MISHNAH: What is biting¹ 25:36) must be biting, i. e. cost the debtor money, and increase, result in monetary gain for the lender. and what is increase² feature is missing. Transactions which are perfectly legitimate in general can become forbidden as rabbinic interest if enacted between borrower and lender. There are different shades of rabbinically prohibited interest. Transactions which result in gain for the lender for deferral of repayment of a debt are plain interest payments. Services the debtor renders to the creditor which carry no monetary value are אֲבַק רִבִּית “dust of interest”.? What is biting, lending a tetradrachma for five denars, two se’ah of wheat for three; because this bites. What is increase? Paying more for produce. How is this? One bought from another wheat for a gold denar the kor at the going rate³. Wheat appreciated to thirty denars. He told him, deliver my wheat, for I want to sell it and buy wine with the proceeds. The other said, let your wheat be given to me for thirty denars⁴ and you have wine with me⁵ of wheat at the time of the second transaction., but he has no wine⁶. A creditor may not dwell on the debtor’s premises for free or rent it below the going rate, for this would be interest⁷.

footnotes: ¹ Interest which is prohibited by biblical law (Lev. ² תַּרְבִּית “increase”, refers to rabbinic interest prohibitions in which the biting ³ For later delivery. ⁴ So far, the transaction is perfectly legal. ⁵ They fixed the amount of wine which was the monetary equivalent of a kor ⁶ Since at the time of delivery the seller might have to buy wine at a higher price, the quantity of wine delivered would contain a “premium paid to the buyer for waiting to receive delivery”. The latter is the definition of rabbinically forbidden interest. This prohibits all trades in futures (even to a farmer, who might have a bad harvest and be forced to buy grain in the open market to cover the quantities he contracted for at the start of the growing season.) ⁷ רִבִּית is the common rabbinic expression for “interest”.

HALAKHAH: “What is biting,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, this⁸ is interest which is taken away by the judges. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, can interest be taken away by the judges? He said, if it were so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel⁹. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that no document obligates another¹⁰. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if the document exists one subtracts [the interest]¹¹.

footnotes: ⁸ The interest described as “biting” in the Mishnah, where the rate of interest is spelled out beforehand. In the Babli, 61b, this is the opinion of R. Eleazar. Everybody agrees that rabbinic interest, where the effective rate depends on market forces, is not recoverable in court. ⁹ To return interest taken is a moral but not a legal duty; Babli 61b. ¹⁰ While a court will not force a creditor to return the interest he already received, it cannot accept documents subjecting the debtor to a fixed rate of interest. If several documents are submitted to the court in a dispute between two parties, and one claim, containing a stated interest rate, was already paid off, the interest paid thereon cannot be deducted from the capital in dispute in the document which was not yet liquidated. ¹¹ If a document subjecting the debtor to a fixed rate of interest comes before the court, they have to delete the interest clause.

“What is increase?” It was stated¹² 30b, Bava batra 94b; Yerushalmi Giṭṭin 4:4 (Notes 129,130), Pesaḥim 2:2 (29a l. 38).: A Jew who lent to another Jew with interest can collect neither principal¹³ nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he may collect the capital but not the interest. ¹⁴ It is written: “Your money you shall not give him by biting¹⁵ 25:36, “and against increase do not give your food.”.” Not only money by biting and food by increase. From where increase in money and biting in food? The verse says, “do not take from him biting and increase,¹⁶ 25:35, “and fear your God, I am the Eternal.” This establishes the prohibition of stated interest as a moral imperative, subject to the jurisdiction of Heaven, not the human court. The argument identifies תַּרְבִּית in v. 35 and מַרְבִּית in v. 36.” it brackets biting with increase and increase with biting. Since biting refers to money, increase also refers to money; since increase refers to food, biting also refers to food¹⁷.

footnotes: ¹² Babli 72a, Bava qamma ¹³ Not as a matter of biblical law but as a fine. For him, the court will refuse to look at a document containing a stated rate of interest which therefore becomes barred from any action needing the sanction of a court. ¹⁴ Babli 60b. ¹⁵ The reference includes the second half of Lev. ¹⁶ Lev. ¹⁷ In each case every instance of taking stated interest is two sins by one action.

“One bought wheat from another.” Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the rate which is valid for everybody¹⁸. Less than that, woe to the seller; more than that, woe to the buyer!

footnotes: ¹⁸ The going rate mentioned in the Mishnah is the rate at which the seller is ready to sell to any buyer. It is presumed that market forces are effective at all times.

“He told him, deliver my wheat, for I want to sell it.” How did he acquire¹⁹? Rav Naḥman bar Jacob was of the opinion that he had to deliver (to the other person)²⁰ As stated in the previous note, this is a trivial inference. [by law. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His money acquired for him by biblical law.]²¹ 2:6, Note 138, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, successor of R. Joḥanan in Tiberias, disagrees in the name of R. Joḥanan.

footnotes: ¹⁹ Since the Mishnah forbids taking money for merchandise which is not yet in the seller’s hand, it must assume that the contract is binding; otherwise it could not be forbidden. E has here an extended quote from the Mishnah. ²⁰ Reading of the Leiden ms. and editio princeps. ²¹ Reading of E. The Mishnah here follows R. Yannai and R. Joḥanan (Chapter 4, Note 2) that by biblical standards paying money transfers both ownership and possession. The seller obligates himself by taking money or money’s worth. In Qiddušin

“A creditor.” A person lent money to another, who let him live in his house, then said, give me the rent for my house. The first one said, give me my money²² 13 (on Alfasi # 391; 63a in the Wilna edition of Alfasi). There, the creditor first asked for his money; the debtor responded by asking for rent.. The case came before Rebbi Abba bar Mina²³, who told him to give what was a reasonable rent.

footnotes: ²² The text is quoted by Ran Ketubot ²³ In Ran: Abba bar Zamina.

It was stated²⁴: “There are things which are interest but are permitted. How is that? A person may buy another’s promissory notes at a discount, or bills of debt at a discount, and need have no compunctions because of interest²⁵. Other things are not interest but are forbidden because of circumventing interest. How is that? One received from another a field for ten kor of wheat²⁶.… A person said to another, lend me a tetradrachma²⁷. He answered, I only have a kor of wheat, take it. If he then turned around and bought it back for 24 it is not interest but forbidden because of circumventing interest.²⁸ equals 25 tetradrachmas, the lender makes 1 tetradrachma on the deal. The question arises, why is this not true interest?” He might have said to him, you do not have to do this and take your denar but then you have to pay for vessels and porters of the containers²⁹.

footnotes: ²⁴ Tosephta 5:3, Babli 62b. ²⁵ As a matter of principle, while interest, a “premium for waiting to receive money due”, is forbidden, discount, a premium for paying early, is unquestionably permitted. The securities are due sometime in the future; the lender needs money now. He sells his securities at a discount. ²⁶ This statement is both corrupt and incomplete (in both mss.). Most likely it refers to Mishnah 3: A farmer rents a field and is given the choice of either paying 10 in advance for the year or each month 1 (of whichever unit it may be.) Since in talmudic tradition rental fees are payable at the end of the rental period, the difference of 2 for the year is discount rather than interest; it is unquestionably permitted. ²⁷ The continuation shows that one must read “mina”, 100 denars, for “tetradrachma”. ²⁸ Since a mina ²⁹ Since the borrower would have had expenses of a tetradrachma if he actually had sold the wheat on the market, the lender can save him the expense by taking the wheat back while deducting the putative costs. But since for the lender it actually is a “premium for waiting,” it is prohibited as “circumventing interest”.

Rebbi La said, he pays him the wages of his foot; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he rents him the dwelling at an inflated price³⁰.

footnotes: ³⁰ It seems that these statements refer to the following Mishnah 3, that it is permitted to rent a dwelling at a discount if the rental fee is paid for a year in advance. R. La holds that the discount is not a simple finance operation but represents real savings for the landlord who does not have to go every month to collect his rent. R. Ze‘ira holds that rental fees are not really determined by the market; every landlord has the choice for how much he wants to rent out his real estate. If there exists no market price, one cannot talk about over-or undercharging.

MISHNAH: One may increase rental fees but not sale price. How is this? He leased a courtyard saying to him³¹, if [you pay] now it is yours for ten tetradrachmas a year but if paid monthly it is a tetradrachma per month; this is permitted³². He sold his field and said to him³³, if [you pay] now it is yours for 1’000 zuz, but if after the threshing floor³⁴ it is twelve mina; this is forbidden. If one sold his field, [the buyer] made a partial payment and [the seller] said, anytime you wish bring the remainder and take yours; this is forbidden³⁵. If one lent money on a field and said, if you do not repay me in three years from now, it will be mine, it is his³⁶; Boethos ben Zenon³⁷ 31a; Tosephta 4:2: On the instruction of R. Eleazar ben Azariah. acted thus following the Sages.

footnotes: ³¹ The landlord to the renter. ³² As explained in Note 26. ³³ The seller to the buyer. ³⁴ When the farmer sells his crop; this is the only time of the year when he has ample cash. ³⁵ If the field is sold now but the yield remains the seller’s until it is fully paid for, the yield collected by the seller is a “premium for waiting.” ³⁶ A mortgage with a forfeiture clause. ³⁷ In the Babli, 63a, ‘Arakhin

HALAKHAH: “One may increase rental fees,” etc. It was stated³⁸: “If somebody sells a field to another and stipulates, on condition that I shall work it as a sharecropper, on condition that I shall be part owner, on condition that the tithes shall be mine³⁹ 6:3 (Notes 77,84); Babli Bava batra 63a. In this case, the seller must be a Cohen or Levite; he reserves for himself the place at which the grain used as tithe grows. The condition is impossible for an Israel since for him it would be a trade in futures which is null and void., on condition that if you sell it, you will sell it only to me, that anytime I want I may pay you back and take it; this is permitted.” ⁴⁰ 27b, Arakhin 31a.“If he owed him money and wrote his field over to him as a sale, any time the seller⁴¹ eats the yield it is permitted; any time the buyer⁴² eats the yield, it is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case it is permitted. Rebbi Jehudah said, that is what Boethos ben Zenon did following the Sages³⁷ 31a; Tosephta 4:2: On the instruction of R. Eleazar ben Azariah.. They said to him, is that a proof? The seller was eating the yield.” Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Eleazar, and Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Jehudah learned from the houses of walled cities⁴³ 25:29–30. The sale of a house in a walled city implies an automatic right for the seller to buy back his house at the exact sale price during one full year. During that year, the buyer has the house as owner for his unrestricted use.. As it was stated: The year mentioned in the Torah regarding walled cities is like interest but it is not interest⁴⁴. Another Tanna stated: This is interest but the Torah permitted it⁴⁵. He who said, it is like interest but it is not interest, Rebbi Meïr⁴⁶ 31a. E here has a lacuna.. He who said, this is interest but the Torah permitted it, Rebbi Jehudah⁴⁶ 31a. E here has a lacuna..⁴⁷ Rebbi Idi said, when I came from the Diaspora, I found that a case⁴⁸ was before Rebbi Immi of “it is like interest but it is not interest.⁴⁹” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that “this is interest but the Torah permitted it.” There⁵⁰, the Torah permitted it, therefore not in any other case. Nevertheless, Rebbi Immi did not consider it⁵¹, for he said: a house dwells with its inhabitants⁵²8 (1937) 395–397 who considers the case before R. Immi as antichretic lease (cf. 6:7, Notes 77–78 and Giṭṭin 4:6, Note 168.) But antichretic loans are endorsed in Mishnah 6:7 in certain cases..

footnotes: ³⁸ Tosephta 4:4. ³⁹ Demay ⁴⁰ Babli 63a; Megillah ⁴¹ The debtor. ⁴² The creditor who in the end will return the field to its owner and in the meantime receives the field’s yield as “premium for waiting.” ³⁷ In the Babli, 63a, ‘Arakhin ⁴³ Lev. ⁴⁴ Since no interest rate was spelled out, no biblical prohibition was violated. ⁴⁵ He holds that rabbinic interest prohibitions are basically biblical as long as they involve a clear “premium for waiting.” The only rabbinic interest prohibitions which are purely a “fence around the law” are those which only involve a possible, but not a certain, premium (such as “increase” defined in Mishnah 1.) ⁴⁶ It seems that one has to switch the positions of R. Meïr (i. e., “the rabbis”) and R. Jehudah; cf. Babli ‘Arakhin ⁴⁶ It seems that one has to switch the positions of R. Meïr (i. e., “the rabbis”) and R. Jehudah; cf. Babli ‘Arakhin ⁴⁷ E here has an addition: “What is R. Jehudah’s reason? Any interest which involves one permitted aspect is permitted.” The permitted aspect in this case is that the debtor decides not to repay his debt. Since the loan was structured as a conditional sale, the buyer retroactively is justified in harvesting the yield from the date of sale. This is Abbaye’s reading of R. Jehudah’s position in the Babli (63a); the addition seems to be a gloss by a student of the Babli. ⁴⁸ E has an addition: הַדָּר בַּחֲצַר חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתּוֹ “about one who dwelt on another’s property without the latter’s knowledge.” If this addition be relevant, it must have been the creditor who lived on property which belonged to the debtor but was held by the latter neither for rental nor for his own use, cf. ברכיהו ליפשיץ מחזי כממון מחקרי תלמוד ג (2005) p. 438–460. ⁴⁹ It is more likely that the problem was a sale which in the end was rescinded but in the meantime the buyer lived in the house. ⁵⁰ A house in a walled city, and the case before R. Immi was not in this category. ⁵¹ He ruled according to R. Jehudah. ⁵² When the sale was rescinded, the full price was to be returned without any deductions for rental during the period in which the buyer used it. R. Immi did not necessarily follow R. Jehudah’s argument as presented in the Halakhah; he holds that an uninhabited house deteriorates much more than an inhabited one and, therefore, the buyer is due some consideration for the upkeep of the house. Then this consideration might as well be the entire rent.E’s text contradicts the interpretation of J. N. Epstein in Tarbiz

MISHNAH: One does not hire a shop clerk for half the gain⁵³; one does not give him money to buy produce for half the gain unless one pays him wages as an unemployed⁵⁴ worker. One does not give chickens to breed⁵⁵ for half, nor does one hand over calves and foals for care for half the risk unless one pays for his work and food⁵⁶. But one takes in⁵⁷ calves and foals for half and grows them until they are one-third grown⁵⁸, and a donkey⁵⁹ until it becomes a beast of burden.

footnotes: ⁵³ I. e., half the gain or loss, because then the material or the money provided to the trader is a loan and the 50% gain, the profit from the loan, is a “premium for waiting”. But if the trader receives a basic wage, he is an employee rather than an independent agent receiving a loan. ⁵⁴ This word appears in the Tosephta but is missing in the Babli. ⁵⁵ To split the difference in price between chicks and eggs. ⁵⁶ Again if the rancher not only will get 50% of the gain but also will be responsible for 50% of any loss. Then the investment is a loan, and the rules of the prohibition of interest are applicable. Cf. Note 84. ⁵⁷ When all the risk is borne by the investor. This is a monetary equivalent of the investor paying the rancher for his work. ⁵⁸ It is possible to read this as “three years old”. ⁵⁹ Used in rabbinic Hebrew both for he- and she-asses.

HALAKHAH: “One does not hire a shop clerk,” etc.⁵⁴ p. 211) כתף "porter" means "work, exertion"; cf. Halakhah 6, Tosephta 5:6. A person lent another one denars. He said to him, take two denars⁵⁵ as your wages and what they will bring shall be mine and yours.

footnotes: ⁵⁴ E has here an addition: וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לַעֲלוֹת שָׂכָר כַּתָּף לְמָעוֹת מַעֲלִין . "At a place where one is used to pay carrier's wages as money, one pays." This refers to the Mishnah, that one must pay the clerk a minimum wage. It is stated that the minimum cannot be less than what is customary locally. This seems to contradict the next sentence. According to S. Lieberman (Tosefta kiFshutah Bava Mesi'a ⁵⁵ The wages required by the Mishnah can be a token sum. In practice, the Babli agrees in the name of Samuel (69a).

It was stated⁵⁶: “If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half [the gain]; if that one says, I did not buy⁵⁷, he only has a complaint on him⁵⁸. But if it was known⁵⁹ that he bought, the other forcibly extracts from him.”

footnotes: ⁵⁶ Tosephta 4:22 ⁵⁷ After some time he returns the money and claims that he did not trade. ⁵⁸ The injured party has the right to complain (i. e., tell about the case to other people) but has no recourse in court for the gain lost by leaving his money inactive for some time. ⁵⁹ If the other's commercial activity can be proven by any means, the injured party can sue in court.

⁶⁰“If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half the gain and one of them wants to age it, the other may hinder him⁶¹. But if it was the eve of a Sabbatical year, the other may not hinder him because it was understood that it was bought for that purpose⁶².”

footnotes: ⁶⁰ Tosephta 4:18. There, the second sentence appears in the name of R. Jehudah. ⁶¹ In the absence of a prior agreement, if they bought grain at harvest time and one of the parties wants to defer selling until close to the next harvest when prices will be appreciably higher, the other partner can object and prefer a quick penny to a slow dollar. ⁶² Since there is no harvest in the Sabbatical year, the price of grain is certain to rise. In this case, the presumption is that the parties bought the grain for storage and later sale.

⁶³“If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half the gain and one says, here you have a mina for I cannot be bothered with the details, that is forbidden. But if he saw that grain was going up in price, it is permitted⁶⁴ only that the other party is ready to take less but receive his money immediately, it would be a permitted discount..

footnotes: ⁶³ Tosephta 4:17. ⁶⁴ The person who did the trading wants to pay the person who gave the money a lump sum and not be bothered with providing a detailed accounting. In general, this is (rabbinically) forbidden even though the trader would do it for his own convenience. But if it is obvious that the other’s share in the gain would be more than a mina,

If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half the gain, the trader is permitted to buy of the same kind. When he sells, he may not sell everything together but sells this first and that later⁶⁵.

footnotes: ⁶⁵ The trader is permitted to invest of his own money in the same commodity which he buys together with another in order to get a better price for the larger order. But when he sells, he has to sell the quantity for which he is trustee first and only then may he sell for his own account, when it is to be expected that the large quantity will have lowered the price somewhat.

⁶⁶“If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with⁶⁷ for half the gain, the trader is permitted to buy any kind he wants, but he should not buy a garment or wood⁶⁸.” ⁶⁹ (vol. 2. p. 93, #339) quotes it as the Yerushalmi’s commentary to that Tosephta. Rebbi Isaac said, this implies that if one who leaves another’s capital unemployed, he only has a complaint on him⁵⁸. If he leaves another’s field unused, he is obligated to serve him⁷⁰. If he leaves another’s ship or store unused⁷¹, what [is the rule]⁷² (Note 69) quotes the Yerushalmi 9:3 as leaving the question unanswered, but adds that in Chapter 4 the answer is: He is not liable.?

footnotes: ⁶⁶ Tosephta 4:21. ⁶⁷ Without specific instructions. ⁶⁸ This would be illicit use of another person’s money. ⁶⁹ This remark does not belong here; it is repeated as Halakhah 9:3. It is a commentary on Tosephta 4:22, Notes 56–58. Or zarua‘ ⁵⁸ It is possible to read this as “three years old”. ⁷⁰ A sharecropper is not permitted to leave a field fallow (unless it is good agricultural practice in crop rotation and done with the landlord’s knowledge). He cannot say that he is required only to deliver 50% of the gain, which means 0 if there is no gain. שפת means “to serve food”. ⁷¹ When given to him for 50% of the net gain. ⁷² Or zarua‘

⁷³ p. 198), Babli 72b/73a.“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted⁷⁴. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders⁷⁵ obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates⁷⁶.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day⁷⁷. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent⁷⁸. But did one not object to [Rav]⁷⁹ Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable⁸⁰? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower⁸¹? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part⁸²! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate⁸³.

footnotes: ⁷³ Tosephta 4:8 (Tosefta ki-Fshutah Bava Meṣ‘ia ⁷⁴ The other person takes the merchandise, brings it to the high-priced place, sells it there, and pays the owner on his return. In the meantime he has the use of the money he received for the sale. If this second person is responsible for any accidents, the original owner gets a “premium for waiting” in that he does not have to spend time and money for the trip and does not need insurance; this is rabbinically forbidden. But if the risk remains the original owner’s, it is a legitimate business deal and permitted. ⁷⁵ They collect produce from farmers at a stated low rate, transport it to a highprice city, sell it there and buy supplies cheaper in the city than in the countryside, sell in the countryside and pay the farmers at the end. They do business without investing their own money. ⁷⁶ In Tosephta and Babli: “They do not have to worry about interest prohibitions.” This has to be understood here also. ⁷⁷ Then no interest would be due and interest restrictions do not apply. ⁷⁸ The donkey driver is the farmer’s agent for selling the latter’s produce. Interest rules do not apply to agency. ⁷⁹ From E, missing in L by scribal error. ⁸⁰ Since the donkey driver has to pay the farmer for his grain, irrespective of what happened on the road, he cannot be an agent. ⁸¹ An agent is not liable for accidents only if he strictly acts in the principal’s interest. If he is permitted to use the other’s money for his own trades, be becomes liable as a borrower while remaining an agent (Babli 94a). ⁸² This really is the same question again. An agent cannot be responsible for part of the merchandise if he is not responsible for the entirety. How can the donkey-driver be an agent if he collects produce from many farmers? S. Lieberman follows R. Eliahu Fulda in assigning these last sentences to Halakhah 5:7. ⁸³ Usually an agent is told what he is expected to do. If he is a buying agent, he is expected to pay the price which the principal agreed to. But here, he is only required to pay the farmer at the agreed local rate; he can reasonably be expected to be liable for accidents even if he acts as an agent.

MISHNAH: One hands a cow or a donkey over for care as well as anything which works and eats⁸⁴ of the Babli follows Rashi in reading: “One estimates the value of a cow and a donkey and anything which works and eats for the middle,” i. e., the owner of the animal and the person who cares for it and is the beneficiary of its work split any increase or loss arising from the animal 50–50. Maimonides, whose Mishnah text is identical with the Yerushalmi and the mss., does not comment on it, but in his Code (Šutafim 8:3) formulates that the owner and the tenant farmer share profits on a 50–50 basis; he does not mention that the farmer has to carry 50% of the risk and even 100% of the risk if the animal dies through of his fault (Note 102). In modern terms the Mishnah states that an investment is not a loan, and that the worker and the capitalist who provides the means of production are free to conclude any contractual arrangement. While the dictionaries and the commentators identify this שם with Aramaic שם “to estimate, determine its value”, for the translation it is identified with Arabic سام، سوم “to impose a task” (“to let graze freely” in the af‘ala stem). In the Halakhah, both meanings are used.. At a place where one usually divides the young immediately, one divides; at a place where one usually raises them, they should be raised. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one hands over a calf with its mother, a foal with its mother⁸⁵, and one invests in improving a field and does not worry about interest⁸⁶.

footnotes: ⁸⁴ This is the text also of most Mishnah and Babli mss.; only the editio princeps ⁸⁵ Even though the calf is not productive, the tenant farmer is obligated to provide food and care for his share in its future value. ⁸⁶ It is legal for the tenant farmer to ask the landlord to invest money in his field, to be repaid by future increases in yield. That is yield of investment, rather than interest.

HALAKHAH: “One hands a cow or a donkey over for care,” etc. It was stated: “A person may receive from another an animal on condition to deliver to him one lamb and one shearing per year, a chicken for ten eggs a month. ⁸⁷ pp. 211–216. The woman receiving a chicken has to care for the chicks as long as those depend on their mother. ⁸⁸ One cares for small animals 30 days and for large animals 50 days. Rebbi Yose says, for (large) [small]⁸⁹ 4:1. animals three months because they need special care. After that, he gives the owner his part equally, everything according to local practice.” What means “he gives the owner his part equally”? A person gave to another 100 denars; they produced 20 denars. Each takes half of it; the half of the owner remains with him as capital⁹⁰. Do people do that⁹¹? But they trade, and at the end they divide it up. ⁹²“A person receiving an animal for care is responsible for it, for an unclean animal⁹³ twelve months, for a human 24 months⁹⁴. At a place where work⁹⁵ is compensated separately, one pays; for offspring of animals, one pays⁹⁶, everything following local custom.”

footnotes: ⁸⁷ Tosephta 5:5. For the entire Halakhah, the basic commentary is S. Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Fshutah Bava Meṣi‘a ⁸⁸ Tosephta 5:7, Babli 69a. ⁸⁹ “Large” is L’s, “small” the E text. The latter is supported by Tosephta, Babli, Mishnah Bekhorot ⁹⁰ The contract is amended automatically to increase the owner’s share in the herd. ⁹¹ In E: People do not do that. ⁹² Tosephta 5:5, Babli 69a. ⁹³ A horse or a donkey, which are not kosher. This is the minimum duration of a contract for care of such animals; the contract period can be shorter for edible animals raised for their meat. ⁹⁴ The contract period for a wet-nurse. ⁹⁵ Work exceeding the daily routine. ⁹⁶ The terms described at the start of the paragraph are not prescriptive; without special written stipulation local custom prevails.

⁹⁷“Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one hands over, etc., even at a place where one pays additional money for exertion, and one is not worried because of interest.⁸⁵”

footnotes: ⁹⁷ Tosephta 5:5. ⁸⁵ Even though the calf is not productive, the tenant farmer is obligated to provide food and care for his share in its future value.

⁹⁸“If one accepts an animal for care from another person, how long does he have to care for it? Symmachos says, small asses twelve months, adult donkeys 24 months⁹⁹ Note 87 p. 213–4) in identifying גודרות (in E: העדרות) as γαϊδάρια, plural of γαϊδάριον, “small donkey”, a word frequently found in Egyptian papyri (it seems originally Persian gaudar, “calf”). He also notes that since in all of Talmudic literature חֲמוֹר denotes both male and female donkeys, one may assume that the word אֲתוֹן, “she-ass” in Biblical texts, also denotes both male and female donkeys.. If he terminates the care in the middle of the term, one estimates for him; after the term one does not estimate for him, but care for one year is not comparable to two years¹⁰⁰.”

footnotes: ⁹⁸ Tosephta 5:8; Babli 69a. ⁹⁹ In E and both other sources, the minimum time is 18 months for adult she-asses, 24 months for the young. This seems reasonable.In E, the name Symmachos is correctly spelled סימכוס.The translation follows S. Lieberman (l. c. ¹⁰⁰ If one of the parties wants to terminate the contract (for cause, as shown later in the Halakhah), the determination of the difference in value of the animals at the start and at the end of the time of care is a matter for the courts. Otherwise, this is not the case since the sale price will determine the final value. It is noted that the increase in value of calves is not constant in time; the increase in the first year of a two-year contract is less than half of the final value.

¹⁰¹“If it dies because of gross negligence, he gives everything; not because of gross negligence, he gives half¹⁰². How is this? It was estimated as one mina¹⁰³ and improved and now is worth 200. If it dies because of gross negligence, he gives six gold denars¹⁰⁴; if not because of gross negligence, he gives 50 zuz.¹⁰⁵”

footnotes: ¹⁰¹ Tosephta 5:11–12. ¹⁰² Since the tenant farmer is given a 50% interest in the gain, he also must bear a 50% risk of loss. The element of risk is what distinguishes investment from loan and exempts the transaction from the laws of interest. If the death is due to gross negligence of the caregiver, the owner may sue him for his loss. ¹⁰³ At the start of the contract period. ¹⁰⁴ 150 silver denars. He pays 100 for the animal and 50 for the owner’s part in the improvement which was lost through the caregiver’s fault. ¹⁰⁵ Half the original value.

¹⁰⁶“If one accepts an animal for care from another person, it is for no less than twelve months. If he occupied himself with it all through the summer and he says to sell it, one forces him to feed it all through the winter. If he fed it all through the winter and he wants to sell it in the summer, one forces him to occupy himself with it all through the summer.¹⁰⁷”

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ Tosephta 5:9. ¹⁰⁷ If either of the parties wants to terminate the contract before its expiration date, the other party can go to court and force the continuation until the end of the contract period.

¹⁰⁸ It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, one invests in improving a field and does not worry about interest. How is this? One leased a field for ten kor of wheat and said to him, give me a tetradrachma¹⁰⁹ This seems to be the correct text since it is unlikely that much improvement can be bought for 4 silver denars, and it is incomprehensible that the rent should increase by 50 silver denars a year for a loan of 4. But in E the text is: תֵּן לִי סֶלַע אַחַת וַאֲנִי נוֹתֵן לָךְ כּוֹר אֶחָד. “Give me one tetradrachma and I shall give you one kor.” and I shall give you twelve kor at threshing time, it is permitted.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield¹¹⁰. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field. What is the difference between them? A store or a ship¹¹¹. According to him who said, because the field may bring an extraordinary yield, one invests in a store or a ship¹¹². According to him who said, it is as if he increased the rent for the field, one may not invest in a store or a ship¹¹³. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Joḥanan said, one invests in a store or a ship. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not invest in a store or a ship, nor in anything which is not invested in the object itself¹¹⁴.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁸ Tosephta 5:13, Babli 69b. ¹⁰⁹ In the parallel sources: 200 denars, 2 minas. ¹¹⁰ The improvement of the object justifies the increase in rent. ¹¹¹ As will be noted at the end, this refers to an additional investment by the owner in merchandise to be sold in the store or transported on the ship. ¹¹² A larger inventory may yield larger earnings. ¹¹³ A perpetual rent for an investment in merchandise would be interest. ¹¹⁴ R. Simeon ben Laqish agrees that an investment in a renovation of the store, or to provide the ship with better sails or steering gear, is legitimate (opinion of Rav Naḥman in the Babli).

MISHNAH: One may not receive mortmain property¹¹⁵ from a Jew because that is interest. But one may receive mortmain property from Gentiles, one may borrow from them and lend them on interest, and similarly from a sojourner¹¹⁶. A Jew can lend a Gentile’s money on interest by the Gentile’s instruction but not by a Jew’s¹¹⁷.

footnotes: ¹¹⁵ Property given in perpetuity, for which rental is due in perpetuity irrespective of whether the original objects are still in existence. Risk-free income is interest; this also is the definition of interest in modern Mathematics of Finance. ¹¹⁶ A Gentile who follows the seven Noaḥide commandments, in particular the prohibition of idolatry. ¹¹⁷ In particular, not his own initiative.

HALAKHAH: “One may not receive mortmain property form a Jew,” etc. ¹¹⁸“What is mortmain property? He had 100 sheep and told another: They are valued for you at 100 gold [denars]; their young, their milk, and their shearings are yours, but if they die you are liable for them and you pay me a tetradrachma for every one of them at the end of the year¹¹⁹. This is forbidden¹.”

footnotes: ¹¹⁸ Tosephta 5:13. ¹¹⁹ This example has an interest rate of 16%. ¹ In the Tosephta: permitted.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There¹²⁰ you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here¹²¹ you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower¹¹²²? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There¹²³ 2:4, quoted in the Babli 70b. The offspring of a Gentile’s mortmain animals in the hands of a Jewish tenant farmer are not subject to the laws of the firstling since the mothers are considered the Gentile’s property. you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second¹²⁴. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first¹²⁵. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second¹²⁶ 2:4, the offspring’s offspring is subject to the rules of firstlings for the same reason..

footnotes: ¹²⁰ Mishnah 5, which forbids handing over calves to be raised unless the rancher is paid for his work. ¹²¹ Mishnah 6, which allows such contracts for adult animals without restrictions. ¹ An agent is not liable for accidents only if he strictly acts in the principal’s interest. If he is permitted to use the other’s money for his own trades, be becomes liable as a borrower while remaining an agent (Babli 94a). ¹²² The quote from Halakhah 5 is slightly out of place here. Since the rancher is supposed to use the animal for his purposes, he cannot be under the rules of the unpaid trustee; he is a paid trustee. But this is really irrelevant for the question; the main point is that the transaction involves an element of risk which shields it from the laws of interest, Note 115. ¹²³ Mishnah Bekhorot ¹²⁴ In the Halakhah here, the offspring is defined as the tenant’s property. ¹²⁵ Since the owner can repossess the mother if the tenant is in arrears with his payment, the Gentile retains a monetary interest in the mother. This is enough to free the offspring from the rules of firstlings. ¹²⁶ As explained in the Halakhah. For the majority opinion in Mishnah Bekhorot

“One may borrow from them and lend them on interest, and similarly from a sojourner.” Rebbi said, I do not know the definition of “sojourner” quoted in reference to the Hebrew slave. I do not know the definition of “proselyte” quoted in reference to interest¹²⁷ 25:47: “If the hand of a stranger and sojourner with you be opulent but your brother wax poor next to him and be sold to the stranger sojourner with you or to the essence of the stranger’s family.” Rebbi notes that the verse implies that “stranger and sojourner” is the same as “stranger sojourner”. Therefore, he objects to the usual explanation (Qiddušin 20b; Sifra ad 25:47): “Stranger” is the proselyte; “sojourner” is the Noaḥide stranger, “stranger’s family” is the idolater, “essence” is an idolatrous temple. But he has no better interpretation to offer. The second question is about *Lev.*25:35,36: “If your brother wax poor and his hand totter with you; you have to support him, stranger and sojourner and living with you. Do not take from him interest and increase, …” Here again, Sifra explains that “stranger” is the proselyte; “sojourner” is the Noaḥide stranger, but the second statement contradicts our Mishnah..

footnotes: ¹²⁷ In the Babli, 91a, “sojourner” is quoted in connection with interest, “proselyte” in connection with the Hebrew slave. There is no need to adapt the Babli’s reading.The first reference is to Lev.

“A Jew can lend a Gentile’s money on interest by the Gentile’s instruction but not by a Jew’s.” ¹²⁸ pp. 220–229.“A Jew had loaned money from a Gentile and wanted to return it when another Jew said to him, give it to me and I shall pay him the same rate as you are paying; this is forbidden¹²⁹. But if he introduced him to the Gentile, it is permitted.” [Rebbi Yose said, only if he let him stand with the Gentile.]¹³⁰ 71b. The question is, what is the role of the Gentile in this matter. Even though R. Yasa holds in Demay 6:1 (Note 10) and Terumot 1:1 (Note 76) that a Gentile can appoint a Jew as his agent, and the Tosephta can be interpreted in this sense that the borrower has to get the lender’s agreement to transfer the loan to another borrower, R. Yose denies this and requires that the loan actually be transferred by the Gentile. The Amora R. Yose was the student of R. Jeremiah, student of R. Ze‘ira, student of R. Yasa.

footnotes: ¹²⁸ Tosephta 5:16; Babli 71b. For the remainder of the Halakhah, cf. Tosefta kiFshutah Bava meṣi‘a ¹²⁹ If the Jew receives the money from the Jew not on the Gentile’s command; this is forbidden by the Mishnah. ¹³⁰ Added from E supported by Nachmanides’s quote from the Yerushalmi in his Novellae ad

¹³¹“A Gentile had borrowed money from a Jew and wanted to return it when another Jew said to him, give it to me and I shall pay him the same rate as you are paying; this is permitted. But if he introduced him to the Gentile, it is forbidden.” Rebbi Yose said, only if he let him stand with the Gentile.

footnotes: ¹³¹ Tosephta 5:17; Babli 71b. As long as the money is given by the Gentile, it is permitted. R. Yose holds that the Gentile cannot be the Jew’s agent; therefore, the transaction is prohibited only if the Jew is an agent, not if the Jew agrees to the Gentile’s action.

¹³²“A Jew had borrowed money from a Gentile or a Gentile from a Jew when he converted. Whether the loan was finalized before or after his conversion, he can collect the principal but not the interest.¹³³ But if a Gentile had borrowed money from a Jew and converted, if the loan was finalized before he converted, he can collect principal and interest; after he converted, he can collect principal but not interest. Bar Qappara said, he can collect both principal and interest.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Bar Qappara’s reason is that if you exempt him from interest he is turned into an insincere proselyte¹³⁴.

footnotes: ¹³² Tosephta 5:21, Babli 72a. ¹³³ E has a longer text:יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלָּװָה מִגּוֹי וְגוֹי מִיּשְׂרָאֵל וְנִתְגַּייֵר. בֵּין שֶׁזְּקָפָן עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְגַּייֵר בֵּין מִשֶׁנִּתְגַּייֵר גּוֹבֶה הַקֶּרֶן וְלֹא הָרִיבִּית [דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי מֵאִיר. רִבִּי יוֹסֵה אוֹמֵר. יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁלָּװָה מִגּוֹי וְנִתְגַּייֵר. בֵּין שֶׁזְּקָפָן עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְגַּייֵר בֵּין שֶׁזְּקָפָן עָלָיו מִשֶּׁנִּתְגַּייֵר גּוֹבֶה הַקֶּרֶן וְאֶת הָרִיבִּית.]A Jew had borrowed money from a Gentile or a Gentile from a Jew when he converted. Whether the loan was finalized before or after his conversion, he can collect the principal but not the interest [the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, if the Jew had borrowed money from a Gentile, whether the loan was finalized before or after his conversion, he can collect both principal and interest.]The text attributed to R. Meïr is the same in Tosephta and Babli. The text attributed to R. Yose is the same in the Babli; it is the same as attributed to Bar Qappara in the Halakhah. In the Tosephta, R. Yose (the Tanna) holds that the Gentile debtor cannot pay interest after conversion but a Jewish debtor of a loan executed before the Gentile’s conversion has to pay interest (since the obligation he entered into was legitimate at the time it was assumed.) The E text as it stands is either superfluous or defective; the L text certainly is defective since the third sentence of the paragraph contradicts the second. The two sentences most likely belong to two different authors, as attested by the Tosephta. ¹³⁴ Who therefore might have difficulty in finding a Jewish mate; his rule is to the ex-Gentile’s benefit.

¹³⁵“A person may borrow from his sons or daughters on interest, but he educates them for interest.” Rav said, e. g., I from Rabba bar bar Ḥana or Rabba bar bar Ḥana from me. “A person may not borrow for a šeqel and lend out for a tetradrachma; but a Gentile may borrow for a šeqel and lend out for a tetradrachma.¹³⁶ per mina) in order to lend to Gentiles at 4%. But a Gentile banker can take deposits from Jews or Gentiles to lend to other Jews at a higher rate.”

footnotes: ¹³⁵ Tosephta 5:15; Babli 75a. The Babli version, “to lend his children and family” is presupposed here; otherwise Rav could not point to deals between him and his cousin’s son Rabba bar bar Ḥana. The Babli prohibits this practice; it only permits deals between scholars who know that interest is forbidden and give the money as a gift. ¹³⁶ A Jew cannot be a banker, taking deposits from Jews at 2% interest (one šeqel

¹³⁷. כגון. A Jew may borrow from a Gentile, and a Gentile from a Jew, and a Jew can become his guarantor without any worries about interest. If a Jew appointed a Gentile as guardian or steward¹³⁸ administrator of an agricultural domain. Since the Gentile gives the loan, interest is permitted even if the capital is a Jew’s., it is permitted to borrow from him on interest. But if a Gentile appointed a Jew as guardian or steward, it is prohibited to borrow from him on interest. ¹³⁹ It is forbidden to borrow on interest a Gentile’s money deposited with a Jew; it is permitted to borrow on interest a Jew’s money deposited with a Gentile. This is the principle: Anything which the Jew has to warrant¹⁴⁰ is forbidden, what the Gentile has to warrant is permitted.

footnotes: ¹³⁷ Tosephta 5:20; quoted in Tosaphot 71b, s. v ¹³⁸ The word was identified by S. Lieberman as Latin saltuarius, ¹³⁹ Tosephta 5:19. ¹⁴⁰ Since the banker is obligated to pay his depositors even if a borrower defaults, the deposits are treated as the banker’s property.

MISHNAH: One does not contract for produce until a rate was established¹⁴¹. If he was the first to harvest, he may contract¹⁴² for the stack of sheaves, or the vat of grapes, or the barrel of olives, or for potter’s clay and lime when it was loaded in his oven. One may contract for manure the entire year; Rebbi Yose says, one may not contract for manure unless he has manure on his dungheap, but the Sages permit it¹⁴³. One contracts for wholesale price¹⁴⁴; Rebbi Jehudah says, even if one did not contract for wholesale price he may say to him, give me some like that or return my money¹⁴⁵. A person may lend to his sharecroppers wheat for wheat¹⁴⁶ as seed grain but not as food; but Rebban Gamliel lent his sharecroppers wheat grain; if at high price and the rate went down or at low price and the rate went up, he took from them at the low rate¹⁴⁷, not because this is practice but because he wanted to be strict with himself.

footnotes: ¹⁴¹ In the absence of a functioning commodities exchange, a trader may not conclude a contract for future delivery of a commodity for a fixed price if he receives the money immediately. For he might have to buy the commodity later at a higher price and then the material delivered would convey a “premium for waiting”. Once the rate is established and the seller can immediately hedge his trade by another contract, the transaction is legitimate even if the seller does not have any of the commodity which he sells and for which he is paid. ¹⁴² Before a rate was established, the farmer can sell at any price level he sees fit if the basic produce is in his hand. He can sell grain on the basis of the harvested sheaves, wine on the basis of the harvested grapes, olive oil on the basis of the harvested olives. The potter can sell finished pottery once he has the raw material in storage. ¹⁴³ Since on a farm manure is continually produced. ¹⁴⁴ It is possible to write a contract that the money be paid now for a later delivery at the then going wholesale rate. ¹⁴⁵ Since money does not acquire (Chapter 4, Note 2), the buyer can require delivery at the going rate, if it is less than the one stipulated earlier, or annul the contract without being subject to judicial censure since he only paid for future delivery. ¹⁴⁶ He gives them a certain amount as seed grain and receives the same amount back at harvest time. As a commercial transaction this is forbidden since in case the rate at the new harvest was higher than at sowing time there would be an element of interest (cf. Note 180). But seed grain for the landlord’s own domain is an investment, not a loan. ¹⁴⁷ The statement of the Mishnah would have been unnecessary since it already was stated that investments do not fall under the rules of loans, were it not that Rabban Gamliel (in the low-inflation environment of Nerva’s and Trajan’s times) used to provide his sharecroppers with seed grain for which he determined the price and then at the next harvest took it back at the lower of last year’s and this year’s prices, to avoid even the semblance of taking interest.

HALAKHAH: “One does not contract for produce,” etc. May one contract based on Saracens’ rates¹⁴⁸? Rebbi Joḥanan says, one may contract; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one may not contract¹⁴⁹. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Would it not be reasonable that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about rates of Saracens of Sepphoris, since that is uninterrupted¹⁵⁰? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, I am wondering about what the rabbis disagree? Whether contracting for produce¹⁵¹, or contracting for money¹⁵², or a loan on produce¹⁵³? Rebbi Jeremiah said, they disagree about a loan, but about (a hostelry) [a contract]¹⁵⁴ everybody agrees that it is forbidden¹⁵⁵. Rebbi Yose said, they disagree about a contract, but about a loan everybody agrees that it is permitted. In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, one contracts for cattle feed¹⁵⁶. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, also on honeycombs. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in all villages near Tiberias one contracts once the rate was established at Tiberias.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁸ The rate quoted by Arab traders who in most cases are itinerant and might not be around at the time of delivery. ¹⁴⁹ In the Babli, 72b, this is attributed to R. Joḥanan and accepted as practice. ¹⁵⁰ While it is the going rate on a Saracens’ market, it is not called “Saracens’ rate”. ¹⁵¹ Contracting for a fixed amount of produce. ¹⁵² Fixing the unit price. ¹⁵³ Taking a loan of produce now to be repaid at the next harvest. If at that time the rate is expected to be higher, this certainly is forbidden (Note 6). But if 6 months before the next harvest the prices probably are higher, this might be permitted. ¹⁵⁴ The text in parentheses is L’s, a scribal error. The text in brackets is E’s. ¹⁵⁵ Since the seller cannot be sure to find the merchandise at a reasonable price if the exchange does not exist permanently. ¹⁵⁶ Mostly taken year round from the spontaneous growth of fallow fields.

“If he was the first to harvest, he may contract for the stack of sheaves,” etc. Rav said, if one processing stage was missing, one may contract; if several processing stages were missing, one may not contract¹⁵⁷. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if several processing stages were missing, one may contract. But the Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If he was the first to harvest,¹⁵⁸” etc.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁷ The farmer may contract to sell his produce if no more than one operation is needed to prepare the produce as it is customarily delivered. ¹⁵⁸ Since the vintner may contract to sell wine once he harvested his grapes, which have to be transported to the wine press, be pressed, the juice fermented, filtered, and cured, it is obvious that Rav is in error. In the Babli 74a, Rav is quoted as permitting two processing stages but not three; Samuel represents the opinion here attributed to the Galilean Sages.

Abba bar Zamina gave a denar to the food merchant and took from him at the cheapest rate of the entire year. Rav¹⁵⁹ did not agree. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder had flax. The donkey drivers wanted to buy from him. He told them, it is not my intention to sell this before Purim¹⁶⁰. They said to him, sell it to us now at the price which you would sell it for at Purim¹⁶¹. He went to ask Rebbi, who told him, it is forbidden. He went out, formulated this in a baraita, and stated the following: ¹⁶²“If one was owing money and the other wanted to take from him on the threshing floor, when he told him, credit it to my account by the market rate¹⁶³ and I shall provide you all twelve months¹⁶⁴; this is forbidden for it is not as if the assarion came to his hand¹⁶⁵.” Rav said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree that if they paid him and he immediately acquired, then it is permitted. If he paid beforehand and acquired afterwards, it is permitted¹⁶⁶; if he acquired earlier and paid afterwards, it is forbidden¹⁶¹.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁹ A name must be missing here since the first generation Amora Rav could not express an opinion about dealings three generations later. ¹⁶⁰ When one would expect the price to be the highest of the year. ¹⁶¹ They intended to transport the flax to a region where flax was more expensive, and pay him on their return. The flax then is a loan and the higher payment later is a “premium for waiting.” ¹⁶² Tosephta 4:23; a different version in the Babli, 62b. ¹⁶³ The wholesale rate at harvest time, which is the lowest of the entire year. ¹⁶⁴ Paying his debt by delivery of produce in installments at a reduced rate implies hidden interest payments. ¹⁶⁵ In contrast to the Mishnah, where money changes hands at the time the contract is signed. ¹⁶⁶ This is the case of the Mishnah. ¹⁶¹ They intended to transport the flax to a region where flax was more expensive, and pay him on their return. The flax then is a loan and the higher payment later is a “premium for waiting.”

Rebbi Eleazar invested a denar with a person and told him, what it earns between now and Ḥanukkah is mine [and yours]¹⁶⁷, afterwards I do not have any part with you, whether they earn or lose it is yours¹⁶⁸. He wanted to give to him after Ḥanukkah but he did not accept¹⁶⁹. Rebbi Eleazar had misgivings because of “close to gain and far from loss,” as it was stated¹⁷⁰: “Close to gain and far from loss is the way of the wicked¹⁷¹. Close to loss and far from gain is the way of the just. Close and far equally to both is the way of everybody¹⁷².” Rebbi Isaac invested denars with a person. He wanted to stipulate as did Rebbi Eleazar but the other did not accept¹⁷³. Cahana invested 40 denars with a person to buy flax for him. Flax went up in price¹⁷⁴. He went to ask Rav, who told him to go and collect 40 large kor¹⁷⁵ of grain, Note 3. The excess of a large over a regular kor represents Cahana’s gain.) In the Babli, Bava qamma 103a, Rav similarly holds that if from the start the money was given as investment, Cahana was entitled to the gain, but not if it was given as a loan..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁷ Reading of E, split 50–50. In the light of the following comments, this seems to be the correct reading. ¹⁶⁸ The trader did not have to return the investment immediately. ¹⁶⁹ Since the trader bore the entire risk, R. Eleazar did not accept riskless income which is interest. ¹⁷⁰ Tosephta 4:16, Babli 70a. ¹⁷¹ As the Tosephta states, the yield of an investment in which the investor is partially shielded from risk is partially interest and therefore forbidden. ¹⁷² As long as risk is evenly distributed among all investors, the question of interest does not arise. ¹⁷³ He did not want to appear as wicked to let R. Isaac feel just. ¹⁷⁴ When they sold the flax and made money. ¹⁷⁵ Money made on investments is not interest. (A gold denar is given as the normal price for a kor

Rebbi wanted to permit the ocean’s absorption but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose did not admit it; some say that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose wanted to permit but Rebbi did not admit it. What is the ocean’s absorption? A person gave 100 denars to another. [He tells him, my yield is 20 denars. If it is less, it is on your account, if it is more, it is for your account. If it is lost, it is of both¹⁷⁵ of grain, Note 3. The excess of a large over a regular kor represents Cahana’s gain.) In the Babli, Bava qamma 103a, Rav similarly holds that if from the start the money was given as investment, Cahana was entitled to the gain, but not if it was given as a loan.. Rebbi Ḥuna said,]¹⁷⁶ for instance those who give merchandise to those who depart overseas to the stadia¹⁷⁷ for two or three xestes¹⁷⁸ as a measure about .53 1. Maybe the idea is that the gain from a successful voyage overseas brings in enough money to be measured by volume (cf. Yebamot 6:4, Note 75).. That is not interest but property.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁵ Money made on investments is not interest. (A gold denar is given as the normal price for a kor ¹⁷⁶ Addition from E. ¹⁷⁷ Probably Greece or Southern Italy. The text of E is לכיסין; Lieberman reads לְנִיסִין, Greek νῆσοι “islands”. ¹⁷⁸ A ξέστης is the equivalent of a Roman sextarius,

Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah¹⁷⁹ 3:2 (Notes 18–22) denying an exception to the rules of the Sabbatical year for accumulation of manure. said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he had little, he may continuously add to it, but Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says only if he raises or lowers it by three [hand-breadths] or puts it on a rock.”

footnotes: ¹⁷⁹ R. Yose in the Mishnah denying an exception to the rules of interest for manure; R. Eleazar ben Azariah in Mishnah Ševi‘it

MISHNAH: A person may not say to another, lend me a kor of wheat and I shall return it to you from the threshing-floor¹⁸⁰, but he may tell him, lend me until my son comes or until I find the key¹⁸¹, but Hillel forbids. Similarly, Hillel¹⁸² said that a woman may not lend a loaf to another unless she fixed its price, for possibly wheat may rise in price and they would be entangled in problems of interest.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁰ This is the general prohibition of lending commodities against the same amount of commodities since lending and repayment might represent very different values on the spot market. ¹⁸¹ Short term loans for which no big change in commodity prices is to be expected. ¹⁸² While the records of Hillel’s time, the reigns of Caesar and Augustus, do not indicate inflationary pressures, it is possible that in Egypt and the neighboring countries the price of wheat was very sensitive to the requisitions for the provision of Rome and therefore unpredictable.

HALAKHAH: “A person may not say to another,” etc. It was stated: “A person may not say to another, lend me a kor of wheat and I shall return it to you from the threshing-floor,” therefore for two or three weeks it is permitted; “but Hillel forbids.¹⁸⁵” Samuel said, practice follows Hillel¹⁸⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁵ E adds: “But he may tell him, lend me until my son comes or until I find the key, but Hillel forbids;” therefore two or three weeks is forbidden. The formulation of L shows that his short text is original; the implication of both texts is the same. ¹⁸⁶ Babli 75a; the editors of the Babli reject Samuel’s statement.

MISHNAH: A man may say to another, weed with me and I shall be weeding with you, hoe with me and I shall be hoeing with you, but he shall not tell him, weed with me and I shall be hoeing with you, hoe with me and I shall be weeding with you. All the dry season is one, all the wet season is not; one may not say to him, plough with me in the dry season and I shall be ploughing with you in the wet season¹⁸³. Rabban Gamliel says, there exists predated and postdated interest. How is this? If one indended to borrow from him and sent him [a gift] saying, so you should lend me; that is predated interest. If one had borrowed and returned the money when he sent him [a gift] saying, that is for your money which was not earning for you while it was with me; that is postdated interest. Rebbi Simeon says, there exists verbal interest. One should not say to him, you should know that X came from place Y¹⁸⁴. The following transgress prohibitions: The creditor, and the debtor, and the guarantor, and the witnesses; the Sages say, also the scribe. They transgress “do not give,¹⁸⁷ 25:37.” and “do not take from him,¹⁸⁸ 25:36” and “do not be a creditor,¹⁸⁹ 22:24.” and “do not burden him with interest,¹⁸⁹ 22:24.” and “before a blind man do not put an obstacle; and fear your God, I am the Eternal.¹⁹⁰ 19:14. While the preceding verses spell out the guilt of the parties, this verse explains the guilt of the scribe, who is supposedly learned in the law and has to know that he participates in an illegal activity. The extended interpretation of Lev. 19:14 is one of the signs of pharisaic doctrine; it is intimated that the Sadducees, the opponents of the Sages, would absolve the scribe from guilt.”

footnotes: ¹⁸³ One may not offer to exchange agricultural work against agricultural work if these would represent vastly different expenditures if they needed hired hands. ¹⁸⁴ To let the debtor take care of the guest for the creditor. ¹⁸⁷ Lev. ¹⁸⁸ Lev. ¹⁸⁹ Ex. ¹⁸⁹ Ex. ¹⁹⁰ Lev.

HALAKHAH: “The following transgress prohibitions,” etc. ¹⁹¹“Rebbi Yose¹⁹² said, come and see how blind are the eyes of people who lend on interest. If a person calls another one idolator, or adulterer, or murderer, the other will want to destroy him. But this one pays witnesses and a scribe and tells them, come and testify that I negated the roots [of Judaism]. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, they negate much more than the roots, for they declare the Torah false¹⁹³ and Moses an idiot and say, if Moses had known how much we are earning, he would not have written it. Rebbi Aqiba says, interest is difficult since even a favor can be interest. If one¹⁹⁴ told him to buy vegetables on the market for him, even though he gave him the money, this is interest. Rebbi Simeon said, interest is difficult since even greeting can be interest. If he never greeted him but because he took a loan from him he is quick to greet him, this is interest¹⁹⁵. ¹⁹⁶ In this sense, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar used to say, about a person who has money and does not lend it on interest the verse says¹⁹⁷ 15:6. “One who does this will never totter.”: ‘his money he did not lend on interest,’ etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi¹⁹⁸ 15(6), R. Samuel (ed. S. Buber, Note 31). said, we would not know what this tottering was if Salomon had not come and explained: ‘to save those taken to death.’¹⁹⁹ 24:11: “To save those taken to death, and tottering to be killed, if you refrain.” The root used in Prov. 24:11 is the same as that in *Ps.*15:6; it is presumed to have the same meaning. As usual, the argument is about those parts of the verses which are not quoted.”

footnotes: ¹⁹¹ Tosephta 6:17–18; a short quote also in the Babli, 75b. ¹⁹² One has to read R. Yose, the Tanna, instead of R. Yasa, the Amora. ¹⁹³ Greek πλαστός, ή, όν, “fabricated”. ¹⁹⁴ If the creditor uses the debtor to run errands for him without paying for the latter's time, it is interest. ¹⁹⁵ In the Tosephta, this is R. Aqiba’s statement. ¹⁹⁶ Babli 71a. ¹⁹⁷ Ps. ¹⁹⁸ In the Tosephta, R. Simeon or R. Shemaia. R. Simeon bar Immi was a third generation Amora. In Midrash Ps. ¹⁹⁹ Prov.