MISHNAH: Some inherit and bequeath; inherit but do not bequeath, bequeath but do not inherit, neither inherit nor bequeath¹. The following inherit and bequeath: The father from the sons, and the sons from the father, and the paternal brothers inherit and bequeath². A man from his mother, a man from his wife, and the sons of sisters inherit but do not bequeath³. A woman to her son, a woman to her husband, and the mother’s brothers bequeath but do not inherit³. But the maternal brothers neither inherit nor bequeath⁴ 26:55 restricts inheritance to “the paternal tribe.”. The order of inheritances is the following: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter⁵ 27:8. Biblical law of inheritance is derived mainly from Num. 27:8–11..” The son precedes the daughter and all the son’s descendants come before the daughter⁶ 13:3.. The daughter precedes the brothers and all the daughter’s descendants precede the brothers. The brothers precede the father’s brothers and all their descendants precede the father’s brothers. This is the principle: For every one preceding in inheritance, his descendants precede⁷. But the father precedes all his descendants⁸.

footnotes: ¹ Among relatives. ² The father inherits from his childless son. The sons inherit from their father. The brothers inherit from their childless brother after the father’s death. ³ A son inherits from his widowed or divorced mother. A husband inherits from his wife. The sons of sisters inherit from an uncle who died without children or brothers. But women do not inherit except daughters of a man who died without sons. ³ A son inherits from his widowed or divorced mother. A husband inherits from his wife. The sons of sisters inherit from an uncle who died without children or brothers. But women do not inherit except daughters of a man who died without sons. ⁴ Maternal halfbrothers are not considered relatives for the law of inheritance since Num. ⁵ Num. ⁶ If at the death of the father a daughter is alive and also a predeceased son’s daughter, the granddaughter will inherit but not the daughter. On the other hand, the daughter has a claim on the estate for support or dowry, cf. Mishnah 11, Ketubot ⁷ Only agnates inherit; all claims to inheritance are valid per stirpes. ⁸ But not his grandchildren. If a son dies during his father’s lifetime, the father inherits only if the son left no descendants. Since the brothers only could inherit as their father’s descendants, they cannot inherit if the father is alive.

HALAKHAH: “Some inherit and bequeath,” etc. It is written: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter⁵ 27:8. Biblical law of inheritance is derived mainly from Num. 27:8–11..” Rebbi Ismael stated: The verse distinguished this inheritance from all other inheritances mentioned in the Torah, since for all of them it is written “you shall give,¹⁰ 27:9–11.” but here is written: “you shall transfer.” It is an extension of the law¹¹ “to transfer” in the meaning of pi‘el “to be pregnant”, to express an exception to the usual rules. As stated at the end of the paragraph, the inheritance of the daughter implies a transfer of the property to her sons, who belong to her husband’s family, not her father’s. that the daughter shall inherit. The Gentile Sages say, son and daughter are equal¹² New York 1944, §11.), for they explain “if he have no son;” therefore, if he has one both are equal. One objected, is it not written “if he have no daughter;¹³ 27:10.” therefore, if he has one are both equal¹⁴? And you agree, if there is no child¹⁵, here also, if there is no son¹⁶. The Sadducees say, the son’s daughter and the daughter are equal¹⁷, for they explain: Since my son’s daughter who comes by force of her father does inherit from me, would it not be logical that my daughter who comes by force of myself should inherit from me? One told them, no. If you mention the son’s daughter who only inherits by the power of the brothers, what could you say about the daughter who only inherits by the power of the old man¹⁸134.? The verse says, “any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes¹⁹ 36:8. The verse really reads: Any daughter, heiress of property, of the tribes of the Children of Israel, … But the word מִמַּטּוֹת carries a (minor) dividing accent which may justify the truncation in the quote..” How is it possible for a daughter to inherit from two tribes? But explain it if her father was from one tribe and her mother from another²⁰ 4:11, 69c l. 37 and the Babli 111a..

footnotes: ⁵ Num. ¹⁰ The inheritance of the agnates, verses Num. ¹¹ He reads the hiph‘il ¹² This is the rule in Roman and Egyptian native law while in Egyptian Greek law the daughter inherited only if her dowry had not been paid (cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, ¹³ Num. ¹⁴ Would a daughter have to share her inheritance with the agnate uncles? ¹⁵ A man’s brothers only inherit in the absence of stirpes. ¹⁶ A daughter only inherits in the absence of sons. ¹⁷ Babli 116b. ¹⁸ The deceased son’s daughter inherits her father’s share in her grandfather’s estate; her claim is the same as that of any of her uncles. But a daughter who has brothers has no claim whatsoever on her father’s estate; she only has a lien on the estate for her dowry if at her father’s death she was not yet married. The principles of the claims of a son’s daughter and a daughter are different. Sifry Num. ¹⁹ Num. ²⁰ The same text in Ta‘aniot

So far the son [inherits from] the father. The father from the son? Since the son only inherits by the father’s power, is it not logical that the father on whom the son depends inherit from him? The verse says, “close²¹ 27:11.”; the closer relative has precedence²² has to be rejected and the rules all must be found in the verse. It is asserted that a person’s closest relatives are his children. The verse then also justifies the rule of the Mishnah that the heir is the agnate connected to the bequeather by a minimum of ascents in the genealogical tree..

footnotes: ²¹ Num. ²² The argument presented would imply that the father has precedence over his grandchildren. Therefore, the argument de minore ad majus

So far a daughter²³ 27:6–11, 36:8–9, Deut. 21:15–17, only the father is mentioned. One might infer that these laws do not apply to the mother’s estate. Since Num. 36:8 mentions the daughter as heiress, one infers that the daughter inherits from her mother (Sifry Num. 134).. A son? Since the daughter, whose power is diminished regarding the father’s property, has her power increased regarding the mother’s property, should the son’s power not be increased regarding the mother’s property, since his power is increased regarding the father’s property? It turns out that for the daughter one infers from the verse and for the son from an argument de minore ad majus. Does the son precede the daughter? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Zachariah the butcher’s son: So did Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah say in the name of Rebbi Simeon: Both son and daughter are equal for the mother’s tribe²⁴ Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai the Kappadokian had a case; the judges were Rav Huna²⁵ Huna; the second generation Babylonian Rav Huna could not sit in a court together with two Galilean fourth generation judges, even though in the Babli, 111a, Rav Huna is reported to have erroneously followed R. Zachariah., Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi, and Rebbi Aḥa. Rebbi Aḥa told them: Our brothers outside the Land are unqualified and err in practice; in particular they rely on Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, but it is not so. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Eleazar the father of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman²⁶ in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. ²⁴ Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Joḥanan were sitting when Rebbi Yudan the Prince came and asked concerning: “Any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes,” what is the rule? He²⁷ said to him, it binds the father’s tribe together with the mother’s tribe. Since from the father’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the mother’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son. Or is it the other way around? Since from the mother’s tribe there is something for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the father’s tribe is there something for the daughter when there is a son²⁸? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him²⁹, let us leave; that man does not want to listen to words of instruction.

footnotes: ²³ In all paragraphs dealing with the laws of inheritance, Num. ²⁴ Babli 111a; Tosephta 7:10. ²⁵ One has to read Rebbi ²⁶ From here it seems that “bar Naḥman” was his family name. ²⁴ Babli 111a; Tosephta 7:10. ²⁷ R. Yannai. the senior authority. ²⁸ This is R. Yudan the Prince’s objection. ²⁹ Probably one should read, parallel to the Babli: He said to R. Joḥanan; since the student R. Joḥanan could not tell his teacher R. Yannai to insult the patriarch to his face.

“A man from his mother, a man from his wife.” Is “a man from his mother” not the same as “a man from his wife”³⁰ 134 the husband’s inheritance is inferred from Jos. 24:33; one explains that the “property of Phineas in the Mountains of Ephraim” must have come to him as inheritance from his wife since as a priest he would have been barred from receiving property outside of Levitic cities.? Rebbi Isaac: he wanted to enumerate all cases³¹ 1:8, Iššut 12:3); rejected in the Babli as minority opinion (Ketubot 83b)]. Cf. M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine, Tel-Aviv and New York 1980, p. 391 ff. and did not find them, so he formulated the rule twofold.

footnotes: ³⁰ Neither rule has a direct scriptural root. The inheritance of a man from his mother was earlier derived from a biblical expression (Note 20). The inheritance of a man from his wife is not implied by this. In the Babli 111b and Sifry Num. ³¹ The word פנסטא in L’s text defies explanation. E’s reading פנטסה is read by S. Lieberman as πάντοσε “in all ways, in any way”. The Mishnah often is formulated with redundancies, if the enumeration of all cases helps memorization.In the Yerushalmi, the husband’s right to his deceased wife’s estate possibly remains a matter of common law [Halakhah 6, followed by Maimonides (Neḥalot

³²“Son.” Not only a son, from where a daughter’s son? The verse says, “a son³³”, from anywhere. “Daughter.” Not only a daughter, from where a daughter’s son, a son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, a son’s son? The verse says, “a daughter”, from anywhere. “Brothers.” Not only brothers, from where brothers’ sons, brothers’ daughters, brothers’ sons’ daughters? The verse says, “his flesh’s relatives”, from anywhere³⁴ 26:55 requires that inheritance be governed by “the names of the fathers’ tribes.”.

footnotes: ³² Cf. Babli 115a. The argument is intended to show a biblical source for the claim that the rules of inheritance are to be interpreted per stirpes. ³³ No definite article is used in the paragraph, to allow maximum freedom of interpretation. ³⁴ As long as an agnate exists, no matter how many generations one would have to go back, he becomes the heir. Only the male ancestors are considered since Num.

MISHNAH: Zelophehad’s daughters³⁵ 27:1–7. took three parts³⁶ 26:52–56 which prescribes first that the land be distributed to “those”, i. e., those mentioned in the second desert census, Num. 26:5–51, but computed “by the names of their fathers’ tribes” which means the names of those who left Egypt. in inheritance: Their father’s who was of those who left Egypt, his part among his brothers in the estate of Hepher³⁷, and because he was firstborn he was taking two parts³⁸.

footnotes: ³⁵ He had five daughters but no sons, Num. ³⁶ Cities with the names of the daughters dominate the entire Southern part of Cisjordan Manasseh. The problem to be discussed is how to compute the distribution of land by Joshua according to Num. ³⁷ Who was supposed to have been alive at the time of the Exodus. ³⁸ Mishnah 4.

HALAKHAH: “Zelophehad’s daughters,” etc. ³⁹ 6, 9 ,Tanḥuma Buber Pineḥas 8, 9, Num. rabba Pineḥas 11. Zelophehad’s daughters said before our teacher Moses: If we are Zelophehad’s daughters, we should inherit from our father. If we are not Zelophehad’s daughters, let our mother enter levirate marriage⁴⁰ 25:5–9. Since the latter conclusion obviously is impossible, so is the hypothesis from which it follows.. Immediately, “⁴¹ 27:5. he brought their suit before the Eternal.” The Holy One, praise to Him, told him, “⁴² 27:7–8. Zelophehad’s daughters speak correctly. Give them possession of inheritance,” give them real estate, give them movables, give them their father’s part among their father’s brothers.

footnotes: ³⁹ Babli 119b; Tanḥuma Pineḥas ⁴⁰ If daughters cannot inherit then the widow of a man who dies without sons should be treated like the widow of a childless man, Deut. ⁴¹ Num. ⁴² Num.

⁴³ 5 = Num. rabba21(9). Rebbi Joshiah said, the Land was distributed to those who left Egypt, as it is written: “By the names of the fathers’ tribes they shall inherit.⁴⁴ 26:55, referring to the census Num. 1.” Then why does the verse say: “To those⁴⁵ 26:53. The verse asserts that the distribution of land has to be based on the census of Num. 26.”? Only because of women⁴⁶ and because of children⁴⁷. Rebbi Joḥanan⁴⁸ said, the Land was distributed to those who entered the Land⁴⁹, as it was said, “to those it shall be distributed⁴⁵ 26:53. The verse asserts that the distribution of land has to be based on the census of Num. 26..” Then why does the verse say: “By the names of the fathers’ tribes”? This inheritance was different from all other inheritances in the world. For in all other inheritances in the world the living inherit from the dead but here the dead from the living⁵⁰. It was stated⁵¹: Rebbi Joshua ben Qorha said, the Land was distributed to those who left Egypt and to those who stood in the plains of Moab. How is that? If one was both of those who left Egypt and those who stood in the plains of Moab, he took two parts⁵² to those who left Egypt and distributed to those who stood in the plains of Moab.. Of those who left Egypt but not of those who stood in the plains of Moab, or of those who stood in the plains of Moab but not of those who left Egypt, he took one part. The daughters of Zelophehad took five parts: their part with those who left Egypt⁵⁴ and their part with those who stood in the plains of Moab. And because he⁵⁵ 6:8). was a firstborn they took two parts. And their father’s part among his brothers. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says otherwise⁵⁶. But “giving you shall give them inheritance among their father’s brothers.⁴² 27:7–8.” That is what is written: “Ten measures fell to Manasseh⁵⁷ 17:5. It is explained in *Jos.*17:2 that Gilead and Bashan were given to the seven male clans of Manasseh, and the Cisjordan territory to the five female clans. If together this made ten districts, it follows that the five females in the plains of Moab, while representing only one person of the Exodus, received 3/10 of the entire territory of Manasseh.”.

footnotes: ⁴³ Babli 117a; a different version Tanḥuma Pineḥas ⁴⁴ Num. ⁴⁵ Num. ⁴⁶ The daughters of Zelophehad. ⁴⁷ As will be explained later, Notes 63 ff. ⁴⁸ One has to read with E and the Babli “Jonathan” as contemporary of R. Joshiah. ⁴⁹ Each of the persons counted in the second census became a candidate for a piece of land similar in value to that of any other. ⁴⁵ Num. ⁵⁰ While the number of lots was determined by the second census, the final allotment was made through the first census as explained by Rebbi in the section after the next. ⁵¹ 117a/b (R. Simeon ben Eleazar), slightly differently Tosephta 7:8 (R. Eliezer ben Jacob). ⁵² In the Tosephta: It was given ⁵⁴ The decree that those who left Egypt could not enter the Land applied neither to women nor to Levites. ⁵⁵ Zelophehad. Even though the rule that the firstborn takes a double portion does not apply to expected acquisitions of the estate, here it is considered already acquired because of God’s promise in Egypt (Ex. ⁵⁶ They only received three parts. The Mishnah can only be interpreted following R. Joshiah. ⁴² Num. ⁵⁷ Jos.

Joshua and Caleb took three parts: Their part with those who left Egypt and their part with those who stood in the plains of Moab⁵³; in addition they took the parts of the spies⁵⁸. This is what is written: “Joshua bin Nun and Caleb ben Yephuneh lived off the men, etc.⁵⁹ 14:38.” But the part of the complainers⁶⁰ 11:1 ff. and Korah’s gang became common property; their sons [inherited] from their paternal and maternal grandfathers. That is what is written: “Korah’s sons did not die.⁶¹ 26:11. They were Levites not involved in the distribution of land.”

footnotes: ⁵³ This applies only to Caleb and Joshua. ⁵⁸ Babli 117b. ⁵⁹ Num. ⁶⁰ Num. ⁶¹ Num.

Rebbi explained it by a parable; to what can this be compared? To two brothers, co-owners who left Egypt. One had nine sons, the other a single son. They inherited ten bet kor. Each of them takes a letekh⁶².. They return it to their fathers and then split. It turns out that the single son takes half and the sons of the other take half⁶³ each of them took a bet kor rather than a letekh, half a bet kor. If the fathers were above the age of twenty at the Exodus, there is no reason why the sons of one should be co-owners with the son of the other. If they were below age twenty at the Exodus, they should have survived and the entire question could not be raised. Therefore, one has to assume that the grandfather was alive at the time of the Exodus and the entire allotment was returned to the grandfather, from whom each son inherited the claim to half the estate which was then split for the ten grandsons..

footnotes: ⁶² Half a bet kor ⁶³ In the Babli, 117a, Rebbi is credited with the explanation by the parable credited here to R. Dositheos ben Jehudah.The text here is inconsistent in several places. If together they took ten bet kor,

Rebbi Dositheos ben Jehudah⁶⁴ explained it by a parable; to what can this be compared? To two brothers, Cohanim and co-owners⁶⁵ who stood by a threshing floor⁶⁶; one had nine sons and the other had one. They took (the area of)⁶⁷ ten qab. They returned it to their father and split⁶⁸. It turns out that the son of one takes half and the sons of the other take half.

footnotes: ⁶⁴ A contemporary of Rebbi. ⁶⁵ Both are still living at their father’s house. ⁶⁶ To ask for heave. ⁶⁷ This has to be deleted since one refers here to volumes, not areas. ⁶⁸ One has to assume that after they collected the heave, the grandfather and the fathers died, since otherwise the grandfather, on whose property the entire family was living, would have received everything for distribution among his dependants. Parables, situated in never-never land, cannot be subjected to stringent logical analysis.

Rebbi Joḥanan objected: “I shall bring you to your forefathers’ land, etc.⁶⁹ 6:8. The verse ends: “I shall give it to you as an inheritance, I, the Eternal.” Giving implies a voluntary act, a gift, whereas inheritance is automatic by law.” If it was a gift, why an inheritance? And if an inheritance, why a gift? But after he gave it to them as a gift, he turned around and gave it as inheritance¹; then those of the generation of the conquest already were an inheritance (Babli 117b).⁷¹ 1:39): “Your little ones, of whom you said, they will be taken as prey, and your children who today do not know good or bad, they will come there, to them I shall give it, and they will inherit it.” If it was a gift, why an inheritance? And if an inheritance, why a gift? But after he gave it to them in the language of a gift, he turned around and gave it in the language of inheritance.”. Rebbi Hoshaia said, anywhere one mentions מוֹרָשָה it means weariness⁷² “to inherit” would be rwš “to be poor.”. They objected, is it not written, “an inheritance (מוֹרָשָׁה) of the congregation of Jacob⁷³ 33:4: “Moses commended to us Torah, an inheritance …” This verse should not have a negative connotation.”? He said, there is no weariness greater than this. He who studies forgets everything⁷⁴ on 1:13: “For his own benefit a person studies Torah and forgets it, for if a person could study Torah and not forget it, he would study it for two or three years and then never think of it again” and miss all rewards for the study of Torah..

footnotes: ⁶⁹ A misquote of Ex. ¹ The rights of the people of the Exodus were established as gift ⁷¹ E here has a parallel version:רִבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר מַרְיוֹן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. כָּתוּב וְטַפְּכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲמַרְתֶּם לָבַז יִהְיֶה וּבְנֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָֽדְעוּ הַיּוֹם טוֹב וָרַע הֵמָּה יָבֹאוּ שָׁמָּה וְלָהֶם אֶתְּנֶנֶּהּ וְהֵם יְרָשׁוּהָ. אִם מַתָּנָה לָמָּה יְרוּשָׁה. וְאִם יְרוּשָׁה לָמָּה מַתָּנָה. אֶלָּא מֵאַחַר שֶׁנְּתָנָהּ לָהֶן בִּלְשׁוֹן מַתָּנָה חָזַר וּנְתָנָהּ לָהֶן בִּלְשׁוֹן יְרוּשָׁה.Rebbi Isaac bar Marion in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is written (Deut. ⁷² It is unclear from which root he derives the word since the only candidate besides yrš ⁷³ Deut. ⁷⁴ This is explained in Eccl. rabba

MISHNAH: Both son and daughter⁷⁵ are equal for the rules of inheritance, except that the son take a double portion of the father’s property⁷⁶ 21:17. The entire paragraph only deals with father and son; since the mother is neither required nor empowered to recognize a child as hers, it cannot refer to the mother’s inheritance. It probably is correct to read פִּי שְׁנַיִם as “double portion” rather than “two thirds” which would read פִּים (*1S.*13:21); cf. Sifry Deut. #217. The double portion of male first-borns is also found in the Egyptian native law both in Ptolemaic and in Roman times and the Syro-Roman law book. but no double portion of the mother’s property. And the daughters can claim sustenance from the father’s property⁷⁷ 4:8. but not from the mother’s property.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ If there are no sons, the rules of inheritance apply to daughters as if they were sons. ⁷⁶ Deut. ⁷⁷ After the father’s death; cf. Mishnah 9:1, Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance,” etc. It is written¹ 21:17. The entire paragraph only deals with father and son; since the mother is neither required nor empowered to recognize a child as hers, it cannot refer to the mother’s inheritance. It probably is correct to read פִּי שְׁנַיִם as “double portion” rather than “two thirds” which would read פִּים (*1S.*13:21); cf. Sifry Deut. #217. The double portion of male first-borns is also found in the Egyptian native law both in Ptolemaic and in Roman times and the Syro-Roman law book.⁷⁸ in the estate at the moment of the father’s death is subject to the double portion privilege of the firstborn son, but not expected income (Sifry Deut. 217).: “Of anything which will be found with him,” etc. How could he inherit the expectancy like existing property? ⁷⁹ 6:18. How? If his father died during his father’s father’s lifetime, he takes a double portion of his father’s estate but not a double portion of his grandfather’s estate. But if his father was a firstborn, just as he takes from his father’s estate so he takes from his grandfather’s estate⁸⁰ 52b.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba [Cohen]⁸¹ bar Delaiah: It was said “a rule of law⁷⁶ 21:17. The entire paragraph only deals with father and son; since the mother is neither required nor empowered to recognize a child as hers, it cannot refer to the mother’s inheritance. It probably is correct to read פִּי שְׁנַיִם as “double portion” rather than “two thirds” which would read פִּים (*1S.*13:21); cf. Sifry Deut. #217. The double portion of male first-borns is also found in the Egyptian native law both in Ptolemaic and in Roman times and the Syro-Roman law book.” in the matter of a double portion just as it was said “a rule of law⁸² 27:11.” in the matter of a single portion. Since for a single portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s single portion⁷ so for a double portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s double portion⁸³.

footnotes: ¹ Deut. ⁷⁸ The verse makes it clear that only property actually at hand ⁷⁹ Tosephta 7:7, Bekhorot ⁸⁰ If the grandfather dies after the father, the grandson can take a double portion of the former’s estate only if he is the only son of a firstborn son. If his father had been a firstborn but has brothers, the rule of Mishnah 1 implies that their father’s estate inherits a double portion in the grandfather’s estate. Since this is future income, all brothers inherit equally. Cf. Babli Bekhorot ⁸¹ Reading of E; this is the name usually quoted. ⁷⁶ Deut. ⁸² Num. ⁷ Only agnates inherit; all claims to inheritance are valid per stirpes. ⁸³ The rule of Mishnah 2 applies to double portions as well as single ones.

MISHNAH: One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,” [or] “my son Y shall not inherit together with his brothers,” did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah⁸⁴ 7:14. The rules based on Num. 27:6–11 are prescriptive, rather than eventual rules in the intestate case.. One who distributes his property orally⁸⁵, if he increased for one, or diminished for another, or made the firstborn equal to the others, his words are upheld; except if, however, he formulated it in terms of inheritance⁸⁶, he did not say anything. But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his words are upheld⁸⁷.

footnotes: ⁸⁴ Mishnah Bava meṣia‘ ⁸⁵ If he makes the oral declaration of the will of a critically ill person. ⁸⁶ If he wrote the entire will in terms of inheritance, the will is void. ⁸⁷ In a document one has to follow the formal rules. If he used the language of gift but also mentioned inheritance, the will is valid as explained by R. Hoshaia in the Halakhah.

HALAKHAH: “One who says, “my firstborn X shall not take a double portion,’ ” etc. Rebbi La made the right of the firstborn equal to that of the brothers⁸⁸. Rebbi Ḥaggai said to them: Is that not a verse, “he shall not be able to declare as firstborn.”⁸⁹ ⁹⁰; Sifry Deut. 216.Rebbi Eliezer said, by the Temple Service! He is able, but he is not permitted⁹¹. Except that he is able designating it as a gift⁸⁷.

footnotes: ⁸⁸ He approved a will which gave the firstborn only what the other brothers received. ⁸⁹ He thought that Rebbi La acted in error. ⁹⁰ Midrash Tanna'im (Midrash Haggadol Deut. 21:16) ⁹¹ What is missing here (compared to the other sources) is the statement that any action to deprive the firstborn of his inheritance be invalid. In general we hold that if a certain action is biblically forbidden, if it is done anyway it is valid in law since, if it were invalid, it could not be punishable. But an action by the father to deprive his firstborn of his double portion is not punishable; therefore, it is invalid. ⁸⁷ In a document one has to follow the formal rules. If he used the language of gift but also mentioned inheritance, the will is valid as explained by R. Hoshaia in the Halakhah.

“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.”⁹² or gift either before, or in between, or after mentioning inheritance. Cf. Babli 129a; Tosephta 7:17. ⁹³ 1:5, Notes 495–499.“Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan⁹⁴ He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death⁹⁵.

footnotes: ⁹² These are examples of acceptable formulations in a will essentially formulated in the language of inheritance but with mention of giving ⁹³ The paragraph is a reformulation of one in Qiddušin ⁹⁴ An oral death-bed will which is valid as if written during the bequeather’s lifetime. ⁹⁵ If the testator had said, I am giving it to him, you go and deliver the document, it is valid. If it were not a death-bed will, it would need an act of transfer, but the act of transfer is understood from the order given by the dying person. But if it is clear from the language of the testator that transfer of property should be effected by the delivery of the deed and he died in the meantime, delivery is impossible since a person’s power over his property ends with his death because the biblical laws of inheritance are prescriptive (Babli 135b).

⁹⁶ 1:5, Notes 490–492. Cf. Babli 152a. Samuel asked Rav Huna⁹⁷: if one wrote a gift in the language of a sale⁹⁸? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that one brings two white horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; it turns out that he caught nothing⁹⁹.

footnotes: ⁹⁶ A reformulation of a paragraph in Qiddušin ⁹⁷ To inquire about Rav’s opinion after the latter’s death. ⁹⁸ A will formulated not as a true gift, as required by the Mishnah, but as a fictitious sale. ⁹⁹ For Rav, the will is valid; for Samuel it is invalid since gifts and sales follow different rules.

MISHNAH: One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me while he has a daughter¹⁰⁰, or, my daughter shall inherit from me while he has a son, did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah⁸⁴ 7:14. The rules based on Num. 27:6–11 are prescriptive, rather than eventual rules in the intestate case.. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqah said, if he said that about anybody who can be his heir, his words stand; about anybody who cannot be his heir, his words do not stand¹⁰¹.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁰ But no son. ⁸⁴ Mishnah Bava meṣia‘ ¹⁰¹ As explained in the Halakhah; Tosephta 7:18.

HALAKHAH: “One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me,” etc. ¹⁰²4:12, Notes 239–248. The statement of R. Joḥanan paraphrases Tosephta 7:18. It is clear that the Tosephta was unknown to the editors, if any, of this Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi mentions neither the restriction of the Babli (130a) by R. Joḥanan ben Beroqa touching the privilege of the firstborn nor the extension of the Tosephta which includes grandchildren. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said only this about a son among sons or a daughter among daughters, but not a daughter among brothers¹⁰³, but naturally the father’s brothers do not inherit if there be a daughter as stated in the same sentence. The two clauses “daughter among brothers,” “brother among daughters” mean the same. or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi asked Rebbi Nathan¹⁰⁴ Nathan the Babylonian.; bar Abba¹⁰⁵ Rebbi Abba. said, so was the question: What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa’s reason? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, so was the question: What did they see to say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? He told him, did you not teach us so¹⁰⁶ 4:12 states that in a polygamous family the sons of one wife inherit her ketubah in addition to their part in the father’s estate. This shows that while the formulation of the biblical law of inheritance presupposes equal parts for every son, there are situations where by common law inheritances are distributed unevenly.: “they shall inherit”? So is the Mishnah: “they shall take.”¹⁰⁷ is an obligation which the father accepted at his marriage, it is not an inheritance from the father (Babli 131a; Ketubot52b, 55a). [Rebbi]¹⁰⁸ R. Ze‘ira. La said, even following him who said “inherit”, is not the power of the court strengthened¹⁰⁹.? As you say, nobody can transfer property using the language of gift; here he may do it¹¹⁰. Similarly, nobody can transfer property using the language of inheritance; here he may do it¹¹¹.

footnotes: ¹⁰² Both following paragraphs are reformulations of a text in Ketubot ¹⁰³ The daughter among the father’s brothers is also mentioned in Ketubot ¹⁰⁴ In Ketubot: ¹⁰⁵ In Ketubot: ¹⁰⁶ Mishnah Ketubot ¹⁰⁷ Since the distribution of the deceased mother’s ketubah ¹⁰⁸ Reading of E. In Ketubot ¹⁰⁹ The inheritance of the sons in a polygamous family is not a private contract but common law interpreted as an ordinance of the Court which promulgated the rules of ketubah ¹¹⁰ Property can be transferred by a gift document but not by words unless accompanied by an act of acquisition. The rule is waived for a death-bed will. ¹¹¹ Again, if the language of inheritance is used exclusively, the will is valid only as a death-bed will. Otherwise the terminology of giving must be used.

¹¹² 9:1, Notes 44–57. There, we have stated¹¹³ 9:1. If a couple write a prenuptial agreement reserving the wife’s property to her and her heirs, it is unconditionally valid for the rabbis but Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel denies the validity of the inheritance clause.: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah.” Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “Since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid”? Conditions other than for money matters. But here we are dealing with a money matter!¹¹⁴ 19b. What is Rav’s reason? Because in the end he acquired it¹¹⁵ 84a, it is stated explicitly that for Rav the husband’s right to his wife’s estate is rabbinic. Therefore his acquisition of the estate is a court decree. (In the Yerushalmi, Ketubot 8:5 Note 44, this is ascribed to R. Simeon ben Laqish.). Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa¹¹⁶, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, if she sold or gave away¹¹⁷, the rule should be that it is valid. Then why did they say that her sale is invalid? Lest she smuggle away her properties from her husband and say, they are mine. Rebbi Justinus had a case before the rabbis and they obligated him¹¹⁸. He came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who told him, enter your properties¹¹⁹. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did not Rav say, because in the end he acquired it. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, go and enter your properties? Who are these rabbis¹²⁰? The rabbis of Rebbi Justinus¹²¹.

footnotes: ¹¹² A reformulation of texts in Ketubot ¹¹³ Mishnah Ketubot ¹¹⁴ He agrees with Rabban Simeon that the inheritance clause is invalid but questions his reasoning since this is a money matter where stipulations are permitted which deviate from biblical rules; Babli Qiddušin ¹¹⁵ In the Babli, Ketubot ¹¹⁶ One is tempted to read instead: R. Joḥanan said, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since the reason given in the next sentence has nothing to do with R. Joḥanan ben Beroqa’s statement. This is the approach taken by all classical commentaries but it is impossible today since the text here and later is confirmed by E.As explained in Note 109, R. Joḥanan holds that the rule of R, Joḥanan ben Beroqa is common law modifying biblical rules. Therefore, he also must hold that an acceptance of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s rule cannot be based on the latter’s reason. His explanation essentially is identical with that ascribed to Rav in the preceding sentence. ¹¹⁷ Her paraphernalia property, to which the husband has no property rights during her lifetime. ¹¹⁸ He and his wife lived under a regimen of separation of properties. When she died, the local court told him to surrender his wife’s properties to her family. ¹¹⁹ He decided following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel as rabbinic ordinance. ¹²⁰ The greatest authorities of the first two Amoraic generations follow Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Which court could decide against him? ¹²¹ Courts of first instance sometimes do err.

“And he shall inherit from her¹²² 26:11: “If his father had no brothers, transfer his estate to his relative who is closest to him of his family; he shall inherit (from) her.” In the verse, the feminine her refers to the estate. The identification of her with the wife is R. Aqiba’s (*Sifry Num.*134). In Lev. 18, the masculine word שְׁאֵר “relative” is used exclusively for female relatives..” I could think that just as he inherits from her, she should inherit from him¹²³. The verse says, “from her.” He inherits from her, she does not inherit from him¹²⁴” when the same could have been expressed by the shorter, וְיָֽרְשָׁהּ. The additional word used for her implies not him.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of the Sages are that her father inherits from her, her brothers inherit from her¹²⁵ in the verse refers to the estate; by biblical law her clan should be her heirs. The inheritance of the husband is purely rabbinical.. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: If you say that the inheritance status of a woman is not from the Torah, should he not inherit from his preliminarily wedded wife¹²⁶.) The question is rather whether there be a biblical basis for the common law practice that the husband’s claim on the wife’s property only starts with definitive marriage, when the couple starts living together.? As you say there, “the one close to him,¹²⁷ 21:2 the expression שְׁאֵרוֹ הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו “the relative close to him” is explained as “his wife who is close to him,” i. e., his definitively wedded wife, since all other closely related relatives are enumerated in vv. 2–3. The mention of closeness excludes the preliminarily wedded one since intimacy with her is forbidden to him [Sifra Emor (4)].” not the preliminarily wedded one, so also here, “the one close to him,” not the preliminarily wedded one. Rav Hamnuna objected: If you say that a woman does not inherit by the word of the Torah, should not the husband inherit the expectancy like existing property¹²⁸? Rebbi Yose said, so did Rebbi teach: The husband does not take the expectancy like that which is at hand¹²⁹. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there is the first-born whose inheritance is from the Torah but he does not take the expectancy like that which is at hand¹ 6:18.¹³⁰.

footnotes: ¹²² Num. ¹²³ Babli 111b. ¹²⁴ He explains the emphasis, “he shall inherit her ¹²⁵ They reject R. Aqiba’s derivation. Her ¹²⁶ There really is no basis for this question since it is generally accepted that preliminary marriage be only relevant for criminal law whereas definitive marriage activates all financial aspects of a marriage (cf. Introduction to Tractate Qiddušin ¹²⁷ Probably one should read הַקָּרוֹב both times for הַקְּרוֹבָה. In Lev. ¹²⁸ If the heiress wife dies before her father, his estate will go to her childen. Since in general common law gives her inheritance to her husband, why not in this case also? ¹²⁹ This is a statement of fact: Moneys due to the wife after her death go to her children, rather than her surviving husband. Babli 125b. ¹ Tosephta 7:7, Bekhorot ¹³⁰ There is biblical precedent to exclude future income from present distribution.

Rebbi Isaac said: About those who write, if she should die without children, all that was hers shall revert to her father. This is a stipulation about money; the stipulation is valid¹³¹ 9:1, Note 87..

footnotes: ¹³¹ This is repeated from Ketubot

¹³² 134.) A different explanation of the verses quoted here is given in the Babli, 113a.“Segub fathered Jair,¹³³ 2:22. The verse states that Jair, a Calebite, had 23 villages in the land of Gilead (Manasseh).” etc. From where did Jair have cities on Mount Gilead? But he married a woman from the daughters of Manasse who died and he inherited from her. If you would say that the inheritance from a wife was not a word of the Torah it should not say that “Jair had” but that “Segub had.¹³⁴” Similarly, “Eleazar ben Aaron died.¹³⁵ 24:33, “they buried him on his son Phineas’s hill which had been given to him on the Mountain of Ephraim.”” From where did Phineas have property on the Mountain of Ephraim? But he married a woman from the daughters of Ephraim and inherited from her. If you would say that the inheritance from a wife was not a word of the Torah it should say that “Eleazar had” not that “Phineas had.¹³⁶ intimates, one cannot say that the tribe of Ephraim gave Phineas property among themselves since the Torah explicitly excluded priests from receiving any land outside the Levitic cities (Deut. 18:1). Therefore, ownership of property outside such cities must be by inheritance from a non-priestly wife. The tribal affiliation of Eleazar’s father-in-law Puṭiel (Ex. 6:25) is not known.”

footnotes: ¹³² This paragraph is R. Ismael’s argument to show that the husband’s inheriting his deceased wife’s properties, if not explicit in the Torah, at least was established practice already in the time of Joshua (Sifry Num. ¹³³ 1Chr. ¹³⁴ In v. 21 it is reported that Jair’s grandfather Hezron married a Gileadite wife. If the property came through her, the verse should have attributed ownership to her son Segub, rather than her grandson Jair. ¹³⁵ Jos. ¹³⁶ As Rashi ad. loc.

MISHNAH: If one writes his properties over to others¹³⁷ while neglecting his children, what he did is done¹³⁸ but the Sages do not approve of him. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if his children did not behave properly, let him be well remembered.

footnotes: ¹³⁷ As a gift “from today, effective after my death”. ¹³⁸ If writing the document was accompanied by an act of acquisition on behalf of the beneficiary, it becomes irrevocable.

HALAKHAH: “If one writes his properties over to others,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, about one who writes his properties over to others while neglecting his children, the verse says: “their sins were on their bones¹³⁹ 32:27. It is a sin which will cling to his bones even in the grave. In the Babli, 133b, Samuel told his student Rav Jehudah in his law practice never to help anybody to deprive a son of his inheritance..” As the following: A person deposited his properties with Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and told him, if my sons will be useful give them half and keep half. His sons came and took half. Later they came to appeal¹⁴⁰ against him. He told them, your father said only: If my sons will be useful give them half and keep half. Now you are badly educated¹⁴¹, return to me what I gave to you.

footnotes: ¹³⁹ Ez. ¹⁴⁰ The root of מיעור is ערר “to launch an appeal.” ¹⁴¹ Greek κακο-παιδευτοί. E reads קקפריגמיניין which Lieberman explains as κακοτραγμόνες “unworthy, useless”.

MISHNAH: He who says, this is my son, is to be believed¹⁴² 21:17 is interpreted to mean that the father has the right to recognize a son without submitting a proof; his statement has to be accepted by the court. There is no difference whether the son was born from a licit or an illicit union; as long as the mother was Jewish the son frees the childless wife from levirate marriage and is entitled to a full share in the inheritance (Mishnah Yebamot 2:6).. This is my brother, he is not to be believed¹⁴³ but he shall split his part with him¹⁴⁴; if he dies the properties shall return to their origin¹⁴⁵. If he received property from another source, his brother shall inherit with him¹⁴⁶. If somebody died and a will¹⁴⁷ 1:7, Note 90. was found tied to his hip, this is nothing¹⁴⁸. If in it he transferred property to another¹⁴⁹, whether of the heirs or not of the heirs, his words are confirmed¹⁵⁰.

footnotes: ¹⁴² Deut. ¹⁴³ If he presents an otherwise unknown person as his paternal half-brother, he is required to provide proof since the half-brother would 1° reduce his other brothers’ share in their father’s estate and 2° require levirate marriage in case the deceased had no other brothers and died childless. Since he acts to the detriment of others, he cannot be believed without solid proof. ¹⁴⁴ Since a person can take an obligation on himself, by recognizing the stranger as his half-brother he acknowledged the latter as a co-heir. Since he cannot diminish the share of his other brothers, he must share his own inheritance with the stranger. ¹⁴⁵ His heirs are not his own children but the sons of the man who recognized him as half-brother. Their father’s unsubstantiated recognition of the stranger cannot impair his son’s rights. ¹⁴⁶ If the stranger accepted the status of paternal half-brother and then died without issue, the half-brother inherits. ¹⁴⁷ Cf. Bava meṣia‘ ¹⁴⁸ Since a person can give away property only when he is alive, a will is valid only if either it was a public document (a death-bed will) or contains a note that an act of transfer of property was executed during the testator’s lifetime. Without such a remark, the will is invalid ¹⁴⁹ E. g., that it was signed by witnesses on behalf of the beneficiaries. ¹⁵⁰ Once part of a will is valid, the entire will is valid.

HALAKHAH: “He who says, this is my son, is to be believed,” etc. ¹⁵¹ 4:7 Notes 182–194, Babli 127b as Amoraic statement. If it was the general belief that he was his son, but at the moment of his death he said, he is not my son, or about one not his son he said, he is my son, he is believed¹⁵² 21:17 requires the father to recognize his son “on the day he distributes his estate”, any statement he makes on his death bed in matters of recognizing sons must be believed without requiring proof.. If he stood near the toll collector and said, he is my son¹⁵³ and then changed and said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, and then said, he is my son, he cannot be believed¹⁵⁴. Some Tannaïm state, he is to be believed¹⁵⁵. Rebbi Mana said, for example those Nabateans who particularly use their sons as slaves¹⁵⁶ and son without inconsistency..

footnotes: ¹⁵¹ A materially different text in Tosephta 7:3, Qiddušin ¹⁵² Since Deut. ¹⁵³ To pay only the low rate applicable to persons, not the high rate payable for slaves as merchandise. ¹⁵⁴ Since he acted to his own detriment. ¹⁵⁵ Tosephta 7:3. If he always declares him a slave for toll collectors but never in other situations, he is believed but not otherwise. ¹⁵⁶ They may switch between slave

¹⁵⁷ 1:6, explained there in Notes 166–173 (Tosephta 8:1, Babli 138a, Ḥulin 39b, Keritut 24b).“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁷ A reformulation of a paragraph in Giṭṭin

It was stated¹⁵⁸3:9 (17d l. 66) Note 175.: “Rebbi Simeon ben Gamiel says: A will invalidates a will, a gift does not invalidate a gift.” Rebbi Abba bar Ḥana: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying that in any case where he can invalidate his will if he recuperates, he also can repeal his gift¹⁵⁹. As the following: Rebbi Onias’s sister¹⁶⁰ wrote her property over to Rebbi Onias. She needed money and sold it to her husband. After she died, he¹⁶¹ came to protest against him. He asked him, why did you not claim it¹⁶² during her lifetime? He answered, I did not want to cause her pain. Nevertheless, Rebbi Immi removed it¹⁶³ explains that the gift was a death-bed gift which became meaningless when the woman recovered; therefore R. Immi confirmed the husband in his possessions and took away the gift document from R. Onias. In either case would R. Immi have followed the instructions of his teacher R. Joḥanan..

footnotes: ¹⁵⁸ Tosephta 8:10, Babli 152b, Peah ¹⁵⁹ The gift of a sick person, even if accompanied by an act of acquisition, follows the rules of death-bed wills, rather than that of gifts among healthy persons. ¹⁶⁰ Who obviously lived under a regime of separation of properties. ¹⁶¹ R. Onias came to protest against his brother-in-law’s taking his sister’s properties as his own. ¹⁶² If the gift was irrevocable, the sale was impossible and R. Onias should have intervened immediately. ¹⁶³ The reader may choose his own interpretation of this sentence. R. Eliahu Fulda explains that the gift was irrevocable among healthy people, that R. Onias became the proprietor of the real estate but had to refund the sale price to his brother-in-law. Pene Moshe

MISHNAH: One who writes his properties over to his sons must write: “from today and after my death¹⁶⁴,” the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said, it is unnecessary¹⁶⁵ 7:3 Note 67.. If one writes his properties over to his son for the time after his death, the father cannot sell them because they are written over to the son; the son cannot sell because they are in the father’s possession. If the father sold, they are sold until he dies. If the son sold, the buyer has no claim until the father dies. The father harvests and feeds anybody he pleases; what becomes part of his estate belongs to the heirs¹⁶⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁶⁴ “Today” for the transfer of title to the property, “after my death” for the transfer of usufruct. ¹⁶⁵ Without an explicit disclaimer, a deed is always deemed to be valid from the day it was written; Giṭṭin ¹⁶⁶ As movables, it is part of the estate, not only of the son inheriting the particular real estate.

HALAKHAH: “One who writes his properties over to his sons,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. “From today after his death,” his gift is a gift. “From today and after death” it is no bill of divorce. ¹⁶⁷ 7:3, explained there in Notes 67–75. The colleagues say, so he told him: this is no condition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun¹⁶⁸: R. Ze‘ira. For reasons of chronology, this is the more convincing reading. said, so he told him: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi La said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is clear. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said before Rebbi La, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira confirmed him¹⁶⁹: מְקַלֵּס לֵיהּ “he acclaimed him”. and called him “son of the Torah.”

footnotes: ¹⁶⁷ A slight reformulation of a paragraph in Giṭṭin ¹⁶⁸ In Giṭṭin ¹⁶⁹ Probably one should read with the text in Giṭṭin

¹⁷⁰ 1:6, explained there in Notes 157–162. Tosephta 9:14.“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I freed him, I shall free him, he is free, this one is free; then he acquired.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but the Sages say, he did not acquire.”

footnotes: ¹⁷⁰ A slight reformulation of a text in Giṭṭin

If someone said, field X I gave to Y, it is given to him, it should be his, Y should inherit my property, Y should take possession of my property, he did not say anything¹⁷¹ 1:5. The Tosephta disagrees, 9:12. The Tosephta text is explained away by the Babli, Giṭṭin40b.. It should be given to him as a gift, Rebbi says, he acquired¹⁷², but the Sages say, he did not acquire; but one forces the heirs to fulfill the deceased’s words.¹⁷³ 14b,15a,40a; Ketubot 70a. It was stated¹⁷⁴: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, also if one writes διέθεμεν¹⁷⁵ 1 fasc. 4 (1931) 144–146 has noted that the expression τάδε διεθέμην is used in Egyptian Greek deeds; also cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, New York 1944, p. 143. Since the expression is a legal Greek term, its use characterizes a valid deed even though the corresponding use of the past in Hebrew was declared invalid as statement of a deed. (S. Lieberman, Tosefta kiFshutah Bava batra p. 441, wants to infer that Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel validates also the Hebrew נָתַתִּי; this seems unjustified.) in Greek it is a gift. Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: I turned to all linguists to know what is διέθεμεν and nobody told me anything¹⁷⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁷¹ Title to property cannot be transferred by simple declaration; cf. Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁷² If this was a death-bed declaration. ¹⁷³ Babli Giṭṭin ¹⁷⁴ Tosephta 9:14. ¹⁷⁵ “I disposed by will”, from Greek “to dispose” (H. M. Pineles). A. Gulak, Tarbiz ¹⁷⁶ They were not acquainted with Greek legalese.

¹⁷⁷ 9:1, Notes 66–85. The text is partially problematic. One who said, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, if Y died to Z. The one who was mentioned earlier receives the property earlier. If the second died during the first’s lifetime, the first one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather¹⁷⁸. If the third died during the second’s lifetime, the first¹⁷⁹ one has the usufruct; when he dies the property reverts to heirs of the bequeather. If both the second and the third die during the first’s lifetime, the first has the usufruct and acquired the real estate¹⁸⁰ Rebbi is reported to permit the first holder to sell the real estate and use the proceeds for himself; then the second and third will receive nothing since the real estate for which the condition was formulated is no longer operative. Naturally, he may sell only if prior to the sale he had acquired the property. So here one should understand acquired as acquired in order to sell., the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he only has the usufruct¹⁸¹. Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will¹⁸² version. Since a death-bed will becomes valid only at the moment of death, the lien formulated by the bequeather already became active; the property is Y’s before X’s death-bed will is activated.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, not even as a gift from a healthy person¹⁸³. As in the following: A woman wrote her properties over to a certain man¹⁸⁴. She needed money and sold it to her husband. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Madia¹⁸⁵ or bar Maria. brought the case before Rebbi Yose. Did not Rebbi Yannai say, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will? Rebbi Joḥanan¹⁸⁶ said to him, is that not the gift of a healthy person? Since the husband of this woman is obligated to provide for her food, is that not like a death-bed will? So far, he is obligated to provide for her bread and legumes. Maybe eggs? Maybe chicken? Since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired¹⁸⁰ Rebbi is reported to permit the first holder to sell the real estate and use the proceeds for himself; then the second and third will receive nothing since the real estate for which the condition was formulated is no longer operative. Naturally, he may sell only if prior to the sale he had acquired the property. So here one should understand acquired as acquired in order to sell. the real estate, that means that she may sell the property even in order to eat delicacies. Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said, it was stated there¹⁸⁷ 4:6. that her burial is part of her upkeep. If she did not have a burial site, since it was stated that the first has the usufruct and acquired¹⁸⁰ Rebbi is reported to permit the first holder to sell the real estate and use the proceeds for himself; then the second and third will receive nothing since the real estate for which the condition was formulated is no longer operative. Naturally, he may sell only if prior to the sale he had acquired the property. So here one should understand acquired as acquired in order to sell. the real estate, it means that he may sell the real estate and acquire a burial site.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁷ This is a reformulation of a paragraph in Ketubot ¹⁷⁸ Since Z has to receive the property from Y’s estate, if Y never got the property Z cannot get it. Babli 136b. ¹⁷⁹ One has to read: The second. ¹⁸⁰ The expression “my property should be given to X” is the language of a bequest. The bequest was conditional. If the condition becomes moot, the bequest becomes unconditional. In Ketubot, ¹⁸¹ Babli 137a. ¹⁸² This is intelligible only in the Ketubot ¹⁸³ He holds that the property was given to X for his use; therefore he may sell it for profit but is barred from giving it away. ¹⁸⁴ In her will. From the following it is clear that in this case, there was no separation of properties. During the woman’s lifetime, her husband has the usufruct of her properties. Therefore, she can neither sell them nor give them away. ¹⁸⁵ It is not clear whether his name was bar Madia ¹⁸⁶ One has to read: R. Yose; the story is dated three generations after R. Joḥanan and contradicts the latter’s statement above. ¹⁸⁰ The expression “my property should be given to X” is the language of a bequest. The bequest was conditional. If the condition becomes moot, the bequest becomes unconditional. In Ketubot, ¹⁸⁷ Mishnah Ketubot ¹⁸⁰ The expression “my property should be given to X” is the language of a bequest. The bequest was conditional. If the condition becomes moot, the bequest becomes unconditional. In Ketubot,

Rebbi Yose said: About those who write, “if she hates, if she is hated”. This is a stipulation about money; the rabbis upheld it¹⁸⁸.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁸ A prenuptial agreement about eventual divorce settlements disregarding rabbinic rules in the matter is valid. Cf. Note 131.

MISHNAH: If he left¹⁸⁹ adult and underage sons, the adult ones cannot be provided for¹⁹⁰ at the expense of the underaged, nor the underaged fed at the expense of the adults, but they split evenly¹⁹¹. If the adult ones wed¹⁹², the underaged may wed. But if the underaged said, we want to have weddings just as you had¹⁹³, one does not listen to them, because what their father gave them, he gave. If he left adult and underage daughters¹⁹⁴, the adult ones cannot be provided for at the expense of the underaged, nor the underaged fed at the expense of the adults, but they split evenly. If the adult ones wed, the underaged may wed. But if the underaged said, we want to have weddings just as you had, one does not listen to them. It is a restriction about daughters which does not exist for sons, that daughters will be fed at the expense of sons¹⁹⁵ 4:13. Sons may not inherit until the claims of the daughters are satisfied. But in the absence of sons, daughters of all ages have identical claims on the estate. but not at the expense of daughters.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁹ A father who died intestate. ¹⁹⁰ With business suits and tools at the expense of the undistributed estate. ¹⁹¹ As long as the estate is not distributed, none of the brothers may receive more than any other. ¹⁹² If a brother marries after the father’s death and the wedding expenses are borne by the estate, any other yet unmarried brother has a claim on the estate equal to the expenses of the one who was the first to marry. ¹⁹³ During the father’s lifetime. ¹⁹⁴ If no sons survive the father. ¹⁹⁵ In any marriage, the daughters have a lien on the estate to be supported by the estate until married, Mishnah Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “If he left adult and underage sons” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Could the older ones take 100 barrels, each worth twenty denars, and the younger ones take 100 barrels, each worth ten denars¹⁹⁶? He told him, what these take, those should be taking.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁶ What is the meaning of the “even split” of the estate required by the Mishnah? Is it by quantity or price. The answer is that everything is computed by money’s worth.