And the son of the Israelite woman invoked the Name, vilifying it. And they brought him to Moshe. And his mother’s name was Shelomith daughter of Dibri of the tribe of Dan. Rabbi Benamozegh explores the concept of associating a son with his mother’s lineage, as exemplified in our verse. He notes that the Tanakh frequently names sons after their mothers, as evidenced in various verses such as in Sefer Melakhim II. He also references Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra’s assertion that a mother’s nature is inherited by her son, highlighting this as a possible explanation for why Aharon’s sons, rather than Moshe’s sons, inherited greatness. Rabbi Benamozegh also refers to the Talmudic idea that sons often resemble their mother’s brothers due to the prenatal environment. However, he challenges the notion that this is the reason why Moshe’s sons were not chosen to lead the people after him. He points out that leadership in Jewish society is meritocratic, rather than an inherited position, and thus Moshe’s sons were not chosen for that reason, rather than a negative influence from their mother’s side. Finally, Rabbi Benamozegh contrasts Israelite matrilineal customs with those of other ancient cultures. He points out that matronymics (naming children after their mothers) was also practised by the ancient Etruscans and Greeks, particularly in their burial traditions. This contrasts sharply with Egyptian customs, where maternal lineage was undervalued. He suggests that this difference is one of the ways in which the God of Israel set His people apart from Egyptian ideas and practices.

And to the Israelites you shall speak, saying ‘Should any man vilify his God, he shall bear his offense. Rabbi Benamozegh delves into a comprehensive analysis of the prohibition against vilifying/cursing gods. At the outset, Rabbi Benamozegh references interpretations from a wide range of sources, including the 1st century Jewish historian Josephus, the 1st century BCE Jewish scholar Philo, and the Essenes of the Second Temple era. (Tangentially, he regards the Essenes as forerunners to the Kabbalists). These sources, despite their varied backgrounds, unanimously interpret our verse as prohibiting blasphemy not only against God, but against the gods of other nations. This consensus underscores a universal moral directive against disrespecting any deity, reflecting a deep-seated reverence for the divine, regardless of religious boundaries. Rabbi Benamozegh then addresses the Zohar, which appeared in late 13th century Ashkenaz. The Zohar similarly prohibits cursing foreign deities, echoing the sentiment of the previously mentioned sources. This interpretation is grounded in the belief that all gods exist by divine permission to govern different nations. Based on this, he criticises those who accused Josephus and Philo of fabricating this interpretation of the verse, in order to appease their respective Roman and Greek compatriots. The Zohar has no need to appease any other nation, and yet echoes their statements wholeheartedly. Reflecting on the origins of the Zohar’s teachings, Rabbi Benamozegh ponders whether the Zohar’s author might have been influenced by earlier Jewish scholars such as Josephus and Philo. He suggests that if the Zohar’s author arrived at these interpretations independently, they were likely formulated during an era when such ideas were already well-established and recognised among the scholarly Jewish community. This period, he infers, would align with the time of the early Tannaim. Rabbi Benamozegh then explores Kabbalistic beliefs such as the notion that every idol mentioned in holy texts contains an element of holiness. This Kabbalistic perspective leads to a prohibition against cursing idols or Satan, as it would amount to cursing something that possesses a divine spark. This belief highlights the nuanced understanding of divinity in Kabbalistic thought, where even entities traditionally viewed as negative are seen as part of a larger divine plan. Notably, Rabbi Benamozegh stresses that Philo’s primary concern was to prevent other nations from cursing the God of Israel. This concern reflects a protective stance towards one’s own deity while also respecting others. Rabbi Benamozegh then connects this ancient prohibition to texts such as the 2nd century Ben Sira (“when the ungodly curses Satan, he curses his own soul”) and the 1st century work, Second Epistle of Peter, to illustrate the ancient roots of this belief. In the second chapter, the author castigates those human beings who slander and blaspheme the celestial beings, even though angels – who sit above those celestial beings – do not blaspheme them, even as they bring judgement upon them. Rabbi Benamozegh observes that this aligns with the perspective of the Zohar, that it is inappropriate to curse those ministering beings whom some worship as idols; the Zohar calls these beings ‘shiltonin de’alema’. This is explained in more detail in the Epistle of Jude, where the author rebukes those individuals, and points out that the archangel Michael, when arguing with Satan over Moshe’s body, said to Satan merely, “May the Lord rebuke you!”. Taking these two sources together, Rabbi Benamozegh concludes that the author of 2 Peter was criticising those human beings who curse Satan, instead taking the stance that it was forbidden to do so, in accordance with Philo, Josephus, the Essenes and the Kabbalists. Rabbi Benamozegh views this as a further indication that Christianity emerged from the Essenes, when they corrupted Kabbalistic teachings by bringing them into mundane spheres. Rabbi Benamozegh moves on to the Talmudic tractate Qiddushin, which reflects similar sentiments. He recounts the story in it of Pelemo who was accustomed to say every day, “arrows in the eyes of Satan”. One day, Satan revealed himself to him and asked, “Why do you say this?” Pelemo replied asking what he could say instead, and Satan said, “May the Merciful one rebuke Satan,” clearly echoing the language of the Epistle of Jude. Another moral derived from this aggada, notes Rabbi Benamozegh, aligns with the Kabbalistic view of not standing in the way of the agents of judgement when they perform their mission. The Kabbalists refer to this as ‘ḥasima’, or ‘blocking’, which is the metaphysical idea of restricting divine flow or energy. Extending this principle, Rabbi Benamozegh discusses broader applications in Jewish practice, such as the prohibition against giving charity at night. He refers to the aggada that details how Rabbi Eleazar was distributing charity at night and encountered the chief spirit of the dead, who challenged his doing so on the basis that night is the time allocated to spirits, and not to human beings; Rabbi Eleazar’s distribution of charity was interfering with the non-human agents carrying out God’s will during the night. He argues that these practices, such as not giving charity at night, whilst ostensibly new, are rooted in deep theological beliefs, tracing back to ancient traditions.

Lastly, Rabbi Benamozegh references the Qur’an, suggesting that Muhammad’s teachings against cursing idols were influenced by Jewish traditions. This further reinforces his argument that this interpretation of the pasuq was widespread at the time of the Mishna, and carried by Jews to Arab lands.