי, even when the murderer has taken refuge near My altar; all the more so when he escaped to one of these cities of refuge.

ומכה אביו ואמו, “and if someone strikes either his father or his mother;” why did this verse have to be written? [If killing someone not related to him by blood results in execution, is it not natural that he will not face a lesser penalty for killing his father or his mother? Seeing that theTorah had written: עין תחת עין, “an eye for an eye,” the Torah had to let us know that this law does not apply when the eye of one’s father had been gouged out by his son, but that he faces a more severe penalty in that instance. The Talmud employs an exegetical tool called heckesh, i.e. [according to some scholars, the 19th of these tools enumerated in the 32 such tools listed by Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yossi hag’lili. Ed.] In order to have halachic validity, this instrument being used in a particular instance must have been a well known tradition, called in the language of our sages: halachah miMoshe mi Sinai, a ruling as binding as if it had been given to Moses at Mount Sinai. Ed.] In our case it would work as follows: just as someone if he has struck his neighbour’s animal is not culpable for such a deed unless the animal sustained a visible wound, so if one strikes one’s father or mother he becomes guilty of the death penalty only if he had actually wounded his father or mother by such a physical blow. The reason it appears in our context in the Torah is that the penalty is parallel to that for murder, something discussed in our paragraph.

ומכה אביו ואמו מות יומת, “and someone striking his father or mother must be put to death.” The peculiarity here is that the Torah informed us of the penalty for violating the commandment before having spelled out the commandment not to strike anyone. Actually, the commandment that the penalty for striking someone and his being subject to 39 lashes has been established, and the Torah had added that this number of lashes, (Deuteronomy 25,3) must not be exceeded by the person carrying it out as agent of the court. Actually, we could have derived that from logic also, i.e. “if the agent of the court who carries out striking an individual is commanded not to exceed his authority, how much more so does such a rule apply to someone who had no authority to strike anyone!” (Mechilta, Mishpatim chapter 5)

וגונב איש, “If one kidnaps another person, etc.” Why was this verse necessary? (it has been repeated in detail in Deuteronomy 24,7) If we had only had the verse in Deuteronomy, we would have thought that the penalty would apply only if we had witnesses to the kidnapping. We would not have known that witnesses to both the kidnapping and the subsequent selling of the victim were required in order for the death penalty to apply. Another thing these two laws have in common is that the death penalty is to be carried out by strangulation.

ונמצא בידו, “and he has been found in his possession;” another way of saying that the crime had been carried out in the presence of witnesses, or that there was so much circumstantial evidence as if it had been witnessed by living witnesses. [One cannot help thinking of coloured photographic evidence even showing the parties in motion. Ed.]

מות יומת, “the kidnapper is to be executed.” The reason is that having sold his victim it is almost certain that the victim will be so abused that he will die prematurely. As to the question where was the prohibition written before the penalty was recorded in the Torah, the reader is directed to the eight of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20,13: לא תגנוב, “Do not steal!”

ומקלל אביו, “and if someone curses his father;” from what is written here we only know that it is forbidden to curse one’s father while he is alive; how do we know that the same law applies to people cursing their fathers posthumously? The word: ומקלל formulated in the present tense, in the widest possible formulation includes cursing him anywhere anytime. Where is the commandment not to curse one’s father stated explicitly independent of the punishment in store for those who violate it? The reader is directed to Exodus 22,27: אלוהים לא תקלל ונשיא בעמך לא תאור, “Do not curse a judge and do not curse an elected political leader within your people.” לא תקלל חרש, “do not curse a deaf person!” The common denominator in these three prohibitions is that they are part of your people, and that your father and mother are similarly not only your relatives and have begotten you, but they are part of your nation, a holy nation. The reason why the Torah interrupts this sequence with verse 16, which deals with kidnapping, is that most people who are kidnapped are minors, who were unable to defend themselves against their abductor. As a result of having been kidnapped and sold to a foreign nation they will grow up in a country where they do not even know their parents, and when they get involved in an argument they will likely curse their fate and the father who had not protected them. Therefore this insertion is not a deviation from the theme the Torah deals with here. Verses 16 17 18 have a common denominator, as the Torah hints that in practice the occurrence of these sins are interrelated through the negative experiences in life by the parties who become guilty of them. [We must never lose sight of the fact that the Torah does not address itself to wicked people, as this would be a waste of time. What wicked person would take any notice of it? Ed.] What the Torah did here was listing sins which originate in quarrels between people some of which result in violent action, others in violent language. The honour due to father and mother is based on the honour due to the Creator himself, seeing that father and mother represent two thirds of begetting each one of us, G-d being the remaining third, who had helped father and mother to produce progeny. Therefore, cursing parents or cursing G-d are part of the same phenomenon, the result of frustration of the guilty party. Moreover, in the case of G-d releasing one’s anger by striking out physically is obviously impossible. Therefore all three are treated in a similar manner when it comes to how such release of one’s anger is treated by the Torah. Some commentators approach our whole paragraph as reflecting what our sages call it “not only this but also this.” For example: not only a person who has been so angry that in striking his fellow he has actually killed him, deserves to lose his life as a result of such lack of restraint, but even people who killed without intention actually deserve the same fate seeing that they had been criminally negligent, but the Torah stops short of this by protecting their lives if they succeeded to reach a city of refuge before an angry relative had a chance to avenge his relative’s needless death. This approach is supported by the Torah stating that if such a killer had acted intentionally, and had sought immunity next to the altar, [a symbol for a location where violence is absolutely forbidden, Ed] by taking refuge in the precincts of the Temple, this will not protect him against being brought to court by force and tried. Having stated this, the Torah extends this to people who in their anger only struck a parent also deserve the death penalty. If their act leaves a mark, injury, on the body of either parent they will be treated as having committed a capital offense. Finally, even if the son or daughter did not raise their hands against either parent and cursed them instead, they are also dealt with as having hurt them bodily.

וכי יריבון אנשים, “if two men engage in an argument that has become physical;” from this wording I might think that the legislation which follows applies only to males, how do we know that it applies equally to females? Rabbi Eliezer says that seeing that when the Torah discusses the subject of compensations for damages caused is written in general terms not mentioning men or women separately and mentions genders only a single time (in verse 29, i.e. that the victim is either man or woman) it is clear that the entire subject applies equally to both sexes.

או באגרוף, “or with a certain type of stone,” (according to the Targum) The same expression is used by Torat Kohanim when explaining Leviticus 14,40 where the treatment of an eruptive like plague on the walls of a house is discussed. The usual translation of אגרוף, is: ”fist,” possibly not acceptable to the sages, as it is not a lethal tool, and the death of the victim within 24 hours, which according to Torah law would be equivalent to murder, seems unduly harsh.

אם יקום והתהלך בחוץ, “if he (the person who had been knocked to the ground) gets up and walks outside the house unaided;” if that person takes to his bed and does not even partially recover, so that he dies before having been able to walk, the party that knocked him down will be tried for murder (and executed if he had been duly warned by witnessing observing the fight).

על משענתו, “supporting himself on his walking cane;” the word משענת is used in the Bible in this sense in Kings II 4,29: וקח משענתי בידך, ”and take my walking cane in your hand;” [Elisha speaking to his servant Geychazi)

שבתו, “compensation for income lost through being bedridden;” Compare use of this expression in Ruth 2,7: זה שבתה הבית מעט, “she has rested but a little.”

יתן, he (the one who inflicted the wound) has to “give,” even if the wounded person recovered without having sustained permanent damage.

וכי יכה איש, “and if a man strikes, etc.;” how do we know that the verse also addresses women? Rabbi Yishmael says what we already attributed to Rabbi Eliezer as an answer to this question on verse 18.

בשבט, “with a rod;” the Torah chooses as an illustration instruments with which the average master disciplines his slaves. This is why the first letter ב in this word is “open,” as if the Torah had written: בהשבט. If the master had struck that slave with a sword or other instrument used to inflict death, he will be treated as an intentional murderer even if his victim survived for a day or two, seeing that this was not the way one disciplines a person.

ומת מחת ידו, “and he dies as a result of this beating;” seeing that he had used permissible means of disciplining, the death of the victim is attributed to something like an accident, the master not having intended to deprive himself of the services of this slave. An alternate interpretation of the expression: תחת ידו; “while still being beaten;” this is no longer “disciplining,” but killing with one’s own hands.

יום או יומים, “a day or two days.” The reference is to one day that is equivalent to two days. The verse could not be referring to actual days, as if even one day’s survival is sufficient to absolve the killer from the charge of murder, survival for two days would not need to be mentioned. According to the plain meaning of the text, in consonance with the practice of the Torah, we can simply translate this as “he does not even have to survive two days for the master not to be accused of murder, even a survival of 24 hours is sufficient.” We find a parallel construction in Deuteronomy 17,6: על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים, “on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses.”

כי כספו הוא, “for he is as if his own money.” He has full control of the servant including beating him, but only in order to discipline him. (Rash’bam)

וכי ינצו אנשים, “if men fight,” why was there a need for this verse? Seeing that from verse 14 where we were told only that deliberate killing of one’s enemy is punishable by death, we would not have known that when one kills one’s friend instead of one’s enemy in a fight, he would not be considered as a murderer, we are told now that when the objective of an altercation was to kill one’s adversary, it does not matter that one had killed the wrong target by mistake. There are some commentators who do not understand this verse as prescribing the death penalty for the killer, but that he is only liable for monetary compensation to be assessed by the court. (Rabbi Yitzchok in Mechilta Mishpatim chapter 8) He interprets our verse along the following lines: as long as we had only heard Leviticus 24,17: if someone deliberately smites a human being (so that he dies) the killer must be executed, even if that human being had been born after a pregnancy of only eight months, (which according to the Talmud is not considered a baby with a regular life expectancy). The Torah here describes the premature birth of such a baby as a result of the mother having been struck as having given birth to a נפש אדם a human being in the full sense of the word. The wording in our verse makes it clear that only if the mother had been struck in the region of her body to which her fetus is sensitive, does the attacker deserve the penalty prescribed, not when she was hit on the head or other parts of her body not related to her pregnancy. An alternate explanation: even if only one of her fetuses was killed. [The wording in the verse speaks about fetuses, plural. Ed.]

אשה הרה, “a pregnant woman; we would have known this as soon as we read the balance of the verse in which we are told that she lost her fetuses when the Torah speaks about her losing her fetuses prematurely; how could she have done so unless she had been pregnant?The reason that the Torah had to first inform us that she had been pregnant was to teach us that the attacker’s penalty is related to the fact that she had been pregnant and he should therefore have been especially careful, as well as to tell us that if the loss of her fetus could be attributed to the fact that she had been hit in the region of her womb, the penalty of which the Torah writes does not apply.

ענוש יענש, “he will be severely punished.” Rashi explains here that the financial penalty is the difference in value that the husband would receive on the slave market for offering a pregnant woman and one who is not pregnant (Bava Kamma 49a). The buyer would offer more money for the pregnant women because he would receive her as well as the babies. If you were to ask why the attacker is not subject to the death penalty for murder, the answer is that there is no certainty that they would have been born after nine months as healthy babies. If this is a relevant consideration why is it not applied to fully grown human beings who might have been terminally ill had they lived to die naturally? The answer is that we base ourselves on the majority of such cases where the victim would prove not to have been terminally ill. To the question why we do not apply the same logic to the fetuses? If we were to do this the attacker would also have to be guilty for hitting the woman who is the mother of these fetuses. We have to derive from the wording of the various verses dealing with violent encounters between people that as long as the fetus has not seen the light of day, it has no market value, as decided in the Talmud tractate Erchin folio 7, where it is stated that unborn fetuses have no claim to the estate of their fathers.

כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, In accordance with the conditions imposed upon him by the husband of the woman; in the event that the men who were fighting had decided to settle their dispute out of court. If they cannot agree on the amount of compensation, ונתן בפלילים, he will have to abide by the court’s decision about damages. We find a similar construction in Leviticus 7,10: בלולה בשמן וחרבה, “mixed with oil, or dry.”

לחפשי ישלחנו, “he has to discharge him to freedom.” The Torah’s point here is that the slave does not have the option of accepting a financial settlement for the loss of his limb by his owner. The reason is that such a settlement would be useless to him, seeing that as long as he remains a slave all that he owns belongs to his master. Even a person who has sold himself into slavery with the express condition that his master cannot control his possessions, the master remains in a position that enables him by harassing his slave force him to hand over his belongings to him. The only way this can be avoided is by setting his slave free.

ישלחנו, he will release him. The expression שילוח, is similar to the when we read in Deuteronomy 24,3: ושלחה מביתו, “he sends her away from his house;” the reason that the word: חנם, “without any compensation is absent here is the reason why the word: חנם “without compensation,” is absent here in our chapter, [as opposed to verse 11 in our chapter, where automatic release of slaves after 6 years service is discussed Ed.], is to teach us that the release must be accompanied by a document just as the document of divorce to a wife.

תחת שינו, “on account of his tooth.” The Torah teaches us that even though the master owns the slave bodily, this does not mean that each body part of that slave is his to do with as he likes. G-d did not consent to slaves being owned in order for their masters to be able to mutilate them when they are angry at them. The Torah singling out the word: his “tooth” (sing), teaches that even if the slave lost only one tooth through his being beaten this suffices to his master having to free him unconditionally. In the event that the master had caused the slave to lose an eye, and before releasing him he caused him to also lose a tooth, he will have to compensate him financially for the loss of the tooth, as by that time, halachically, he did not own that slave’s body anymore, even though he was still under his physical control. According to our author, the rule that a gentile slave receives his freedom in return for losing a limb, is arrived at by simple logic. If he gains his freedom at the hands of heaven when he becomes unable through disease to perform his duties, how much more does he qualify for his freedom when he has been abused by a human being owning him. [Rabbi Chavell in his glossaries, cites a statement from the Talmud B’rachot 5 according to which the logic is precisely the reverse, i.e. “if a gentile slave receives his freedom in return for having lost a limb as a result of punishment by his master, how much more so must G-d forgive sinners whose entire bodies have been punished by Him with painful sickness and disease!” This is whatDavid asked for when he said in Psalms 118,18: 'יסור יסרני קה ולמות לא נתנני, “the Lord punished me severely but did not hand me over to the angel of death.” Surely, if someone had to endure man’s inhumanity to man, he would be entitled to his release in exchange.]

וכי יגח שור את איש, “when an ox gores a man, etc. up until this point the Torah had listed a number of situations when a human being had inflicted pain or loss of life; now it turns to damages caused by animals under the control of human beings, or property owned by human beings and not secured against causing damage to his peers.

וכי יגח שור את איש, the expression: נגיחה is used when an ox gores a human being, whereas the expression: נגיפה is used when said ox gores another animal. The reason is that the fate of a human being is influenced by his mazzal, the astrological constellation of the stars when he has been born, and as a rule animals fear human beings (Genesis 9,2) so that even when they gore they take care not to inflict death. Animals do not enjoy this advantage and therefore when one animal is being gored by another animal this is generally fatal. (Compare Rashi on Talmud Baba Kamma folio 2)

סקול יסקל השור, “the offending ox is to be stoned to death. If you were to ask that if even an ox that did not have a history of goring people is subject to stoning, why did the Torah have to tell us that an ox with a history of goring has to be stoned? (verse 29) Answer: this is faulty logic; the reason why a hitherto tame ox is stoned is because no penalty of compensating the victim is imposed on the owner;I could think that seeing that the owner of an aggressive ox that has killed a human being would not have to be stoned. To make sure that we do not think so, the Torah added that the guilty ox has to be stoned in all such situations. You might also ask that how can it happen that an ox will gore people twice or even three times, i.e. become labeled: “an aggressive ox” מועד, if he had been stoned to death already after the first time he killed a human being? Answer: either such an ox had escaped after it gored the first time, or, that whereas we know the ox but did not know who its owner was so that we could have accused him of deliberate negligence.

ולא יאכל את בשרו, “and its flesh may not be eaten.” Is it not clear from the fact that this animal had to die through stoning that its flesh would be forbidden, seeing that only animals that have been killed by ritual slaughter may be eaten? The expression יאכל in the passive mode, always means that it is not only forbidden to be eaten by Jews but may neither be fed to dogs or sold to gentiles.

ובעל השור נקי, and the owner of that ox remained free of guilt as long as his ox had not displayed signs of being aggressive. (Rash’bam)

וגם בעליו יומת, “and also its owner is guilty of the death penalty by execution.” According to the plain meaning of the text he should be executed in practice, seeing that he was aware of allowing a dangerous animal to be on the loose, and he took no precautions.

אם כופר יושת עליו, in the event that the heirs of the person who had been gored to death are willing to accept a financial settlement for their father having been killed;

ככל אשר יושת עליו, “the owner must pay whatever is imposed upon him.” The reason that the Torah does not apply the principle that we do not accept financial compensation for killing human beings, is that that this rule applies only if the human being in question has personally committed such an act. [The reason that this verse begins with the word: “if”, is that most people would spurn such an offer by the party who was responsible for their father’s death.”

The word אם, “if” here, does not belong to the list that the author had made when this word is not an option. (Compare Exodus 20,22)

אם בן יגח או בת, “if it gores a son or a daughter;” it is most unusual for the Torah to spell out separately that the victims are either man or woman, or son or daughter; (Compare verse 28). Why did it do so here? The reason is that the owner of the ox could have argued that if the father or mother of the child who had been killed had taken care of their son or daughter these would not have been where the animal could have attacked them with impunity. The Torah had to inform us that such an excuse by the owner of the ox which had killed is absolutely irrelevant. A different explanation: when the Torah speaks of free people, the status of minors and adults is exactly the same. (Talmud Baba kamma folio 43) when the victim of this ox was a slave, the owner of the ox is liable only if the victim was an adult.

אם עבד יגח השור, “if the ox had gored a slave, either a male of a female slave, (which had already been legally labeled as an aggressive ox) this latter point is clear without having to be spelled out, otherwise killing a slave would be rated as a more serious offense than killing a free man.

כסף שלשים שקלים, the compensation payable by the ox’s owner to the owner of the slave is to be 30 shekels. This corresponds to the value of a free woman between the ages of 20-60 years of age as stated in Leviticus 27,4.

והשור יסקל, “and the offending ox is to be stoned to death.” This is the only way we can be sure that it will not at some time in the future also gore a free man. Seeing that it is customary for the slaves to be looking after the master’s livestock, feed them, etc., it is not a rarity that sometimes an animal turns on its keeper. This will lead to arguments between the owner of ox and the master of the slave as to how much the dead slave was worth. In order to forestall such arguments, the Torah spelled out a fixed amount for all such situations. Seeing that the chances that a free man becomes the victim of such an ox are statistically quite insignificant, the Torah uses a different yardstick in evaluating the damage.

וכי יפתח איש בור, If a man opens the lid over a pit (which had been placed there to protect pedestrians); the Torah refers to a pit which had remain fully covered for a long time, or even if that person had a dug pit which had never been in that place, and he had not bothered to cover it because he intended to dig deeper on the following day;

ולא יכסנו, “and he fails to cover it.” If he had covered it, he is free from further responsibility, provided that he covered it securely. The term “securely” is applied to a cover strong enough to prevent a wagon loaded with stones from collapsing the cover. (Jerusalem Talmud Baba Kamma 5,7) One is not permitted to dig a hole underneath the public streets unless wagons loaded with stones can cross above it without concern.

ונפל שמה שור, “and an ox falls into it.” Human beings, seeing that they have been given a brain by G-d, are expected to look where they are going, and if they come to harm due to not looking out for themselves, the person causing the obstacle is not held responsible. [How different from our time when people try to sue the city for potholes on the sidewalk! Ed.] The Torah adds here the word: או חמור, “or a donkey,” to tell us that if people‘s belongings fall into that hole, the person who dug it is also not responsible as these belongings must have been guarded by a human being who did not do his job properly. (Talmud Baba Kamma, folio 53) An alternate explanation: Oxen and donkeys are mentioned here as they are the most likely animals to fall into such a hole. What applies to them applies to all other animals also.

בעל הבור, “the one responsible for that hole;” this cannot refer literally to the owner of the land on which the hole has been dug, but must refer to the one who created the hazard on it. The owner of the land, if not the same, is completely free from responsibility.

והמת יהיה לו, “and the carcass will belong to the person who caused the damage,” as seeing he has paid full damages this is only fair. (This is the plain meaning of the verse, not necessarily the Talmud’s, there being a debate about who is the subject of the word: לו, “his”)

ומכרו את השור החי, “and they sell the surviving ox.” What the Torah writes here applies only when the damage was caused through the ox being used on land that was not owned (or leased) by the owner of the ox. If it had been on property owned or leased by the ox’s owner, the party causing the damage is free from responsibility as the party that caused the damage can say to the owner: “what business did your ox have on my property?”

וחצו את כספו וגם את המת, “they will share equally the price they realized for the surviving ox as well as that they salvaged for the carcass of the animal that was killed.” Seeing that the animal that gored did not have a history of being aggressive, its owner had no reason to take special precautions by tying it up. Fate played an equal role for both in causing them to suffer a financial loss.

., “and he had not secured it;” actually we could have learned this by simple logic. If an owner of an ox that had gored must bear half the cost of the loss of its victim if the offending animal had had a reputation for aggressiveness and its master had not secured it, he surely must be liable for the whole damage! Why do we need the words: “and he had not secured it?” Therefore we learn that this word speaks another type of guarding that ox; he has to also muzzle such an ox so that it cannot become guilty of causing damage with its mouth, by either biting, or grazing in other people’s fields. An alternate explanation why the words: ולא ישמרנו are needed; logic does not suffice to impose penalties. Perhaps someone could come up with another aspect nullifying our logic. Therefore penalties have to be spelled out. Still another interpretation: the penalty applies even if the offending ox had been looked after on behalf of its owner by someone who did not charge the owner a fee for this.

כי יגנוב איש, “if a man steals etc,” the legislation applying to the stolen goods having either been slaughtered and consumed or disposed of commercially, and the thief has been found, i.e. אם ימצא הגנב, applies also to the slaughterer and the seller (if they are not the thief himself). They are all penalised with 4 or five times the value of the objects they were trying to dispose of before they could be found. (Rash’bam)

וטבחו או מכרו, and the thief had either slaughtered it or sold it; here we could also say that logic would have told us this. If the slaughterer is guilty of this penalty, surely the one who had sold it is also guilty of it? Had the Torah not written this example we would have reasoned that this is proof that penalties can be imposed by the court by the judges simply using their logic.

וטבחו או מכרו, why did the Torah choose these two examples of how a thief wishes to eliminate suspicion from himself? Just as slaughtering and subsequently eating the ox is an irreversible act, so selling him and transferring ownership is a similarly irreversible act.

חמשה בקר וגו' וארבע צאן, “five times the value of cattle, etc. or four times its value if he stole a sheep or goat.” The reason why the thief faces a relatively smaller penalty if the object he stole was a sheep or goat, is that he had to demean himself by carrying the animal from where he stole it. He did not use such tactics when stealing a large animal such as an ox. Also the loss of an ox to its owner is more serious as it deprives him of an animal that works for him while in his possession. This is not the case with sheep or goats. A different explanation for the penalties imposed for hiding evidence. Stealing a large animal such as an ox is evidence that the thief had experience in how to steal successfully. Stealing a lamb successfully is no evidence that the thief had become a professional thief.

תחת השור.... תחת השה, “in exchange for the ox, in exchange for the lamb. The reason that the Torah repeats this legislation for each animal separately, is that by doing so it teaches that this particular legislation applies only in the event that either of these categories had been stolen and sold, etc. It does not apply if the stolen animal had been a camel or donkey, for instance.