MISHNAH: Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife¹ is invalid. How? If one was walking in the market and heard the scribes dictating² “Mr. X divorces his wife Y from place Z” and said, these are mine and my wife’s names, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he wrote [a bill] to divorce his wife but had second thoughts, and a fellow townsman came and said to him, my name is identical with yours and my wife’s name is identical with your wife’s, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he had two wives with identical names and wrote a document to divorce the older one by, he cannot use it to divorce the younger. In addition, if he said to the scribe: write that I may divorce either one³ I wish, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce either one.

footnotes: ¹ If the scribe did not intend to write for one particular woman. As will be clear from the sequel, the scribe not only has to know the wife’s name but her identity as well. ² A school of scribes and the teachers were dictating a text as example of a bill of divorce. At the end of the course, every student would have forms available for all situations. ³ Of the two who have identical names.

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers⁵. ⁶. What means “in addition”⁷? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”⁸? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start⁹. 24:1 requires that the husband “write her a scroll of divorce”; it must be written from the start for one and only one divorce..

footnotes: ⁵ In the Babli, 24b, “a training course for scribes.” ⁶ From the Babli, 24b, it appears that the remainder of this paragraph is a baraita ⁷ In what is the case of the man who wants to use somebody else’s bill different from the case of the bill written as a writing exercise? ⁸ The question is what is the difference between the bill destined for the older one and the bill destined for either one of the two. ⁹ Deut

Rav said, none of these are invalid¹⁰ except for the last which is invalid¹¹. Issi¹² said, all are invalid¹³ except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena¹⁴ said, all are invalid¹⁵. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid¹⁶. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid¹⁷. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage¹⁸ 1:1 states that a preliminary marriage can be effected either by a transfer of valuables, or a contract, or sexual relations. It is then explained [Qiddušin 1:1 (58c 1. 29), Babli 9a] that the contract is a written statement by the groom declaring his future bride to be his wife; the marriage is effected by the acceptance of the letter by the adressee (or, if she is underage, her father). not for a specific name¹⁹, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage²⁰? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her²¹? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce²². 24:1 “if a man take a wife” as “if a man buy a wife” since in Mishnaic Hebrew the verb לקח means “to buy” [Qiddušin1:1 (58b 1.35), Babli 4b]. The possibility of marriage by document is inferred from Deut. 24:2: “She [the divorcee] left his house, went and became another man‘s.” Since “becoming a manʻs” means to marry him, the verse connects leaving (divorce) with becoming (marriage). Since leaving is effected by a document, so becoming can be effected by a document [Qiddušin 1:1 (58b 1.33), Babli 9b]. Therefore, a document invalid for leaving must be invalid for becoming., and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married²³ 9b. There, the question is attributed to R. Simeon ben Laqish; the argument agrees with the latter’s position as given here..

footnotes: ¹⁰ As explained in Chapter 2, Note 132, if a Cohen divorces his wife with a document which is found to be invalid but which possibly might have been valid, (the technical term is: the document has the “smell” of a bill of divorce) one forces the Cohen to deliver a valid divorce document to his wife and he is prohibited from changing his mind and not divorce her. Rav states that all the bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishnah except the last do not have a “smell” of a bill of divorce; they are pieces of paper, not bills of divorce, neither valid nor invalid. ¹¹ The bill written for two wives with identical names is invalid but if the husband is a Cohen he is forced to divorce the wife to whom the bill was delivered. ¹² In the Babli, 24b/25a, Rav’s opinion is atributed to Rav Assi (= Issi) and vice versa. ¹³ And force a definitive divorce if made by a Cohen. In the Babli, 24b, this position is attributed to Rav. ¹⁴ An Amora of this name is not otherwise known. In the Geniza text, the name is Ze‘ur bar Ḥinena, known from both Talmudim as the name of a third-Century Amora who almost was killed by Queen Zenobia of Palmyra. ¹⁵ In the Babli, 24b, this appears as Samuel’s opinion. ¹⁶ The sentence about R. Simeon ben Laqish is missing in the Geniza text. R. Simeon ben Laqish considers the statement that the document is one of divorce so important that its writing without the explicit instruction by the husband invalidates the bill; cf. Chapter 2, Notes 100,101. But his choice of the word “invalid”, not that “there is no ‘smell’ of a divorce”, shows that in all cases he holds that any material expression of the husband’s desire to divorce prohibits the Cohen to remain married to his wife. ¹⁷ R. Joḥanan strictly follows the Mishnah that only the names of husband and wife and the date have to be written by the explicit instruction of the husband. Therefore, he also follows the language of the Mishnah, not that the bills of divorce are simply invalid but are “invalid to be used in divorce”, meaning that the use of any of these documents cannot imply any divorce in any form. (The classical commentators all feel obliged to switch the positions attributed to R. Simeon ben Laqish and R. Joḥanan; this position cannot be sustained against the testimony of both mss.) The Babli, 25a, quotes R. Joḥanan in the sense given here but explains his disagreement with the position attributed here to Rav by the fact that he never admits retroactive validation of documents; therefore, he cannot admit that the husband has the power to decide after the writing of the document to which wife it shall apply. ¹⁸ Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁹ Meaning: not for a specific woman; since no name has to be written in the statement, it may simply read: By accepting this document, you are my wife. The document contains no formulaic text. ²⁰ If he thought that any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishnah would possibly count as active for a Cohen’s wife, he would have to ask about circumstances of divorce, where the problems are real and grave. ²¹ The Geniza text has a longer argument: “Since he has a problem with divorce where [the documents] are not invalid; therefore he asks about preliminary marriage. If you say he has a problem with divorce, he should not ask about preliminary marriage. Since in the case of divorce, where it is required that the document be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce did not touch her; in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required, if it was not for a specific name preliminary marriage should take hold of her. It should be so. That is impossible. Since in the case of divorce, where it is required to be for a specific name, if it was not for a specific name, divorce did touch her; in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage should take hold of her.” It is difficult to make coherent sense of this text. ²² The validity of a preliminary marriage by a symbolic bride purchase is given biblical status by reading Deut ²³ The Babli agrees, Qiddušin

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women²⁴, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state²⁵: “If two people sent two [identical]²⁶ bills of divorce which were intermingled²⁶, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]²⁷. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

footnotes: ²⁴ This refers to the last clause in the Mishnah, when the husband, married to two identically named women, orders a bill of divorce in their name without specifying to whom it will refer. ²⁵ Mishnah 9:5. ²⁶ Added from the Geniza text. The same messenger carries two bills of divorce from two men, both called X ben Y, to two wives, both called Z bat U. ²⁶ Added from the Geniza text. The same messenger carries two bills of divorce from two men, both called X ben Y, to two wives, both called Z bat U. ²⁷ If each wife receives both bills it is certain that each one received the one intended for her.

After it was delivered to her²⁴, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start²⁸? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]²⁹: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated³⁰ 1:14.: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground³¹ 1:13) but a doorbell cannot become impure. and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent³², make me two sheets³³, one to lie on and one for [a pattern]³⁴ 24:13; concurrent explanation by Arukh, Maimonides, and R. Simson of Sens, based on a Gaonic source.) The Leiden ms. text, “for hides” is difficult to understand since a sheet used as wrapping is an implement and subject to the impurity of utensils., ³⁵ only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity³⁶.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start³⁷.

footnotes: ²⁴ This refers to the last clause in the Mishnah, when the husband, married to two identically named women, orders a bill of divorce in their name without specifying to whom it will refer. ²⁸ Since the bill was written for one of two women, can one not say that the delivery made it clear that from the start it was written for the recipient? ²⁹ Text of the Geniza. ³⁰ Tosephta Kelim Baba Meṣi‘a ³¹ In the Tosephta: For the door. “For the ground” means the same, i. e., to be affixed to a structure connected to the ground. A cowbell can become impure (Tosephta Kelim Baba Meṣiʻa ³² A mat to sit on can become impure in many ways; a mat used as part of a tent cannot become impure. ³³ Textile sheets. ³⁴ The translation follows the Geniza text, supported by the Tosephta. A bed sheet can become impure like a mat; a sheet on which a picture is embroidered to serve as a pattern to be copied is not a utensil and is pure (Mishnah Kelim ³⁵ In the Tosephta the text reads: “All these accept impurity up to the moment when he spells out;” if a utensil is made which can serve a dual purpose, it can become impure (once finished) unless it is clearly designated for a use which shields it from impurity. The common testimony of both ms. texts leaves no room for the addition of the Tosephta but its interpretation is similar: All these utensils are subject to impurity unless he spells out which one is pure, i. e., is shielded from impurity. ³⁶ Since a manufactured item only accepts impurity if it is used as a vessel or a tool, R. Simeon rejects any retroactivity in the designation of dual use items and declares that impurity can affect the item only in the future, after it was designated as tool or utensil, even if it was exposed to impurity beforehand (cf. D. Pardo, Commentary on the Tosephta, Part 4-1, ed. S. Lieberman, New York - Jerusalem 1970, p. 84). In the Tosephta, R. Simeon agrees that if an item is manufactured for sale as a utensil it is subject to impurity up to the moment a buyer designates it for a protected use. ³⁷ He rejects any retroactivity, cf. Note 17.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.]³⁹, on Alfasi #556). One still discusses the case of the man with two wives whose names are identical; Rebbi rejects the bill of divorce since he holds that its meaning must be clear before it is delivered; cf. Note 45. Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so⁴⁰ is quoted in the Babli, 84b.: “All conditions⁴¹. 24:1. This is interpreted to mean that all ties between husband and wife have to be cut; a divorce in which the husband retains any influence in his wife’s life is invalid. invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi⁴². But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing⁴³. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing⁴⁴ within 30 days, then the divorce would become valid if and only if the money had been paid within 30 days. If it had read: only if you pay me 200 zuz, the divorce would be invalid since without a time limit there is no separation. The Babli’s concerns, whether the stipulation was written in the declaration of divorce or attached to it, are unknown to the Yerushalmi and all explanations of the Yerushalmi text based on the Babli have to be rejected, as noted by Naḥmanides (Note 39).. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees⁴⁵. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi⁴⁶. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.⁴⁷” Rebbi Ezra⁴⁸ asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts⁴⁹? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts⁵⁰. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce⁵¹. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish⁵². Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan⁵³ and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction⁵⁴? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish⁵⁵ disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita⁵⁶ and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

footnotes: ³⁹ From the Geniza text, missing in the Leiden ms. but confirmed by Nahmanides (Milḥamot Hashem ⁴⁰ The same baraita ⁴¹ The bill of divorce is called סֵפֶר כְּרִיתוּת “a scroll of cutting” in Deut ⁴² Any condition written into the bill invalidates the bill. If the husband wants to attach a condition to the divorce he has to negotiate this separately with his wife before delivering the bill. ⁴³ This reserves an influence of the husband’s for the rest of the wife’s life and clearly invalidates the divorce. ⁴⁴ The divorce becomes valid immediately; the wife accepts a monetary obligation which the husband eventually could enforce by foreclosure. If the stipulation had read: on condition that you pay me 200 zuz ⁴⁵ In this interpretation, Rebbi agrees with the Sages on what is or is not an acceptable condition. He differs in that (a) he does not permit any erasures in a bill of divorce and (b) he stipulates that there cannot be any change in conditions after the delivery of the bill. ⁴⁶ It is unreasonable to assume that Rebbi formulated an entire series of Mishnaiot about conditions attached to divorce documents (Chapter 7) if he himself held that these are impossible. ⁴⁷ The previous argument is invalid; the Mishnaiot are about conditions attached to, but no written in, the bill of divorce. ⁴⁸ Cf. Chapter 2, Note 80. ⁴⁹ Since he does not admit any conditions to be written in the text of the bill, he does not make any distinction between the formulaic text and the essential entries. Does this imply that he prohibits the scribe from preparing bills where only the names, the date, and the declaration of the divorce can be entered with a specific couple in mind? ⁵⁰ In Mishnah 3:2. ⁵¹ No condition can be written in the bill; if written it would have to be a separate codicil. ⁵² Since the condition was written in the bill, he declared it invalid. ⁵³ Who permitted written conditions under certain cirsumstances. ⁵⁴ The Babli would take this as a statement of fact. ⁵⁵ Who only was No. 2 in R. Joḥanan’s court. ⁵⁶ The text is not spelled out.

MISHNAH: If somebody⁵⁷ writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time. For bonds, he has to leave space for the lender, the borrower, the sum, and the time. For commercial deeds, he has to leave space for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field⁵⁸, and the time⁵⁹, because of good order⁶⁰. Rebbi Jehudah invalidates all of these. Rebbi Eleazar validates all of them except women’s bills of divorce, for it is said⁶¹: “He shall write for her”, in her name.

footnotes: ⁵⁷ A scribe. ⁵⁸ The descriptions of the boundaries of the parcel. ⁵⁹ All predated documents having financial implications are invalid; cf. Chapter 2, Note 16. ⁶⁰ There is a dispute between the Talmudim about the meaning of this clause. ⁶¹ Cf. Chapter 2, Note 100. The Babli, 26a, reports only R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, in the name of Samuel.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid⁶¹. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.⁶²” He explains it, with the essential text⁶³. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything⁶⁴ in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired⁶⁵? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing⁶⁶ to collect her due. (The Babli permits only in emergencies to divorce such a couple without due characterization or in the presence of the other couple; 66a.).. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid⁶⁷! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines⁶⁸ 162b; Tosephta Giṭṭin 7:11). about one subject⁶⁹ 10:1; this belongs to another editorial team. Cf. Halakhah 9:8.) is invalid in any case.

footnotes: ⁶¹ Cf. Chapter 2, Note 100. The Babli, 26a, reports only R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, in the name of Samuel. ⁶² It is assumed by the questioner that the text to be written for that woman only includes the sentence that by the document she is divorced. ⁶³ The Mishnah has to be explained in a restrictive way: Only the spaces mentioned in the Mishnah have to be left blank. ⁶⁴ Including the divorce sentence. ⁶⁵ If there were two couples in town, in both cases the husband was called X ben Y and the wife Z bat U, would this not require a special characterization such as “X ben Y who dwells in house W”, and the space left blank would not suffice for the characterizations. ⁶⁶ Even if there were two couples with identical names, if the bill of divorce is written without special characterizations it is valid since one assumes that the bill was intended for the woman who presents it together with her ketubah ⁶⁷ The opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish has no basis in the Mishnah which either does not permit prepared forms or requires only the personal data and the date to be filled in. ⁶⁸ The witnesses have to sign on the second line after the end of the text; not directly after the text in order to show the difference between the text and the witnesses nor two lines apart because then the document could be falsified: a line could be added after the witnesses signed. A document signed by witnesses at a distance of more than one line is invalid in all cases (Halakhah 9:8, 50c 1. 10; Babli Baba Batra ⁶⁹ The Venice printer read אחר instead of אחד; this led the commentators into difficulties. (The ms. text has אחר in Baba batra

What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced⁷⁰. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable⁷¹. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed⁷².

footnotes: ⁷⁰ The forms must contain blank spaces to introduce an artificial complication forcing the husband to go to a scribe to get a bill of divorce. ⁷¹ The answer given fits the position of R. Jehudah who prohibits the preparation of forms. ⁷² All legal formalities contain an element of protection for lawyers, to make sure their services are needed. This is the only explanation given in the Babli, 26a.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah for bills of divorce and Rebbi Eleazar⁷³ in commercial documents. Could we not say, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar⁷⁴? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar for bills of divorce and Rebbi Jehudah in commercial documents. Could we not say, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah? But because Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar⁷⁵; in order not to let you think that here it is the same, it was necessary to state that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah for bills of divorce and Rebbi Eleazar in commercial documents⁷⁶.

footnotes: ⁷³ Both in Mishnah 3:2 and in 9:4 the name is R. Eleazar, but in Mishnah 9:4 in the Babli (editio princeps and Munich ms.) as well as in the Cambridge ms. of the Mishnah the reading is Eliezer. In Tosephta 2:10, two sources read Eliezer, one Eleazar. Since “Eleazar” is the reading of all Medieval commentators of the Babli, it is accepted here. ⁷⁴ Since he agrees with R. Jehudah about bills of divorce. ⁷⁵ That the witnesses to the delivery of the bill effectuate the divorce. The Babli agrees, 86b. ⁷⁶ The reason for the rejection of divorce documents based on prepared forms is that of R. Jehudah, i. e., that both writing and signing are part of the biblical requirement of “writing for her”. The statement of R. Abba is rejected.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid⁷⁷, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box⁷⁸, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive⁷⁹. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen⁸⁰ and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive⁸¹. 88:6). The last two statements are included to illustrate the principle that in matters of ritual law one may always act on the assumption of the permanence of the status quo ante..

footnotes: ⁷⁷ One does not fear that the bill might be written for another couple with identical names from identical places. ⁷⁸ Greek γλωσσόκομον “case, box, chest”. ⁷⁹ If the husband died childless, the widow is freed from ḥalîṣa or levirate marriage as long as the husband’s death was not known at the moment of delivery of the bill. ⁸⁰ And who is childless at the moment of her husband’s departure. At the moment of her husband’s death she loses her right to priestly food. ⁸¹ A dead person’s purification offering cannot be sacrificed since “the dead are free” (from obligations) (Ps

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. ⁸² What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there⁸³. In the Babli, it is attributed to the Tanna R. Simeon ben Eleazar and the Amora R. Abba bar bar Ḥana (27b,28a); there it is declared as practice. It is also the only explanation offered in Tosephta 2:11.. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan⁸⁴, “before the rabbis” is preferable since the verb is in the plural.; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state⁸⁵ 16:6: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill⁸⁶ 36a..

footnotes: ⁸² The paragraph also appears as Halakhah 16:6 in Yebamot, explained there in Notes 133–144. The readings from there are notedי . ⁸³ This statement is missing in Yebamot ⁸⁴ The reading of Yebamot ⁸⁵ Mishnah Yebamot ⁸⁶ The Mishnah is explained away, as referring to a most unlikely hypothetical case. In the Babli, the Mishnah is accepted practice; the contrast between the two Talmudim is noted in Sefer Ha‘iṭṭur

Bar Qappara stated: Even if he left [the man] when he was 100 years old and spent another 100 years on the way, he delivers it to her under the presumption that he is alive⁸⁷ away, that a person who has reached 100 years of age might go on to live much longer, and implies that a person between the ages of 81 and 99 can be presumed to die soon. Since the Yerushalmi quotes the statement without commentary, it appears that it endorses an unrestricted application of the permanence of the status quo ante until further notice..

footnotes: ⁸⁷ The Babli, 28a, explains this baraita

But did we not state⁸⁸ 69b.: From where that “if somebody says to his wife⁹⁰, this is your bill of divorce one hour before my death, or he says to his slave girl, this is the document of your manumission one hour before my death, each would be immediately forbidden to eat heave?” There, she is disabled immediately⁹¹, but here she will only be disabled when he has died⁹². The Tosephta does not contradict the principle. The explanations of the Babli in Giṭṭin and Yebamot are inconsistent with one another and the Yerushalmi..

footnotes: ⁸⁸ A similar text is in Tosephta 4:12, quoted in the Babli 28a, Yebamot ⁹⁰ She is childless. ⁹¹ Since the bills were executed in the expectation of his death, whose time is unknown, it has to be expected immediately. ⁹² Since the husband expects to return from his trip overseas, the wife does not have to expect his death and can apply the principle of permanence of the status quo ante

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar ben Parṭa said three things before the Sages and they confirmed his words: [People in] a city which was surrounded by palisades⁹³, on a ship in emergency at sea, or a person about to be judged⁹⁴, are presumed to be alive⁹⁵. But on [people in] a city conquered from palisades, a ship lost at sea, or a person led to execution, one puts the restrictions of the living and the dead: neither an Israel’s daughter⁹⁶ married to a Cohen⁹⁷ nor a Cohen’s daughter⁹⁶ married to an Israel⁹⁸ may eat heave.

footnotes: ⁹³ Besieged by a hostile army. ⁹⁴ In a capital case. ⁹⁵ The wife of a man in one of these situations has to assume that her husband is alive. ⁹⁶ If she is childless; otherwise she remains in her husband’s clan after the husband’s death. ⁹⁷ She has to assume that her husband is dead and she has lost the right to priestly food. ⁹⁶ If she is childless; otherwise she remains in her husband’s clan after the husband’s death. ⁹⁸ She has to assume that her husband is alive and she has not regained the right to priestly food.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Jabne: About [people in] a city which was surrounded by palisades.”¹ which seems to have disappeared from Tosephta 2:12 (quoted in the next paragraph) which is missing an introduction.¹⁰⁰What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For example if bells, chains, and dogs, and geese, and chickens, and soldiers surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saved all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.

footnotes: ¹ This is not a quote from the Mishnah; it might be from a baraita ¹⁰⁰ This is from Ketubot 2:10 (noted כ), explained there in Notes 163-171. (Note the spelling ליסטים, the final ם representing ס, a sure sign of Babylonian spelling.)

¹⁰¹ They added three additional cases: One who was dragged away by a wild animal, one who was swept away by a river, and one buried by a collapse¹⁰². One puts the restrictions of the living and the dead on her¹⁰³: neither an Israel’s daughter⁹⁶ married to a Cohen⁹⁷ nor a Cohen’s daughter⁹⁶ married to an Israel⁹⁸ may eat heave.

footnotes: ¹⁰¹ Tosephta 2:12. ¹⁰² Collapse of a house or a landslide. ¹⁰³ The wife of a man who is the victim of one of these accidents. ⁹⁶ If she is childless; otherwise she remains in her husband’s clan after the husband’s death. ⁹⁷ She has to assume that her husband is dead and she has lost the right to priestly food. ⁹⁶ If she is childless; otherwise she remains in her husband’s clan after the husband’s death. ⁹⁸ She has to assume that her husband is alive and she has not regained the right to priestly food.

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else¹⁰⁴. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such¹⁰⁵, he cannot send it by somebody else since he¹⁰⁶ 9:5, Note 144. does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ Since the messenger does not have to declare that the bill was written and signed before him, there is no reason why the original messenger would have to deliver the bill. ¹⁰⁵ If the wife wants the divorce, the husband can require to be paid for it. ¹⁰⁶ The husband. A person entrusted to handle valuables cannot transfer his responsibilities to another person without becoming liable for any damages that may occur; cf. Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick,” etc. Because he falls sick; therefore not if he did not fall sick¹⁰⁷.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁷ Without special authorization, the messenger who transports the bill of divorce cannot appoint a substitute. In Babylonian sources (Babli 29a, Tosephta 2:13) any messenger is empowered to deliver the bill to a substitute unless the husband explicitly restricted his powers.

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible¹⁰⁸ 1:4 (60b 1.48). In the Babli (Baba Qama 11b, 56b; Baba Meṣi‘a 36a) the matter is in dispute. In this opinion, the messenger who chooses a substitute if there are valuables involved accepts responsibility for any accidents that may befall the substitute for his mishandling of the matter.. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce¹⁰⁹. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it¹¹⁰. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable¹¹¹ appoint a substitute, meaning that the appointment of a substitute invalidates the divorce.. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand¹¹² appoint a substitute, but such an appointment does not invalidate the divorce.. Is it the same for preliminary marriages¹¹³? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody¹¹⁴. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody¹¹⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁸ Unless the principal gave his prior agreement. The main source is Qiddušin ¹⁰⁹ He reads the Mishnah as stating that the divorce shall become valid only if (a) the bill of divorce was delivered and (b) the valuables were delivered by the wife to the designated messenger. A substitute can fulfill (a) but not (b), invalidating the divorce. ¹¹⁰ The valuable he wanted from the wife. ¹¹¹ The Mishnah which states that the messenger cannot ¹¹² In this case, one has to read the Mishnah as stating that the messenger should not ¹¹³ According to R. Joḥanan, can an agent appointed to conclude a preliminary marriage by proxy appoint a substitute agent? ¹¹⁴ Since the divorce does not need the consent of the wife, the choice of the agent is the husband’s and is irrelevant. ¹¹⁵ An agent not approved by the prospective bride is useless.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick, he assembles a court to send it and declares before them: “it was written and signed before me.” The later messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says: “I am an agent of the court.¹¹⁶

footnotes: ¹¹⁶ This implies that if the original bill of divorce was certified by a court, no messenger has to say that it was written and signed before him but that he is a court appointee, or, in modern terms, that a bill of divorce certified by a competent court can even be sent by mail to the court which has jurisdiction over the wife.

HALAKHAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, this¹¹⁷ is only necessary if he already has arrived in the Land of Israel. Lest you say, since he arrived in the Land of Israel it should be treated as a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel¹¹⁸, and for bills of divorce from the Land of Israel one does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me.¹¹⁹”

footnotes: ¹¹⁷ His problem is, if the second messenger is an agent of the court, why does he have to declare anything (in front of two witnesses at the moment he hands over the bill of divorce)? ¹¹⁸ Since it had been certified by a court in the Land of Israel. ¹¹⁹ Nor does he have to say: I am an agent of the court.

If the messenger¹²⁰ fell sick. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a case came before the son of Rebbi Abba and he sent to ask Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa and Rebbi Immi¹²¹. They instructed him that the first messenger¹²² does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me¹²³,” but he says, “I am an agent of the court.¹²⁴ latter messenger”, to the effect that the appointment of successive messengers is explicitly authorized by the Mishnah. There, the main actor is the son of R. Abbahu.”

footnotes: ¹²⁰ The one appointed by the dying first messenger. ¹²¹ The three successors of R. Joḥanan. ¹²² He is called “first” because he appoints a new messenger but really he is a second or later messenger to whom the bill was entrusted. The problem is that the Mishnah only empowers the original messenger to appoint a new one; nothing is said about successive later messengers. ¹²³ Since he is a substitute, he could not say that. ¹²⁴ He can say that and appoint a new messenger by the local court. The Babli, 29b, reads the expression in the Mishnah: “the later messenger” as “any

Does he have to deliver the entire agency to him¹²⁵? Rebbi Jeremiah said, he has to deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, he need not deliver the entire agency to him. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana brought it from this: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’¹²⁶” Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Abin bar Cahana retracted this, because of: “The later messenger does not have to say: ‘it was written and signed before me,’ but he says: ‘I am an agent of the court.’¹²⁷”

footnotes: ¹²⁵ If the husband had entrusted the first messenger not only with the bill of divorce but charged him with additional messages, is the transfer of agency valid if only the delivery of the bill is given to a subsequent messenger or is the agency one and indivisible? This is a new question since its protagonist, R. Jeremiah, was a student of R. Ḥiyya (bar Abba)’s student R. Ze‘ira. ¹²⁶ He reads the Mishnah as stating that the later messenger has only to identify himself as an agent of the court for the delivery of the bill without further comment. ¹²⁷ The same Mishnah can be read in the opposite sense: Since obviously no substitute messenger can say that the bill was written and signed before him, the mention of writing and signing for a later messenger can only mean that he stands for the first in all respects.

MISHNAH: If somebody¹²⁸ lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich¹²⁹. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs¹³⁰; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission¹³¹.

footnotes: ¹²⁸ A farmer gave a loan to potential recipients of his heave and tithes with the understanding that they do not have to repay the loan but that the farmer will separate both heaves for the account of the Cohen, sell the heaves to another Cohen, and credit the receipt to the Cohen’s account with him, reducing the amount owed. Similarly, he will separate first tithe on the Levite’s account and tithe of the poor for the poor man, deduct the fair value of the produce from his account and eat the tithes himself with his family, since tithes are permitted food for anybody. ¹²⁹ Once the poor person becomes disqualified for public assistance, he has to inform the farmer. ¹³⁰ They might want to pay off the outstanding balance to establish a record of good credit. ¹³¹ If the setup was part of a public document, the heirs would have to negotiate with the farmer to change its terms.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there¹³² 2:8. The Mishnah speaks of a rancher whose ewe gave birth to twin lambs, one of which is a firstling but it is not known which. A firstling has to be given to a Cohen (Deut. 15:19); it may not be shorn (or, if a calf, used for work). The rancher can fulfill his monetary obligation by giving one of the two lambs to the Cohen; the other lamb has to be put out to graze until it develops a defect; then it can be eaten by its owner (Deut. 15:21–22). If it was known which lamb was a firstling, that one would have to be given to the Cohen and if the other lamb were slaughtered, some parts would have to be given to a Cohen (Deut. 18:3). But in the case under consideration, R. Yose holds that no gifts to the Cohen are due since potentially the lamb was the Cohen’s and a Cohen who slaughters does not have to give away anything. He equates potential possession and real possession. The application to the Mishnah here is that the Cohen can dispose of the heave as if he had received it. R. Meїr holds that the gifts are due since they would be due if it was known which one was the firstling. In the Babli, 30a, this is Ulla’s opinion.: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow¹³³ 5:5, Note 113), R. Yose’s argument cannot be applied to our case.! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites¹³⁴. 12:6,8); it refers to people who regularly give all their priestly gifts or tithes to the same Cohen or Levite. Then heave and tithes have the status of annuities and cannot be said to be nonexistent. In the Babli, 30a, this is Rav’s opinion. Samuel requires that heave or tithes be actually given to a third party Cohen or Levite, acting as recipient for the debtor, who then returns the produce to the farmer. That opinion has no parallel in the Yerushalmi.. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances¹³⁵? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him¹³⁶, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following¹³⁷ 7:15. The Levite cannot tell the Israel to arrange with other farmers that they pay him to give tithes for them and deduct the sum from the Levite’s debt, since no Levite can dispose of another Levite’s tithes.: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate¹³⁸, but from his own he may separate.

footnotes: ¹³² Mishnah Bekhorot ¹³³ Since nobody can acquire anything nonexistent (Ketubot ¹³⁴ The expression is Biblical (2K ¹³⁵ The tithe of the poor has to be given to the first poor person who applies. ¹³⁶ After the loan was given, the debtor then asked to be excused from repayment using the method outlined in the Mishnah. ¹³⁷ Tosephta Demay ¹³⁸ Missing in the text: Other people’s tithes.

There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so¹³⁹ p. 824, Note 16. The last clause means that if the poor person temporarily became rich (i. e., was ineligible for public welfare as defined in Peah 9:9) and then poor again, the lender cannot use the tithe of the poor of the time of ineligibility but must give it away to another poor person since that tithe was lost for the borrower. The Yerushalmi text considers poor and rich as different persons residing in the same body since they fall in different legal categories.: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”

footnotes: ¹³⁹ It seems that the text is slightly corrupt; the translation follows the text of Tosephta 3:1: הַמַּלְוֶה מָעוֹת אֶת הֶעָנִי וְהֶעֱשִׁיר אֵין מַפְרִישִׁין עָלָיו. שֶׁאֵין מַפְרִישִׁין עַל הָאָבוּד. This is also the Yerushalmi text quoted in many medieval authors, cf. Tosefta ki-Fshuta Giṭṭin

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name¹ of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status¹⁴⁰. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this¹⁴¹; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This¹⁴² means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.¹⁴³” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms¹⁴⁴.

footnotes: ¹ This probably should read “son of”. ¹⁴⁰ The creditor has to renew the contract if the heirs are priests or Levites. This excludes the poor from this rule, as well as cases in which a Cohen or Levite has only daughters married to Israel husbands. ¹⁴¹ Poverty. ¹⁴² “This” is not Bar Qappara’s homily but the Tosephta stated earlier and repeated later, that the poor debtor who became rich cannot continue the arrangement but must pay off the debt. This means that if the circumstances change, the debtor can change the terms to terms less favorable to him. ¹⁴³ The last sentence is also in the Tosephta, Note 139, quoted in the Babli, 30b. If the poor remains rich, the creditor has no way to recoup his money. ¹⁴⁴ In the Tosephta, 3:1, this is an explicit statement. In the Babli, 30a, both the statement that the debtor can change the arrangement but the creditor cannot are attributed to the late Amora Rav Papa; both Talmudim are unaware of the Tosephta.

Does this¹⁴⁵ not disagree with Rav? Since Rav said, an heir is like a holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan given before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property¹⁴⁶, so it cannot be collected from heirs. He explains it for a documented loan¹⁴⁷. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan given before witnesses can be collected from heirs, on condition that they inherited real estate¹⁴⁸. As¹⁴⁹ those from the house of Rav Neḥemiah, who lent money to the public¹⁵⁰. The case came before the rabbis who said, the public is neither all rich nor all poor.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁵ The statement that after the Cohen’s death the creditor has to renew the agreement with his heirs. ¹⁴⁶ In rabbinic practice, mortgages are not written on specified parcels but are liens on all real estate the debtor owned at the time the loan was given. If such real estate is later sold, the lien of the mortgage holder is not removed; if the debtor cannot pay, the creditor can foreclose from the buyer. A loan arrangement made orally before witnesses is not a mortgage; the loan can be foreclosed neither from any buyer nor from debtor’s property subject to another person’s lien. If the loan cannot be foreclosed, there seems to be no reason why the creditor can ask anything from the heirs. ¹⁴⁷ A mortgage. ¹⁴⁸ He agrees that a loan cannot be foreclosed from encumbered property, but if the debtor has unencumbered property, free of any lien, it can be foreclosed on the testimony of the witnesses. Therefore, as long as the heirs inherit any real estate (in the language of the Babli, 30b, at least the area covered by a needle), the oral loan remains in force and the creditor has reason to approach the heirs. ¹⁴⁹ This is an illustration of the Mishnah, not of the preceding rules. ¹⁵⁰ They advanced money to the public welfare fund, to be repaid from future collections. The question was raised whether money collected for the relief of the poor can be diverted to repay the capitalists. The answer is positive since the committee overseeing charity always will have clients on whose behalf they took the money in the first place and on whose behalf they may repay.

MISHNAH: If somebody sets aside¹⁵¹. produce to be used for future heave and tithes, or money to be used for Second Tithe¹⁵²., can refer to them on the presumption that they exist. If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back¹⁵³, the words of Rebbi Eleazar¹⁵⁴. Rebbi Jehudah says, three times a year one has to check the wine¹⁵⁵: At the time of East wind after Tabernacles¹⁵⁶ wind., when the vines blossom, and when fluid starts to enter unripe grapes.

footnotes: ¹⁵¹ At the beginning of the harvest he sets aside a quantity of produce so that for the remainder of the harvest he simply can declare that all heave and tithes due at the moment of declaration should be taken from a certain spot of the set-aside. He can do that from a distance and does not have actually to go to the produce and separate heave and tithes for the next batch. For the rules of heave, see Tractate Terumot ¹⁵² To redeem the Second Tithe the moment it becomes due; cf. Introduction to Tractate Ma‘aser Šeni ¹⁵³ Any heave and tithes which were supposed to be referred to the produce set aside earlier than within 24 hours of the discovery that they were missing are still considered in good order; only produce referred to in the last 24 hours before discovery has to be tithed a second time. ¹⁵⁴ The Tanna, ben Shamua. ¹⁵⁵ That it remained wine and did not turn into vinegar, since vinegar cannot be used to tithe wine. ¹⁵⁶ A fall ḥamsīn

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day¹⁵³. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day¹⁵⁷, as we have stated there¹⁵⁸ 2:2: If a miqweh was measured and found deficient (containing less than 40 se’ah of water), all things and persons purified by immersion in the miqweh after the last preceding check are considered impure. As pointed out by M. Margalit, R. Joḥanan proves too much since by his reason everything should have to be re-tithed, even what was put in order during the first 24 hours.: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar¹⁵⁹: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar¹⁵⁴, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.¹⁶⁰ is inconsistent with that in Giṭṭin. This proves that the Mishnah here, which is formulated in the name of a single person, represents a minority opinion. The Mishnah in Miqwa’ot is from the anonymous majority. The same argument is quoted in R. Eleazar’s name in the Babli, 31b.”

footnotes: ¹⁵³ Any heave and tithes which were supposed to be referred to the produce set aside earlier than within 24 hours of the discovery that they were missing are still considered in good order; only produce referred to in the last 24 hours before discovery has to be tithed a second time. ¹⁵⁷ He reads the words of R. Eleazar meaning that one worries about all the times except the first 24 hours; all produce processed later than that date have to be tithed again. Both opinions are also reported in the Babli, 31a, with the Babli leaning towards the interpretation of R. Joḥanan as the correct one. ¹⁵⁸ Mishnah Miqwa’ot ¹⁵⁹ The Amora, ben Pedat. ¹⁵⁴ The Tanna, ben Shamua. ¹⁶⁰ The Mishnah in Miqwa’ot

There, we have stated¹⁶¹ 7:5; Notes 60–62. The Mishnah states that one may drink Samaritan wine (which is kosher but certainly not tithed) immediately on condition that one declare that one will take a stated amount from it as heave and tithe as soon as the wine is in storage.: “If someone buys wine from Samaritans.” It was stated¹⁶² 7:5, Note 63.: “Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon prohibit to do so, for the wine bag might spring a leak and it may turn out retroactively that he drank ṭevel¹⁶³ is untithed produce, whose consumption at times other than during the harvest is a deadly sin..” Does the Mishnah here not follow Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon¹⁶⁴? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there¹⁶⁵ that everything is in order. it was not in order from the start. But here it is not in order from now to the future.

footnotes: ¹⁶¹ Mishnah Demai ¹⁶² Halakhah Demai ¹⁶³ Ṭevel ¹⁶⁴ Since the Mishnah permits to tithe by relying on produce stored elsewhere, and which might have disappeared in the meantime. ¹⁶⁵ RR. Yose and Simeon may agree with the Mishnah here. In the case of Samaritan wine, it was known that the wine was not tithed, but here there is a presumption following the status quo ante

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine¹⁶⁶; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point¹⁶⁷. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. ¹⁶⁸ following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, he cannot give heave, and a leniency if forty days passed without break point that he can give heave. A restriction following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a leniency, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he can give heave. Since wine and vinegar are considered two different products for the purpose of heave, it is forbidden to give heave for wine from vinegar and vice-versa (MishnahTerumot 3:1). A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave¹⁶⁹.. From there on to the future it is not heave. ¹⁷⁰ 6:1 (15b/c) edited differently. The first part also has a parallel in the Babli, Baba Batra 96a. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it¹⁷¹. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt¹⁷². There it is explained that they differ in the analysis of the process which turns wine into vinegar. This cannot be the background of the Yerushalmi since then the comparison to the status of the needle would be impossible.. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar¹⁷³. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar¹⁷⁴. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there¹⁷⁵ 3:5. There, “pure” means “cannot be impure” and “impure” “can become impure”. The only items which can become impure are humans, food, vessels, and tools. An impure tool or vessel is purified when it becomes unusable.: “A rusty or broken needle is pure¹⁷⁶ 3:10 that if it was impure, rusted and became pure, then was rubbed clean, it returned to its original impurity..” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi¹⁷⁷ 6:1, practice is decided following R. Joshua ben Levi only in the case of the needle. The Babli Baba Batra 96a implies that practice follows R. Joḥanan in the case of the amphora (understood in this sense by Maimonides and R. Moses of Coucy.).

footnotes: ¹⁶⁶ It is difficult to judge whether fermenting freshly pressed cider will turn out to be wine or vinegar. Since in most cases one obtains wine, the fermenting juice can be considered to be wine and if a vessel full of fermenting cider was set apart to serve as heave for the entire harvest, one may declare parts of it to be heave for successive batches up to 40 days. ¹⁶⁷ One of the three meteorologically dangerous dates listed by him in the Mishnah when wine is apt to turn into vinegar. ¹⁶⁸ The following two sentences are garbled. One should read: A restriction ¹⁶⁹ The previous paragraph shows that in this sentence one has to read: His heave is no heave. In the next sentence, one has to read: His heave is heave. The text already was corrected in editio princeps ¹⁷⁰ From here to the end of the Halakhah there exists a parallel text in Baba Batra ¹⁷¹ Since heave has to be given from the finished agricultural product, it is in order to set aside a small amphora of the first wine of the season to be used to provide heave for the entire harvest. From the moment the first small volume of wine is declared as heave, the entire contents of the amphora can be consumed only by a ritually pure Cohen. This does not alter the fact that most of the contents are still profane and can be used for future declarations of heave; cf. Note 151. ¹⁷² In the Babli, R. Joḥanan’s opinion is supported by a baraita ¹⁷³ It was exposed to oxydation for a prolonged period after turning into vinegar. ¹⁷⁴ Turned into vinegar only recently. ¹⁷⁵ Mishnah Tahorot ¹⁷⁶ In this state it is not usable. It is stated in Tosephta Kelim Baba Meṣi‘a ¹⁷⁷ In Baba Batra

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years¹⁷⁸? Let us hear from the following¹⁷⁹. If wine turns into vinegar before Tabernacles, usually in October, the buyer can declare the transaction as executed under false pretenses, return the wine, and request restitution of his money.: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan¹⁸⁰. There is no Amora called “R. Judah” without additional qualifier. said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles¹⁸¹). This wine has to be guaranteed until the next Tabernacles and automatically has to be checked at R. Jehudah’s three break points. and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years¹⁸² 6:3. Wine sold as old is warranted to be aged at least a full 12 months.”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years¹⁸³. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year¹⁸⁴. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside¹⁸⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁸ This question is asked only for R. Jehudah who identifies times dangerous for wine. ¹⁷⁹ This belongs to trade rules, one of the topics of Baba Batra ¹⁸⁰ This is the name in Baba Batra ¹⁸¹ Since harvesting is forbidden on Tabernacles, they harvest overripe grapes to make sweet wine after the end of the holiday (for Tokay wine this is called Ausbruch ¹⁸² Mishnah Baba Batra ¹⁸³ The year it was made and the next. ¹⁸⁴ The seller who does not check all his wine after Tabernacles cannot sell his wine without risking to have to take it back. The entire paragraph only deals with money matters, not with heave since it is forbidden to give heave from one year’s produce for that of another year. ¹⁸⁵ Vintners do not have to open the amphoras and taste; they learn how to check quickly and accurately; the rules of warranty do not require an undue amount of work.