Know that in the Torah, when any prophet expresses a thought that implies some question or uncertainty, it does not mean that that prophet doubts the word of the Lord, or considers the possibility that His word, whether great or small, could be voided. (The reason is that a prophet knows that) “there shall fall unto the earth nothing of the word of the Lord.”¹ When such statements are spoken by the prophets, as when Abraham said, “Shall a child be born unto him that is a hundred years old,”² and “Wilt thou indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked”;³ or when Jacob said, “Thou saidest, ‘I will surely do thee good’”;⁴ or when Moses uttered several statements of this kind—all these are spoken in the fullest faith that the word of the Lord will neither fail nor deceive. These statements come instead by way of investigative query, inasmuch as the word of the Lord can be interpreted in various ways. The student, i.e., the prophet, requests clarification of whether (the Lord’s) intention is to (all) the interpretations or some of them, and if to some of them, how many and which ones.⁵ Regarding this variety of interpretations, there are many things to consider. The most important, those that override the others, are two: are there terms or phrases which are equivocal; and, what is the mode of expression? (The latter factor occurs) when (it is not clear whether the expression) is contingent or necessary, because it lacks a qualifying phrase.⁶, fol. 182a, Kaspi says: Examples of statements that are without qualifying phrases are “man lives,” “man writes,” while examples of statements with qualifying phrases are “man lives necessarily,” “man writes possibly.” An example of a contingent statement (that is unclear) is, “It may be that I shall be builded up through her.”⁷, Kaspi appears to say that this verse is an example of a statement that possesses a qualifying phrase, for “it may be” is the equivalent of “possibly.” That explanation appears more accurate than the present one. An example of a necessary statement (that is similary unclear) because it lacks a qualifying phrase, is, “I will give thee a son of her.”⁸ (“I will give”) could mean “I will possibly give.” Statements having qualifying phrases include “Nay, but Sarah thy wife shall bear thee a son,”⁹ which (indicates) a covenantal obligation or an expression of an oath. Nowhere in the Torah is there an expression that has qualifying phrases unless such a phrase conforms to these (two) formulations. Even the pronouncements of Isaiah on the destruction of Edom¹⁰ are not really necessary expressions—certainly none of the others (that prophesy destruction).¹¹ (MK II 286) and Shulḥan Kesef, fols. 182a ff., for a fuller treatment of this doctrine.

footnotes: ¹ 1. II Kings 10:10. ² 2. Gen. 17:17. ³ 3. Gen. 18:23. ⁴ 4. Gen. 32:13. ⁵ 5. He means that God’s words can be interpreted in several ways, and it is not always immediately clear to the prophet which interpretation is correct. ⁶ 6. In the Shulḥan Kesef ⁷ 7. In the same passage of Shulḥan Kesef ⁸ 8. He means that in the original Hebrew the term natati ⁹ 9. V. 19. ¹⁰ 10. Isa. 34. ¹¹ 11. This, as well as the entire paragraph, is in accordance with Kaspi’s assertion (against Maimonides) that divine decrees never change—they are only reinterpreted in the light of subsequent events. Accordingly the pronouncement of a divine decree, while it may appear to foretell a necessary event, in most cases foretells a contingent event. The only exceptions, Kaspi says here, are pronouncements that include an oath or a covenant. See Maṣref La-Kesef

The general rule here is that both | the fool and the wise raise questions, but that while the fool asks in order to make fun, a wise person will inquire out of consideration of the principles of science. This is meant by “it is not out of wisdom that thou inquirest concerning this,”¹² for indeed (Ecclesiastes) asks precisely that question¹³ —however, it is from such considerations that he attained wisdom, for he inquired in investigation of that detail in a manner that a fool would not even ask regarding general principles. (Similarly) Aristotle said that one only knows something by comprehending it from both points of view, as is recorded in the Posterior Analytics.¹⁴ II, 1, 89b, Aristotle says: “thus when our question concerns a complex of things and attributes, and we ask whether a thing is thus or otherwise qualified, whether, for example, the sun suffers an eclipse or not, then we are asking as to the facts of the connection.… on the other hand, when we know the fact we ask the reason; as, for example, when we know that the sun is being eclipsed, and that an earthquake is in progress, it is regarding the reason of the eclipse or earthquake that we inquire.”

footnotes: ¹² 12. Eccles. 7:10. ¹³ 13. The question asked is: “How was it possible that the former days were better than these?” (Eccles. 7:10). ¹⁴ 14. In the Posterior Analytics