IMPLANTED NAILS SHOW THAT EVEN REJECTED OPINIONS MUST BE STUDIED BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE INSIGHTS IN UNDERSTANDING THE TORAH THERE IS, HOWEVER, a second method by which the sages derived several laws [from the same verse], one that was used when there was disagreement.¹ One sage holds that a certain law is derived [from certain words in a verse], while the other sage advances an opposing opinion, arguing that a different law is to be derived [from them]. Behold, one opinion is of importance and brings life to the world [instructs us what to practice], while the second is of lesser significance and is not the accepted halachah. Perhaps, Heaven forbid, you might believe that the [rejected] opinion is null and void and is not included within the category of the light of Torah. For this reason [Jeremiah] compared [the opposing derivations by sages] to an “anvil striking a rock.”² It is similar to one who strikes a rock to produce sparks so that he can light a lamp that enables one to walk in the proper path.³ Although when one strikes a rock he produces many sparks, he is only concerned about the [single] spark that he will use to light the lamp. Yet although the other sparks cease to exist and do not fulfill that purpose, they are unequal in how distant they are from achieving that goal. Some sparks do not travel very far, for as soon as they leave the rock, their brightness subsides and they decay until they no longer possess any light. Other sparks will last for a [longer] time and will be able to brighten the area towards where they are traveling. But some flying sparks become caught in certain things [that are flammable], and they create a large bonfire, which was not the intent of the one who struck the rock. Thus it is when the words of the sages are in disagreement.

footnotes: ¹ In chapter 9 of this section, the Netziv discusses the derivation of laws when there is no disagreement. ² An anvil striking a rock is symbolic of disagreement among the sages, in which there are clashing opinions. ³ According to the Netziv, the Talmud sees two meanings in the verse in Jeremiah: first, many different interpretations of Scripture that can result from disagreement, similar to the way an anvil shatters a rock; second, these different opinions contain properties similar to the sparks that emanate from the anvil as it strikes the rock.

One opinion decides the law in accordance [with accepted] practice, which is the main purpose [of Torah study, i.e., to ascertain the true halachah], while the other opinions serve no purpose [in relation] to the decided halachah. Nevertheless, these other opinions, [though they did not] fulfill the main purpose of [leading one to] the true halachah, are unequal [in their effect].

Some opinions [seem to] have [an insignificant impact], for as soon as they issue from the rock of contention, their brightness is diminished and degenerates to the extent that they no longer contain the light of Torah. For example, the sages in ancient times disputed [whether the verse], “Neither an Ammonite nor a Moabite may enter into God’s community,”⁴ also included a prohibition of marrying an Ammonite or Moabite woman. [Some included such women in the prohibition, while others disagreed]. At the time of the disagreement [the former view] was considered within the] category of words of Torah. [However, once] Boaz came forward, as stated in Tractate Kesubos 7b,⁵ and established the halachah for future generations [that the prohibition applies only to Ammonite or Moabite men], the Torah spark [of the rejected opinion] was totally extinguished. Therefore, one studying the opinion of Do’eg⁶ [as quoted in Tractate Yevamos],⁷ 76b–77a describes how King Saul’s armor was miraculously able to fit David for his fight with Goliath. This indicated to King Saul that David was of royal lineage, which in turn led to a discussion between King Saul, Do’eg and Avner (King Saul’s general), as to whether David, a descendant of Ruth the Moabite, was permitted to marry into the congregation. The Gemara reports that Do’eg argued strongly against allowing David to do so until Yisra the Israelite (II Sam. 17:25) said that he had a tradition from the court of the prophet Samuel that the scriptural prohibition applied only to Moabite and Ammonite men. that Ammonite or Moabite women are included in the prohibition, discovers something that is dissimilar to the rest of the words of Torah. It is unlike a person studying the opinion of R. Shimon in the Mishnah in Tractate Yevamos 76b, according to which Egyptian and Edomite women are not included in the prohibition [in Deut. 23:9].⁸ [R. Shimon’s light of Torah lasted longer and indeed was not extinguished until the Amoraic era]. So it was regarding the decision of Do’eg and Ahisophel,⁹, the oracle upon the high priest’s breastplate. that they ruled it was permissible [for Absalom to marry] king David’s wife, since [in their view, King David] was subject to capital punishment and was therefore considered [legally] dead¹⁰ quoted there states, “The one [Achisophel] permitted incest and bloodshed [when he counseled Absalom], ‘Go to your father’s concubines’ (II Sam. 16:21). The other [Do’eg] permitted incest, as R. Nahman, the son of Shemuel, the son of Nahman, stated, ‘He annulled David’s status and declared him an outlaw and as one already dead, so that anyone could shed his blood or marry his wife without penalty.’” (see the beginning of Bereshis Rabbahon the Torah portion of Noah).¹¹ Clearly, this opinion receded, and has no light of Torah.

footnotes: ⁴ Deut. 23:5. ⁵ Boaz assembled ten men when he married Ruth. According to the Gemara, he did this in order to publicize the ruling that one may marry a Moabite woman. ⁶ Do’eg was a Torah scholar and an advisor to King Saul. He later slandered King David and, as stated in I Sam. 22:9–18, was responsible for the destruction of Nov, the city of Kohanim. ⁷ Tractate Yevamos ⁸ The verse states: “Sons who are born to them [an Edomite or Egyptian] in the third generation may enter the congregation of the Lord.” ⁹ Achisophel was a great Torah scholar and an advisor to King David. He is described in II Sam. 16:23 as so wise that his advice was comparable to one making decisions through the urim ve-tummim ¹⁰ The Midrash ¹¹ Parasha 32.

In a similar manner, during the Second Temple period, there was a dispute as to whether the Hagigah sacrifice overrides the Sabbath.¹² Tractate Pesahim 70b states that according to Yehuda ben Dortai and his son, the Hagigah sacrifice overrides the Sabbath, just as the paschal lamb does. Rav asks, “What is the reasoning of Ben Dortai?” [Rav analyzes Ben Dortai’s opinion], after which R. Ashi replies, “Must we come and explain the reasoning of those who separate themselves?”¹³ Thus we see that according to [R. Ashi], this spark had vanished and should no longer be discussed. Also see Tractate Avodah Zarah 7b, which gives [several opinions of Nahum the Mede].¹⁴ After each opinion, the Gemara says: “Let this matter be forgotten and left unspoken.” According to Rashi’s second explanation,¹⁵ this statement is to be translated as, “Let this matter not be discussed beyond our debate,” which implies that this opinion is no longer included within the definition of Torah. Who knows how many [other] disagreements of earlier generations came to naught because their brightness was extinguished?

footnotes: ¹² Bringing a sacrifice involves the performance of acts such as slaughtering an animal, which are included in the thirty-nine main categories of work that are prohibited on the Sabbath. ¹³ This refers to one who refuses to follow the majority opinion. ¹⁴ The Talmud cites three opinions of Nahum the Mede, to which the rabbis responded, “Let this matter be forgotten and left unspoken.” His three opinions are: 1) it is forbidden to transact business with idolaters on the day that precedes their festivals; 2) one may sell an old male horse to idol-worshippers during wartime; 3. dill is subject to tithes whether harvested as a seed, a vegetable or as shoots. Notwithstanding the admonitions regarding Nahum’s opinions, the Netziv says that they still have value in understanding the opposing opinions. The Gemara itself uses them for that purpose. ¹⁵ According to Rashi’s first explanation, these words are interpreted as, “No one had ever made such a statement.”

However, there are many disagreements in which each opinion is itself a lamp that glows with the wisdom of the Torah, even though one of the opinions is not in accordance with the decided halachah. This is obvious according to [the previously discussed] opinion of Tosafos in Part 1, chapter 3, that [individual opinions] retain their significance; for [according to Tosafos], in emergency situations we can rely on a solitary opinion that is lenient. Moreover, [this is true] even though the opinions of Rashi and the Rambam, [discussed in the above mentioned section], hold that it is impossible ever to rule in accordance with the lone opinion.¹⁶ For even in those places where the Gemara decides unequivocally against a certain opinion, such as when the School of Shammai argues against the School of Hillel, Halachah is not in accordance with the Academy of Shammai.¹⁷ 13b where it rules that Halachah is in accordance with the House of Hillel. See also Tractate Sukkah 3a, in the Tosafos s.v. De-amar lach mani, that according to Rav Amram Gaon, in six instances Halachah follows the School of Shammai. Nevertheless, [Shammaite] opinions contain concepts that shed light upon other areas unrelated to the topic being debated,¹⁸ or have certain aspects that may be useful in determining the halachic matter under discussion.¹⁹ 51b and 52a, where R. Meir and R. Yehuda disagree as to the way the School of Hillel differs from the School of Shammai concerning the order of the blessings in the Havdalah service.

footnotes: ¹⁶ This opinion is restricted to when the sages voted on the particular issues. If no vote was taken, it was permitted to follow the lone opinion. ¹⁷ See Tractate Eruvin ¹⁸ The last clause is literally, “or [their opinions] become caught within the sought-after opinion.” This is like a spark that leaves a rock and ignites something that catches fire, just as when one strikes a rock to produce sparks. His main concern is the one spark that lights the lamp, but other items that are not related to the main topic of discussion become ignited. ¹⁹ For an example, see Tractate Berachos

Translator’s note: Next, the Netziv cites an example to illustrate the significance of opinions that are not in accordance with the accepted halachah. This example is complicated and contains four ways to describe the disagreement between Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis. The Netziv has also included two addenda that have been moved to appendices. If one is not comfortable with reading the Netziv’s analysis of the gemara in Tractate Berachos, one may proceed to the end of the chapter to see the way the Netziv explains how Koheles describes the significance of various differing opinions and how they pertain to the interpretation of Torah. Take, for example, the first disagreement that occurs in the six Orders of the Talmud. The discussion relates to when one recites the shemain the evening. [There are three opinions cited in the Mishnah]. According to R. Eliezer, the shemamay be recited at nightfall, beginning from the time that the kohanim, who had been tamei – ritually impure – returned home²⁰.” to eat their *terumah,*²¹ receives a certain percentage of the crops that are grown in the Land of Israel. This percentage is called terumah. Since terumah is considered sacred, it may be eaten only by the kohen when he is in a state of tohorah (ritual purity). A kohen who is ritually impure can only become tahor for the purpose of eating terumah by immersing in a mikveh and then waiting for nightfall. The Gemara defines nightfall as the time when three medium-sized stars may be seen in the night sky. and ends at the completion of the first ashmurah[watch].²² The sages say that it may be recited until midnight, while according to Rabban Gamliel it may be recited until the break of dawn. According to our [the Babylonian] Talmud, the halachah is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,²³ 8b, where R. Yehuda states in the name of Shemuel that the halachah is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel. whereas according to the Jerusalem Talmud, the halachah is in accordance with the sages.²⁴ The opinion of R. Eliezer has certainly been halachically rejected. Perhaps you will say, Heaven forbid, that the words of R. Eliezer contain no light of Torah. However, this is not true, for his opinion provides a spark that enlightens another area [of the Torah]. We learn from his words that the night has three watches, which is in itself deep wisdom and sheds a sublime light.²⁵ 3a, which discusses at length how the three watches correspond to three events that occur both in heaven and on earth.

footnotes: ²⁰ Literally, “enter to eat their terumah ²¹ The kohen ²² The night is divided into three watches. Therefore, the first watch ends at the end of the first third of the night. ²³ See Tractate Berachos ²⁴ The Netziv discusses this later in this chapter in the text at n. 28. ²⁵ See Tractate Berachos

In addition, by [properly understanding] the opinion of R. Eliezer, one achieves a correct understanding of the opinion of the sages. [Because of R. Eliezer’s opinion], the sons of Rabban Gamliel questioned the scope of their father’s opinion and that of the sages. As it states in Berachos 9a, [Rabban Gamliel’s sons came home from a banquet after midnight and asked their father], “Do the sages who say that one may read the shemauntil midnight disagree with you [regarding the Torah definition as to when the shemamay be read, and therefore hold that the shema cannot be read under any circumstances after midnight], and that when there is a disagreement between the majority and minority, we follow the opinion of the majority? Or perhaps the sages agree with you on the definition of the Torah law [and concur that according to the Torah, the shema may be read until dawn], and that when they said [one may only recite the evening shemauntil midnight], it was only in order to distance a person from sin? Rashi explains this discussion as the following: [Do the sages disagree with your understanding of how late the Torah allows one to read the shema]? That is, do the sages agree with R. Eliezer that be-shochbecha refers only to when people are preparingto go to sleep, and their disagreement with R. Eliezer is only regarding the time period in which people prepare to go to sleep? Or do the sages perhaps agree with you [that the Torah allows one to read the shema the entire night, and be-shochbecha means when people are sleeping]?²⁶ and becoming susceptible to falling asleep until dawn.

footnotes: ²⁶ Thus, the sages are only stating a rabbinic decree to prevent people from delaying the recitation of the shema

[ONE SHOULD NOT question [why Rabban Gamliel’s sons’ questioned regarding the scope of the sages’ opinion based on what the Gemara states about the opinion of the Sages] in Berachos 4a. There the Gemara asks, “The Sages [who hold that the shema may be read only until midnight], with whom do they agree? If they hold like R. Eliezer, let them state like R. Eliezer [that the shema must be read prior to the end of the first watch]?” Rashi explains that if the sages agree with R. Eliezer, who explains be-shochbecha as ‘when people are preparing to go to sleep,’ they should not allow anyone to read the shema after the first watch, since by then, anyone who was planning to go to sleep for the night has already done so? Therefore, how could Rabban Gamliel’s sons question [the Sages’ interpretation of be-shochbecha if it is the same as defined by R. Eliezer, for then the Sages should have required the shema to be read prior to the end of the first watch?]

Although the commentaries have already discussed this issue, I would like to offer the following solution. Concerning the morning shema, there is a disagreement between the Tanna Kamma¹. and R. Yehoshua as to when it may be read, the resolution of which depends on the definition of the Scriptural term, u-vekumecha, “and when you rise up.” According to the Tanna Kamma, the morning shema may be read only until sunrise, as that is when most people get up. However, according to R. Yehoshua, the morning shema may be read until the end of [the first] three hours [of the day], as that is when royalty arise – i.e., we take into account the period when the minority arise. Since the Talmud decides in accordance with R. Yehoshua, we consider the practices of the minority for determining the time for reading the shema, [at least in the morning], one could argue [with respect to the evening shema], that the Sages who disagree with R. Eliezer hold in accordance with R. Yehoshua that we consider the practices of the minority of people, such as Talmudic scholars and the like, who go to bed around midnight. Therefore, there is room for doubt, as expressed by the sons of Rabban Gamliel [whether the Sages accepted be-shochbechaas defined by R. Eliezer, and considered the sleeping habits of the minority as R. Yehoshua believes.

footnotes: ¹ Tanna Kammah refers to the first anonymous opinion stated in a Mishnah

However, the Gemara [4a] questions [how anyone could suggest that the sages defined be-shochbecha as R. Eliezer did, i.e., when people are preparing to go to sleep, and considered the minority of people's sleeping habits like R. Yehoshua]. It is clear from the wording of the Mishnah that the sages do not agree with R. Eliezer regarding the evening shema, and they [also] disagree with R. Yehoshua pertaining to the morning *shema.*² states this opinion in the name of R. Yehoshua, it is a solitary opinion. If it were in the name of the sages, it would have stated, “The Sages say,” and so on, as worded in the first Mishnah. We infer that the sages disagree with R. Yehoshua. See Meromei Sadeh. [Therefore, since the sages do not hold that we consider the sleeping habits of the minority, they must interpret be-shochbecha differently from R. Eliezer, since the sages state that one can read the shema up to midnight]. Nor does it appear that R. Yehoshua disagrees with R. Eliezer [in which case the Gemara could not argue that perhaps the sages held like R. Yehoshua who would consider the minority of people who go to sleep at midnight].³ The sons of Rabban Gamliel, [however], who lived prior to the redaction of the Mishnah, knew only that the Sages disagreed with Rabban Gamliel, and believed that the sages could follow R. Eliezer’s definition of be-shochbecha in relation to the time for reading the evening shema, and also agree with R. Yehoshua [who considers the minority’s sleeping habits for purposes of the morning shemaand that his explanation could be applied] to the evening shema.]

footnotes: ² Since the Mishnah ³ The Netziv is rebutting a possible argument that the Sages agree with R. Yehoshua. One could argue that R. Yehoshua disagrees with R. Eliezer, thus if the Sages disagree with R. Eliezer , they must agree with R. Yehoshua. However, neither Mishnah indicates that R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua disagree.

Behold, it is due to R. Eliezer’s opinion that we must analyze the opinion of the rabbis even more deeply. It also appears from the Jerusalem Talmud that there truly are two different views of the sages’ opinion. The Jerusalem Talmud questions how Rabban Gamliel could issue a ruling for others to practice in accordance with his minority opinion, since it is known that when other tannaitic sages disagreed with the majority opinion, they did not act in accordance with their lone opinion. [The Jerusalem Talmud provides two different answers.] One view is that Rabban Gamliel told his sons that in reality, halachah agrees with the sages, [and one can no longer fulfill the mitzvah of reading the shema after midnight]; however, they should still read the shema in order to receive the reward for Torah study.²⁷ 9b: “One who recites the morning shemafrom that point on [after the third hour, even though he does not receive the reward for reading the shema] does not lose [all of his Heavenly reward], since he is rewarded as one who reads from the Torah.” The second view is that Rabban Gamliel answered his sons that since the time for reading the shema as defined by the Sages had passed, they should read the shema in accordance with his opinion. Prima facie, [the second answer] is difficult to understand, for Rabban Gamliel is still ruling against the sages, for according to their opinion, there is never any reading of the shema after midnight. Therefore, one must argue that these two different answers imply two different interpretations of the Sages’ opinion. The first view is that the sages agree with R. Eliezer that [the time limit is defined by when people are preparing to go to sleep]. Therefore, once midnight has passed, one may no longer read the evening shema under any circumstances, for it is as if the sun had already risen. Those who offer the second opinion, however, hold that the Sages agree [with Rabban Gamliel] that the time period for reading the shema, as defined by the Torah with the word, be-shochbecha, is when people are asleep. [This would invite the conclusion that], according to the Torah, one can read the shema up til dawn, but the Sages stated that one should read the shema before midnight to prevent one from sinning. It is then understandable why Rabban Gamliel instructed his sons to read the shema, be-di’avad, after the fact, i.e., once midnight has passed, for the sages would agree that [even after midnight] one should still read the shema in accordance with Rabban Gamliel’s opinion. Behold, we see that according to the first view, the sages concur with R. Eliezer’s interpretation of be-shochbecha.

footnotes: ²⁷ The Sha’agas Aryeh compares this to the mishnah in Tractate Berachos

However, after further analysis of this discussion in the Jerusalem Talmud, one sees that it is not possible to offer the interpretation we described above. It is clear from the Jerusalem Talmud that [the rabbis of the Land of Israel were of the opinion that] according to Rabban Gamliel one may deliberately delay the reading of the shema past midnight. The Jerusalem Talmud states²⁸ 1:1. in that section in which R. Yassa [to stress that the halachah is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel] exhorted Talmud sages who entered the academy to study at night to recite the shema, thus ensuring that they would read it before midnight.²⁹before midnight and study [afterwards].’” We infer from this, that according to the Jerusalem Talmud, the halachah follows the sages, and it is taken for granted that according to Rabban Gamliel one is allowed at the outset to delay the reading of the shema past midnight. Therefore, one must conclude that [according to the Jerusalem Talmud], when the Mishnah rules that one must read the shema prior to midnight [not because the Torah prohibits any postponement, but in order] to prevent one from sinning. This is indeed the proper interpretation of the Sages, as they disagree with R. Eliezer’s [definition of be-shochbecha that one can read the shema the entire time that people are preparing to go to sleep].

footnotes: ²⁸ This is stated in Berachos ²⁹ There it states, “R. Yassa stated in the name of R. Yohanan that Halachah is in accordance with the rabbis. R. Yassa would charge his colleagues, ‘If you wish to engage [all night] in the study of Torah, [make sure] that you read the shema

Thus, we must say that these two answers [explaining how Rabban Gamliel could permit his sons to read the shema after midnight], are only disagreeing as to how the Sages implemented the precautionary rule to distance oneself from sin.³⁰ after midnight which is granted from the Torah? The Nimukkei Yosef states that the rabbis were given the power to uproot a positive commandment, by applying shev ve-al ta’aseh (“sit and do nothing”) to ensure that people do not sin. In the first opinion, according to the rabbis, even after the fact one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of reading the *shema.*³¹ This, in fact, is [similar to] Rashi’s opinion in Berachos 9b, s.v. O Dilmah: “Nevertheless, if he was unable to read the shema before midnight, there is still time to read the shema.” Rashi means that the sages disagree, [holding that] even after the fact, [if one deliberately] delayed reading the shema, one cannot read it after midnight. One can only recite the shemaafter midnight if one was unable to do so before midnight.³² The Jerusalem Talmud, [however], does not differentiate [between a deliberate and an inadvertent delay, and opines that according to the sages one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of reading the shema after midnight regardless of the circumstances]. This is why Rabban Gamliel told his sons that they could read the shema, for they would not be going against the sages, [even though the sages ruled that one could no longer fulfill the mitzvah of saying the shema at that time, they would nevertheless agree that one could read the shema] because they would receive reward for Torah study by doing so. The second answer is given by those who hold that according to the Rabbis [their ruling was only a precaution, so that where there was a delay], and a person did not recite the shema before midnight, he could still fulfill his obligation by reciting the shemaafter midnight.

footnotes: ³⁰ In other words, did the sages uproot one’s ability to read the shema ³¹ The rabbis have the power to apply a decree and ensure observance by limiting the scope of a Torah law. ³² That is, it was delayed by accident.

[FROM WHAT HAS been discussed regarding the way in which the Jerusalem Talmud differs from the Babylonian Talmud in their interpretations of the opinions of Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis], it is clearly possible to suggest that the rabbis instituted their rule as a precautionary measure to the extent that if one was delayed, he could not read the evening shema after midnight. This interpretation of the sage’s view addresses the objection raised against this opinion as expressed by the great genius, the Sha’agas Aryeh.¹. In the Laws of Kerias Shema, siman 4, he discusses whether, from the outset, a person can delay the reading of the evening shema until dawn. He analyzes in depth two possible approaches to the disagreement between R. Gamliel and the sages. One possibility is that both R. Gamliel and the sages allow one to read the shema until dawn, but R. Gamliel allows one to delay the reading of the shema after midnight from the outset, while the sages do not allow us to delay its reading from the outset. The second possibility is that R. Gamliel holds that from the outset one is not allowed to delay the reading of the shema after midnight. However, if one did delay after midnight, R. Gamliel allows the shema to be read until dawn, while according to the sages one is no longer allowed to recite the shema. The Rif and the Rambam, as understood by the Sha’agas Aryeh, agree with R. Gamliel as in the second approach. The Sha’agas Aryeh, based on his interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud, argues against the Rambam, and preferring the first way of describing the differing opinions between R. Gamliel and the rabbis. The argument of the Sha’agas Aryeh is based on his understanding that the Jerusalem Talmud considers both possibilities and rejects the second. He also believes that the Jerusalem Talmud understands the opinions of R. Gamliel and the rabbis similarly to the way they are understood by the Babylonian Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud questions how R. Gamliel could rule against the rabbis by allowing his sons to read the shema past midnight, when it is seen from several examples, that sole authorities always instructed others to follow the majority opinion rather than their own. The first answer is that in reality they could no longer fulfill the mitzvah of shema; however, the sages allow one to read the shema past midnight as this would at least fulfill the mitzvah of learning Torah. This answer is rejected by the Talmud, since they could fulfill this even past dawn and the Mishnahshould not have specified that the question referred to the time before dawn. The second answer is that R. Gamliel’s instruction to his sons did not contradict the rabbis, since they also allow one to read the shema past midnight. As explained by the Sha’agas Aryeh, if the sons had questioned R. Gamliel prior to midnight, he would have ruled that they are not allowed to delay the shema, as they are required to follow the majority opinion. However, since midnight had already passed, he told them to read the shema, for the Rabbis agreed that it could be read up until dawn. It is then clear that according to the second opinion, R. Gamliel allows one from the outset to delay the shema past midnight. Since, according to the Babylonian Talmud, the Halachah follows R. Gamliel, the Sha’agas Aryeh disagrees with the Rambam and allows one to delay the reading of the shema past midnight from the outset. It would then follow logically that Rabban Gamliel also agrees that from the outset one may not delay the reading of the shema past midnight, which [indeed] is the opinion of the Rif. The Rif proves from what the Talmud states in [Berachos] 4b: [that according to all opinions, one may not intentionally delay the reading of the shema past midnight]. The Gemara there states, “The sages made a fence for their words, for a person should not come from the field in the evening and say, I will first go to my house and eat a little…. A deep sleep will come over him, and the result will be that he will sleep all night [and not read the shema].”² may be read until midnight is to distance a person from sin. It has been taught: The sages made a fence for their words, for a person should not come in from the field in the evening and say, I will first go to my house and eat a little… drink a little and sleep a little, and afterwards I will recite the shema and pray. A deep sleep will come over him, and as a result he will sleep through the whole night [and omit the shema]. Rather, when a person returns from the field in the evening, he should go directly to the synagogue… recite the shema and pray. [Only then] should he eat his bread and recite the blessing afterwards. Whoever transgresses the words of the sages is liable to the death penalty.” Therefore, since [this precautionary measure instituted by the rabbis that a person should not] eat or sleep prior to the reading of the shema is in accordance with all opinions, even including Rabban Gamliel, so all the opinions agree that from the outset one may not delay the reading of the shema past midnight intentionally regardless of whether he eats or drinks. The disagreement between Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis thus pertains to one who [intentionally] delayed the reading of the shema past midnight. According to the rabbis, one thereby forfeited his right to read the shema, while according to Rabban Gamliel, he may continue to read the shemauntil dawn]. This is also the opinion of the Rambam³ 1:9. of blessed memory, whose view is contrary to the opinion of the Jerusalem Talmud. For according to the Rambam, the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud, and we follow the Babylonian Talmud.⁴ past midnight. According to the Babylonian Talmud, both the Rabbis and R. Gamliel agree that from the outset one is not to delay the reading of the shema past midnight. As a general rule, we follow the opinion of the Babylonian against the Jerusalem Talmud.

footnotes: ¹ Rabbi Aryeh Leib Gunzberg (1695–1785), one of the three teachers of Rav Hayyim Volozhiner, is commonly referred to by the name of his classic work, Sha’agas Aryeh ² This is the Talmudic text: “In reality it is R. Gamliel’s view that they adopted, and the reason for saying that the shema ³ Laws of Kerias Shema ⁴ The Netziv rebuts the Sha’agas Aryeh’s objection against the Rambam (and the Rif) by stating that the Rambam considers that the Jerusalem Talmud understands R. Gamliel and the rabbis, differently from the Babylonian Talmud. Only according to the Jerusalem Talmud does R. Gamliel allow one from the outset to delay the reading of the shema

The genius Sha’agas Aryeh argued that such a decree [disallowing] the reading of the shema [past midnight] could not possibly be imposed by the rabbis. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, the rabbis decreed that one could no longer fulfill the mitzvah past midnight [only if a delay could result in severe consequences] such as the punishment of kares, excision, [which would not apply to delaying the reading of the shema].⁵ states], ‘… and all those sacrifices that may be eaten for only one day, the time of the mitzvah extends until the light of dawn rises….’ If it is true [that these sacrifices may be eaten until dawn], why did the sages state that they [may only be eaten] until midnight? [It is in order to distance a person from sin]. One may eat the sacrifices past dawn [while thinking that it is still night], thereby violating a prohibition. [Now that the sages] required a person to eat the sacrifices before midnight, [he will be more zealous], and [at most] will only delay the sacrifices past midnight, thereby avoiding the transgression of a negative commandment.” We see that for the same reason, the rabbis applied this decree [that one could not fulfill the mitzvah past midnight] regarding the eating of the kodashim, holy sacrifices. However, this is not a question at all, for the Jerusalem Talmud stated this law only in reference to [their view of] Rabban Gamliel that one may, from the outset, postpone the reading of the shema past midnight, [i.e., in relation to kodashim, even Rabban Gamliel agreed with the Rabbis that one could not intentionally delay the offering past midnight, since, unlike the shema, kodashim involve the punishment of kares, excision. But according to the rabbis, the punishment of kares was irrelevant]. It goes without saying that this interpretation [regarding the effect of kares] fits well with the Rambam. For according to the Rambam, kodashim may never be eaten, even *be-di’avad,*⁶ past midnight, as he writes in the laws of *Korban Pesah.*⁷ , 8:5, states: “… The paschal lamb can only be eaten until midnight [as required by the rabbis] in order to distance one from sin, [although] it is a Torah law that it may be eaten the entire night until dawn.” Yet [in the Babylonian Talmud] everyone agrees that according to Rabban Gamliel, one may read the shema be-di’avad after midnight. [One has to conclude that Rabban Gamliel treats kodashim differently], since they involve the punishment of kares.

footnotes: ⁵ Due to this interpretation of R. Gamliel’s statement, the Sha’agas Aryeh is confronted with the problem of what the Jerusalem Talmud means by its statement that R. Gamliel agrees with the sages regarding the limits placed upon the burning of sacrificial limbs and fats – that they may only be burned until midnight. As the Jerusalem Talmud states at the end of halachah 1, “[The Mishnah ⁶ Literally, “after the fact.” ⁷ The Rambam in the Laws of Korban Pesah

Returning to our topic of discussion, [it has been demonstrated] that the words of R. Eliezer stand on their own as words of Torah, since they may be used to teach us other things [e.g., that there are three watches], and we also see that his words are interwoven with the words of the Rabbis [upon which they shed light]. This is also true of every lone opinion stated in the Mishnah or Gemara, for every such opinion contains a light for a particular purpose, and it is for this reason that it is proper, and indeed required, to study and consider them carefully. Koheles compared this method [of deriving Torah from conflicting opinions] to [the concept of] implanted nails. A fruit tree has many branches that do not produce fruit, and they are therefore unequal in fulfilling their purpose.

Some branches are stripped bare and the twigs have whitened, so they can no longer accomplish any purpose. However, some branches, even though they do not bear fruit, nevertheless have leaves which serve a medicinal purpose, as is often found with leaves that grow on fruit trees. In addition, the barren branches can be grafted onto a superior tree, and thereby enhance the fruit of the grafted branch so that it produces fruit equal in quality to this [superior] tree. They are then literally like implanted nails,³³ since the branch does not provide any fruit in its current state, and does so only when implanted in another location. King Solomon used the above parable [of goads and implanted nails] to extol the virtues of the words of the “wise,” as they provide new insights in the interpretation of Scripture, whether they are the accepted or rejected halachah. They are like goads and implanted nails. So are the words of the wise ones in every generation, whether they are the sages of the Talmud who attained insights into the words of the Mishnah, or the later Sages who attained insights into the words of the Gemara. **Translator’s summary:**³⁴ The Netziv stresses the importance of studying all the opinions stated in the Talmud, even those that are not halachically accepted. He offers two different reasons for this proposition: First, although several halachic concepts may be contained within their words, and one of them may be refuted in that part of the Talmud, the other concepts are of importance to other areas that may not be the main subject under discussion at that particular point. Second, even if these opinions do not contain any light of Torah, i.e., they do not express any concepts that relate to the accepted halachah, nevertheless, when one studies the rejected dissentient views, one obtains a better understanding of the scope of the views that are halachically accepted. The Netziv uses the disagreement between R. Eliezer, Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis to illustrate this point. When we understand the extent to which the rabbis disagree with R. Eliezer, we gain an understanding as to when one is allowed to read the shema. That is, do the Rabbis agree with R. Eliezer that the time for reading the shema is dictated by defining be-shochbechaas the time people are preparing to go to sleep? However, unlike R. Eliezer who defines the time that people prepare to go to sleep with the first watch, do the Rabbis believe that people prepare to go to slep at midnight? Or, perhaps, the Rabbis hold like Rabban Gamliel, who defines be-shochbecha as the time people are sleeping? Thus, Rabban Gamliel and the Rabbis only disagree as to how the rabbinical decree was formulated to discourage people from reading the shema past midnight. Furthermore, since there is a level of ambiguity in understanding how the Talmud perceives the extent to which the sages agree with R. Eliezer, the Sha’agas Aryeh and the Netziv contrast the opinion of Rabban Gamliel with that of the rabbis, and the Netziv discusses four different possibilities, listed in the table below. According to the Sha’agas Aryeh, both the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds believe that the opinions of the rabbis and of Rabban Gamliel are as in Number 1 above. He therefore disagrees with the decision recorded by the Rambam, that one may not from the outset delay the reading of the shema past midnight, since the halachah is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel. While the Rambam agrees with one view in the Jerusalem Talmud, namely the opinions of Rabban Gamliel and the sages as depicted in Number 2, this was explicitly rejected by the Jerusalem Talmud and the Sha’agas Aryeh assumes that it was also rejected by the Babylonian Talmud. According to the Netziv, the Rambam and the Rif believe that the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds disagree regarding the opinions of Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis. The Jerusalem Talmud presents the first and fourth possibilities, while the Babylonian Talmud puts forth the third option. The Netziv argues that this interpretation (3) is the rationale for the opinion of the Rambam and the Rif, for we follow the Babylonian Talmud when it disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud.

footnotes: ³³ He is discussing grafting, which involves removing an area from the good tree after which the graft is inserted in the cut. Some methods, such as bridge grafting, involve chiseling a T-shaped cut into the tree after which the graft is actually nailed in place. ³⁴ This summary includes Addendum 10B.